BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY

STUDIES

Brigham Young University Studies

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Guest Editor's Introduction

Allen E. Bergin

This special issue of *BYU Studies* on human behavior was conceived several years ago when Edward Geary, the editor, and I encountered each other on the BYU campus. As an old friend and neighbor, I congratulated him on his appointment as editor and made a remark to the effect that I thought *BYU Studies* was biased toward history and religion and ignored other important areas such as the behavioral sciences. Clever man that he is, he hooked me then and there into developing an entire issue of the journal that would focus on human behavior studies while also being pertinent to the moral and spiritual concerns of Latter-day Saint readers.

Creating a specific plan for the issue turned out to be difficult. There are hundreds of worthy topics and competent people to select from. It was tempting to consider devoting the issue to one of my own specialties, psychotherapy, especially since we could draw from the nine hundred members of the Association of Mormon Counselors and Psychotherapists; but that one field, socially significant as it is, seemed too narrow to capture the flavor of what is happening among LDS behavioral scientists. Eventually we drew up a list of a dozen topics and names of persons who had done important work in each area, ranging from family studies to sociobiology and including such varied topics as sex roles, depression, power motivation, and obscenity and violence on television. We considered having a short article on each subject. This was appealing in that it would provide a picture of the broad scope of efforts underway and of the creativity emerging in this field. Given our space limitations, however, this approach seemed to run the risk of superficiality, so we ultimately elected to arbitrarily choose three diverse subjects and do them in depth.

While I might well have chosen other topics, I settled on representatives of the clinical, theoretical, and sociological domains because they are important and because there were individuals dealing with them who were creative and competent both in their professional specialties and in making their professionalism relevant to the spiritual and intellectual life of the Latter-day Saint subculture. In selecting our

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three essayists, I sought both diversity of views and creative, pathfinding efforts that might make a difference in how we think and act in our work in the future. Moreover, there had to be some products or results of this creative energy which would realistically illustrate the intent of each scholar's design and which would be available for each of us as readers to assess in our own terms. Whether the views expressed by the three individuals I selected will prove to have a major effect on the way we view and manage human behavior remains to be seen, but I am betting that this will be the case. This, then, suggests a final criterion for their inclusion here: that their works, however history may assess them, simply cannot be ignored by anyone who takes seriously the study of human behavior.

Once I had made the final decision on the topics and the contributors, it seemed important to have critiques written by persons from outside the LDS community. I felt that such commentaries would be a useful stimulus to our thinking about the main essays and would help to prevent insularity. We were fortunate in obtaining commitments from three distinguished scholars: H. Newton Malony, Ph.D., of the Graduate School of Psychology at Fuller Theological Seminary, who is both a clinical psychologist and a Methodist minister; Jon P. Alston, Ph.D., a sociologist and professor of sociology at Texas A&M University; and Ivana Markova, Ph.D., a professor of psychology at the University of Stirling, in Scotland. I am most grateful for their perceptive contributions to this special issue.

Readers may be curious to know how I personally assess the specific positions presented by our three major essays. It seems to me that our outside reviewers have done a good job of commenting on the implications of these works, and that in these comments, and the replies by the authors, we have plenty to think about. Possibly, the critics could have been more critical, but that is a matter of judgment as to what is important in assessing creative essays such as these. Such matters are grist for future discussions, perhaps in this forum or elsewhere. I did not choose these participants because I necessarily agree with everything they have to say, but because they are vigorous, brilliant, and provocative thinkers whom I respect for their work and their integrity.

I hope this issue of *BYU Studies* devoted to human behavior will make it clear why I believe this kind of work is important to us individually and collectively. I also hope we have set the stage for many more contributions by behavioral experts to this important forum in the LDS community.

Healing Problems of Intimacy by Clients' Use of Gospel-Based Values and Role Definitions

Victor L. Brown, Jr.

INTRODUCTION

Reliable evidence shows that people are, in fact, helped to overcome social and emotional problems by professional therapies when certain conditions of change are present. It is important to specify as precisely as possible those factors that enhance change. They include the ability of the therapist, the attitude of the client or patient, and the methods used. Among the factors in change as specified in the *Handbook of Psychology and Behavior Change* are:

1. Change is multidimensional. Various aspects of the client's life change, not just the target behavior.

2. Change is internal as well as external. Thoughts and attitudes are as important as overt behavior.

3. Change criteria ought to relate to the client's situation. It may be more important to measure change against the client's own situation than by comparison to a referent group.[1]

Most reports about the effectiveness of psychotherapy and its related methods deal with outcome and not therapy itself. There is a dearth of information "of specific treatments with specific problems" that "result in practically useful information."[2] One reason is that it is extremely difficult to explain completely the more subtle elements of therapies that depend heavily upon the quality of the human relationship between client and therapist.

Measurement of psychotherapeutic effectiveness also needs to account for the client's contribution. It is pertinent that among recommended "useful techniques," Bergin and Lambert list patient self-report, patient checklists, self-concept measures, and self-regulation measures.[3]

The clinical experiences reported in this article need to be considered with these various factors in mind. Obviously, the limits

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of journal-length articles, the usual challenges of writing, and the impossibility of conveying certain real but subtle factors all combine to render any such report incomplete. Nevertheless, the intent is to share as much as possible in reporting results of a synthesis of theory and practice that has proven efficacious in healing problems of intimacy.

This clinical work was based upon four assumptions:

1. The Savior's teachings, when acted upon correctly, promote optimal healing.

2. Effective therapy is as much a self-education effort by the client as it is clinical technique done to the client by the therapist.

3. Values so permeate life that for clinician or client to disregard them is counterproductive.

4. Role beliefs and behaviors offer client and counselor alike very tangible, reliable tools for evaluation and change.[4]

Christian clients with problems of intimacy can avail themselves of powerful healing methods if clinicians are willing to utilize the gospel of Jesus Christ. To aspire for less is to disregard the absolute claims made by the Savior. Teaching the Samaritan woman at the well and offering healing of her serious intimate problems, he promised: "Whosoever drinketh of this water shall thirst again: But whosoever drinketh of the water that I shall give him shall never thirst; but the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up into everlasting life" (John 4:13–14).

Offering succor to the emotionally and physically needy is bedrock Christian doctrine. Paul counseled the Thessalonians to "warn them that are unruly, comfort the feebleminded, support the weak, be patient toward all men" (1 Thes. 5:14). King Benjamin was equally explicit: "I would that ye should impart of your substance to the poor, every man according to that which he hath, such as feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, visiting the sick and administering to their relief, both spiritually and temporally, according to their wants" (Mosiah 4:26).

Abiding by such articles of faith demands that the clinician either offer healing balm for wounds of intimacy or inform clients that such assistance is not within the ability of the clinician, for to paraphrase James's question, "If a brother or sister be [lonely or devoid of self-esteem], and destitute of daily [companionship], and one of you say unto them, Depart in peace, be ye [loved] and [secure]; notwithstanding ye give them not those things which are needful to the [heart]; what doth it profit?" (James 2:15–16).

In view of the unequivocal scriptural promises of healing through living the gospel and through the redemption of Christ, those in the helping professions who claim Christian discipleship cannot temporize in the application of the Savior's doctrines in the clinical setting. Neither

would it do to usurp the separate and distinct authority of priesthood officers. Nor should the therapist, in an effort to help the client use gospel principles, abandon the discipline of professional training.

When one's brothers and sisters seek help with problems that are destroying self-esteem and wrecking intimate relationships, they need neither an excess of pseudoreligious exhortations nor a surfeit of valueless or ineffective mental technology. The futility of some therapies has led many professionals in recent years to stop trying to help people solve certain problems of intimacy. Recognition of inadequate treatment regimens may account for erroneous but widespread beliefs such as that male homosexuality is not changeable. Counselors who see too much of family discord and abuse may, with decent intent, too often see divorce as a solution. It may be that sexology has been accepted because it offers rapid reduction of frustrations although not long-range personal growth. But abdication of values is not available to those Latter-day Saint professionals who do not choose to separate covenants from practice methods.

Neither is abdication feasible for those who respect the work of secular thinkers such as Erik Erikson who test their theories in therapy. In his "Eight Ages of Man," Erikson denotes the stages through which each of us is likely to pass with benevolent or detrimental consequences. It might be said that he dares to face the reality of consequences and expose the illusion of valueless clinical criteria. For example, discussing "generativity versus stagnation," he warns that those who choose not to seek intimacy may deteriorate as "regression to an obsessive need for pseudo-intimacy takes place, often with a pervading sense of stagnation and personal impoverishment."[5]

Be they moved by a sense of professional duty, the wisdom of such thinkers as Erikson, or the loving pleadings of the Redeemer, responsible clinicians must offer solutions or else risk practicing well-intended sham. Such concerns prompt us to engage in public discussion of difficult enterprises.

CLIENTS AND METHODS

Eight clients were treated for problems of intimacy (all names and certain identifying information have been changed):

1. Frank J.   42 years old, married, father of four
2. Eileen M.   45 years old, divorced, mother of three
3. Warren T.   41 years old, never married
4. George T.   20 years old, never married
5. Brad S.   42 years old, divorced, father of one
6. Marian P.   48 years old, divorced, mother of five
7. Gretchen P.   32 years old, married, mother of four
8. Myra M.   19 years old, never married

These clients' problems of social and emotional intimacy stemmed from various causes in their childhood or adult experiences: incest by a mother with a son; incest by a father with daughters and sons; male homosexual aggression by a teacher upon an adolescent; adult male homosexuality; adult female homosexuality; homosexual activity by an adult with boys (pedophilia); transsexualism; emotional abuse in childhood; emotional and physical abuse in adulthood by spouse and loss of sexual desire. Even though each person's life was affected by one or more of these sexual problems, they all suffered from broader problems of intimacy including lack of self-esteem, inability to maintain relationships, serious insecurity, spiritual impoverishment, depression, and fear. In fact, achievement of sexual satisfaction was one of their lesser priorities.

Clinical involvement with these cases ranged from a minimum of eight weeks to a maximum of four years, except for one which lasted, off and on, for ten years. In six cases, the treatment resulted in a cessation of problem behaviors, diminution or extinction of troubling thoughts, and achievement of satisfying intimate relationships consistent with gospel principles and self-esteem. In one case, problem behavior stopped but therapy ceased before new relationships were developed. It was later determined that ideation did not change. In fact, the client intentionally falsified reports of change to satisfy family and Church expectations. In another case, it was too soon to tell the long-range outcome of treatment because the victim of incest had not yet married. However, behaviors and thoughts indicated strong movement toward lasting healing.

Although each person suffered from a problem severe enough to suggest a pessimistic prognosis and most were older than the optimal age for change, seven have essentially overcome the problems that they sought help for. One has made some behavior changes but must be regarded as only slightly improved, and tenuous at that.

While the intimate problems of these people included specific sexual manifestations, they had broader consequences. *The American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM III) refers to psychosexual disorders, but even this is too narrow.[6] As I have explained elsewhere, problems of intimacy exist when the individual cannot make those commitments or take those risks that are implicit in especially intense, highly significant relationships.[7] Erikson defines intimacy as ''the capacity to commit [oneself] to concrete affiliations and partnerships and to develop the ethical strength to abide by such commitments, even though they may call for significant sacrifices and compromises.''[8] From the scriptures I infer that a person suffering from problems of intimacy does not love God, neighbor, or self (Matt. 22:34–40). Thus, apart from sexual factors,

the eight clients were troubled in their social, emotional, and spiritual relationships with parents, husbands or wives, children, selves, and God.

Clinical methods were based upon those doctrines, norms, and methods that might be considered orthodox for members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Methods utilized within the helping professions but which appear to conflict with gospel principles were not used. Among them are masturbation therapy, painful or demeaning aversive techniques, and the erotic regimens of the Masters and Johnson type of sexology. This is not to say that the utility of some of these approaches was ignored. One does not ignore the obvious usefulness of the internal combustion engine because it pollutes the environment. Instead one seeks to develop a clean engine. No one who has felt the despair of those who suffer from problems of intimacy is inclined to ignore helping methods, even when repugnant. The more humane course is to offer viable alternatives.

Because the theoretical basis of these alternatives depends upon scriptural justification as well as support from the clinical literature, some concepts need defining. *Values* refers to those beliefs held strongly enough to motivate overt behavior. *Role definition* consists of those attitudes and behaviors that are demonstrated by the individual in various roles including son, daughter, spouse, parent, and child of God. *Self* refers to the client's responsibility for his or her behavior. *Personal agency* is a bedrock gospel value (see D&C 29:35) and as basic a clinical principle.[9] Clients were encouraged to assume and retain full responsibility for their lives. The clinician served as an educational resource to them. In the therapeutic transaction, the client asked, ''What values do I *really* hold about intimate behavior?'' and ''What kind of person have I been and what kind do I want to become in my relationships?''

Answers to these questions were influenced by the clients' perceptions of the Church, the gospel, and the Savior. It proved very important for the clients to differentiate between the Church and gospel of Jesus Christ on the one hand and the culture that might be termed ''Mormonism'' on the other. In this vein, the clinical goal became not restoration to ''Mormon'' cultural orthodoxy, but the obtaining of healing such as that offered by the Savior to the survivors of destruction following his crucifixion:

> O all ye that are spared because ye were more righteous than they, will ye not now return unto me, and repent of your sins, and be converted, that I may heal you?

> Yea, verily I say unto you, if ye will come unto me ye shall have eternal life. Behold, mine arm of mercy is extended towards you, and whosoever will come, him will I receive; and blessed are those who come unto me.
>
> (3 Ne. 9:13–14)

CLINICAL EXPERIENCES

Deferring to the client's agency, the clinical approach consisted of three phases: self-understanding, self-mastery, and self-definition. *Self,* as noted, is used to focus the responsibility for change. *Self-understanding* involves the gathering of historical data through which the client recalls or seeks information from others about himself or herself and then evaluates how much deviation has occurred between his or her value system and preferred behaviors. The history is not gathered to blame anyone but rather to obtain as accurate a picture as possible about past behavior of client, family members, and significant other people as it influenced the client's current situation.

Self-mastery involves both the reduction and eventual extinction of those thoughts and behaviors that conflict with values and preferred roles and the reinforcement of existing, preferred values and role behaviors. Obviously this phase can only initiate the lifelong process of mastery of oneself.

Self-definition occurs as the person clarifies, reaffirms, and embraces the values by which she or he intends to live and specifies and practices intimate role behaviors consistent with those values.

All three of these phases can take place concurrently, with self-definition initiating most of the therapeutic activity. However, for literary purposes, they are presented in reverse order here.

The professional literature indicates that it is a valid clinical approach for clients to deal with thoughts and behaviors that conflict with their values and preferred role behaviors.[10] And, of course, this is a basic assumption of the gospel. The eight men and women discussed here suffered, as did Paul, from a bitter sense of divergence between what they believed was right and how they actually behaved: "For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not" (Rom. 7:18).

SELF-UNDERSTANDING

This evolutionary and ongoing phase actually begins as the client becomes increasingly aware of a disparity between what she is and what she wants to be. Not infrequently she is trying quite earnestly to be a conforming "Mormon" but derives little peace from her efforts. In fact, all of the clients were very active in the Church although each had done or been victim of things that merited severe sanctions including loss of membership.

The process of acquiring self-understanding is not unlike Nephi's introspection and appraisal as he examined his fidelity to values and role expectations:

> Behold, my soul delighteth in the things of the Lord; and my heart pondereth continually upon the things which I have seen and heard.
>
> Nevertheless, notwithstanding the great goodness of the Lord, in showing me his great and marvelous works, my heart exclaimeth: O wretched man that I am! Yea, my heart sorroweth because of my flesh; my soul grieveth because of mine iniquities.
>
> I am encompassed about because of the temptations and the sins which do so easily beset me.
>
> And when I desire to rejoice, my heart groaneth because of my sins; nevertheless, I know in whom I have trusted.
>
> (2 Ne. 4:16–19)

It is pertinent that Nephi's lamentation occurred as he was beset with problems of intimacy about a deceased father, alienated brothers, and his relationship with God.

Similar to Nephi's self-scrutiny here were five parts of personal history that the eight clients examined to increase self-understanding: (1) relationships with parents, past and present; (2) gender-role experiences; (3) relationship skills; (4) early sexual episodes; (5) integrity of values and roles. Because these are also discussed under self-definition I shall just skim them here.

Parent-Child Relations

With few exceptions people with problems of intimacy have histories of difficult relations with their parents. Often these difficulties are current and unresolved between adult children and parents. The oldest person (not one of the eight) with whom I have dealt who expressed this was seventy-one. It appears that when these conflicts are unresolved, anxiety may increase with age.

The emotional mechanism that seems to trouble the child as years pass is increasing resentment at the parents' failure (or so the child perceives) to live up to the values and roles of nurturant parenting. What makes it impossible to emancipate oneself from the parent by anger or contempt is a yearning for the lost nurturance. In trying to isolate a critical factor in this transaction, I have come to believe that the cause of such elemental pain is that the child's innate need to behave intimately toward someone is frustrated during the very first developmental stage by rejection of the offering. As a consequence, throughout life the child is uncertain about others' acceptance of intimate overtures. This creates, at times, an unbearable emotional insecurity.

In other words, it may not be nearly as important for the child to experience intimacy directed at him as it is to have his offering of intimacy accepted. It was useful, therefore, for the clients to recall and research not just how their parents behaved but also how they behaved toward their parents.

Eileen sought help with several failing relationships. Some of her greatest distress followed visits to her widowed mother. At first she described her mother as lonely but later began to speak angrily of her mother's incessant criticism. Eventually she recalled or researched information that showed her mother, as a younger woman, to have been weak willed and guilty of various breaches of the family value system but also someone who had coped with considerable emotional pain as a child. As she put her mother's values and role behavior in perspective, Eileen's emotional distress lessened sufficiently for her to begin to interact with her mother without being devastated.

Gender-Role Experiences

Each of the eight felt unable to be the kind of man or woman others expected. This stemmed partly from parent and peer expectations and partly from cultural stereotypes.

Frank's history included both parent–child and sibling abuse as well as severe gender-role stress. Conducting oral family history interviews helped him recall deeply repressed memories of parental sexual abuse. This freed him to sort out the dissonance he had felt all his life between his family's violent reaction to any disagreement and his own desire to be quiet and conciliatory.

Warren, when asked how he felt about his manhood, wrote about a lifelong feeling that had undermined his self-esteem: "I have a very low opinion of myself in this area. . . . I feel like there are things which men are 'supposed to do' which I don't feel part of; for example, I am not the least bit interested in football, hunting, even career 'position power.' "

Myra, attractive and articulate, wore male athletic clothes and played male-dominated sports. As a victim of incest, she was trying to prevent further sexual male attention.

Brad believed he was the wrong biologic gender for his spirit. He believed that he was really a female, despite stereotypic success in male roles—mission, military, marriage. He felt such a terrible inner dissonance that he eventually considered sex reassignment surgery.

Diffuse role insecurity such as feeling inadequate in employment or a church calling is probably part and parcel of living in a contentious world. But fear of being unacceptable in one's essential gender role—as a man or a woman—is so specific an insecurity as to render life nearly intolerable.

Relationship Skills

Each of the eight were past victims of and present participants in problem relationships. In understanding themselves they needed to

recall and research what kinds of relationship skills they had learned over the years.

Myra was a victim of paternal incest for eight years. It ended when she became physically able to repel him. Nevertheless she had learned, quite against her will, seductive words and mannerisms.

Gretchen, to the other extreme, had been treated in her home as frail and in need of protection from herself. As a consequence, her repertoire relied upon appearing dependent and inadequate, belying considerable resilience and ability.

George was heavily involved in homosexuality. He had acquired a type of antidote to loneliness from an unscrupulous schoolteacher who seduced him. Relationships in his home were very reserved, and both parents were gone a lot because of employment and church activity. However, his interest in homosexual relations clashed with his recollection of a satisfying relationship with a high school girlfriend, one that included enjoyable physical affection.

Early Sexual Episodes

The histories of the eight each contained one or more episodes where they were exposed to sexual behavior before they were able to understand it. Because of their emotional isolation, these episodes had inordinate emotional impact. They occurred as early as age five with most happening around age eleven. This is consistent with other reports.[11]

The early sexual behavior was usually but not always genital. Brad, at age eleven, had dressed in girls' clothing and gone for a private walk. An adult who discovered him made cruel fun and spread the story around their small town. The boy was unable to talk with someone who could help him fathom his needs. All he knew then was that he had totally clashed with his community values and normative role behaviors.

Some of the eight had witnessed upsetting sexual conduct by parents who were immodest and exhibitionistic. For each of the clients, premature exposure to violent, aggressive or inappropriate sexual behavior combined with loneliness so powerful that, later in life, erotic physical acts came to symbolize a significant method of achieving relationships or at least took on a meaning out of proportion to the actual event.[12]

Integrity of Values and Role Behavior

The previous four elements of self-understanding lead to the overall question, "What do I believe in enough to act on?" A useful way for the eight to get at this was to evaluate the integrity (or lack of it)

between how they actually behaved and how they felt they should behave. They tended to see this integrity as "goodness" and its absence as "badness." There is, as Karl Menninger stated, a powerful clinical efficacy in understanding what values and behaviors the client believes are good or bad and whether the client has the integrity to live them.[13]

Myra was awakening to the fact that her relationships were almost always abrasive. As she gained insight into her anger, she sought some psychological excuse either to maintain her anger or to subdue it. When she could find no sufficient excuse, she concluded that as a follower of Christ and his values she was obliged to be good, that is, patient, courteous, and kind.

Myra was representative of the others, none of whom felt he or she had acquired this integrity. At times, they adjudged themselves bad, unworthy and virtually without hope. This feeling lingered even after they eliminated behaviors that were deemed improper for "Mormons." Eventually the reason for their despair became apparent. Each of the eight had inferred a set of criteria delineating "successful Mormon." Deduced from LDS-oriented media and personal observation, these criteria included material acquisition, secular fame or power (preferably noted by the popular media), hierarchical status, university affiliation, and flawless family relationships. Each client's self-esteem was eroded further by the impression that true Latter-day Saints are self-reliant, meaning they do not need anyone's help or attention and that they overcome difficulty by sheer grit.

To deal with such culturally induced despair, it was essential, as part of the clinical process, to help the client distinguish between cultural "Mormonism" and the gospel of Jesus Christ as taught by The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. Thus, they each had to study the scriptures and the teachings of the living prophet. Of special comfort was the prophetic description of the Savior's mortal struggle found in Alma 7:10–16.

These eight people seemed to yearn for that revitalizing intimacy promised by the Savior: "Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light" (Matt. 11:28–30).

Apart from the cultural problem, it proved quite urgent to dispel the despair each client felt because of lack of integrity of values and behavior. Each one was invited to make a list of strengths and weaknesses, virtues and vices. This was done in an active, open manner, often using a chalkboard. One of us would write the "virtues" or "vices" that sprang to mind while brainstorming. Each item was discussed to verify its belonging under the assigned heading. Then each list was candidly discussed. The clients seldom discovered anything new

on the "vice" list, for they had been obsessed with their weaknesses and perversities for years. Some relief resulted, however, from having them out in the open. The more remarkable consequence was the "virtue" or strength list, for it often reflected goodness that the client had lost sight of. Seldom had any of the clients looked at a profile of personal strengths. Through this exercise, each person discovered a positive side he or she had apparently dared not hope for.

Myra had long since concluded she was wicked and perverse for acquiescing to her father's sexual advances. When she was helped to recall that from the beginning (age five) she knew it was wrong and had resisted in every possible way and had stopped him when she became old enough, she accepted this as proof of her lifelong desire to do good things.

George viewed himself as perverse in the extreme, for he had violated the trust of the Church in his premission interviews and by his conduct on his mission. And it was true that he had deceived several people. He also felt he lacked the moral stamina to overcome homosexuality. He seemed unaware of the effort he had made over his lifetime to cope successfully with a major handicap not apparent to others because its manifestations were internal. As we listed on the board how hard it was to overcome the limitations it imposed and how thoroughly he had overcome them, George literally sat up and smiled as his self-esteem grew then and there. He had never before attempted to inventory his "virtues" but, like the others, had done an extensive and redundant appraisal of his "vices." Unfortunately, he lacked the candor to admit that his preference for erotic activities conflicted with his professed beliefs. Self-deception precludes the emotional integrity necessary to the achievement of self-understanding.

Eileen discovered that her sexual interest in another *woman* was a separate issue from her long-standing commitment to helping *women* grow in self-esteem.

Warren began therapy holding to the belief that his homosexual thoughts and activities were exclusively and thoroughly evil, and certainly his external behavior had been reprehensible. He did have, however, an unusual capacity to empathize with and nurture other lonely men and boys. This decent tenderness was the character scaffolding upon which he later erected his self-definition.

After a personal odyssey of turmoil and near self-destruction, Brad came to see that many of the emotions that provoked dislike of his biologic gender could actually be doors to becoming a more nurturant male.

Marian was drowning in a sea of troubles, not a few waves of which had been stirred up by her own unwise decisions about past actions. Nevertheless, she gained courage sufficient for the course when she

looked back carefully and saw that, despite her erratic path, her general direction or at least desire was consistently true to the values of the gospel.

Gretchen's lack of emotional and behavioral integrity was the exception that proved the rule, for she had not accepted the extent of her weaknesses before seeking help. Initial clinical efforts were aimed at achieving an accurate self-understanding of deficits. This was necessary because she was attributing too much blame to her husband for their problems. Once she saw clearly the extent of her self-inflicted wounds, she also began to appreciate her exceptional capacity for parenting. Paradoxically, she needed to understand her bad behavior clearly before she could discover the good within her.

Self-understanding for the eight people included the five elements listed here. In the clinical enterprise, they did not occur as neatly and logically as they have been set forth here. But they did occur and apparently needed to occur. By this means, the eight clients stabilized the emotional chaos of their lives, slowed the deterioration of important intimate relationships, and began to gain reassurance from understanding why they were so troubled. Thus stabilized, they were able to move toward self-mastery, to take control of themselves.

SELF-MASTERY

Joseph Smith taught that our mortal challenge is to destroy our enemies, meaning those traits within us that would harm or destroy our eternal growth.[14] Erikson's eight stages of development trace a path of increasing discipline of emotions and behaviors. Before we can achieve intimacy with others, we must know and be in control of ourselves. At the end of his mortal ministry, the Savior declared, ''I have overcome the world'' (John 16:33), meaning neither worldly temptations nor inner weaknesses held any allure for him.

Each of the eight clients entered treatment struggling with habitual attitudes or behaviors that they themselves considered undesirable. Therefore, mastery over impulsive, detrimental habits was the next phase of treatment, for it led to increased self-esteem. In my experience, no one who lacks self-esteem is capable of deeply rewarding intimate relationships.

''Vice'' lists were useful here, for the goal was to break a bad habit. The clients prioritized weaknesses, beginning with those they found least troubling, then divided the list into short- and long-term items. Short-term items were those habitual attitudes or behaviors that could be eliminated within seven days. The rest were long-term. No more than two long-term tasks were to be undertaken at a time. Short-term change fueled the long-term effort. Measurement of progress was

predetermined by the client's deciding what values and role definitions to adhere to and what measurable behaviors would demonstrate attainment of the goal. Often, the initial tasks were mundane, not even directly related to relationships.

By exertion of agency, George ceased biting his nails within one week. Elimination of this habit encouraged him to attack the more complex task of conquering masturbation. Marian curbed her overeating and thereby gained momentum to curb a quick tongue and destructive family language.

Breaking bad habits permanently requires more than raw willpower. It requires a strategy that enhances sheer determination. The process may be compared to that of the weight lifter who can lift up to a certain weight by brute strength but beyond that must augment strength with leverage. By developing such a strategy, the client can avoid emotional exhaustion as he deals with successively more complex habits as his confidence and problem-solving skills expand.

In each of the eight instances, the client first identified the habits that were labeled as improper or bad, then the role behaviors he or she preferred, and finally the sequence of events that usually led to the habitual bad behavior. Much motivation came from a desire to do good and be free of enslavement. In this, they could echo Paul's sentiments about the same struggle:

> For we know that the law is spiritual: but I am carnal, sold under sin.
>
> For that which I do I allow not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I.
>
> For I delight in the law of God after the inward man:
>
> But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members.
>
> O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?
>
> I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord. So then with the mind I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin.
>
> (Rom. 7:14–15, 22–25)

I found that the more tangible the task the more rapid the progress. Whatever the tasks, they invariably had consequences beyond conquering the habit or impulse itself. Warren wrote, ''Since stopping masturbation I have felt freer in touching other people, men, women, boys and girls alike. . . . [I] feel much more comfortable around everyone I meet.''

Marian's need for self-mastery stemmed from abuse as a child and her husband's total violation of moral values and nurturant role expectations. Her despair was severe. Left emotionally and financially destitute, she entered therapy with the primary goal of being good

enough to endure for her own sake. Added to this was her realization that to fail to endure would exacerbate her children's already serious wounds. Her urgent short-term task was to overcome a habitual response of diffuse reaction to stress. That is, when faced with several problems she got on her ''horse'' and tried to ride off in several directions at once. This frenetic activity gave only the illusion of progress and soon exhausted her. She had to learn to set priorities by which to expend her limited time, money, and energy each day. Another goal was to think for no less than twenty-four hours before acting on major social or emotional problems. A third was to listen more carefully before responding to others' comments.

Marian's long-range tasks were to make a list of priorities and fully deal with no more than two items at a time if possible. Among the first long-range tasks were to cooperate with the district attorney in his prosecution of her husband, obtain a divorce, and paint the house inside.

As practiced by seven clients, self-mastery was the beginning of an ever-expanding ability to choose when, where, and how to exercise agency according to preferred values through behaviors consistent with preferred role definitions. Eating and grooming habits improved. Physical exercise toned their bodies. Intellectual growth expanded minds. Tempers were controlled. Discouragement and depression were lessened through assertive action. Erotic habits were eliminated. Self-focus turned to self-esteem. Each began to judge himself or herself to be good as role behavior harmonized with Christlike values. As virtue garnished their thoughts, their confidence increased before God and men, and the Holy Ghost became a companion to encourage and strengthen (see D&C 121:45–46).

There was one client, as noted earlier, who chose to deceive self and therapist. Interestingly, though, even this person developed control of some seriously detrimental erotic behaviors.

With the momentum of mastery over a few habits, the client is also able to redefine himself or herself from a basis of increased self-esteem.

SELF-DEFINITION

This third of the three phases consists of defining and practicing role behaviors that are consistent with the client's values. This integrity of belief and behavior is the most intense of the three because the person sloughs off as many incorrect cultural burdens as possible and learns to behave in accord with Christlike values.

In preparing for self-understanding, the clients, through recall and research, ascertained the degree of harmony or disharmony that

existed between their values, beliefs, and behavior. Self-mastery was the experience of subduing or extinguishing problem impulses and habits. Self-definition is how the person projects himself or herself into the future.

Erikson's ages of man helpfully specify the social, emotional, physical, and spiritual theory by which the eight clients needed to define themselves. Several pertinent experiences recorded in scripture serve to illustrate the desired qualities. The Savior, at the end of his mortal probation, could report to the Father a perfect harmony between his values and behavior:

> I have glorified thee on the earth: I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do.
>
> I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world: thine they were, and thou gavest them me; and they have kept thy word.
>
> For I have given unto them the words which thou gavest me.
>
> (John 17:4, 6, 8)

Paul reacted unapologetically to the struggle with evaluation, mastery, and definition required of the Corinthian Saints:

> Now I rejoice, not that ye were made sorry, but that ye sorrowed to repentance: for ye were made sorry after a godly manner, that ye might receive damage by us in nothing.
>
> For godly sorrow worketh repentance to salvation not to be repented of: but the sorrow of the world worketh death.
>
> For behold this selfsame thing, that ye sorrowed after a godly sort, what carefulness it wrought in you, yea, what clearing of yourselves, yea, what indignation, yea, what fear, yea, what vehement desire, yea, what zeal, yea, what revenge! In all things ye have approved yourselves to be clear in this matter.
>
> (2 Cor. 7:9–11)

Alma offers insight into integrity of values and behavior in testifying of his own change:

> For, said he, I have repented of my sins, and have been redeemed of the Lord; behold I am born of the Spirit.
>
> And the Lord said unto me: Marvel not that all mankind, yea, men and women, all nations, kindreds, tongues and people, must be born again; yea, born of God, changed from their carnal and fallen state, to a state of righteousness, being redeemed of God, becoming his sons and daughters;
>
> And thus they become new creatures; and unless they do this, they can in nowise inherit the kingdom of God.
>
> (Mosiah 27:24–26)

Seven of the eight people of this study experienced intense, cleansing desires to "revenge," through their own efforts, the damage

caused to themselves by themselves. They approximated Alma and Paul in their efforts to embrace the gospel of Christ and become new creatures. Their reaction was not just guilt. It was also ''vehement'' desire to rid themselves of lifelong pain due to severe disparity of belief and behavior. As Erikson eloquently states, ''There is a limit to a child's and an adult's endurance in the face of demands to consider himself, his body, and his wishes as evil and dirty, and to his belief in the infallibility of those who pass such judgement.''[15] It would distort the picture to allow professional disinterest to obscure the depth of the emotions or the passion of the struggle these people underwent. Seven of them sought and achieved a mighty change.

The tasks undertaken by the eight to bring about an integration of values and role behaviors included the selection of models, development of relationship skills, and achievement of gender security and sexual clarification.

Selection of Models

Prior to therapy, the people of this report behaved in ways they had seen significant other people behave. As children, each had made intimate overtures to parents and peers and been rejected—or so they perceived. All but two were either spectators to or victims of perversity. All had been confused by adults who did not practice role behaviors consistent with the values they preached or punished children by. Now in adulthood they needed to *see* the behaviors they should have seen in childhood. This is not the same as experiencing them; that comes later.

Their task was to select traits in people they could observe that were of the kind they preferred. Interaction and feedback, though useful, were not necessary. It cannot be overemphasized that only a portion of the model's life was to be observed. No one can bear up under total scrutiny. Neither was the client's purpose to become a behavioral clone. Emulation and adaptation, not imitation, were the goals.

Marian selected as one model a Relief Society visiting teacher whose housekeeping and child-rearing traits she admired. Over time, Marian observed how the other woman kept house and disciplined children, budgeted, shopped, and handled stress, and what kind of books she read. Her purpose was not to imitate but to gather data about how one effective woman functioned in certain aspects of daily coping. She also selected a male model or two. After two painful marriages and childhood abuse by her father, Marian was pessimistic about men in general. This attitude eventually gave way to moderate optimism as she daily worked with a male supervisor who was patient, considerate, and gentle.

Warren's recollection of his childhood was that, "My parents were not very affectionate with each other and were not affectionate at all with [their children]." Warren began treatment with the assumption that he had to change his homosexuality into "macho" heterosexuality. When counseled to observe men that he *really* wanted to be like, men who demonstrated the values he cherished, he selected a decidedly nonmacho model who was a civic, church, and professional leader but in an unassuming, almost atypical male way. What appealed to Warren was the man's gentle manner and family commitment.

One of the personality traits which had set Warren apart from his childhood peers was that he really wanted to play "family," not ball. After a certain age though, most peers, boys or girls, will be uncomfortable with such a playmate. Warren as a boy had no one with whom to play the games he enjoyed. So it was that as an adult he recorded in his journal:

> I watch many men with their families and I don't see any closeness there at all. They are into their careers, hobbies, football on T.V., etc. What a contrast to [the model] who is spending his . . . birthday by taking his son [on a two-day trip], just the two of them. How I admire him. I really believe that I could be that kind of husband, father.

In selecting models, these clients were careful to avoid a major cultural distortion, the flawless "Mormon." Models were selected not because they had achieved perfection but because, despite obvious imperfections, they were striving to live the roles and values that the client preferred and had a trait or two that was worthy of emulation.

Development of Relationship Skills

The people from whose lives this report is drawn each had a deficit in his or her ability to initiate and sustain relationships without resorting to erotic or manipulative techniques. I believe the most perverse element of their previous behavior was not so much the sexual acts they had performed or been victims of. Rather, it was their involvement in exploitation, their mistaking demeaning relationships for intimacy. The corrective process was straightforward and rapid. It was to divide all relationships into three categories—civil, affectionate, intimate—and practice each in an appropriate way.

Civil relationships require minimal but essential interaction: two drivers at an unmarked intersection; a customer buying a gallon of milk at the convenience store; an ordinarily uninterested student and an ordinarily disinterested teacher. These relationships are of short duration and are unlikely to be repeated once the transaction is over.

Affectionate relationships last longer and are likely to be repeated. More energy is exchanged, and the participants are likely to touch, listen,

and speak more animatedly and spend more time together than in civil relationships.

Intimate relationships are much longer in duration, even with separations interspersed. Emotions are intense with high commitment and risk. Ending such relationships is usually painful, causing grief. Maintaining them enriches life immeasurably.

Experience suggests that these three types of relationships form a continuum. An intimate relationship is a consequence of first, civil interaction; then, affectionate words, touches, shared experiences and understandings. Perverse consequences may ensue when one type is absent or the order reversed.

Eileen once spoke abruptly to me over the phone when I called to reschedule an appointment to suit her convenience. This surprised me, for I thought our relationship had become pleasantly affectionate, within the helping milieu. When we next met, I asked if I had offended her. She was surprised. When I explained, she confessed that with a man she did not know how to go from basic civilities to warm conversation. She had learned to be sexual with men and to be civil but not to be affectionate.

Warren recalled that at the going away party for some close friends, he could not express any physical affection to them. With other males he had been sexually active. With other males and females he had experienced many civil relationships. With neither gender, adult or child, was he able to be nonerotically affectionate. During therapy, the practice of civil and affectionate relationship skills led to an increase in social confidence with both genders and a diminution of erotic interest in males. As he recorded in his journal:

> I find that I don't see [males] at all in any sexual way [anymore], although I could and have . . . in the past. Somehow I feel that the learning I have had over the past few weeks has helped me to be close to them, hold them, put my arm around them, talk to them . . . have a very warm relationship, and yet not have any undesirable undertones.

When the breakdown in relationship between Gretchen and her husband reached crisis proportions, of their own volition they suspended sexual activities for several months. During that time they developed the missing civil and affectionate and nonsexual elements. Eventually they resumed sexual intimacies as an extension of the others and by Gretchen's account discovered a richness that had eluded them before.

The clinical utility of this nonerotic approach is underscored by the success of a Christian lay program for changing male homosexuality. As reported in the *American Journal of Psychiatry,* complete, lasting change occurred without resorting to sex as a task. Having learned what are here called civil and affectionate skills, male subjects in that program sought to attain mature Christian masculinity.

They began to experience and practice nonerotic relationships with Christian women in the church. . . . During this time of psychological maturation there was no demand that [they] stop being homosexuals. Homosexual behavior was simply defined as immoral, and they were expected not to engage in homosexual practices.[16]

As it was for the eight clients reported here, change for those men "was not magical, spontaneous, or dramatic. Change was embedded in an accepting, evaluative, and loving, nonerotic social milieu that provided expectations, ideology, and actual interpersonal experiences" leading to the extinction of homosexual impulses and behaviors.[17]

Achievement of Gender-Role Security

Closely related to relationship skills is an ability to do the things that are expected of men or women as they perform various gender-related roles. Some current rhetoric would dismiss gender-specific values and behaviors as sexist, but the reality is that both secular and Latter-day Saint cultures prescribe very strong, and in certain instances, very useful gender-role expectations.

Each of the eight clients felt insecure and unaccepted by his or her respective gender-based "fraternity" or "sorority." Myra attempted to be a better football player than the boys her age and avoided feminine activities or mannerisms. Gretchen was convinced she in no way measured up to the expectations of "super wives and mothers." When asked how he felt about his masculinity, Warren stated, "I have a very low opinion of myself in this area." In childhood, Frank had been punished or ostracized by his father and mother when he avoided fights or showed tender emotions; as an adult he battled with anyone or anything if provoked even slightly. Eileen sought female sexual experience after fleeing from a civil but affectionless marriage. George sought male sexual experience after concluding that he could not measure up to the athletic, intellectual, and social achievements that were expected of boys in his ward. Marian considered herself an uneducated, unattractive person whose femininity was irretrievably lost after divorce, especially when compared to the other women in Relief Society. Brad did not even believe he was male.

Four of the eight were victims of outright sexual abuse in childhood that evoked anxiety about their sexual identities. Three had been exposed to gender-threatening trauma. One had had her gender adequacy chipped away steadily over the years. All had inculcated into their self-images a sense of inadequacy as a male or a female.

Frank had been raised in a Dickensian family where parents and children fought verbally and physically. He had developed extremely intimidating, even abusive, mannerisms that thoroughly squelched his wife and children. Yet, while engaging in self-understanding recall and research, he discovered a consistent childhood trait of tenderness. Forced to face consequences when his wife sought a divorce, he began to redefine himself around the value of Christlike kindliness and gospel-defined roles of nurturant husband and father. Self-understanding rekindled his childhood desires to be gently masculine. There was no question about more prosaic male behaviors, for he had well proven his ability to be tough. The greater challenge now was to govern his tongue and temper. Freed by self-understanding and self-mastery from stereotypically harsh role behavior, he relaxed into a self-definition that permitted him to demonstrate in adulthood the gentleness he had learned to hide in childhood.

Warren recorded an event that contributed significantly to his gender security. With a group of other middle-aged men, he went to a bachelor party at an amusement park. They played in ways that Warren had not as a youth. Then they all tried the batting cage. His lifelong belief was that he had no ability to throw a baseball, let alone hit one. He wrote:

> I don't know that I have ever really hit a baseball. . . . [I] was very apprehensive, but found that I could really do it. . . . Another mistaken opinion about myself; I had always thought that there were some fairly fundamental reasons why I probably would never be able to hit a ball. I still wouldn't like to go up against a fast hard ball pitcher, but the other guys for the most part didn't want much to do with that either.

This last insight was the key. Warren was discovering that he was not the odd man out he had believed all his life. And as his gender security increased, his homosexual desires decreased.

Gretchen undertook a major task directing a road show. The effort was draining but the result successful by her criterion of getting all the young people to participate in a quality production. At the end, she reported increased love for her husband and family, a goal she had sought for years. As with Warren, she had overcome a lifelong inner sense of inadequacy. Or, to be more precise, in an era when the roles of wife and mother are explicitly devalued by many, Gretchen proved *to herself* the existence of certain abilities admired by those who control admittance to the sorority of acceptable women. Then she was free, by self-adjudication, to immerse herself in the domestic roles she preferred.

There seems to be an irreversibly positive consequence to achieving gender-role security, as if once and for all the person has evidence of self-worth in the most basic of all roles.

Sexual Clarification

Each of the eight had experienced childhood sexual trauma or was enmeshed in it currently. At the outset of therapy, I intended to discuss only general concepts of intimacy, leaving sexual specifics to the clients' private consideration. This did not prove sufficient, for each needed to discuss sexual matters in varying detail. To be sure, each reported that the general concept of intimacy gave a frame of reference which had been missing in their previous sexual ideation and behavior. But each also needed to clarify with some degree of specificity certain sexual values and behaviors. Please note, however, that it was never necessary to be as graphic or crude as is the case in certain types of therapy and literature.

I attribute the clients' inability to go readily from the general to the specific to three factors. First, the pervasive erotic climate in America engenders anxiety in those who fear they are not up-to-date on sexual techniques. This prevents a couple from discovering that relaxed, respectful enjoyment of each other is far more important than technical proficiency in achieving sexual satisfaction.

The second factor is a ''Mormon'' folkway that narrows and reduces profound gospel values. ''Morality,'' by this folkway, has become a synonym for ''sexual righteousness,'' afflicting those who adopt this particular definition with moral tunnel vision. By this same folkway, an essential and intimate responsibility of exalted beings—eternal increase—is reduced to mean continuous procreation, rather than unending nurturance.

The third barrier is the problem of the sex ''drive.'' Carelessly used by professionals and lay people alike, this belief was initially very detrimental to the eight clients. They had been taught that in puberty hormones begin to dictate sexual urges that demand expression. Therefore, every normal adolescent boy has nearly irresistible forces boiling within him. Marriage, it was hoped, would legitimize the gratification of these forces. And in the current dogma of sexology, every normal girl has similar urges and needs. This not only demeans marriage, it fosters the illusion that adolescents who are not readily aroused by erotic stimuli are not quite normal.

The human sciences themselves call into question simplistic belief in an imperative human sex drive. Anthropology does not sustain this belief. Numerous cultures dictate when, where, and how to be sexual, irrespective of puberty. Some require continence after puberty; some promote sexual behavior long before puberty. History records variations of sexual methods ranging from religious celibacy to religious promiscuity. Biology searches and finds no conclusive evidence that human beings are impelled, as are animals, to mate.[18]

In his intriguing synthesis of innate sensuality and learned intimacy, Erikson's schema shows that beginning with nursing at mother's breast while teething, the person expands through stages of sensory exploration and learning mutual trust.[19] Obviously there is a sexual appetite.[20] Millions of dollars paid to purveyors of sensuality prove it. The infant has genital sensual capacity. Androgens enhance this capacity during and after puberty. Once experienced, climactic sensual arousal is not forgotten. But the specific act is not the result of an urgent and undeniable drive.

An essential point is made by Helen Singer Kaplan, a respected sex therapist and writer: "Sex can be delayed and diverted indefinitely and is highly malleable and infinitely variable in its expression."[21] Indefinitely divertible sensory *needs* or *appetites* are not the same as mandatory *drives*. We do not learn to metabolize nutrients or respirate oxygen. We do learn to perform sex acts. Denial of water eventually destroys body cells. Denial of intercourse and orgasm does not even slightly damage our physiologic or neurologic apparatus.

What can destroy our psychic system, however, is inability to successfully express social and emotional intimacy to at least one other person. It is this insistent drive, not the sex appetite, that I have found unfulfilled among people with problems of intimacy. In fact most of these people—and certainly seven of the eight in this study—have learned that social, emotional, and spiritual enjoyments supersede sexual gratification as sources of satisfaction.

Dealing with this controversial topic proved to be a liberating factor for the clients. Warren initially sought help because he believed he was unable to control his sex drive. He had tried periods of abstention from homosexual activity (though not from masturbation) and felt the stress it caused was more than he could bear. When first considering the possibility that his sexual interests were learned options and not chemically driven imperatives, he wrote, "Assuming that this is correct, then I can certainly see from my past that I have never learned appropriate skills in many areas."

Warren and the others eventually placed sexual expression in perspective as a learned behavior, but there was still a need to clarify sexuality in regard to their values and role preferences. Therefore, we dealt with whatever questions each person had as to what was proper for Latter-day Saints: methods of receiving emotional, nonsexual, and sexual pleasure; how to solve problems of dysfunction; proper understanding of the sexual parts and functions of the mind and body. As it would have been presumptuous to dictate absolute answers, the service here was to assist the clients to examine gospel doctrine, along with physiologic, social, and emotional data so they could form their own opinions. Interestingly, though, once they gained initial

momentum they seemed to lose the need to discuss sexual behavior explicitly.

Gretchen, knowing I expected a status report, phoned to say that after months of sexual abstinence she and her husband had rebuilt their intimate relationship and had tenderly resumed sexual relations. "And," she said, "it was so special that I would rather not discuss it."

Frank said it somewhat differently. His marital behavior had been a continuation of his "survival of the fittest" childhood. Thus, it was significant to hear him say that he and his wife had reached such a gentle yet passionate sexual fulfillment that it was too sacred to talk about with anyone else.

What this particular task of understanding evolved into was, first, a general frame of reference for intimate values and role behaviors; second, specific sexual information as sought by the client; third, respect shown for the sanctity of the subject by honoring the client's preference not to discuss it explicitly once he or she was sufficiently confident.

CONCLUSION

When the tasks of self-understanding, mastery, and definition are at least minimally accomplished, the person has tangible evidence of change of the sort he or she intended. The clients discussed here redefined themselves from feeling unworthy and hopeless, to knowing they were good and capable of enjoying rewarding, nurturant intimate relationships. They gained sufficient self-esteem to make commitments and endure risks without their past vulnerability to emotional devastation. They were beginning to believe in themselves. Erikson speaks of this as ego integrity: "Although aware of the relativity of all the various life-styles which have given meaning to human striving, the possessor of integrity is ready to defend the dignity of his own life-style against all . . . threats."[22]

These clients did this by reducing social and emotional chaos through several mechanisms. Values provided internal justification for change. Role definitions offered external measures of practice and change. Given the apparently infinite number of emotional and behavioral variables in human beings, a focus on these two enabled clients and therapist to reduce change to manageable proportions.

Self-esteem developed as the client completed self-defined tasks and engendered a level of confidence sufficient to renew or enter into various types of relationships, culminating in intimate ones. Use of professionally determined clinical methods—science and art that they are—made possible a relatively orderly process that may be replicable. Respect for the clients' agency kept the responsibility for self-definition where it would lead to maximum therapeutic results.

Finally, use by clients and clinicians of the Savior's undiluted doctrines had the effect he promised. That his promises are true and his covenants binding upon him and his followers ought to be reassuring for those who presume to assist their brothers and sisters in healing grievous wounds of the heart and mind.

Frank was representative of seven of the eight. Through self-definition he resurrected a gentle, even sweet self that had been overlaid by a stern facade. When he expelled from his system the anguish of having been abused in childhood, when he explicitly embraced Christ-like values, when he carefully and, at first awkwardly, practiced the role behaviors specified in the fourth section of the Doctrine and Covenants, he began to acquire basic integrity. He was no longer at war within himself. His church service became a labor of love rather than a rigid exercise of hierarchical power. His employment was no longer an end in itself. (It must be reported that as he lost some of his competitiveness, family income declined.) As with the others, he was a far more complete human being.

The eight people accepted for counseling sought more than moderation of symptoms or minimal control of problem behavior. Because of their values, they expected to achieve thorough and lasting change. To disregard this would have been an inadequate response to their needs. By open acknowledgment of values, client and therapist committed themselves to very specific outcomes. By resorting to role definitions based on those values, subjectivity was diminished in measuring outcome.

This report would be incomplete and seriously inaccurate if a central spiritual observation were not reported. Seven of the eight were hungering and thirsting for relief of their distress. To each of them, the gospel of Christ provided justification to engage in the strenuous tasks of change. At crucial times, priesthood ordinances and covenants stiffened resolve. On occasion, the Spirit whispered encouragement as they learned to take responsibility for change. That they found the strength to persevere was due, I believe, to an ever-growing faith in their Redeemer.

NOTES

[1] Allen E. Bergin and Michael E. Lambert, "The Evaluation of Therapeutic Outcomes," in *Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change: An Empirical Analysis,* ed. Sol L. Garfield and Allen E. Bergin, 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978), 171–76.

[2] Ibid., 180.

[3] Ibid., 176–77.

[4] See George A. Rekers, "Atypical Gender Development and Psychosocial Adjustment," *Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis* 10 (Fall 1977): 559–71.

[5]Erik H. Erikson, *Childhood and Society,* 2d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1963), 267.

[6]*American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,* 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 1980), 261–83.

[7]Victor L. Brown, Jr., *Human Intimacy: Illusion and Reality* (Salt Lake City: Parliament Publishers, 1981), 12–19.

[8]Erikson, *Childhood and Society,* 263.

[9]Felix P. Biestek, *The Casework Relationship* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1957), 101.

[10]*American Psychiatric Association: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,* 281.

[11]Victor L. Brown, Jr., "Male Homosexuality: Identity Seeking a Role," *Association of Mormon Counselors and Psychotherapists Journal* 7 (April 1981): 5.

[12]R. J. McGuire, J. M. Carlisle, and B. G. Young, "Sexual Deviations as Conditioned Behaviour: A Hypothesis," *Behaviour Research and Therapy* 2 (January 1965): 185.

[13]See Karl Menninger, *Whatever Became of Sin?* (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1973).

[14]Joseph Smith, Jr., *Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith,* sel. Joseph Fielding Smith (Salt Lake City: Deseret News Press, 1938), 297.

[15]Erikson, *Childhood and Society,* 253.

[16]E. Mansell Pattison and Myrna Loy Pattison, " 'Ex-Gays': Religiously Mediated Change in Homosexuals," *American Journal of Psychiatry* 137 (December 1980): 1559.

[17]Ibid.

[18]John Bancroft, "The Relationship between Hormones and Sexual Behaviour in Humans," *Biological Determinants of Sexual Behaviour,* ed. J. B. Hutchison (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978), 493–519.

[19]Erikson, *Childhood and Society,* 348.

[20]See Kenneth R. Hardy, "An Appetitional Theory of Sexual Motivation," *Psychological Review* 71 (January 1964): 1–18.

[21]Helen S. Kaplan, *The New Sex Therapy: Active Treatment of Sexual Dysfunctions* (New York: Brunner and Mazel, 1974), 145–46.

[22]Erikson, *Childhood and Society,* 268.

Looking at a Utah Road Map

It is pinched now, like any epic brought to line and page.
Pressed like flowers in a book is the land. The stingy pines,
The dry mountains, the creeks, the desperate sage
Are marks and scratches in a map with interstates and highway signs.
One-quarter inch equals each mile of blessed Zion wide—
Of love and hate between sons and brothers; of hope and dread;
Of charity and sin, trusting time's vast capacity to hide
In ink and ledgers; waiting there for the anxious pilgrim to read
The secret signs and markings—the promises of a promised land
         Vernal, Fairview, Pleasant Grove.
         Richfield, Fruitland, Bountiful;
         Eden, Garland, Sunnyside.
And hear hidden music to soothe hurt hope
         Tooele, Payson, Kamas;
         Manti, Parowan.
There, too, the tales of will and power told by men
Who chose to mark the map
         Heber, Murray, Hyrum, Hinckley.
         Woodruff and Brigham City.
But somewhere near the edge of myths, reminders
Small of second sons and lost prayers still linger
         Sandy, Thistle and Hurricane. Sulphurdale, Salina,
         Faust and Thermo. Muddy Creek and Dirty Devil.

—Thomas Asplund

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Facilitating Intimacy: The Process and the Product
A Response to Victor L. Brown, Jr.

H. Newton Malony

Three themes dominate Brown's approach. First, he affirms the thrust of Bergin and Garfield's *Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change,* that complete healing is multi- rather than unidimensional.[1] The very title of the book evidences the truth that in helping persons with sexual problems, such as Brown reports in his article, the therapist should focus on both internal (psychotherapy) and external (behavior change) goals.

The second theme that Brown emphasizes is that intimacy is distinguishable from sex. This distinction stems from Brown's earlier monograph entitled *Human Intimacy.*[2] Intimacy is presented as the more essential need while sex is described as a need that can be diverted, delayed, or denied. Here Brown aligns himself with such social-analytic theorists as Harry Stack Sullivan and Eric Berne.[3] Sullivan concluded that being in relationship is the prime motive in life, and Berne suggested that being in spontaneous, committed, intimate relationships is the goal to which all persons should aspire.

Brown's third theme pertains to the intentional inclusion of values and the teachings of Jesus in the therapeutic process. The implicit impact of therapist values on therapeutic process and outcome has been persuasively chronicled in the professional literature over the last decade.[4] For religious therapists, the communication of wisdom (what is good) as well as advice (what will work) is, or should be, explicit. Those who came to Brown were Mormons seeking help from a Mormon. His very title clearly states the perspective from which he counsels. Each of his counselees was troubled by his or her inability to live up to the ideals of the Church as well as by failures in relationships. However, Brown is making a more important point. He feels that religious counselors should use the best information they have for helping people and that the best information comes from the Savior's teachings.

With each of these themes I agree—as a psychotherapist, as a Christian, and as a Christian psychotherapist.[5] Let me elaborate on these issues.

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CHANGE AS INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL

In the treatment of sexual disorders, the emphasis has often been focused solely on changing behavior.[6] Brown perceptively argues for a psychotherapeutic process which attends to changes in what people do but also attends to how they think and perceive. I have often repeated an old maxim to my clients which affirms this position: "You can act yourself into a new way of thinking or think yourself into a new way of acting." Then I add, "Begin where you like—but eventually both thinking and acting must come together." Change in one without change in the other is not sufficient.

Brown would agree. He conceives of the therapeutic process as including three steps: self-understanding, self-mastery, and self-definition. One might think of self-mastery as being behavioral while self-understanding and self-definition are perceptual. Self-mastery is external, behavioral change while self-understanding and self-definition are internal, perceptual change.

Another way of analyzing this three-step process is to think of self-understanding and self-mastery as "descriptive" and self-definition as "prescriptive." Descriptive processes are designed to help persons better comprehend what *is*. Prescriptive processes are designed to help persons determine what *could be*. Of course, there is a sense in which the self-mastery phase includes both descriptive and prescriptive components. Based on self-understanding, persons decide to change their habits toward better adjustment and satisfaction. They master themselves. This includes goal-directed behavior aimed at a new state of being. However, this phase of treatment is typically directed toward alleviating social disapproval or personal dissatisfaction. Only in the last phase of treatment, self-definition, do persons reconsider their own behavior and identity in terms of higher ideals such as religious faith. Here the meaning and purpose of human behavior and of life in general are reconceived. New goals for life are set. New role aspirations are determined. In almost all of Brown's clients, these new ideals and identities can be seen. Here is where true transformation becomes possible.

Another aspect of this descriptive/prescriptive dichotomy can be seen in the fact that each of Brown's cases could be called "ego-dystonic." They all acknowledged they were having difficulty. Since they were all Mormons who referred themselves to a counseling service sponsored by the LDS church, we can probably presume that they were experiencing descriptive as well as prescriptive pain. By this is meant that they were suffering from frustration in their daily lives and were also feeling dissatisfied with their lack of achievement in their religious lives. They were unhappy with who they were (descriptive pain) and unhappy with who they should be (prescriptive pain).

All of the above discussion is to say that Brown's emphasis on the multidimensional character of psychotherapeutic change is well taken. I affirm his emphasis and have elaborated on the issues of perceptual as well as behavioral change. I also suggest that the process he espoused includes descriptive as well as prescriptive aspects.

INTIMACY AND SEX

Freud reportedly said, "In every pairing there is sex." By this he probably meant that people yearn for intimacy. This is a much more benign interpretation than is usually given to Freud's maxims. However, there is increasing warrant for assuming that Freud was less obsessed with sexual disinhibition than has been assumed, and more concerned with freeing up individuals to pursue intimacy—a value he implicitly espoused in his description of the genital character.

Brown would agree with this basic emphasis on intimacy. In distinguishing intimacy from sexual behavior, he makes two bold statements with which I firmly agree: "Denial of intercourse and orgasm does not even slightly damage our physiologic or neurologic apparatus. What can destroy our psychic system, however, is an inability to successfully express social and emotional intimacy to at least one other person." Intimacy is more than having sex, but intimacy very often includes sex. That is probably what Freud meant with his statement, "In every pairing there is sex."

Sexual difficulties, like most habit problems, have "commission" and "omission" dimensions. One person may be engaging in deviant or atypical acts. Another person may have difficulty in performing normal acts. Homosexuality would be an example of the former while impotency would illustrate the latter. One would be called perversion, the other inhibition. Brown's cases illustrate both types. Of course, it could be said that there was both a commission and an omission dimension in each case in that they were all behaving abnormally by what they did or did not do and that they were all failing to do what they wanted to do or could do.

Brown does not shy away from treating these behavioral problems or philosophize away the difficulties in treating sexual deviations. He deals with them and does not perceive them as incurable—as even a number of Christian psychologists have reportedly contended. However, he sees beneath behavior to the issue of intimacy. Here Brown speaks to us all. Not having sexual problems is no proof that persons have intimacy. Being married and potent or orgasmic is no guarantee that persons have satisfied their need for intimacy. Intimacy and sexuality are related but different issues. One can occur without the other, but intimacy is more basic and essential.

Personally, I have been impacted by the theorizing of Eric Berne in such books as *What Do You Say After You Say Hello* and *Sex in Human Loving.*[7] He espouses an understanding of intimacy that I have found particularly helpful. Moreover, I perceive it to be extremely compatible with the Christian understanding about love. The principal components of intimacy, according to Berne, are trust, commitment, and spontaneity. Trust comes close to meaning "entrustment" or "having faith in" as implied in such portions of scripture as Hebrews 11:1ff. Here we read that "faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." The chapter continues with numerous accounts of biblical heroes who walked by faith. The trust in human intimacy approximates, but does not duplicate, the trust faithful Christians have in God. To be able to entrust oneself to another person without fear that one will be hurt and with confidence that one is acceptable is a bold but necessary act if intimacy is to occur. I think the possibility of trust in others is greatly enhanced by the experience of putting trust in God. Thus, Christians have an edge in the intimacy process.

Spontaneity is the second component of intimacy from Berne's point of view. This makes good psychodynamic sense. As Rogers has suggested, the greatest danger is that we will live by other persons' "conditions of worth."[8] This means that we do not trust that we are accepted just for being who we are. We fantasize that our worth is based on how well we perform and how much we please. So we deny ourselves and spend our energy ascertaining what is expected of us. Thus, we are rarely, if ever, spontaneous. We calculate and do not act freely. To be intimate means to give up those calculations. It means to respond freely without forethought and to assume we will be accepted. It assumes that we have already been accepted and that the relationship is no longer up for grabs. For Christians, this is the very essence of our security in God, for as John 3:16 states, "God so loved the world, . . . that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." This security makes spontaneity possible.

Commitment is a response to trust. It is the next component of intimacy, according to Berne. The words of the marriage vows bespeak the essence of all intimate relationships: "for better, for worse; for richer, for poorer; in sickness and in health; till death us do part." One of the more exhilarating experiences of life is to be committed. Commitment is grounded on the sense that one is needed and wanted. It is based on the assumption that one makes a difference in the life of another. It comes close to the meaning of Jesus' commandment, "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one to another" (John 13:35). Love means commitment.

Intimacy becomes a possibility when one can say, along with Thomas Harris, "I'm OK, You're OK."⁹ As Harris notes, this involves risk and can never be proved beforehand. However, intimacy assumes it, and, where these types of close relationships exist, intimacy is usually proven right. Christians, however, have the security of faith as a basis for venturing out into the world with an "I'm OK, You're OK" stance. They know that they and other people are forgiven sinners who are loved by God. They also know that they have God to fall back on even if others fail them.

In sum, I affirm the centrality of intimacy in Brown's essay and his suggestion that sex can be redirected but that intimacy is a basic human need. Intimacy is rooted in faith, and faith is preeminently exemplified for Christians by their trust in God's goodness in Christ. I believe this is good psychology and good religion.

THE IMPORTANCE OF VALUES

The final theme which Brown emphasizes is the importance of values in the psychotherapeutic process. Brown's clients were Mormons who came to an explicitly Mormon social service agency for help. This makes it easy. Clients expect religious counsel, and therapists are paid to give it at such an institution as this. However, I think Brown is making a more basic point, namely, that values *should* be a part of therapy wherever therapy is done. I agree. Values not only *are* but *should be* integral to psychotherapy.

I have proposed elsewhere that counselors *let* things happen while psychotherapists *make* them happen.¹⁰ Perhaps this is a caricature of the helping process. Counselors and psychotherapists may be more alike than I think. However, the distinction between a client-centered or an adjustment-focused, advice-giving process and a life-changing, transformative process is important to note. Counselors who are committed to pragmatic problem solving or to letting clients find their own space, whatever that might be, are definitely different from therapists who are committed to self-understanding, self-mastery, and self-definition. These latter types of therapists are similar to Brown in that they have definite ideas about where therapy is going and what constitutes the good life.

A valid distinction can be made between wisdom and advice. Wisdom pertains to what is best, while advice pertains to what will work. In a book of readings entitled *Wholeness and Holiness: The Psychology/Theology of Mental Health*, which I edited recently, I distinguished between negative, normal, and positive mental health.¹¹ Taking a cue from Marie Jahoda's seminal volume *Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health*, I concluded that normal mental health

involves achieving some ideal state above and beyond what society expects.[12]

Brown's "teachings of the Savior" are the Christian faith's guide for achieving positive mental health. They embody the essence of what we Christians believe to be the good life. They take their cue from God, not from culture. They stand as the ideal to which all persons should aspire. What is perhaps more important, it is the conviction of most Christians that this way of life includes happiness as well as fulfillment. In other words, Christ's teachings are good psychology as well as good theology.

We psychotherapists are engaged in therapy of the psyche—the healing of the soul. We should make no apology for that. We intend it, and it is the sine qua non of what we do. It is what we *should* do if we would be true to our task. Thus I forthrightly affirm Brown's inclusion of values in therapy and am of the opinion that much of the healing he demonstrated in his clients was ultimately due to his inclusion of such ideals.

NOTES

[1]Sol L. Garfield and Allen E. Bergin, *Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change: An Empirical Analysis,* 2d ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978).

[2]Victor L. Brown, Jr., *Human Intimacy: Illusion and Reality* (Salt Lake City: Parliament Publishers, 1981).

[3]Harry Stack Sullivan, *The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1953); Eric Berne, *Games People Play* (New York: Grove Press, 1964).

[4]Allen E. Bergin, "Psychotherapy and Religious Values," *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology* 48 (February 1980): 95–105; Perry London, *The Modes and Morals of Psychotherapy* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964).

[5]See my article, "God Talk in Psychotherapy," in *Wholeness and Holiness: Readings in the Psychology/Theology of Mental Health,* ed. H. Newton Malony (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1983), 269–80.

[6]R. L. McGuire, J. M. Carlisle, and B. G. Young, "Sexual Deviations as Conditional Behaviour: A Hypothesis," *Behaviour Research and Therapy* 2 (January 1965): 185.

[7]Eric Berne, *What Do You Say After You Say Hello: The Psychology of Human Destiny* (New York: Grove Press, 1972); *Sex in Human Loving* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).

[8]Carl Rogers, *On Becoming a Person* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), 283.

[9]Thomas A. Harris, *I'm OK, You're OK: A Practical Guide to Transactional Analysis* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

[10]H. Newton Malony, "Integration: The Adjoiners," in *Psychology and Theology: Prospects for Integration,* ed. Gary R. Collins (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1981), 85–123.

[11]Malony, ed., *Wholeness and Holiness.*

[12]Marie Jahoda, *Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health: A Report to the Staff Director, Jack R. Ewalt, 1958* (New York: Basic Books, 1958).

Response to Malony

Victor L. Brown, Jr.

Dr. Malony concisely sums up the thrust of my efforts to understand helping principles when he asserts that I feel "that religious counselors should use the best information they have for helping people and that the best information comes from the Savior's teachings." He also underscores the particular principle upon which this article rests when he notes that I am "making a more basic point, namely, that values *should* be part of therapy wherever therapy is done."

Those of us involved in the helping professions and in religion would do well to heed the Savior's warning against attempting to serve, with equal allegiance, two masters (Matt. 6:24). At the same time, a decent respect for empiricism demands that we avoid the ruse of camouflaging professional inadequacy with ideological fervor. Jesus himself offered an empirical test when he stated that false prophets can be discovered by their fruits (Matt. 7:15–20).

I propose that the therapeutic power of methods based upon the doctrines of Jesus is enormous, and that dilution of gospel doctrines or principles weakens the efficacy of these methods. Malony understands this when he states that Christians "take their cue from God not from culture." The type of inquiry reported in my essay examines the clinical usefulness of the teachings of Jesus Christ. For reasons of research clarity, this type of inquiry is needed in far greater amounts. I must emphasize, however, that the tests my article reports are not of the *validity* of the doctrines of Christ but of the *application* of those doctrines to the therapeutic task.

Walking Provo Canyon

At dawn the wind
delivered the oaks
of their last papery leaves,

and I saw that someone had scattered
the hornet's nest you nailed
to the maple tree.

At the spot where we saw the snake slip
its thin skin,
I stopped, listened

to the corn husks
we'd shucked east of the cabin.
They rattled the death of all green things.

—Loretta M. Sharp

What We Are

C. Terry Warner

We human beings have little comprehension of what we are. The difficulty is not that we are ignorant. It's that we are self-deceiving. We systematically keep ourselves from understanding ourselves. We don't do this deliberately. In order to do it deliberately we would, as Jean-Paul Sartre once wrote, have to "know the truth very exactly in order to conceal it [from ourselves] more carefully." Instead, we do it by means of sin—by going against our honest feelings of what's right and wrong for us to do.

I'll give an example. Marty was lying in bed, wrapped in the comfort of a deep sleep. He was and still is a young, ambitious businessman concerned about his career ladder and preoccupied most of the time with corporate assignments. As he slept, the four-month-old baby began to cry in the nursery just off the master bedroom. Marty roused, lifted his head, and looked at the clock. 2:30. His wife, Carolyn, lying next to him in her curlers and sleeping mask, wasn't stirring. Marty told this story:

> At that moment, I had a fleeting feeling, a feeling that if I got up quickly I might be able to see what was wrong before my wife would have to wake up. I don't think it was even a thought because it went too fast for me to say it out in my mind. It was a feeling that this was something I really ought to do. But I didn't do it. I didn't go right back to sleep either. It bugged me that my wife wasn't waking up. I kept thinking it was her job. She has her work and I have mine. Mine starts early. She can sleep in. Besides, I was exhausted. Besides that, I never really know how to handle the baby. Maybe she was lying there waiting for me to get up. Why did I have to feel guilty when I'm only trying to get some sleep so I can do well on the job? She was the one who wanted to have this kid in the first place.

When Marty failed to do what he felt he ought to do, he betrayed himself. He may also have violated whatever moral principles he learned at home, at school, or at church, but that's irrelevant. Whether or not others expected him to share caretaking responsibilities with his wife,

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he expected himself to do it, at least on this occasion; it was his own expectation of himself that he betrayed.

It's impossible to betray oneself without seeking to excuse or justify oneself. Marty rationalized. He became irritated with the situation and with his wife. Childishly he tried to place blame elsewhere. In the process of betraying himself, Marty began to live a lie, the net effect of which was to excuse himself in his own mind for what was happening. One of the ways we betray ourselves is to do just what Marty was doing—to insist by our attitude and our actions that it's all right to be doing less than our best because of how we're being treated or what it will cost us to do better.

But that's not the only possibility. Another way Marty might have refused to yield to the promptings of his conscience is by getting up with the baby in a self-righteous spirit, saying to himself: ''Here I'm the one who's got to get up early, and I'm stuck with the night shift too.'' Or: ''It's all right. I'll do it. She hasn't got my sense of honor and duty. It would be glorious to be married to a person sensitive to my needs and willing to do her share.''

Whether childishly rationalizing his moral failures or self-righteously claiming to be morally superior, the self-betrayer is blaming others and excusing or justifying himself. He can consider himself in the clear only if he can successfully find fault in others for whatever he is thinking or doing. There's no way around this. There's no possibility of betraying oneself without living a lie—no possibility of sinning in a straightforward, guileless, and open manner. This can be seen by considering the solution to a version of a puzzle well known to the ancient Greeks. The puzzle is this: Immorality—what I am calling ''self-betrayal'' and ''sin''—seems impossible. It seems impossible that anyone could know in his own mind what is morally right for him to do and yet not do it. When we experience a *genuine* prompting of conscience (there is such a thing as false or distorted conscience, and I'll get to that later), we are in that moment obligated: we are requiring of ourselves the course of action it prescribes. (I am not saying the prompting cannot originate from a source outside ourselves, but only that whatever its ultimate origin, we in experiencing it recognize and accept its validity for us.) There is no room for wondering whether we *ought* to follow this course. In the very reception of a moral summons, we feel we ought to follow it. But if this is so, what sense can it make to say that we require this course of action of ourselves in the very moment and by the very act of refusing to comply with the requirement? What sort of self-requirement is that? None at all, the tradition has said. Either (1) we don't really understand the requirement, or (2) we aren't really making it of ourselves, or (3) we lack the power or opportunity to comply with it. But the fourth alternative, that we are

acting immorally—requiring moral action of ourselves in and by the very act of violating the requirement—seems to make no sense at all.

Yet we do make a moral requirement of ourselves in and by this kind of act. We do it by carrying out the refusal in such a way that it seems to us that we are doing the very best we can under the circumstances. We make the moral requirement of ourselves by denying that we are doing what we're doing. In short, we do it by hypocrisy. This hypocrisy acknowledges, in a backhanded way, the rightness of what we are not doing. Paul wrote that when we violate the law of God written in our hearts, we ''consent unto the law that it is good'' (Rom. 7:16). Someone who is straightforwardly doing what seems to him right will have no cause to excuse or justify himself; and someone who *isn't* doing what seems to him right shows that he does have such a cause. In the words of La Rochefoucauld, ''Hypocrisy is vice's tribute to virtue.''

We are deceived by this hypocrisy of ours because it and the self-betrayal are the same event. We do not first betray ourselves and then, following a moment in which we recognize that we've got something to hide, act as if it's someone else's fault. If this were what happened, we could perhaps hang on to the momentary, accurate knowledge we had about ourselves and thereby keep ourselves from slipping into the lie. But that's not what happens. The self-betrayal and the lie we live do not come in sequence. They are two sides of the same act, for as we've seen the betrayal wouldn't be possible unless it were a lie from the first moment. Blaming others and making it seem that we're doing our best in spite of them is *the way* we betray ourselves. Marty failed to take care of the baby *by* entertaining a host of rationalizations and accusing feelings.

It's important to understand that emotions are always involved in the self-betrayer's lie. It would not be the same if we merely *told* ourselves a lie. We would not be able to get ourselves to believe it. Consider Marty's lie. Besides the words he said, he felt an unaccountable fatigue (which he wouldn't have felt had he been getting up at that very same hour to go fishing), irritation at his wife for insisting they have a child at this point in his career, and perhaps even resentment toward the baby for awakening him. (Irrational? Yes, but remember that blaming others is something the self-betrayer can't avoid, even if doing so doesn't make much sense.)

This point enables us to understand what's really going on when individuals profess, as they sometimes do, to know full well that they're doing wrong and yet continue to do it anyway. They are ''intellectually'' or verbally admitting to the truth, but emotionally they are still caught up in the lie. Everyone knows this who has experienced the sorrow of deep repentance; it is an emotion that's worlds apart from the self-betrayer's anxiety or guilt.

COLLUSION

Accusing others means making ourselves out to be their victim. We're not responsible for what's going on because we're helpless in the face of what they are doing. We feel unjustly used by them— wronged, threatened, or disadvantaged. Feelings of psychological or emotional victimhood are telltale signs of self-betrayal. A thirty-year-old bachelor named Larry wrote this:

> My former fiancée, Julene, loved to dance, but I felt unmasculine on the dance floor. One night she wanted to go dancing with some other couples. I didn't feel like going but said I would just to make her happy. Throughout the evening she kept insisting that we dance when no one else was out on the floor. I did it because I didn't want to make a scene, but it embarrassed me. It seemed to me that she was using me, that she wasn't being herself—you know, too bubbly and all that.
>
> On the drive home she said, "Something is bothering you." I had decided not to say anything, because I don't like to hurt people's feelings. But since she brought it up I decided I ought to be straightforward about what was on my mind. So I told her I thought she didn't care about others' feelings, but only about her own. She got very angry. Her eyes were wet and she looked at me hard. I was a cold, selfish person, she said, very loud. After her fit had kind of died down I put my arms around her to show I forgave her for her cruel words. I felt I was a better person than she was. I think that is when I started being less interested in her.

Each of these people felt victimized by the other. Notice the difference in styles. Hers was volatile and childish—temper and tantrums. He "self-sacrificingly" did his "duty," suffered in silence, and nursed his sense of superiority.

Victims are victimizers. When we make ourselves out to be victims of others, we are accusing them of victimizing us. We are making them appear the guilty ones. In reality, *we* are victimizing *them*. That's what Marty did to his wife and his child, when he felt he was their victim, and what Larry and Julene did to each other. What we need to learn from such stories as Larry's and Julene's (and I find that most people can readily think of many of them in their own experience) is that when others' behavior offends us we are finding in it justification or excuse for our own wrongdoing. To us it's proof that we are right because they are wrong. Even when it disadvantages us, we find it useful. There are people who make fools of themselves in public, chronically lose their jobs, even take their lives, just to have proof that someone, possibly everyone they know, perhaps even God, has treated them unfairly.

What's even more astounding is that by our blaming attitude we encourage and even provoke the behavior that we find offensive. Consider Larry's pouting, self-righteously critical attitude. *He* thought he was responding as best he could to the insensitivity with which Julene was insisting on kicking up her heels in spite of his reluctance to join

her. But this attitude of his offended her. (Our accusing attitudes *always* come across, even if we try to mask them with airs of courtesy or with silence, because there's a perceptible difference between the person who cares and the person trying to make it appear that he cares.) The message in it was, ''The trouble was all your fault.'' Thus accused, she felt justified in treating him even more coldly than before. He was trying, he supposed, to straighten her out, but she didn't appreciate it. She didn't respond to his accusations by saying or feeling, ''Oh thank you, darling, for pointing out this shortcoming to me. You know how I want to improve myself so that I can be a better companion to you.'' On the contrary, she felt he was unfair, pompous, and insensitive to *her.* From her point of view, she had to drag him through the evening; if it weren't for her enthusiasm, they would never have had any fun. His criticism only confirmed in her mind that he was so selfish he could only enjoy doing the few things *he* wanted to do. She told her roommate that from that evening on she lost a lot of her interest in him.

So blame begets blame. It is ''self-fulfilling.'' Others react to our accusing attitudes with accusing attitudes of their own and feel they are being provoked to do so. Thus they do the very sort of thing we are blaming them for. They do the very sort of thing we feel is provoking us to blame them! As I said, this gives us confirmation that someone else besides ourselves is at fault. It validates the lie we are living. The more others engage in the accusing behavior we are provoking by our attitude toward them, the more they give us the excuse we need for having that attitude. Both our suffering and their wrongdoing give us proof that they are wrong and we are right.

When self-betrayers blame one another reciprocally, they are in *collusion* with one another, each provoking the other to give him or her validation of the lie he or she is living.

Generally, when people are colluding, each feels he is doing his best to cope with the other's unfair or hostile behavior. He doesn't consider *himself* unfair or hostile. He feels he's only trying to defend himself. Both Larry and Julene thought they were doing the best they could to deal with the problems thrown at them by the other's inconsiderateness.

A's view   I am only ——————————— A is   B's view
                coping with B   attacking
                as best I can   me

(A)   (B)

                B is   I am only
                attacking   coping with A
                me   ——————————— as best I can

These two views of the situation are worlds apart. The people involved are *alienated* from each other. They both see the situation falsely. Indeed, each believes the problem would go away if only the other would change. Yet because the other's behavior proves to him the other is at fault, each of them finds it useful for the other *not* to change. Indeed, it may even strengthen his position if he does all he can to get the other to change because the more he tries to do this the worse the other's behavior tends to become and the more proof he has that he is right. Thus, colluders' solutions to their problems only make the problems worse.

> A new foreman got assigned to our drywall crew. He got paid by the job, and we got paid by the hour. The faster we worked, the more he got, and he pushed us without mercy. It bugged me. I'd be working somewhere in a house and would need instruction on a hard spot. I knew if I asked I'd get lectured in disgusted tones that my grandmother was smarter and faster. I'd get mad just thinking about it, so I'd keep on working without asking, covering up my mistakes as best I could. When I didn't cover them very well, I'd get chewed out for not asking and for wasting the time it took to redo the job. I vowed I'd never ask him anything if I could help it.

The more evasive the employee was (this was the employee's solution), the more suspicious and punitive the foreman felt he had to be (this was the foreman's solution), and this in turn only encouraged the employee to be more evasive.

What one colluder does justifies the other in doing what he does, and round and round. What each is blaming in the other, he himself is helping to create. The two of them (and there can be more) are quite literally producing the problem *together.* They are accomplices in the behavior they resent in one another. When we have a problem with another person, the chances are that our seeing that person as the problem *is* the problem.

FALSE MORALITY

What I've said about emotions goes against the conventional and scientific wisdom of our age. One of our dominant, almost unexamined

fictions is that we are not responsible for our emotions. They are caused in us, we believe, by events outside of our control. Recently this dogma has been undergoing reexamination, and it is becoming increasingly clear that it is false.[1] Accusing emotions are performances in which we engage. In the history of a particular people, patterns of emotion evolve as do patterns of rhetoric. They arise, flourish, and become extinct. Yet the metaphor dogmatically persists that such emotions are injuries because we invoke it anew whenever we compromise ourselves. (For example, if we're angry with someone we cannot fail to believe that that person is making us angry.)

This dogma is the core of every self-betrayer's self-deception. Given our conviction that we are not responsible for our accusing emotions, we can imagine only two ways to manage them. We can try to control expressing and acting on the emotion—we can "keep our feelings in"—or we can be forthright in expressing or acting on it—we can "let our feelings out." In our minds, our outward behavior is under our control but not our motivations. This places us in a moral dilemma characteristic of self-betrayers. If we express or act on our emotions openly, we will (we think) be honest but run the risk of hurting the feelings of those we accuse. If we control ourselves, we will (we think) be kinder but not candid. Our choice is to be either deceitful or inconsiderate. Whichever way we go, we'll do wrong. But since we believe it's the blameworthy behavior of the accused that has put us in this trap, we are convinced that whichever way we go is not our fault. We're exonerated in advance for whatever we do. Ultimately, no sinner will accept responsibility for the troubles he is party to; the moral traps in which he finds himself only support his conviction that he is not at fault.

Such traps are self-deceptions; they do not exist in reality but are projections onto reality of accusing, self-exonerating attitudes. From what I have said so far, it's not difficult to see just how false each of the supposed options is. Hiding our accusing feelings from others is not really considerate because the feelings are accusing and because those feelings always come across to others, no matter how we try to hide them. And openly expressing or acting on such feelings is not really forthright and honest because the feelings are false representations of the situation.

There is yet another trap the self-betrayer invariably finds himself in, another dimension of his falsification of reality. Accusing others always means regarding them as threatening something we want—some right, privilege, possession, opportunity, etc. We place an exaggerated value on such things in proportion to the threat we feel. We crave, lust for, or worry about things just to the extent that we accuse others of jeopardizing them. In other words, an anxious desire

for something that *can* be jeopardized by someone else is the inseparable companion of an attitude that accuses that person of jeopardizing it, and is just as much a lie as the accusation is! It's not hard to see that when we have this kind of attitude we are not going to be overjoyed at the prospect of doing our "duty" towards this person—treating him fairly or kindly. As far as we're concerned, we're being called upon to treat someone fairly or kindly who is making trouble for us! For example, Marty felt he ought to help his wife, but in his accusing eyes she was the very person who was inconsiderately lying there asleep and who didn't appreciate the demands his job made upon him, as proven by the fact that she insisted upon having a child at the most crucial point of his career. For self-betrayers, then, duty and desire are usually in conflict, and both of them are distortions of genuine duty and desire. As far as Marty was concerned, doing his "duty" towards his wife and baby meant not protecting himself against the threat to his career they presented; either he could succeed in that career or else sacrifice it for duty's sake. The summons of conscience self-betrayers refuse to follow inevitably strikes them as onerous and perhaps even ridiculous; that's why they so often roll their eyeballs, sigh disgustedly, scowl irritably, or pout when deciding to do what they themselves know they should do. It is they who have created the myth that moral goodness is absurdly self-sacrificing.

Duty is not burdensome emotionally for those of us who aren't betraying ourselves, even though it may be burdensome physically, mentally, or financially. We don't resent it. It must be done, but it doesn't seem unreasonable, unjust, or unfair. If Marty had simply and straightforwardly gotten up to check on the baby in the first place, he wouldn't have had any need to blame anyone; he'd have felt neither irritated nor resentful. The task would not have seemed a drudgery. Indeed he probably wouldn't have noticed any prompting of conscience; it would have seemed to him more like an invitation than a demand. Conscience usually isn't a major issue for people who don't betray themselves because they aren't fighting it.

We have seen that self-betrayal brings with it distortion of conscience. When embedded in self-betrayal, we do have feelings of right and wrong, but these are perverted by our self-concern, hardness toward others, and defensiveness. A prompting to be honest is felt as a demand to find a way to express victimized and accusing feelings in a way that won't appear too ruthless; a prompting to be kind is experienced as a demand to disguise our true feelings; a prompting to do our duty feels like a demand to sacrifice our own interests in favor of people who, we are convinced, don't deserve it.

Thus the person whose conscience is distorted concerns himself about justification and excuse rather than about doing what love and

integrity dictate—though of course he would deny that statement. He's concerned with the ''moral'' rules that define what is reasonable and unreasonable to expect of ourselves in helping our neighbor. For example, he's interested in why it's okay for him not to help his neighbor paint his house—he's too busy; he needs time for himself; the neighbor never did anything like that for him—or else why he's morally superior to those he's accusing—his wife is a nag; she never notices all he does around the house and with the children; he never complains about her faults the way she complains about his. Being right means much more to him than doing right—that's the profound moral shift that takes place in self-betrayal. It's a shift from self-forgetfulness to self-concern.

One of the most harrowing aspects of the distortion of conscience that comes with sin is an almost unwitting ruthlessness. Good people can feel justified in doing cruel things. The following is an experience of Duane Boyce, a family therapist and corporate officer who has been part of our research team for many years:

> For a few years after we were married, my wife, Merilee, and I lived in a trailer court filled with families who also had young children. When our Kelly and Kimberly were about three and two, we came home one day to discover that all their toys were missing. Finally a five-year-old girl told us she had taken the toys and showed us where she had hidden them.
>
> Now Merilee and I weren't upset about the incident. It was nothing. When word reached the girl's mother, however, she denied that it could be true, and her daughter started denying it as well. She became so adamant that she began accusing us to others of starting a vicious rumor, and tried to poison our friends against us. Even when her daughter admitted the truth, she didn't come to us and apologize. She didn't try to make sure there were no hard feelings. We said we pitied her. She was obviously a sick woman. But I have to admit that I was angry.
>
> Two months later the little girl had a birthday party. Every child in the trailer court was invited except Kelly and Kimberly. The children had long forgotten the incident and played together every day. And now not to invite two of them! A mature woman, supposedly, was taking out her guilt on two little kids!
>
> I was outside when the morning of the party came, planting flowers and watching the children gather gleefully at the woman's trailer for the party. Soon they were playing games. Then Kelly and Kimberly came out of our trailer and saw the children having fun. They naturally went over to join them. To them it was just another day. I had a sinking feeling as I watched them go. I was afraid the worst might happen.
>
> It did. About the time my girls got there, the other children were invited into the trailer and the door was closed, leaving Kelly and Kimberly standing outside alone. A bit later the children emerged again and my girls joined them. The girl's mother began passing out ice cream cones. I watched in stunned amazement as she carefully gave one to every child but mine. Kelly and Kimberly just stood there, puzzled. I was fuming. Then the woman passed out balloons, again to all the children but two.

It was a touching sight. All those children dancing and jumping excitedly and just two standing alone in the middle, silent and still.

I was furious. These two little girls were innocent and helpless. What a monster this woman was! She was using these kids to hide her guilt and get at me and my wife! It was easily the most detestable thing I had ever seen.

Several years later I was telling this story in a seminar as an example of self-betrayal. "It shows," I said, "the lengths to which people will go to justify themselves."

Others present agreed. "She must have been insane," someone said. An otherwise jovial fellow blurted out, "Boy, I'd like to hit her right in the mouth!"

Then a woman asked, "Why were you so offended at that woman if you were as innocent as you say you were?"

"Obviously, she was misusing my little girls," I replied.

"You said she tried to ruin your reputation," another person added. "Weren't you doing the same to her?"

"What do you mean? I don't understand."

"Well, you said you were angry at this woman and that you would ignore her."

"Yes, but . . . "

"And you said she never came to you to be certain there were no hard feelings. But did you ever go to her?"

"Well, no, but . . . "

"Honestly, didn't you have just a little sweet taste of revenge when you said she must be sick?"

"Look," I said. "It's that woman who's got something to straighten out with me."

"And what about the children going to the party?" another person interrupted.

"Well, what about it?"

"You knew they weren't invited."

"Yes."

"Then why did you let them go?" said another.

Another person piped up. "I know why. You were angry at this woman. You knew what would happen. You knew your neighbor would treat them that way. You *wanted* her to. Then you would have proof you were justified all this time in hating her."

"You were using your children just as much as she was," said another. "She mistreated them but so did you. *You let them go.* You set them up."

"I think *you* were the one who was insane."

The first responses to Duane sided with him. The rules most of us live by justified him. (If you want to see those rules written down, read the syndicated advice columns in the newspapers.) It took an extraordinarily sensitive group of people to see that Duane was not only not justified but was actually abusing his own children in *trying* to be justified. Not for several days, Duane told me, did the pain and sorrow he felt that evening start to subside.

Societies in general have substituted moral codes for the moral and spiritual sensitivity of uncorrupted conscience. These codes specify

what honesty, considerateness, and duty will consist of, with the result that everyone is relieved, if they choose to be, of responsibility for their immoral feelings, as long as they outwardly conform to the rules. To grow up in such a society is to be nurtured in the ways of hypocrisy; few escape the influence. When the Pharisees conformed to the scriptural law outwardly while inwardly remaining corrupt, Jesus denounced them as hypocrites. We have to distinguish two kinds of morality. One is moral or spiritual sensitivity to the needs of others and the will of God (which is fixed always and unerringly on what others need), and the other is an obsession with rules that we can follow without yielding our hearts.

EMOTIONAL BONDAGE

Once one's outlook takes on the structure characteristic of self-deception, each new situation tends to be interpreted accusingly and defensively, self-righteously or childishly, and most experiences of conscience are distorted. Thus sin is habituating. When we see our world in an accusing, victimized, self-protective manner, our options are laid out for us in such limited patterns as I have described. Restricted to these options, we can find no way to deal with our unwanted emotions. Every course of action we can conceive of to bring about personal change leads further into self-deception. Generally speaking, if we have been childish we will think the only thing we can do about the problem is to control ourselves—but if we do this we'll only succeed in becoming self-righteous. And if we have been self-righteous, we'll think that we need to give vent to our feelings—but if we do this we'll only succeed in becoming childish. The only authentic emotional change we can undergo is abandonment of our accusing feelings, and we cannot consider this an option because we're convinced we aren't responsible for our feelings.

Isn't it possible for the self-betrayer simply to confess his dishonesty and pretense and thus be rid of them? Yes, it's possible. The trouble is that even when we confess our sins we are entrapped in one of the artificial dilemmas I've been talking about. From his self-deceiving point of view, what looks to the self-betrayer like confessing dishonesty is actually a counterfeit of the real thing, like his counterfeit conception of duty, desire, kindness, and honesty. I'll explain how this works.

Whether we are acting self-righteously or childishly, we are striving to qualify as justified, worthy persons. But because we have to work at this, we're bound to suspect that the person we're striving to be is a mere facade. When that happens, we can only wonder whether those who have been counteraccusing us may be right. We must fight off the suspicion that hidden within us is a self who is not at all

the idealized person we've been striving to be. Such suspicions of unacceptability or unworthiness are the almost inevitable corollaries of the quest for a positive self-image. By our concern for a good self-image, we create the fear of a bad one! I believe this is the source of the anxiety and insecurity that are endemic in our culture.

We see, then, that a self-betrayer who is considering being "honest" with himself confronts the specter of this "unworthy self." But this "self" is just as much a fiction as the idealized, justified self-image he has heretofore been insisting on. It is merely another variation on the lie he has been living.

We all know people for whom this kind of self-disparagement is a life-style. It works just as well as self-justification to excuse us from responsibility for what we are doing. Whether we despair over what we are "confessing" or congratulate ourselves for finally being completely honest, we are sure we have discovered what we are, and that we can't help being that way. A participant in one of my seminars, describing a repeated problem of collusion in his life, wrote the following story:

> When I was eleven the following conversation took place frequently.
> "What's wrong, Tad," my mother would ask. "Didn't you have a good day?" (I can see now I was pulling her strings. I could get her started just by the expression on my face when I walked in the door.)
> "Whadda you care?"
> "Son, if you need to talk about your problems, I'd be glad to listen."
> "Keep yer nose outta my business." (Once I got this much started, it would start my father all by itself. It was like priming the pump. It worked even better than when my sister would hum a tune while he was trying to tell the family in no uncertain terms all the things they were doing wrong.)
> "That's no way to talk to your mother. Even dogs treat their own better than that."
> "There, there, Dear," Mother would counsel him. "Remember, it's hard to be growing up nowadays."
> "It's no favor to him to be allowing disrespectfulness. We haven't done anything to deserve it."
> "Nuthin', huh? Then why d'ya pick on me all the time?"
> Then mother would put her arms around me. "It must be awful to feel nobody likes you." (That was the booster engine that sent Dad into his final orbit.)
> "I swear you're absolutely ruining him, Blanche. We've sacrificed to give him more opportunities than we gave any of the other children."
> "Yeah, just to keep me outta your hair."
> "The trouble with you, fella, is you're spoiled. You can't even keep your room straight. Shows just how appreciative you are! The doghouse is cleaner."
> "That's where you'd like me to live, isn't it?"
> "I've had about all I'm going to take from you."
> "Roger, he's only a boy."
> "You better shut up, Blanche. You make it seem like I'm the one who's acting up."
> "I'm just a spoiled and messy snot-nosed kid, just like you say."

"That's the stupidest thing I've ever heard."

"And now I'm stupid too." (Now I would start to cry, real brokenhearted tears. Vengeance was mine. Mom would be so upset she wouldn't say a word all evening. Dad would be shaking with rage. Some nights I would try to go to sleep so if they came up to my room to check on me they couldn't apologize. One night they came up and couldn't find me. They called out the neighbors to help them look. I had gone outside with a blanket and made my bed in the doghouse.)

Recall Duane's story. Everything he managed to accomplish in his self-righteous conviction of moral superiority, Tad achieved by being down on himself.

In contemporary counseling circles one of the fads is helping people gain a "positive self-image." Since a bad self-image is obviously unhealthy, a good one must be desirable—so it is assumed. But both are forms of self-preoccupation, as we have seen; they are the obverse and reverse sides of a single self-deceptive outlook. What is unnerving about the current fad is that, inevitably, preoccupation with a positive self-image creates the basis for doubting the validity of that image; it fosters insecurity; the client will require periodic "fixes" to maintain his anxiety-driven "conviction" that he comes off well by comparison to other people. What we need is to drop the self-preoccupied concern about image altogether. Spiritual wholeness consists in self-forgetfulness.

There is an answer to the question, "What's so bad about sin?" that rarely gets mentioned. It is that sin fundamentally alters our outlook on and feelings toward reality—towards both others and ourselves. We feel insecure and can be easily offended or rejected. We're anxious about what we have or might have and how we'll get on. For us, much is wrong with the world and with others. Thus obsessed with ourselves, we have little sensitivity for other people; we're far too insecure to love freely. So other people respond to us in ways that confirm our fears and anxieties. Most tragically, once mired in this kind of perversion of reality we can't see our way out; or, more accurately, the ways out we think we see are really further bypasses within the threatening world of our self-deceptions. There is a bondage in iniquity, a servitude.

LIBERATION

How is it possible for self-betrayers to come out of self-deception if every avenue of escape conceivable to them is a cul-de-sac? It's true that if we hang on to our accusing emotions and the falsified world that accompanies them, we will not escape self-deception, no matter how we try to change. So whatever we can think of to *do* is going to backfire. Nevertheless, we *can* give up these emotions altogether, and with them our false picture of the world. We can cease making

accusations in our hearts. There's hope for us precisely because our emotional problems are what we are *doing.* Abandoning them is a matter of *ceasing to do.* It requires no special expertise. We are capable of ceasing to do anything. Emotional honesty is within everyone's reach.

Coming to this honesty is described in different ways by different people. I would like to mention two. The first consists in desisting from self-betrayal. I've observed over and over that the person who makes a decision simply to do what he feels to be right, from moment to moment, without quibbling or stalling, undergoes a profound change of attitude. The following example is one of many sent to me by David Hamblin, a member of our research team and a practicing psychotherapist in upstate New York:

> Roberta was sixteen when she came with her eighteen-month-old boy, Andrew, to the clinic. She was shy, nervous, and very angry; her mother, at home with Roberta's three-month-old girl, made her come because she was abusing Andrew. She had become sexually active at fourteen, dropped out of school, and continued her switchblade, fight-with-anybody life-style. She said she was surprised at her angry outbursts—they seemed to come upon her unbidden and unwanted. Andrew, she said, would throw tantrums if he didn't get his way and would do just the opposite of what she told him to do. He'd hold his breath until he went blue to get what he wanted. She admitted striking him on the head when she lost control of herself. Her boyfriend wanted to marry her, but she felt she couldn't control her anger enough. She was sick of herself, worried about what she might do, and despairing about the future.
>
> Instead of using a standard psychotherapeutic approach, I taught Roberta very simply that sometimes we get angry at others when we don't do things we feel we should, to prove they are to blame and not us. I gave some everyday examples. She laughed and blushed; what I was teaching her matched her experiences. Her ''homework'' assignment was to stop whenever she got angry and think about what she was supposed to do that she was refusing to do. After she found what it was, she was to do it right away. She said she would. I told her that if she did it, her feelings would change. She wouldn't have any more need to prove she wasn't to blame.
>
> Two weeks later, when she returned, I asked her how things were going. ''When I went home,'' she said, ''I was determined not to get angry, but the next day I got angry at everything. I was tying Andrew's shoes, and as I would tie one and go to the next, he would untie it. When I would go to tie it again, he would untie the other one. When I got them both tied, he untied them with both hands at once. I was so mad I caught myself about to hit him. Then I remembered the homework and tried to think of what was right that I should do. I couldn't think of anything. As I sat there concentrating, I called Andrew over to me and I put him on my lap and just sat there rocking with my arms around him and my eyes closed, trying to think of what was right. After a long time I knew the right thing was just to love him and I started to cry and couldn't stop. I sat there hugging him. My mother came over to me and said, 'You were getting angry, weren't you?' I said, 'Yes.' She said, 'But you didn't, did you?' 'No, Mother, I didn't get angry.' And since I've stopped getting angry, everyone has started liking me.''

Roberta later told me that when her friends come to get her to play basketball she tells them she wants to stay with her kids, and told me it wasn't any sacrifice to do it. She said that what she had written in her diary about her cruelty to animals and her fistfighting even with teachers now "grosses me out." Her boyfriend called long-distance, and as they talked he stopped and asked, "Roberta, is that you?" "Yes, it's me." And a little later, "Are you sure this is you?" "Sure, of course it's me." Andrew has turned out to be a very loving, happy, and obedient child.

A standard psychiatric diagnosis would have classified Roberta's problem as a "characterological disorder"—an "illness" very resistant to intervention. But for Roberta, changing was not the prolonged struggle many would have predicted. She did not learn to "cope" with people because they were problems for her. Instead she ceased to see them as problems. She gave up her blaming emotions because she no longer had anything to blame them for.

Another way to end self-deception is to be emotionally honest about ongoing self-betrayals and collusions, which is to say, to "yield our hearts" wholly to the truth. From inside of self-deception we cannot conceive the truth that needs to be admitted; nevertheless, it is possible to be truthful. For we do not find the truth by searching for it; instead, the truth is simply what is there—it is what we are—when we stop being false.

My husband and I are both writers. We have a baby. Shawn insists without sympathy that I keep the house clean, prepare the meals, stay well-dressed and appealing, and, most of all, keep the baby absolutely quiet during his writing hours. I write during the baby's afternoon nap if I can, but usually *late* at night and early in the morning.

If there is any noise from the baby, Shawn is not patient. He bitingly asks whether I understand the importance of what he is writing or its crucial place in his career or what it means for our future. Until recently tears would well up in my eyes in response to this harshness. Sometimes I would protest that he had no right to speak rudely to me. A quarrel would ensue. But more often I would suffer this sharpness silently and bitterly. I could not understand why I had to suffer when I had done nothing wrong.

One morning I was doing an assignment on collusion—writing a case. I left the bedroom door ajar and the baby toddled out. She was scattering some of Shawn's pages when he saw her. He began to yell at me. Immediately I felt attacked; I began to burn with resentment and to search my mind for some way I could respond in kind. But all of a sudden I thought, "It's a lie. What I am doing right now is a lie." I was doing the very thing that I was imputing to him! My rage just melted. I was filled with compassion toward Shawn for the first time in a long time. In fact, all I could think of in that moment was how I could help my husband.

LOVE

Celia "before" and Celia "after" are represented respectively by the collusion diagram and the diagram below. Before she yielded to

the truth, Celia, when she looked at Shawn, saw a person who was hurting her. That "perception" was not the truth; it was a false accusation. After, because she looked at him with no accusing feelings, she did not see him hurting her; she did not feel hurt. What did she see? A person who was hurting himself. This, at last, was the truth.

When our hearts change as Celia's did, we are able to perceive others as betraying themselves and even acting maliciously, if they are, but we will not take offense. This is what it means, in this context, to see the truth and not to live a lie.

What emotion do we have when we perceive another hurting himself and do not ourselves feel we are being hurt? Obviously, we no longer feel threatened and defensive. Some of the things we struggled for before might not even seem important to us now. Our false values have been left behind. And we aren't overcome with anxiety about protecting ourselves. Our insecurity and desperation are gone. We see another human being in trouble; our hearts go out to him. When compassion enters, fear departs. "Perfect love," John said, "casteth out fear" (1 John 4:18).

What are we that we can have the kinds of emotional troubles we have and yet be capable of being free of them, happy, and at peace? What are we that we are capable of feeling both animosity and compassion? A simple way to answer these questions is to say, We are loving. Or, more accurately, we *would be* loving if we weren't making something else of ourselves—if we weren't generating accusing emotions. I will discuss this point later.

HELPING OTHERS

When we are compassionate, we matter-of-factly expect others to do what they themselves know is right and to perform up to their ability. And we genuinely—not indulgently—desire to help them help themselves. Our compassion requires us to do all we can to help heal any damage we have contributed to: we may ask forgiveness for the offenses we have committed, and especially for taking offense, and we

will do whatever we can to heal the damage. We will refuse to collude again, no matter how enticed or provoked. No longer feeling provoked and reinforced in their self-betrayal—no longer feeling the need to defend themselves—our former colluders are left undefended before their own consciences. And the most immediate issue of conscience for them is how to respond to the honest expectations and the love that are now being extended to them. Though there is no guarantee that they will respond in kind, it is amazing to me how often they do. I haven't space for a specimen of the many stories I've collected that illustrate this point, but year-and-a-half-old Andrew is an example, and so is Celia's husband, Shawn, whose attitude softened for many months after the episode she related.

The most powerful human incentive, in families or organizations, is the opportunity to grow in an atmosphere free from accusing attitudes and evasion. Simply giving up our own negative attitudes is the best thing we can do to help others give up their negative attitudes and grow. If this is our primary desire, there is no limit to the power for good we can have. When others give up their negative attitudes in response to us, they become free to turn and affect other people in the same way, including ourselves. What they give back to us is love. In this way individuals liberated from self-concern create around themselves a society that cares for them and motivates them further to care in return.

II

There may be readers who find my position interesting, congenial, or perhaps even correct, but who are put off because it doesn't sound ''scientific.'' Its terminology is that of everyday life, with a tone that seems more moral or religious. I'd like to indicate briefly the reasons why my position is a bona fide theory of human behavior, and more adequate than rival theories.[2]

One of the rivals might best be called ''mechanistic.'' For a long time most psychologists and philosophers have thought that we human beings are nothing more or less than completely physical, very complicated objects. Since we have working parts, we are different from such simple objects as rocks and water puddles. We are machines, machines constructed of meat rather than of metal or plastic. Our component parts—the mechanisms that make up these machines—respond to stimulation from one another and from the external environment; that's how our behavior is produced. The currently popular idea that the human nervous system is a highly complex computer is a version of this mechanistic point of view.

Though it's by no means dead, this conception of human beings is clearly losing its grip. A growing number of theoreticians from a variety of disciplines are finding it far more fruitful to regard human beings as role-players in large-scale social dramas. According to this "dramaturgical" conception of humanity, our personalities are the roles we play, and we develop these personalities by "internalizing" others' expectations of us, accepting the social status (with its rights and obligations) that they assign to us, and adopting the repertoires of speech, emotion, and gesture that brand us as having that status. Thus, insofar as an individual is a person, he is "socially constructed" to be a particular kind of person—an individual with a particular kind of status—in one or more class-striated systems, such as a group, family, institution, community, or society. "Social constructionism" is one of the most widely used names for this kind of theory.[3]

The mechanistically oriented study of behavior has generated methods that are intended to mimic the methods of the physical sciences and very technical vocabularies to accompany these methods. (Actually what is mimicked is a simplistic misunderstanding of the methods of the physical sciences, but that is a separate issue.) Part of the motivation for this attempted mimicry is a widespread (and false) belief that the terms in which we daily talk about one another are too vague to be "scientifically" useful. But from the social constructionist viewpoint these everyday language terms are the *only* ones acceptable for explaining behavior, because they are the very terms that guide behavior. No other theory or conception of ourselves can fit our conduct as well as the conception we have of ourselves as we act, for it is out of that conception that our conduct flows; the conduct perfectly expresses it. (One of the social constructionists' criticisms of mechanistic approaches is that their discoveries are made in contrived or artificially described situations and can be related to the behavior of ordinary life—which, after all, is what we want to understand better—only by guesswork.)

On the mechanistic view, we are what nature has made us, presumably through evolutionary processes, and we do what we are physically stimulated to do. We respond to stimuli in predictable patterns. One of the standard complaints brought against mechanism is that it cannot account for the sense we all have when we act—especially when the choice is between duty and self-interest—that we, and not just our bodily appetites and aversions, are responsible for what we do and that we can choose to do otherwise if we will. Moreover, conduct that can coordinate with the conduct of others—that can enter into "the conversation of mankind"—must not merely seek the satisfaction of appetites and the avoidance of pain; it must conform to standards of intelligibility and propriety shared by others, standards that silently guide and coordinate conduct. These standards or mores

are and can be maintained *nowhere else* than in the community functioning *as* a community. They cannot be sustained wholly within an individual psyche or even by a collection of individuals who do not form a community. (Even colluders deeply alienated from each other are bound together in an irreducibly corporate activity that depends upon their sharing an understanding of what it means to be offensive, obligated, excused, justified, etc.) The developing person adopts and assimilates these standards as his own as he learns by public responses to enter into the communal ''conversation,'' and only subsequently and gradually does he ''privatize'' his communal skills and thereby establish his own ''individuality.'' So *as a person* he is essentially one with others, essentially responsive and responded to, essentially constituted by his relation to others in his community. In the mechanistic picture we are far too radically individual for all this to be possible. Though that picture allows for us to stimulate one another electrochemically, there is no room in it for individuals to be constituted essentially by their responsiveness to one another.

On the constructionist view, we are what others have made us by means of the processes of socialization. We do what we are silently guided to do by the expectations of intelligibility and propriety the assimilation of which has made us the persons that we are. We do it in order to acquire legitimacy in the estimation of others. This is true, the social constructionists claim, even though we may never realize that such expectations are the sources of our desires and choices—even though we misguidedly may feel we are acting from inner convictions without regard to what other people think. For we acquired the convictions as part of the process of social construction in the first place. So the social constructionists' problem is just the opposite of the mechanists'. On their view we're *wholly* responsive; our individuality tends to disappear. There is nothing in a strictly constructionist conception of the universe to moderate the unperceived control exerted by the community. If we are merely role-players, we may be agents, but not independent agents—not ''agents unto ourselves.''

Aware of this problem, some constructionists ascribe individualistic characteristics to human beings. For example, some say we are inherently honor- or approval-seeking. This helps explain why individuals are susceptible to the community's techniques of social construction. But the solution it provides loads the theory with some of the deficiencies of mechanism. It conceives of individuals as adopting the community mores not because of a fundamental sensitivity to the personal reality of others, but as beings who are manipulated, by their status-seeking caretakers, to seek a status of their own. I suspect that adding this dimension to constructionism represents persons so individualistic, so self-encased, that socialization becomes impossible.

What are we, then, if we are neither essentially self-interested nor wholly other-directed? We are creatures capable of responding to others as others, which means we are capable of responding to their responsiveness to us. We are beings of empathy, caring, and love. We can regard ourselves as being like others and of them, and regard each of them in the same way. It is this, not an inherently approval-seeking disposition, that makes our socialization possible.

Nevertheless, the constructionists are right to this extent: we are beholden to the others in the community for our repertoires of speech, emotion, and gesture—the wherewithal of personality and agency. Our capacity for love acquires its form of expression only in a particular family, tribe, community, society, and culture. Though we are not wholly what we are made to be in the process of socialization—though we are something besides, something individual—it is nonetheless true that without this process our individuality could not be realized. We would mature biologically, but we would not become persons. Our agency is inseparable from our capacity to love, and our capacity to love is dependent upon the people whom we are committed to love.

In the first part of this paper I tried to outline why creatures essentially loving and responsive could profoundly misunderstand their own natures. It is because of sin. In sin, we are convinced we are objects controlled by factors within and without, frustrated by others in our search for satisfactions that would not otherwise be very interesting to us. But this conviction is a consequence of self-deception. We are not objects; we are not inherently self-seeking. Instead, we make ourselves—indeed bind ourselves—to act self-seekingly. Our self-concern is an artifact, a creation for which we ourselves are responsible.

There's little wonder that close observers of human conduct have thought otherwise. They've supposed that the insecurity and brutality of most of humankind can only be explained on the premise that we are *in our natures* wholly self-interested—carnal, territorial, possessive, approval-seeking, power-hungry, etc. Now the theory I have been outlining does not deny or discount the insecurity and brutality. But instead of explaining them in terms of our natures, it explains them in terms of sin. It derives the characteristic behavior of fallen mankind from the idea of sin. Far from original, this is the most ancient explanation of such behavior.

This claim is not just an alternative to mechanism. It is empirically more powerful. The mechanist view cannot allow that individuals might be motivated by love and integrity rather than self-interest. It excludes the possibility out of hand. It cannot allow for St. Francis, Betsey ten Boom, Mother Teresa, Viktor Frankl, Joseph Smith—good people found here and there all over the world, including a number in my very neighborhood—and above all Jesus. But if, as I claim, what

we really are (or would be, if we were not playing ourselves false) is loving, and if sin can be shown to generate all the patterns of self-interested behavior the mechanists can account for, then my view explains more than mechanism does. It explains altruism as well as egoism; love as well as enmity.

There are parallel points to be made about social constructionism. If all personality is role-playing, it is all self-conscious and insecure. This is true even if, as some constructionists say, we are essentially honor-seeking. As I noted earlier, when we strive to fulfill roles we cannot avoid suspecting that we are not what we are striving to be. Our behavior then becomes an anxious flight from the empty or unworthy selves we fear we are. Thus, unless we are more than our roles, the process of socialization can result only in individual inauthenticity.

So the constructionist theory cannot allow—as my theory can—for the possibility that there are human beings not ridden with anxiety, even subliminally, or for the possibility of a loving symbiosis in which the young acquire the ways of the community without ever feeling the need to do so in order to make themselves legitimate in the eyes of the others, and therefore without ever having occasion to suspect that all they are is what they've managed to arrange in the minds of other people. Social constructionism excludes these possibilities in advance.

Nor is it just empirically that the kind of view I'm offering is stronger than its rivals. Ultimately, I believe, it's the only *theoretical* basis for refusing to despair over the prospects for humankind. (Of course there are religions and individuals who are not despairing, but I am speaking of theories here.) Part of the intellectual fashion of our era is to think it charitable to excuse people for their behavior on the grounds that it can be completely explained by reference to their biological make-up or their early life experiences. ''To understand all is to forgive all.'' Clarence Darrow made himself a celebrity by arguing against the imprisonment of criminals on the grounds that anyone with their backgrounds would have turned out similarly. But contrary to what he supposed, there is no charity in this idea, only indulgence. People who believe it can extend no hope to those of us who are emotionally troubled; in their view we are stuck with our emotional deficiencies and will simply have to cope as best we can (perhaps with the aid of drugs that diminish our sensibilities generally, so that we can be rid of our destructive intensities only by giving up our enlivening ones into the bargain). Not only that, people who believe this doctrine will tend, like Tad's mother, to collude with disturbed individuals in their pity for themselves. A collusive indulgence is just as condemnatory and, if accepted, just as debilitating as a collusive accusation. On the other hand, treating people as responsible for their emotional lives is not condemnatory: it is a form of believing in them. It holds out hope.

I tend to think that at bottom all our self-betrayals are withholdings of this hope from others and from ourselves. They are refusals to love. The perpetual decision most of us make to persist in self-betrayal is a decision against acting for the welfare of others and in favor of the (supposed) gratification of ourselves. It is a refusal to forget ourselves and to be at one with others. The pursuit of an idealized image of ourselves is such a refusal; we place our hope of fulfillment in achieving it. Self-disparagement is such a refusal; in it, we are preoccupied with the idea that we have unfulfilled needs that must be met before we can reach out to others, and with the idea that we have incapacities that prevent us from reaching out to others. In short, our emotional problems are refusals to love.

CHILDREN

The hope I have spoken of extends even to the primary historical sources of emotional problems, namely, the influence of collusive parents. The predominant pattern is for children to adopt the collusory style of one or both parents, develop troubled personalities, and then perpetuate the family collusions in future relationships; they may even select marriage partners with whom they can carry them on. Nevertheless, though this pattern is commonplace it can be broken. Though children and other nonaccountable people can learn to collude—though they are capable of acting against conscience—it is not they who are responsible for any wrong that is done. The sins of such children are answered upon the heads of the fathers; the fathers are accountable. Little children cannot sin. Nevertheless, though they are not accountable for wrongdoing, the children are instruments by which the parents do it—the children are, as it were, the ''proximate agents''—and therefore they suffer the consequences of doing wrong as if they *were* responsible even though they are not! They suffer self-deception, guilt, anxiety, and enmity. The sins of the fathers are visited upon the heads of the children.

It's usually thought that psychological problems originating in childhood are like wounds that have not healed since being inflicted. But in my view we who are suffering from such problems are continuing to collude with our parents; our difficulty does not lie in what was done to us in the past but in what we are doing in the present. We may be subject to chronic failure; we may be driven to succeed even at the expense of relationships with loved ones; we may be hypochondriac or ill-tempered or macho or sexually deviant or depressive. There are countless kinds of attitudes with which we can continue to try to prove that we're worthwhile or admirable or exonerated or victimized or some other excused or justified kind of person. But precisely this

is the hopeful point: Because the problems we developed from our early nurturance are our attitudes in the present, we can give them up and be rid of the burden we are carrying forward from the past.

> Margaret was a twenty-nine-year-old woman who asked to attend one of my seminars. She had been in counseling or therapy for fourteen years, chronically depressed and almost nonfunctional. She blamed her misfortunes on her mother. She never had more than a single friend at a time and would alienate that person within a few weeks. Her lips trembled when she talked and were tightly pinched when she didn't, and her eyes were always downcast. I found it hard to pity her because she was obviously expending a great deal of pity on herself. Privately I learned that her mother had molested and abused her frequently when she was a child and thus, as Margaret thought, ruined her life forever.
>
> The seminar extended over the Christmas and New Year's holidays. When it reconvened on 10 January, a woman entered the room about twenty minutes late whom I did not recognize. In a few minutes I realized with a shock who it was and whispered to my assistant, "It's Margaret." Simultaneously I saw others do the same. Her face was relaxed; there was a natural dignity in her bearing. And when she spoke, as she did presently, her lips did not tremble. The self-pity was gone. Her countenance seemed to be illuminated.
>
> She asked to speak and told us she had taken the train back to her hometown to see her mother. She had freely forgiven her. She desired her mother to have a taste of peace before she died and therefore asked her forgiveness for the hatred she had borne her since childhood. She said she now often has tender thoughts toward her mother and calls and writes to her, whereas before this episode she hadn't made contact with her for years. Her fear of being betrayed by friends, which was what tended to drive them away, has eased. During the course of the succeeding year, she became able to hold a job successfully. I have heard from her occasionally since, and she seems to be doing a little better each time.

BEYOND SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

My brief account is and must be incomplete. For its completion, it is necessary to venture beyond the human sciences and philosophy into the domain of religion. I want to mention several reasons why.

First, I think self-honesty that is sufficient to end self-deception requires an independent witness to cut through our hardness and speak directly to our hearts. My strictly theoretical position is that the bondage of sin is so overwhelming that without such a witness we would be mired in it forever. My faith is that a Spirit of truth does strive with us, whether or not we understand or acknowledge it.

Second, even though we may muster a degree of emotional honesty in response to this Spirit, more is usually required. By our sinfulness we generally habituate our bodies to certain gratifications. These habituations are oppressive and return unwelcomed to the individual struggling to repent. Their eradication is the function of the redemptive

power to be found in a living religion, a power no one caught in the bondage of sin can possibly generate on his own.

Third, we need an understanding that is impossible without revelation of what it means to be a moral agent. In nurturing us, our caretakers invest in us everything that they are. They make us one of them. In return, we tacitly make a covenant or commitment to treat them as love would dictate. And we become their fiduciaries, as it were, to personify their mores and tradition in whatever we do from childhood on. We accept a trust. Therefore, when we betray ourselves we betray that trust. We play our caretakers false. Moreover, though we will scarcely admit it at the time, being self-deceived, we dishonor our commitment of conscience to those of our caretakers and contemporaries whom we encourage or provoke to enter into collusion with us—to side in our enmity or to stand accusingly against us. We foster alienation rather than solidarity. Sin is an active crusade of world defilement, conducted in the pretense that we are only doing the best we can to cope with the troubles being dealt to us, but which in fact we ourselves are promoting.

By the same token, when we abandon sin, through the instrumentality of a living redeemer, we become what we are when we aren't trying to be anything special, that is, compassionate and self-forgetful. We have already seen what impact this can have upon others: it is the single most important thing we can do to help them extricate themselves from the bondage of sin. Knowing this, we are happy to suffer whatever we must for their sakes; we are unwilling to take offense or withhold forgiveness. In the words of Carlfred Broderick, we ''metabolize the poison of the prior generations.'' Thus our actions may in a small way recapitulate the Savior's sacrifice and atonement, with effects upon others that follow his pattern. Or we may replicate the devil's acts of betrayal and alienation with effects not unlike the ones he achieves. We may accept the sacrifice of the Lamb or else reject it by insisting upon having other people be our scapegoats. Insofar as we are endowed with what I have been calling moral or spiritual sensitivity, we cannot stand on neutral ground. We may follow the way of the great accuser, who is Satan, seeking by means of sin to gain a bogus certification of worthiness—a salvation, of a fraudulent kind, in our sins—or the way of him who came not to condemn the world, but to save it from sin. I do not think there is anything in uninspired human experience to teach us how much is at stake in all that we choose to do from moment to moment.

I am aware that this kind of talk about religion is bad manners in academic society. That is understandable; religion is widely suspect. One reason is that what our rational and empirical methods have disclosed to us of religion confuses it with self-righteous counterfeits

of religion. So much the worse for these methods. We need more, much more, than we are getting from them. By any standard of scientific inquiry, the human sciences are in disarray. There's no good reason to invest our trust in any of them—including my own version of what they ought to be saying.

When I set out to solve certain conceptual problems that recur in the human sciences and in philosophy, I discovered, gradually, that the important things I finally prepared myself to say had been said before—some in Eastern religious texts, some in Western authors such as certain Christian mystics and Shakespeare and Kierkegaard, some in the commonplace wisdom of guileless people in many communities, but all of it better said and shown in the Hebrew, Christian, and Latter-day Saint scriptures. Without having it as a prior aim, I have come to feel that my work is to convey something of the power of these scriptures to those who do not know them, an endeavor that admittedly loses important elements in the translation.

Though I am by no means the first to make these claims, it seems worthwhile to keep repeating them: Our ignoble desires are not ultimately derived from an ignoble nature, and our anxieties are not the result of being unable to make ourselves whatever we are striving to be. These desires and anxieties stem from our betrayal of what we really are, from our refusal to love, from an exercise of our agency that ties that agency in knots—in short, from sin. If we're emotionally troubled, it is not because we were created to be that way but because we have betrayed, perverted, and denied what we were created to be. The condition of our liberation from our unwanted desires and anxieties is our responsiveness, in love, to what others need from us, and to the supreme loving act that makes our love possible.

NOTES

[1]See, for example, Carol Tavris, *Anger, the Misunderstood Emotion* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), and C. Terry Warner, "Anger and Similar Delusions," in *The Social Construction of Emotion*, ed. Rom Harré (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986).

[2]Further reading on the social science issues I discuss may be found in Rom Harré, David Clarke, and Nicola de Carlo, *Motives and Mechanisms* (London: Methuen, 1985); Rom Harré, *Social Being: A Theory for Social Psychology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979); John Shotter, *Social Accountability and Selfhood* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); and in the many sources cited in these volumes.

[3]Among the more important predecessors of social constructionism are such diverse figures as Thorstein Veblen, George Herbert Mead, and Jean-Paul Sartre.

March

The low cloud cover drifts as slowly
as windblown piles of snow.
This is the time
of earliest budding, like the first curds
that rise to the surface in a butter churn,
the time of the hard brown buds
of the willow oak, with its mauve samaras
spreading through the limbs like a low-grade fever.
Though cedar and pine
have held on to greenness relentlessly,
elm branches are empty;
racks of pecan and hickory
are dry sticks against a sky
cold and grey as tin.
Only the dogwood and the redbud
are flowering now, set deeply within
the deadened heart of the woods;
they are coals smoldering, about to touch
the dry kindling of trees—
fire in these flowers, fever in my veins
rising to touch the skin.
Though the fields are still covered by winter straw
rattling in the harsh wind,
tenacious seeds of a hope
thaw in the frozen stupor of the dirt.

—John P. Freeman

John P. Freeman teaches English at the Oakley Training School in Raymond, Mississippi.

Comment on C. Terry Warner's "What We Are"

Ivana Markova

Much present psychology is based on cognition rather than emotion, and even subjects such as morality and agency are usually associated with cognitive assumptions. For example, morality has been explored in psychology virtually exclusively in the context of cognitive development, with moral judgment and moral reasoning in a child unfolding alongside the changes in the child's structure of knowledge. Emotions, on the other hand, have been viewed as disruptive, interfering with the child's operational thinking and causing him to focus on irrelevant aspects of situations.[1] The dramaturgical approach to the study of human action, favored now by many of those concerned with agency and self, also disregards emotions, since, as Harré maintains, they are not admissible as causes of actions.[2] The role of emotions in psychology has been traditionally relegated to the realm of pathological or at least disruptive behavior to be treated by therapy or controlled by the individuals who suffer it. Indeed, psychotherapies often explain emotions cognitively—as attributional, cognitive, and Gestalt therapies do—or conceptualize and acknowledge them, as humanistic therapy does.

Professor Warner makes a very valuable contribution to psychology by bringing the subject of emotions to the close attention of psychologists. Using both persuasive arguments and pertinent illustrations, he demonstrates that emotions are essential to many of our daily inter-personal interactions and to the views we have of ourselves and thus that their study should become the subject matter of mainstream psychology.

Warner identifies the problem of contemporary psychology in pointing out that the dramaturgical model of man that is now replacing the traditional model of man as a natural being, although it appeals to human agency, does not, in fact, leave much space for agency. Support for Warner's claim can also be found in the theory of the agency-oriented social construction of self-knowledge, in which the information we get

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from others is a main source of our self-knowledge.[3] This view is based on an interpretation of Mead, according to whom "we are in possession of selves just insofar as we can and do take the attitudes of others towards ourselves and respond to those attitudes."[4] But both the dramaturgical approach and the social-construction-of-knowledge approach seem to have difficulty in pinpointing exactly what the agent is, and it appears that the fact that human beings take on and play different roles and do various things is sufficient for the agency metaphor. Playing roles and taking the attitudes of other people, Warner argues, does not suffice to define agency, for we are more than this. We are, first of all, beings who are morally responsive and who have moral expectations of ourselves. The agency of human beings, according to Warner's view, is independent of the role-playing ability; it is a "quality of our own." The question arises, though, what part society does play with respect to human agency as it is defined by Warner. If moral responsiveness leads to internalization of the expectations of a morally ordered community, what, then, can be the individual's contribution to his agency? If, on the other hand, moral responsiveness is an independent quality of each individual on his own, then it is not clear whether moral responsiveness bears any relation to society except in the sense of being thwarted by it, as Warner makes clear in the latter part of his paper.

Warner points out that through socialization we learn to be self-betraying actors since we are raised in a culture of collusion. Is the effect of society only negative? Warner's position on this issue is not obvious. According to Hegel, humanity is not given to human beings naturally. Rather, potential human beings, in order to become really human, must fight for their humanness in the process of anthropogenesis. It is in the process of interpersonal interaction—that is, in the mutual encounter of one conscious being with another conscious being—that self-consciousness eventually emerges: "I that is We and We that is I"; thus they recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.[5] These two characteristics, the recognition of other human beings for what they are and a desire to be so recognized by others, form the basis of humanity. Warner, on the other hand, seems to be saying that honest self-consciousness is given to human beings rather than being the result of their striving.

If self-betrayal is learned through the process of socialization, as Warner maintains, one would expect that it would be possible, through appropriate guidance, to delearn it. This is not so, however. Warner claims we cannot change our feelings by strength of will; neither can we change our emotions step-by-step. The only possibility of giving up self-betrayal is to start, from now on, "to be emotionally honest." It seems to me that there are at least two problems with this solution:

the first is related to Warner's claim that self-betrayal is lived, and the second is related to what one can mean by emotional honesty.

On the first of these problems, the answer of philosophers to the question as to how self-deception is possible has usually been based on the assumption that since people try to protect their self-image and self-esteem they either avoid facing the facts, or reinterpret the information available to them, or divert their attention from damaging information, and so on. In other words, at some level of preconsciousness or consciousness they "know" what is true and what is not true about themselves, and as a result they choose a suitable strategy to protect their threatened self-images. If I understand him correctly, Warner says, on the other hand, that it is not reinterpretation of information or denial or anything else that mediates between the damaging information and ourselves. Rather, we actually experience information as painful or damaging; we actually suffer accusing emotions; we feel others as being at fault. In other words, it is not that information is over there in the world and we respond to it emotionally. Instead, we experience it directly and so actually live a lie. This idea is thought provoking, and it appears that Warner's position is similar to Gibson's theory which holds that a percept is directly perceived rather than derived through reconstruction and internal representation. But if one senses the pain of self-betrayal directly, with no mediator intervening between the truth and the lie, how can one stop betraying oneself? How can I stop doing something if I do not know there is anything I should stop doing? What criterion does a self-betraying person have that he is betraying himself? We may, of course, still be responsible for our distorted view of reality just as we are responsible for our attempt to protect our self-image.

The second problem with Warner's solution is how to distinguish, conceptually and empirically, between immature childish retaliation and an honest emotion. Warner, as I understand him, calls for a return to what we were before we started betraying ourselves. But is this possible? Just as evolution cannot go back, one cannot become what one was before. Even spontaneity changes during one's life. Childish spontaneity is immature and to be rejected, but it seems to me that the other kind of spontaneity, an unspoilt, honest presocialization emotion, is impossible because it is impossible to go back. Experience, gained through our socialization, cannot be rubbed out. Warner's position would mean that, in some way, human beings are static and unchangeable, which would contradict his agency model.

The question of the relationship between self-knowledge and self-deception arises in this context. Self-knowledge is gained through a process of active engagement in the world with other people and physical objects. Self-knowledge gained in the process of interpersonal interaction is due both to the knower's interacting with the other person and to

his reflecting upon such interaction. When does one stop gaining self-knowledge and start betraying oneself instead? Taking Warner's position, it would be when one attempts to justify one's actions rather than just understand and evaluate them. Self-justification is an accusing emotion, and it takes over either when one does not take deeply enough the role of the other person (one is not empathic enough) or when one does not reflect deeply enough upon one's own action. We could say that an accusing emotion is a shortcut for not enough role-playing because one is too egocentric. Could we not say, therefore, that self-betrayal may arise both from cognition and emotion?—although talk about cognition and emotion separately is for convenience only, since there is no evidence of two separate compartments of cognition and emotion in the mind.

Warner's views as expressed in his paper have important consequences for social skills training. The general philosophy in social skills training in clinical, social, and educational psychology, and in mental handicap, is to raise the trainee's social competence to a normative level. It is assumed that competence in interpersonal interaction is closely related to the ability to follow rules of behavior, such as the amount of eye contact, physical distance, and other definable elements of behavior. A successful training program can improve a person's general social effectiveness and role-playing abilities. Such programs, however, do not offer much opportunity for a person to develop his agency. If Warner's agency position is to be taken seriously, any attempt to help people become socially efficient must be based on the individual's agency and not imposed from outside because this would reflect a mere role-playing model that is passive and static.

NOTES

[1]Thomas Lickona, ed., *Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research, and Social Issues* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1976).

[2]Rom Harré, *Social Being: A Theory for Social Psychology* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979).

[3]Kenneth J. Gergen, "The Social Construction of Self-knowledge," in *The Self: Psychological and Philosophical Issues*, ed. Theodore Mischel (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977), 139–69.

[4]George Herbert Mead, "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control," *International Journal of Ethics* 35 (April 1925): 251–77.

[5]Georg W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* [1807], trans. J. B. Baillie (New York: Macmillan, 1949), 226–29.

Response to Markova

C. Terry Warner

Being brief and written for a broad audience, my paper could not deal with every important issue. By her sensitive, incisive, and clear statement of some of the issues I did not treat, Ivana Markova has given me an excellent opportunity to suggest some of the more subtle implications of my position. I am grateful to her for this.

She raises four main issues:

1. I wrote that in order to be socialized, we must in our natures be something more than a capacity to take up social roles. For there are some social role-networks that are alien to our humanity, in that however vigorously we may pursue them we will be tormented in doing so, while being assimilated into certain other role-networks fosters serenity of spirit. In other words, socialization is more than the acquisition of roles. It is a matter of internalizing expectations that are, in a broad sense, moral expectations. Therefore, as a condition for being assimilated into the moral order of a community, we must, in ourselves, be moral sensibilities—beings with agency to appreciate, internalize, and even violate such expectations.

Markova asks, if it be true that our agency stands prior to and independent of society's influence, then what effect can that influence have upon the exercise of our agency, except a negative, oppositional one? On the other hand, if our actual moral commitments at any one time are *only* internalizations of preexisting social expectations, and there is no moral nature apart from the socialized person, we cannot be said to contribute *anything* to the exercise of our agency, except for the trivial fact that it is we rather than some others who are exercising it. Apparently we are left to choose between a picture of the individual as an autonomous being potentially pitted against an intrinsically alien society and a picture of the individual as wholly a product of society. Markova intimates that I have given reasons for accepting both of these irreconcilable pictures as well as reasons for rejecting both of them.

One way to clarify the issue is to say that although the moral commitments we form in the process of socialization are ways of acting out roles that are dictated to us by our tradition, we become individuals only by actively taking up that tradition for ourselves. The influence of society is possible only by means of this active exercise of

agency, just as the exercise of agency is possible only by way of desires, emotions, and fears that are mediated through others. Hence, the character of the individual being socialized is neither autonomous nor dictated. It is mediated. The *We* that is society is the *I* in which it is incarnated: Hegel is right, and so is Markova for endorsing him on this issue. Equally, the *I* is the *We:* there can be no possibility that the emerging individual is autonomous and possibly thwarted by an independent society. If thwarted at all (and this does not necessarily happen), it is because the attitude by which the individual regards society as opposing him is a collusory one: he is accomplice to his own stultification. Even what threatens agency manifests agency.

2. I wrote that self-betrayal is a lie that is lived, in that the agent retains no residual or "unconscious" sense of the truth. Lacking this, he cannot evaluate himself and thereby overturn the lie; he has no leverage against his capacity to transform his world totally by the lies he lives.

If then we have no way of knowing we are self-deceived, Markova asks, how can we put an end to self-deception? My answer, which I develop at length in a forthcoming book, is that there is an emotional bondage in self-deception. We pursue our own misery systematically, *as if* we cannot help it. One way to try to explain this compulsivity, which is by no means limited to clinical cases, is Freud's way, in terms of the absolute unacceptability both of facing up to the dark side of our natures and of hiding them from ourselves by self-deception. In this view, we are forever conflicted in our personalities as a condition of our humanity; psychological peace is impossible. I think I have a more adequate way to explain the self-deceiver's compulsivity: since the lie that is lived is global, every conceivable way out of it is a cul-de-sac in the labyrinth: it leads only into other regions of the self-deception. This does not mean that we cannot extricate ourselves from our self-deceptions, but only that we cannot do so by analysis, or with the help of a plan, or through reflection. The path we must take is not one we can see in advance.

What then is the path? For one thing (though there is no room to discuss this in the present paper), even though we retain no access to the truth when we are self-deceiving, there are telltale signs that something is wrong. In particular, we are anxious to prove that the emotions we are suffering are genuine and not mere pretenses, for we feel assailed from every side by challenges to our claims that we are victims. So the possibility that we are not being truthful is a constant preoccupation for us. It may seem, therefore, that we have a secret access to the truth and are vigorously covering it up. But I maintain it isn't the truth that we are thus defensive about, for if we were to "admit" it we would not arrive at serenity of spirit but would beat

our breasts self-condemningly and remain as agitated about justifying ourselves ("At least I am not a hypocrite anymore!") as we ever were. Even for one who pays attention to the telltale signs, the conceivable ways out are cul-de-sacs.

How then may we stop deceiving ourselves? Just because something cannot be done in steps, it does not follow that it cannot be done at all. From observation of many cases, I have come to believe that escaping self-deception is an absolutely simple act that is ever within our power (given the spiritual resources I mention in the last section of my paper). We are able simply to be honest, to "get off it," to stop the self-insistence. A self-deception must be renewed in every moment by attentive pursuit of our self-justification; equally, it is within our power at every moment to abandon the effort. After all, deceiving oneself in the first place cannot be accomplished by taking thought either. (If anyone doubts this, let him try it.)

3. Markova writes that I seem in my paper to suggest that by means of emotional honesty we may return to our childhood condition of pristine spontaneity, whereas this is clearly impossible since it would require undoing the socialization that has made us what we are and what we must be in order to be capable of that kind of honesty. For me there is a difference between a child's kind of innocence and the innocence possible for people who have become accountable for their acts. By repenting of the lies we have been living, we become like little children in openness and straightforwardness but without the child's kind of innocence. We come to our adult kind of innocence after complicity in the world's sorrows, and when we do, the oppositions between ourselves and others that we may have nurtured in our lifetimes are at last reconciled. For little children, those oppositions do not yet exist. To mark the difference between the two kinds of innocence, we might call the child's kind *innocence* and the adult's *virtue*. Virtue consists of overcoming evil by love, and so the path of virtue is a way through the world's troubles, not a way back. Little children are naive, not virtuous in this sense.

4. Markova raises also the issue of self-knowledge. I think she and I would agree that there is no self independent of knowledge of the self. The self is not an entity but is *only* the object of self-knowledge. Therefore, what we think we are when we are engaged in living a lie is a very different sort of thing from what we would think we are if we were free from self-deception. The self we conceive self-deceivingly is a creature replete with emotional needs, hungers, anxieties, and vulnerabilities that simply do not exist in the self we conceive when we are more self-forgetful, less self-involved, more concerned about others.

Death and Resurrection of a Cat

Her life had been as most: impulse quick,
acting out an instinct bred the size of rat's feet
scuttling across hardwood floors.
A hunter of ancient toothless insects.
Still, life always seemed enough
as she staggered in the grass, milk-drunk,
and collapsed on a million lightbeams,
     purring.

She lived overstuffed
as the cushion that held her impression
warm, long after stepping out for a meal (and
back again). Catnapping.
Suckling kittens.
Growing old with age tucked beneath calico hair,
     settling in bones
ready to leave their skeleton in the cool ground.

Fifteen years.
But the sixteenth, like a kitten pawing wild at imagination,
pain twisting   slowly, until blind
she began to step in her dish;
each time shaking off the indignation,
like shit on a silk slipper.
  Tearing out claws
    one by one
until fur hung thick with blood,
and the service porch like the aftermath of punctured arteries.

Perhaps
    a tumor self-destructing. Painfully.

Seventeen years to die,
and only eight more times to go.

              —R. Blain Andrus

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R. Blain Andrus is a poet living in Reno, Nevada.

Toward a Social Science of Contemporary Mormondom

Howard M. Bahr and Renata Tonks Forste

We have three main objectives: first, to sketch what we believe to be the essential characteristics of a responsible social science of the Mormon people and their cultures; second, to assess the social science of modern Mormondom through a review of the existing literature, and to highlight gaps—where they exist—between what is and what might or ought to be; third, to suggest some objectives and approaches that might help to move the social science of Mormonism and Mormondom from a prolonged infancy into a more robust childhood.[1]

MORMON CULTURE AND EMPIRICAL SCIENCE

Contemporary Mormondom consists of a people and their cultures. The people are members of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, together with their children under the age of baptism. A broader definition would include all people who consider Mormonism as their religious preference, whatever their membership status.

The term *culture* refers to a people's artifacts, ways of doing things, ideas, and beliefs. Cities, transportation networks, tools, technologies, and consumer goods of all sorts are cultural artifacts. Culture embraces people's notions about other people and about the earth and the cosmos and their modes of transmitting these beliefs and practices to others. Culture includes heritage: material objects and ecological organization, sacred shrines and special days, inherited proscriptions and priorities. Mormon temples, visitors' centers, meetinghouses, and office buildings are contemporary cultural artifacts. So are the historical bases of Mormonism preserved in books of scripture and history.

An adequate depiction of contemporary Mormon people and cultures must include the scientific and literary explanation of the past and of how the present came to be. However, to keep our task manageable and to avoid trespassing on the historians' turf, the focus

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of this paper is limited to the people and culture of contemporary Mormondom, that is, Mormon culture and behavior in the 1970s and 1980s. We do not define studies of Mormons published before 1970 as contemporary.

Viewing Mormondom from a social science perspective, we are not as concerned with the ultimate "truth" about the Church and its members as with those attributes of LDS people and their social life that may be observed and interpreted by Mormons and non-Mormons alike. Presumably, most social facts about Mormondom are accessible to anyone who applies appropriate measurement techniques, whether these be questionnaires, observations of church meetings, analyses of videotapes of general conferences, or compilations of vital statistics.

Social science, as we conceive it, involves an interplay among at least three elements: a body of knowledge, a set of techniques, and a social/historical context. The knowledge embraces information of more or less apparent accuracy about what exists—how things are thought to be—and about how the components of "reality" are thought to be interrelated. The techniques are accepted procedures for observation, inference, search, and verification. Scientific knowledge is information accumulated by the application of accepted rules of systematic observation and proof. Segments of the body of scientific knowledge are continually revised, and in theory all of it is subject to replication, reassessment, and reinterpretation. However, fads, customs, and power relationships affect the definition of problems and the collection, interpretation, and dissemination of scientific findings. Some things are rarely, if ever, questioned, and persons who challenge accepted facts or widely shared assumptions may be labeled as misguided, foolish, or even dangerous.

The most favorable social context for science is a free society where the community of interested persons—amateurs and professional scientists, dilettantes and specialists, common citizens and Nobel laureates—all have access to the accumulated evidence supporting accepted generalizations. Indeed, among the essential characteristics of the scientific method is the attribute of "communism," which in this context refers to the *obligation* of scientists to communicate their findings to each other and to interested people generally.[2] The term is shorthand for an ethic that treats scientific knowledge as belonging to everyone; it is not the property of any individual, school, organization, or nation.

In practice this ethic of universal access is sometimes honored in the breach. Scientific work is often competitive and may be biased in favor of powerful, respected institutions and scientists. Even so, the ideal of communism is perhaps the most critical standard of empirical science. Without open communication of findings and procedures, verification

is impossible. In the words of a recent book on social science research methods:

> The scientific approach is the ultimate democratic approach. It assumes that everyone has a right to the answers. Confronted with the questions, What is so? and How do you know? the scientists are obligated to transmit their knowledge (findings) clearly and often to spell out their implications. . . . They are obligated to describe their methods clearly enough that the doubter can follow step-by-step and arrive at his or her own conclusions in the matter. *The importance of this essential democratic ethic in science cannot be overstated.* Whereas the keepers of the mysteries in other knowledge systems—the priests, the wise ancients—were repositories of sacred, often secret knowledge and rituals, the high priests of science are bound by the ethics of the scientific method to make the "recipes" for their hard-won knowledge public.[3]

In accordance with this principle, we limit the "social science of Mormondom" to studies of the Mormon populations, however defined, that have yielded findings available to the public. In the strict—and ideal—sense, proprietary studies, whether conducted by governments, business concerns, or private organizations, are not part of contemporary scientific knowledge unless descriptions of methods used and results obtained are available to public scrutiny.

We share the perspective of the "sociology of knowledge" that people's *images* of what is, as well as so-called "facts" or "realities," determine their actions. People never confront reality whole or unbiased; their senses and experiences condition their perceptions of what is real, of what causes what, of what is going on. To a degree, we all live in private worlds: no one shares our unique experience and its effects on our perceptions and interpretations of life. If our private worlds become too private, people call us crazy, insane, or out-of-touch. If our private worlds seem to agree with those of most other people—if our "objectivity" matches that of our peers—we are regarded as good, practical people, validating the "common sense" of others, sanely in the mainstream. Nowadays that mainstream is increasingly defined by systematic observation. More and more, "reality" is shaped by empirical science.

There is a place in the development and continued expansion of scientific knowledge for impressions and intuitions, for playful conceptualizing, imaginative application of metaphor, and combining old ideas in new ways. Indeed, theorizing about the world around us with a sensitive imagination is an essential step to understanding. However, our illuminating insights are apt to be most useful if at some point we stop intuiting and do the systematic observation necessary to validate or refute them.

The character of good scientific work changes with the maturity and sophistication of a discipline. Early in the social science of

Mormondom, there was need for scholars such as Thomas O'Dea, who produced an insightful body of work on Mormon society based largely on personal experience and the creative assembling of example and illustration. O'Dea tied his view of Mormonism to the historical themes and currents of his own time in a way that helped his readers see things they might otherwise have missed. O'Dea may well have been, as Robert Michaelsen affirms in a posthumous tribute, "the first social scientist systematically to describe Mormonism as a religious movement."[4] His framework and observations continue to be useful sensitizing devices. In 1966 Leonard Arrington wrote that O'Dea's writings were the best treatment of Mormonism by a non-Mormon then available,[5] and contemporary book-length treatments of Mormonism are invariably held to O'Dea's standard.

O'Dea, as a pioneer, is not held to the same rules of evidence that must be required of his would-be scholarly descendants. Michaelsen speculates about how O'Dea might have responded to data that did not support his ideas about the impact of modernity on Mormonism:

> He would have raised questions about the adequacy of quantitative data for assessing vitality relative to the challenge of modernity. He was not primarily a data-oriented sociologist. He sought to go beyond data or to understand it in a larger context.[6]

The same kind of scientific impressionism and bold theorizing three decades later does not merit the same acclaim. There comes a time in the evolution of knowledge when it is not enough to explain by hunches and to illuminate by metaphor. At some point exploratory work must yield to system, quantification, and verification.

The necessity of this development is not yet recognized in all quarters, however. It is still high praise to be cited as "belonging with O'Dea." Thus Klaus Hansen's *Mormonism and the American Experience* was described by an enthusiastic reviewer as a book that "ranks with O'Dea's *The Mormons* as a classic of Mormon scholarship. Hansen has done more than any other scholar to help us place Mormonism in its broadest context."[7] To another reviewer, Mark Leone's *Roots of Modern Mormonism* is "the most penetrating and provocative analysis by a social scientist of Mormonism since O'Dea's now classic *The Mormons*."[8] It is notable that one can be penetrating and provocative, even "brilliant . . . and suggestive"[9] and still lack evidence for one's insights. For another reviewer of Leone's book warns the unwary about how shallow Leone's "brilliance" may be:

> Assertions offered as truth . . . tumble out in every chapter and are used to support one another in the absence of evidence. To be generous, we might call such claims "concluding hypotheses." . . . The ethnographic observations of contemporary Mormon religious practices are so few and so meager that it is surprising that any scholar would seek to explain so much with so little.[10]

include education, the economic order, political institutions, family and kinship, the military, and religion. The term *social structure* refers to the relationships among such essential societal functions.[11] Part of the knowledge base of a mature social science of Mormondom would be a delineation of LDS social structure in varying national and developmental (that is, preindustrial, industrial, and postindustrial) contexts.

A second way to identify strengths and weaknesses in existing work is the method of grounded theory, in which research literature is arranged among the "natural" categories into which it seems to fall, without being forced into a preconceived system. Identifying themes in a body of literature, as Mauss did in a recent essay on sociology and Mormon subculture, illustrates this approach. Mauss found that until about 1950, the scholarly literature on Mormons was mainly concerned with social geography, rural sociology, agricultural economics, the family, and fertility. After 1950 some new themes surfaced, including the impacts of modernization and secularization, the public images of Mormonism, politics and the Church, ethnic relations, gender roles and sexism, types and consequences of religiosity, and Mormonism's international expansion. Notable by their absence were studies of stratification, parent–child relationships, deviance, divorce, conversion, and defection.[12]

A third means of assessing comprehensiveness of inquiry is John Sorenson's list of ten "emergent levels," which provides a framework for categorizing all data about human activity and also for relating activities to each other systematically. Sorenson claims that "the ten levels form a hierarchy, from 'higher' to 'lower.'"[13] By referring to these "levels," we can see that some of the most important topics (or levels) necessary to a mature social science of Mormondom remain unexplored. The ten levels are:

10. Ideology (explanations of why things are as they are)
 9. Values (judgments of what is desirable)
 8. Knowledge (description of how things are)
 7. Communicative symbols (language, in the broadest sense)
 6. Social organization (interaction patterns)
 5. Population distribution (population in its spatial aspect)
 4. Demography (population in its temporal distribution)
 3. Technology (external means for energy processing)
 2. Human biology (somatic features and processes)
 1. Natural environment (the residual environment)[14]

Sorenson argues that there is a culture of Mormonism apart from the American culture, and that "the distinctiveness of the Mormons is ultimately based upon their unique worldview."[15] If there were representative data on Mormons in a variety of cultural settings, it would be possible to test the utility of Sorenson's hierarchy of levels of human activity as well as his notions about what makes Mormons distinctive.

Even so, among students of Mormonism, the market for explo
work continues to be much larger than seems justified by the ap
utility of the work. People identified as social scientists contin
publish works about Mormons in which impressions, intuitions
hypotheses are stated as facts.

There is some utility to "sensitizing theory," a term some
applied to unsystematic observation and unsupported conceptualiz;
Such writing may guide the reader to things otherwise unnoticed
there is also danger in impressionistic and intuitive analysis of
representative experience: it may point in wrong directions and
to faulty conclusions because we were beguiled into looking at tl
in one way rather than another. Glib generality and the omnis(
overstatement impede understanding at least as often as they pror
it. Both the scientific and the popular literature on Mormons si
from overconfident generalization from insufficient data, proo
authoritative testimonial, and affirmation based on personal, o
unreplicable, experience. There are exceptions, but most of the th
everyone—including the Mormons themselves—seems to know at
Mormondom are grounded so shallowly in evidence that we can
distinguish matter from myth.

We may applaud the pioneers who "go beyond data." We can
acclaim a subsequent generation of scholars who continue to do
If we credit O'Dea and some other early students of Mormondom w
having shown us "where to dig," an appropriate motto for mod(
students of Mormonism might be: "No more surveying; it's time
the shovels."

SOME STANDARDS OF SCOPE, EMPHASIS, AND METHOD

One way to evaluate research literature is to construct a model
ideal type of what a proper social science of Mormondom might lo(
like. For instance, we can list major social institutions and process
and inquire how each occurs in Mormon society, how the Mormon
differ, if at all, from other ethnic or religious groups, and how th
institutions of the wider society impinge on Mormondom and ar
resisted, ignored, or adopted.

Among the processes essential to the continuity of a society ar(
socialization (how people learn the right ways of doing things)
differentiation (how people vary in characteristics, opportunities
achievements, and possessions, and also how such variation comes tc
be), and social control (how people react to deviant behavior). In
addition to such processes, there are complex patterns of belief and
behavior associated with the critical tasks a society must do to survive.
The "institutions" to be considered in any thorough account of a people

A fourth way to gauge the stature of the social science of Mormondom is to look at existing studies in relation to the geographic or ecological scale, especially as it applies to geographic scope and member density. As shown in table 1, the geographic continuum ranges from studies of individual congregations or neighborhoods to studies of the entire Church, worldwide. There is also a member density continuum, which ranges from situations where Mormons are a statistical majority to the more common contexts in which they are a tiny minority. It seems likely that the religiosity and life-styles of Mormons are influenced in many ways by the religious composition of their immediate neighborhoods, urban areas, and regions. Similarly, it is probable, though it has not been demonstrated, that the influence of Mormons on the non-Mormons they live among (or, conversely, the influence of the non-Mormons on Mormons) varies with the proportionate size of the Mormon population. We suspect that contexts where Mormons are a statistically insignificant part of the population differ vastly from higher-density contexts.

TABLE 1. TYPOLOGY OF GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE—MEMBER DENSITY CONTEXTS

Geographic Scope	Member Density (% of Population LDS)			
	50+%	10–49%	1–9%	Under 1%
Sublocal (wards, schools, neighborhoods)	a	b	c	d
Local (towns, stakes)	e	f	g	h
Metro, Multilocal (counties, metropolitan areas)	i	j	k	l
State or Province	m	n	o	p
Regional (multistake, multiprovince)	*	r	s	t
National	*	v	w	x
Continental	*	*	*	bb
Multicontinental	*	*	*	ff
Churchwide, Worldwide	*	*	*	jj

Note: Starred (*) cells are null cases given the present size and distribution of the LDS population.

Using only four categories for the member-density continuum and nine levels of geographic scope generates the typology of thirty-six cells shown in table 1. Given the present distribution of the LDS population, twenty-five of the cells represent realistic possibilities. The point of the table is to demonstrate that there are more than a score of geographic/density contexts in which the patterns of LDS belief and practice are enacted. Accordingly, researchers need to be very specific about the geographic scope and limits to generalizability of findings from samples representing only one or two of the twenty-five possible contexts.

It is possible that some things are unaffected by ecological scale and density, but until that possibility is demonstrated in fact, research

on Mormondom which does not control for the effects of these variables cannot be assumed to apply to more than one twenty-fifth of the contexts in which Mormons live. In fact, as we will soon see, most research on contemporary Mormondom represents only three of the possible contexts (cells a, b, or e in table 1).

A fifth way to assess progress toward a social science of Mormondom is to ask whether researchers have viewed their data from the most fruitful perspectives. C. Wright Mills calls "the sociological imagination" the "quality of mind that seems most dramatically to promise an understanding of the intimate realities of ourselves in connection with larger social realities."[16] In Mills's view, social science at its best is the study of biography and history and their intersection in social structure. He takes pains to stress that the sociological imagination is not limited to sociologists: "This quality of mind is found in the social and psychological sciences, but it goes far beyond these studies as we now know them."[17]

The proper role of the social scientist, Mills says, whatever his or her discipline, is to ask and try to answer questions of social structure, historical place, and human variety. The analysis of social structure necessarily involves identification of a society's essential components and their relationships and examination of how the society differs from other societies in space and time and how its characteristics presage continued change or stability. The historical issues requiring attention include how a society changes over time, its place within historical movements, and how its location in a particular period affects its character. Among the issues of individual variety necessary to an appropriate social analysis are the identification of the characteristics of men and women in the society, an understanding of how they came to be that way, how they are changing, the kinds of "human nature" they reveal, and an assessment of what meaning their variety and their society have for other peoples and other times.[18]

Mills's charge to the social scientist is an ambitious one. Historians of Mormonism have made substantial progress toward meeting Mills's standards, while most of the rest of us have been laboring in dead ends or turning out work of limited or unknown generality. In fact, the type of social science Mills prescribes is so far beyond present standards in the sociology and psychology of Mormondom as to intimidate. Perhaps his vision is most useful if it reminds us to pay attention in *all* our work to the three essential contexts: social structure, historical place, and individual variety.

Despite his disdain for "abstracted empiricism"—counting for counting's sake without concern for theoretical or historical relevance—Mills insists that proper social science is empirical, conducted openly and with an eye to replication and verification by others:

> The classic practitioner verifies a statement by detailed exposition of whatever empirical materials are relevant. . . . Of course it is true that we are never certain; in fact, that often we are "guessing," but it is not true that all guesses have an equal chance of being correct. Classic social science . . . is, among other things, an attempt to improve the chances that our guesses about important matters may be right.
>
> Verification consists of rationally convincing others, as well as ourselves. But to do that we must follow the accepted rules, above all the rule that work be presented in such a way that it is open at every step to the checking up by others. There is no One Way to do this; but it does always require a developed carefulness and attention to detail, a habit of being clear, a skeptical perusal of alleged facts, and a tireless curiosity about their possible meanings, their bearings on other facts and notions. It requires orderliness and system.[19]

Time and again, Mills urges social scientists to try to understand human variety. His emphasis is especially relevant to those who would understand a church whose members enact their religiosity in wards and branches scattered over the world. Only a handful of the available studies are comparative in the sense that they describe findings and explore their implications for Mormons in different nations.

Sixth, and finally, researchers of contemporary Mormondom must conduct their work according to the standards of proper research technique. These are too numerous to consider in detail here, but we wish to single out three specific issues of procedure critical to our assessment of the research literature. These are the issues of generalizability, replicability, and comparison/triangulation.

Generalizability refers to the degree to which a research finding can be accepted as representative of some population. Maximum generalizability is obtained in census enumerations or in summaries of the day-to-day registry of vital statistics, where the population base is an entire population. In most cases, however, enumerating or observing an entire population is far too expensive, and so researchers try to study representative subpopulations or samples. If probability sampling is used, it is usually possible to specify within fairly narrow limits how close the characteristics of the sample are to the characteristics of the population from which the sample was drawn. Even if researchers are unable to specify the statistical relationship between a sample and some wider population presumably represented by the sample, if the characteristics of the respondents are reported in detail it may be possible to match some of them to the known characteristics of the larger population and thereby obtain a rough estimate of how biased the nonrepresentative sample may be. However, if the characteristics of a nonrepresentative sample are not spelled out in detail, then it is impossible even to estimate how the persons studied may differ from a larger population.

In summary, there are at least four levels of generalizability tha
we may use in assessing research on LDS populations. They are, ii
descending order (from best to worst):

1. Enumeration or observation of the entire Church.
2. Assessment of carefully specified samples, whose relationship to the
entire Church, or some segment of it, is known and given.
3. Assessment of partially described samples, whose relationship to the
entire Church, or to segments of it, is unspecified or unknown but in
principle possible to estimate.
4. Assessment of poorly described samples, whose relationship to any
larger population is unspecified and unknown and impossible to estimate.

As for replication, if research procedures are described in sufficien
detail, direct replication—repeating a study, or portions of it, to checl
the findings of the earlier work—is often possible. If a research repor
does not include a systematic description of procedures, replication ma
be impossible. Often a writer on Mormondom will make som
generalizations about Mormon people or beliefs, and not identify th
basis for the generalization. Such statements may serve as hypothese
for testing, but in the absence of ''hard'' supportive data or account
of the procedures generating the findings, they cannot be accepte(
as valid or factual.

Finally, there is the issue of cumulation and triangulation
Comparative studies that include data from different populations, o
from the same population over time, are preferable to one-shot studie
that stand alone. Triangulation refers to the procedure of bringing severa
research techniques to bear on the same scientific problem, an(
cumulation has to do with assembling the findings of previous studie
or the work of several researchers in such a way as to assess th(
consistency of results or the degree of consensus among investigator
in interpreting what the findings mean.

Reflecting back on the six standards of scope, emphasis, an(
procedure, we can identify several types of ''knowledge'' in terms o
the consistency and quality (including attention to replication an(
triangulation) of the relevant research evidence. For convenience, w
divide the continuum of empirical support for propositions abou
Mormondom into four categories:

1. ''Facts'': propositions accepted as accurate and valid (consistently
supported by evidence of good quality);
2. ''Probabilities'': propositions that *seem* to be accurate and valid (sup-
ported by considerable evidence, but generalizability open to question);
3. ''Possibilities'': propositions that *may* be accurate and valid
(supported by little evidence, or by evidence of poor quality or of limited
generality);
4. ''Unknowns'': propositions with little or no basis in empirical research
(unsupported assertions).

Following a description of our literature search, we will identify several propositions of types 1 and 2 ("facts" and "probabilities") that apply to contemporary Mormondom.

THE LITERATURE SEARCH

We did not try to produce a definitive bibliography on social science and Mormondom. That has already been done, twice in 1984, by Armand Mauss.[20] Our selective survey of the literature was greatly simplified because we were able to start with the Mauss bibliographies. We began with a working list that consisted of the articles and books cited by Mauss that had been published after 1969, that treated contemporary Mormons, and that seemed to draw upon quantitative data. Pieces that seemed to meet these three criteria were inspected and abstracted.

The abstracting procedure included special attention to sampling techniques, if any, and modes of data collection. As we went along, we checked and extended the working bibliography by reviewing the references section of each article or book. We also checked the *Social Science Citation Index* for the 1970–84 period, examining the topic entries under "Mormons" and "Latter-day Saints," and reviewing the entries in the *Citation Index* listed as citing Thomas O'Dea's book, *The Mormons*. Theses and dissertations by BYU students in sociology, psychology, and family science (formerly child development and family relations) between 1970 and 1984 were scanned to see if LDS people had been subjects or respondents in the graduate research projects. Also, we scanned the issues of *Dialogue* and *BYU Studies* published since 1970. Finally, we included some articles from official LDS periodicals because such pieces were sometimes the only public releases of data from research projects sponsored by the Church.

Our final list of articles and books containing empirical data of some kind on contemporary Mormons ran to over 250 titles. Our findings and conclusions in the following pages derive from classifications of these works by topic, research procedures, and findings.

From our review of these works, we discovered that most published research on Mormons does not pass the test of truth in labeling. Much of what passes as the social science of Mormondom is in fact a social science of Utahns, of LDS college students, or of respondents in a few atypical wards and branches. To express reservations about the generalizability of findings from studies of LDS college students is not to say that such studies are without merit. But BYU students are not representative of LDS college students, and the latter are not representative of LDS young adults in the U.S. or elsewhere, let alone of LDS adults in general.

The social science of modern Mormondom is, with a few notable exceptions, a patchwork of conjecture and speculation, of impression and uncontrolled observation. It is long on imaginative conceptualization and insight by metaphor, but short on systematic observation and probability sampling. Finally, most of the available empirical grounding anchors a social science of the "traditional" culture and behavior of Utahns, rather than of the majority of contemporary Mormons who live elsewhere.

An essential first step toward a minimal scientific depiction of contemporary Mormondom is to know what the people are like. Are they old or young, rich or poor, married or divorced, farmers or factory workers? It is at this first basic question—what are the characteristics of contemporary Mormons?—that our hope for a responsible social science founders. The available information about even the most basic attributes of today's Mormons—their educational attainment, their labor force status, their family status—is scanty indeed. There are two exceptions to this bleak picture, both topics on which there has been considerable good comparative work. These bright spots are the study of Mormon fertility and the analysis of Mormon/non-Mormon differentials in mortality and morbidity, especially in rates of cancer.

Mormon Death and Disease Rates

There is more good research on Mormon/non-Mormon differences in disease and death rates than on any other topic. Much of the research is based on large samples, and there is considerable triangulation, with some articles reporting consistent results from data collected in different ways and at different times. The parameters of twenty-one recent studies of morbidity and mortality among Mormons are summarized in table 2.

As may be seen in column 8 of the table, the chief liability of these studies is that the research is usually limited to two states, Utah and California. Even so, the populations represented in the studies are large, typically over one thousand cases and occasionally between five thousand and twenty thousand. The populations at risk, from which the deaths or officially recorded cases of disease are drawn, are much larger. Note in the descriptions of research methods (column 7) that there are many data sources, including national and state death records, LDS church death records, state disease registries, telephone interviews, face-to-face interviews, and state birth records.

There are some useful side benefits from the research on religious differences in diagnosed cases of cancer. The statewide control-sample populations interviewed by Lyon, West, and their associates provide

TABLE 2. PARAMETERS OF TWENTY-ONE RECENT STUDIES OF MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY AMONG MORMONS[21]

Author(s)	Date	Sample/Population			Data Collection		Limits of Generalizability
		Size[a]	Characteristics	How Selected	Date/Period	Methods	Locale/Population
Enstrom	1975	4,865	California Mormons	Died	1970–72	LDS death records matched against Annual Mortality File	California
	1977	b	Utah Mormons	Died	1950–70	LDS death records matched against state mortality records	Utah
Enstrom	1977	b	California Mormons	Died of cancer	1968–72	LDS death records	California
Enstrom	1978	1,352	California high priests	Died	1968–75	LDS death records matched against California Mortality Files	California males
		1,856	Utah high priests and seventies	Died	1970–75	LDS death records matched against National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) national mortality tape	Utah males
Enstrom	1980a	12,569	California Mormons	Died	1968–75	LDS death records matched against California Mortality Files	California
		4,592	Utah Mormons	Died	1970	LDS death records matched against NCHS national mortality tape	Utah
Enstrom	1980b	12,569	California Mormons	Died	1968–75	LDS death records matched against California Mortality Files	California
		1,856	Utah high priests	Died	1970–75	LDS death records matched against NCHS national mortality tape	Utah males
		8,000	California high priests and wives	b	1979	Mail questionnaire, health and dietary practices	California active high priests
Jarvis	1977	1,120	Alberta, Canada Mormons	Died	1967–75	LDS death records matched against vital statistics (mortality) records, Alberta	Alberta
Lyon & Gardner	1975	869	Utah women	Diagnosed cervical cancer	1966–70	Utah Cancer Registry matched against LDS membership files	Utah women
Lyon et al.	1976	10,605	Utahns	Diagnosed cancer	1966–70	Utah Cancer Registry matched against LDS membership files	Utah

TABLE 2 CONTINUED

Author(s)	Date	Sample/Population		How Selected	Data Collection		Limits of Generalizability
		Size[a]	Characteristics		Date/Period	Methods	Locale/Population
Lyon et al.	1977	10,641	Utahns	Diagnosed cancer or died of cancer	1966–70	Utah Cancer Registry	Utah
Lyon et al.	1978	6,108	Utahns	Cardiovascular deaths	1969–71	State death certificates matched against LDS records; obituaries	Utah
Lyon et al.	1980a	19,940	Utahns	Diagnosed cancer or died of cancer	1967–75	Utah Cancer Registry; LDS records; matched against obituaries; comparisons by gender, religion	Utah
Lyon et al.	1980b	19,753	Utahns	Diagnosed cancer or died of cancer	1967–75	Utah Cancer Registry records matched against LDS records and obituaries; comparisons by rural–urban residence, religion	Utah
Lyon et al.	1980c	19,753	Utahns	Diagnosed cancer or died of cancer	1967–75	Utah Cancer Registry records matched against LDS records and obituaries; comparisons with national rates	Utah
Lyon & Nelson	1979	10,641	Utahns	Diagnosed cancer or died of cancer	1966–70	Utah Cancer Registry records matched against LDS records and obituaries	Utah
		900	Adult Utahns	Random digit telephone dialing	1977–78	Interview on dietary habits, life-style and sexual history	Utah
		6,108	Utahns	Cardiovascular deaths	1969–71	State death certificates matched against LDS records and obituaries	Utah
		b	Utahns	Deaths from cerebrovascular disease or cirrhosis of liver	b	State death certificates matched against LDS records and obituaries	Utah
Skolnick et al.	1981	1,119	Women in Utah Cancer Registry and genealogy file	Diagnosed breast cancer	1952–80	Utah Cancer Registry records matched against LDS genealogical file	Utah
Vernon & Wadell	1974	b	Utahns, Mormons	Died	1940–70	LDS death records, Utah death records for diseases of heart, cancer, liver, infancy-related diseases, and accidental deaths	Utah

TABLE 2 CONTINUED

Author(s)	Date	Size[a]	Characteristics	How Selected	Date/Period	Methods	Locale/Population
			Sample/Population		Data Collection		Limits of Generalizability
West	1980	613	Utahns aged 24+	Random-digit dialing	1977–79	Interview following telephone census; focus on factors related to risk of colon cancer	Utah
		305	Utah women ages 24+ living in urban areas (SMSA's)	Random-digit dialing	1977–79	Same; factors related to risk of cervical cancer	Urban women, Utah
		109	Utah women aged 24+ living in urban areas (SMSA's)	Random-digit dialing	1976–77	Same; factors related to risk of ovarian cancer	Urban women, Utah
West et al.	1980		Same as West, 1980	See West (1980)		Interviews (see above); additional analysis of demographic and life-style characteristics of persons in these three control samples, including dietary habits and marital/sexual history in the cervical and ovarian studies	Utah
West & Powell	1979	3,140	Utah men	Diagnosed cancer of prostate	1966–77	Utah Cancer Registry cases classified by religious and demographic variables	Utah men
West et al.	1978	827	Utahns	Diagnosed malignant melanoma	1967–76	Utah Cancer Registry cases classified by religious and demographic variables	Utah
Seegmiller & Hansen	1980	128,857	All children born to Utah residents	Birth Certificates	1968–72	Inspection of birth certificates for evidence of congenital malformations (1687 malformations recorded on 1,502 certificates)	Utah children

[a]Some reports draw upon several samples or data sets; unless otherwise noted entries in the table are for the largest of the samples or populations studied. Some smaller samples/data sets are not cited specifically in the table.
[b]Not reported.

some of the little available data on the dietary habits and histories of sexual experience among random samples of Utah adults.[22]

These studies of Utah and California populations, along with some evidence from Alberta, Canada, yield the largest cluster of documentable "facts" about Mormon people available in the contemporary research literature. Among the generalizations receiving sufficient support in a variety of studies to justify considering them "facts" are the following:

1.   Dietary habits, including reference to smoking, are "better" or more healthful among Mormons than in the general population of non-Mormons in Utah and California.
2.   Rates of mortality from and reported incidence of most cancers are lower among Mormons than non-Mormons.
3.   Mortality rates for many other diseases, some of them not directly linked to diet or smoking, are also lower among Mormons than among non-Mormons.
4.   Mortality from and reported incidence of most cancers and of many other diseases are lower among highly active or "practicing" Mormons than among other Mormons.

There are numerous other "facts" regarding specific types of cancer, mortality rates by cause of death, and so on that the interested reader may find in the studies summarized in table 2. Most of the findings, either because they have not been fully replicated or because there are qualifications to be explored (for example, life expectancy for Mormon men is considerably longer than for other men; there is a similar Mormon/non-Mormon differential for women, but the differences are much smaller), do not yet merit designation as "facts."

Even so, it may be useful to mention a few of these "probabilities," or generalizations that require further research before they can be fully accepted. For convenience in reference, we have assigned numbers to propositions of "fact" status, and letters to those of "probability" status.

A.   *It is probable that* among Utah women, Mormons have had fewer different sex partners than non-Mormons.[23]
B.   *It is probable that* among Utah women, Mormons have fewer miscarriages than non-Mormons.
C.   *It is probable that* among Utah women, birth defects are less common among the children of Mormon women than among those of other women.

Fertility

One other topic, Mormon fertility, has spawned enough good empirical work to justify some generalizations of "fact" stature. Most research on Mormon fertility in the U.S. has compared Utah rates, or official Church reports of LDS birthrates, to fertility rates of other states

or of the U.S. as a whole. Unlike the U.S. census, the Canadian census includes items on religion, and there it is possible to trace variations in LDS fertility over the past five decades from national census data. In addition to these demographic analyses, there have been numerous studies of local or nonrepresentative populations that have produced findings in line with the studies of census data. On the basis of the work cited in table 3, the following conclusions are warranted:

> 5. Both historically and in contemporary Canada and the U.S., Mormon women have higher than average fertility.
> 6. The fertility of Mormon women is influenced by many of the same factors that influence changes in national and regional fertility, so that trends in national rates are mirrored in LDS fertility trends, although the absolute rates for Mormon women remain higher than for non-Mormon women.

That Mormon women in the U.S. and Canada have high fertility is well documented. The reasons for their higher fertility are not so well understood. Studies of LDS attitudes about and practice of birth control are usually hampered by small, nonrepresentative samples. Nevertheless, the consistent finding in the nonrepresentative studies,[24] also supported in the responses of the small subsample of LDS women interviewed in some national fertility surveys,[25] is that LDS women are as aware of contraceptive technology as are other women and that they are as likely to have practiced contraception at some time in their lives. Their higher fertility apparently derives from personal values or social pressures favoring large families rather than from beliefs that birth control per se is wrong. And thus the generalizations read:

> D. *It is probable that* contemporary LDS women are as likely as other women to practice birth control or child spacing at some time during their childbearing years.
> E. *It is probable that* the high fertility of LDS women is *not* attributable to their ignorance of or unwillingness to apply—given "appropriate" circumstances—the contraceptive technology available in their society.

National surveys

The best studies of national samples of Mormons published to date are releases from a 1981 demographic survey of Mormons in the U.S. and Canada conducted by the Church. The sampling frame was the computerized membership file maintained at Church headquarters. Most of the data was collected by mail questionnaire, but follow-up methods included sending interviewers in person, interviewing by telephone, and asking local ward bishops having the potential respondents' membership records to supply what information they could from personal knowledge and inspection of the records. In all, information was obtained for 81 percent of the sample, including

TABLE 3. PARAMETERS OF SIXTEEN RECENT STUDIES OF FERTILITY AND FAMILY SIZE AMONG MORMONS[26]

Author(s)	Date	Size	Sample Population		Data Collection		Limits of Generalizability
			Characteristics	How Selected	Date/Period	Methods	Locale/Population
Bahr et al.	1982	41	College-educated, mothers of 7+ children, child born in 1977	All mothers meeting specific selection criteria, 1977 county birth records	1979	Depth interviews	Utah county, but only to the 41 respondents[b]
Bowers & Hastings	1970	165	"Contrived population" of ever-married women graduates of Univ. of Utah, 1940–41	Persons listed in 1941 commencement program with current address available in alumni association records	1968	Mail questionnaire	1941 Univ. of Utah women graduates, but only the 165 women respondents[b]
Bush	1976	a	Various samples and populations, censuses and vital church records, historical documents and published research; summarizes ten surveys of LDS attitudes toward birth control, 1935–72, including two of Univ. of Utah students, six of BYU students, and one of BYU graduates		1850–1975	Analysis of historical records, documents	"The Mormons" as variously defined in source documents (largely Utahns)
Chadwick	1981	a	Utah, regional, and national health statistics on fertility and abortion		1970–78	Analysis of vital statistics	Women in Utah, Mountain States, United States
Hastings et al.	1972	a	Discussion of Mormonism and birth planning summarizes six surveys, including two of BYU and three of Univ. of Utah students/alumni; all but one nonrandom or nonreplicable.		1941–69	Analysis and summary of prior studies	BYU/Univ. of Utah students/alumni, but only respondents[b]
Heaton & Calkins	1983	258	Once married, currently married, white LDS women in National Fertility Surveys; three samples of 70, 117, and 71 women		1965, 1970, 1975	Secondary analysis of national surveys	LDS married women, U.S.
Henripin	1972	a	Canadian women, including LDS, in four national censuses		1931–61	Analysis by religion of census data	LDS women in Canada
Kane et al.	1976	158	Adult women, 84 percent LDS	Salt Lake City metropolitan city directory, random	1972	Interview	Unnamed suburb
Miller	1972	27	Young married LDS women and their mothers and grandmothers	From two rosters of young married LDS, one for a univ. neighborhood, the other a nearby rural area; 102 third-generation LDS women generated 35 three-generation sets; 27 produced completed questionnaires	1971	Mail questionnaires	Cache Valley young married LDS women, but only to respondents
Miller & Schvaneveldt	1977	27	Young married LDS women and their mothers and grandmothers	From two rosters of young married LDS, one for a univ. neighborhood, the other a nearby rural area; 102 third-generation LDS women generated 35 three-generation sets; 27 produced completed questionnaires.	1971	Mail questionnaires	Cache Valley young married LDS women, but only to respondents

TABLE 3 CONTINUED

		Sample Population			Data Collection		Limits of Generalizability
Author(s)	Date	Size	Characteristics	How Selected	Date/Period	Methods	Locale/Population
Peterson	1971	795	BYU Students	Randomly drawn from 1963 student roster; 1,874 names yielded 1,810 potential respondents; 795 completed questionnaires		Mail questionnaire	BYU Students
Pitcher et al.	1974	547	LDS couples, descendants of four "original Mormon pioneers"; married between 1900 and 1959	Listed in LDS genealogical records 1900–60 and born between 1800 and 1940		Analysis of genealogical records	LDS couples, but only those descended from the four "original pioneers"[b]
Roundy	1970	372	Married women aged 24–48; graduates of BYU, 1963; married by 1968	1963 graduates listed as married by 1968 in alumni office records; 477 potential respondents	1968	Mail questionnaire	Married women, graduates of BYU[b]
Spicer & Gustavus	1974	a	LDS persons of record, Church Historical Department	LDS church records available to public, U.S. vital statistics	1920–70	Demographic analysis	LDS worldwide; Utah
Thornton	1979	a	People listed in US. and Canadian censuses; included in U.S. vital statistics (birthrates); public data on fertility of wives of LDS General Authorities; LDS respondents in National Fertility Surveys, 1965 and 1970	Available historical and demographic data	1850–1971	Demographic analysis; secondary analysis	Utah; LDS married women, U.S.; LDS, worldwide; LDS in Canada
Van Dyck & Brockert	1980	a	Utah women aged 25–44; girls aged 10–14	Represented in Utah vital statistics on fertility and pregnancy	1970–78	Analysis of State Health Statistics	Utah females aged 10+
Willis	1975	a	Married white women in Utah	Represented in U.S. census data	1960, 1970	Analysis of U.S. census data	Utah white married women

[a] Does not apply; many different samples or populations.
[b] Generalization unwarranted due to (1) inadequate specification of sampling universe, (2) lack of sampling or inadequate specification of respondents' characteristics, or (3) respondents represent highly particularized, atypical populations.

54 percent who returned mail questionnaires, 5 percent interviewed personally, 7 percent interviewed by telephone, and 15 percent represented in questionnaires filled out by bishops. Public releases from this survey are summarized in table 4, along with entries from two other national surveys.

Among the findings that seem to merit being called facts—most of them supported by results from small-scale, nonrepresentative samples as well—are these:

> 7.   Mormon adults in the U.S. and Canada are much more likely to have had post–high school education than are adults in the U.S. populations as a whole.
>
> 8.   The Mormon advantage in years of formal education completed also applies to graduation from college. However, there is a sizable gender difference favoring Mormon men, who are much more likely than U.S. men generally to have finished college, while Mormon women are only slightly more likely than other women to have finished college.
>
> 9.   Although most studies of correlates of religiosity among U.S. adults reveal an inverse relationship or no relationship between higher education and religiosity, among Mormon adults the relationship is direct: college-educated Mormons are *more* apt to attend church and to exhibit other manifestations of "high" religiosity than are less-educated Mormons.

The above findings appear in scientific articles as well as in an official Church publication.[27] Here are some other findings from the 1981 Church demographic survey that have appeared in official LDS publications (see entries 2 through 5 in table 4):

> 10.   Among Mormon adults in the U.S. and Canada, most converts joined the Church during their teen years or as young adults.
>
> 11.   Women converts outnumber men converts almost two to one.
>
> 12.   Compared to the adult population of the U.S., Mormons in the U.S. and Canada are more likely to be currently married and less likely to be separated, divorced, or widowed.
>
> 13.   Among unmarried Mormons, the sex ratio (men per one hundred women) declines sharply with age, ranging from ninety-five for ages thirty to thirty-nine, to twenty-four for ages sixty and over.
>
> F.   *It is probable that* Mormon women are more likely to marry nonmembers than are Mormon men.

Comparisons between LDS rates of attendance at church services and those obtained in surveys of other populations indicate that:

> 14.   Mormon adults attend church services more frequently than U.S. adults in general, and also more frequently than do members of any major denominational group except Catholic women, whose attendance rates are comparable to those of Mormon women.[28]

Duke and Johnson's analysis of the various dimensions of religiosity in a national sample of Mormons supports this proposition:

TABLE 4. SELECTED STUDIES OF CONTEMPORARY MORMONS[29]

| | | Sample/Population | | | Data Collection | | Limits of Generalizability |
Author(s)	Date	Size	Characteristics	How Selected	Date/Period	Methods	Locale/Population
Albrecht & Heaton	1984	6,000+	Adult LDS, U.S. and Canada	Random sampling from current Church membership file	1981	Mail questionnaire; personal and telephone interviews and bishops' descriptions of potential respondents who could not be contacted	U.S. and Canada
Heaton & Goodman	1984	''	''	''	''	''	''
Van Leer	1983a	''	''	''	''	''	''
Van Leer	1983b	''	''	''	''	''	''
Van Leer	1983c	''	''	''	''	''	''
Duke & Johnson	1984	1,384	Adult subscribers to major Church publications	Random sample from subscription list	1981	Mail questionnaire	U.S. subscribers to official LDS publication
Herrin	1983	548	274 active LDS couples	Stratified sample, 21 LDS congregations selected to maximize sample representativeness in continental U.S. with reference to region, membership dispersion, density, unit size, activity level, age distribution, and rural–urban character. Of 974 adult respondents, 548 were active couples who completed and returned questionnaires and time-logs. *All* persons 12 and over in the 21 units were potential respondents; the 548 individuals were 56% of adults responding, representing 10% of original sample to whom materials were mailed.	1981	Mail questionnaires, including adult questionnaire and time-log for persons 18+; youth questionnaire and time-log for persons 12–17; and brief rating scale on church "activity" from bishops of all persons sampled	Active U.S. LDS couples
Partridge	1983	1,695	565 LDS young men aged 12–18 and both parents	Lived in one of 54 randomly-selected wards in a national sample of LDS stakes (50 randomly selected, 4 added to maximize geographic representation)	1981	Group administration of questionnaires to all young men and their parents in LDS Sunday service; hand delivery of questionnaires to those absent; personal follow-up	Active LDS young men who live in complete (two-parent) families, U.S.

G.   *It is probable that* among Mormons a "consequential" dimension (including behavioral consequences of religious belief and commitment such as personal honesty, chastity, and service to others) is an important component of religiosity.[30]

The seventh entry in table 4, Donald Herrin's doctoral dissertation on time use by married couples, is a significant contribution to the social psychology of family life but adds little to the social science of Mormondom for the following reasons: (1) the representativeness of the couples whose time use is analyzed is open to question (they constitute only 10 percent of all individuals to whom sets of materials were mailed and 56 percent of the adults who responded); (2) it is certain that Mormons partly or totally inactive are underrepresented in the sample; and (3) due to apparent constraints on what parts of the study's findings could be made public (the data derive from the 1979 Member Resources Study done by the Church), simple frequencies describing time use by various categories of respondents, as well as indicators of perceived strain or overcommitment, are not given. Without these distributions, the results cannot be readily compared to research on studies of time use and stress among other populations.

The last entry in table 4, Thomas Partridge's master's thesis, attempts to explain teenaged Mormon boys' identification with their parents on the basis of (1) parental attempts to control their sons, (2) parental supportiveness, (3) the amount and nature of interaction between parents and sons, and (4) the personal characteristics of parents. The thesis is another public release of data from a general Church survey, this time the 1981 Young Men Study. "Structural variables" such as father's occupational status and education proved to be the best predictors of boys' identification with fathers, while for identification with mothers, social-psychological characteristics of the sons (mother's support, guilt, perceptions of mother's withdrawal of love) are more important.

As in the Herrin dissertation, the complex data reduction and analysis procedures in the Partridge report suffice to test a scientific model relevant to the sociology of the family generally but severely limit the work's utility for the social science of Mormondom. Even so, we have described the data sets in some detail in table 4 so that persons who have not shared Rodney Stark's exposure to the national studies conducted under Church auspices will have some idea of what Stark is rhapsodizing about when he writes:

> Through the years, I have consulted with many denominational research departments and have read countless reports of their results. I have often been favorably impressed. Yet, the research efforts of other denominations shrink to insignificance when compared with the quality, scope, and sophistication of the work of the Mormon social research department. One might as well be comparing missionary efforts.[31]

The Social Science of Mormon College Students

Much of the empirical research on contemporary Mormons draws upon surveys of university students, often students of Brigham Young University. Research on student, or former student, samples is not necessarily suspect. Students are an important segment of the general population. The problems arise when researchers permit or encourage generalization to nonstudent populations or make inferences about students generally from atypical "samples" of students.

A mature science of Mormondom would surely include generalizations about college students. Unfortunately, no one has determined precisely what wider universe, if any, the studentbody of Brigham Young University represents. It *is* certain that there have been important changes over the past half-century in the composition and typicality of BYU students. As the Church has grown, and as BYU has imposed higher academic and behavioral standards for admission, BYU students have come to represent a smaller, more distinctive—in some ways, we suspect, more "conservative," in others, more "elite"—segment of college-age Mormon youth.

What is most disappointing about the extant research on Mormon college students is not that the student populations do not represent all Mormon youth, but rather that all but a handful of the studies represent neither the studentbody of a given university nor even a class within that studentbody. Instead, most studies of Mormon students have used "accidental" or "purposive" samples, that is, students who happened to be enrolled in courses available to the researcher. In other words, what we have is not even a social science of the BYU student, but a collection of studies whose generality is unspecified, unknown, and probably unknowable. Of the forty-two studies listed in table 5, and these include much of the best research on Mormon students in the past decade, only three represent a scientifically drawn sample of an entire studentbody or of a specific class level.

Scanning the entries in column seven of table 5, it is immediately and overwhelmingly apparent that only for one study in seven is it possible to specify in any meaningful way the wider population to which the findings apply. The studies listed in table 5 may have provided many useful insights and highlighted tentative hypothetical relationships. What they have *not* done is to allay our suspicions that much of what we know of Mormon students applies to only a tiny minority of the Church and that most of the time it is impossible to tell where that tiny minority begins or ends or what may be its distinguishing characteristics. Table 5 provides sobering, even humbling, evidence of how little we know, and how little real progress we have made in the past decade. What at first glance looks like a solid structure of scientific work crumbles and collapses when we lean on

TABLE 5. THE SOCIAL SCIENCE OF BYU AND OTHER UNIVERSITY POPULATIONS: PARAMETERS OF FORTY-TWO STUDIES OF MORMONS AND MORMONISM[32]

Author(s)	Date	University/College Samples		How Selected[a]	Methods of Data Collection[b]	Limits of Generalizability[c]
		Size				
		BYU	Other			
Barney & Chu	1976	30	30	?	Modified Q-sort	?
Bowers & Hastings	1970		614, Univ. of Utah	Alumni, class of 1940–41	MQ	Univ. of Utah alumni, class of 1940–41
Brimhall*	1977	414		S	Q	?
Bunker et al.	1977	245	134, Biola College	S	Q	?
Bunker & Johnson	1975		616[d]	S	Q	?
Burr, Ahern, Knowles	1977	1,056		S	Q	?
Cardwell & Lindsey	1974		?[e]	S	Q	?
Christensen	1973		220[f]	S	Q	?
Christensen	1982		242 LDS 629 non-LDS	S	Q	?
Christensen & Cannon	1978	1,159 (1935 sample) 1,056 (1973 sample)		S	Q	?
Christensen & Gregg	1970		168 (1958 sample) 220[g] (1968 sample)		Q	?
Day*	1975	278		S	Obs	?
Dunford & Kunz	1973	155[h]		Members in two campus branches	Q	?
Ellis*	1975	1,233	186 WSU	S	Q	?
Galbraith	1982	10,925		S	University Records	BYU
Haney*	1971	333		S	Q	?
Hardy & Larsen	1971	30	Univ. of Utah[i]	?	Q, Obs	?
Hatch**	1973	1,018 in four Utah schools		S	Q	?
Hatch & Cannon	1976	1,021 in four Utah schools		S	Q	?
Hill*	1978	96		S (48 engaged couples)	Q	?
Hughston*	1972	163		R, 1971 family living courses	Exp	BYU 1971 family living courses
Jensen*	1971	907		S, freshman class, 1968	Q	BYU freshmen, 1968
Kunz	1979	216		S	Q	?
Kunz & Petersen	1972	1,126		S	Q	?
Lippetts*	1973	154[j]		S	Q	?
Mackie & Brinkerhoff	1984	236	347, Univ. of Nebraska; 355, Univ. of Calgary[k]	S	Q	?
Madsen & Vernon	1983		134, Univ. of Utah[l]	Sample of 1975 Utah high school graduates[m]	MQ	?
Millet*	1973	110		S	Q	?
Montanye et al.	1971	200[n]	400[n]	S	Lost letter technique	?
Mortenson*	1972	937	Four Utah schools	S	Q	?

TABLE 5 CONTINUED

Author(s)	Date	University/College Samples		How Selected[a]	Methods of Data Collection[b]	Limits of General-izability[c]
		Size				
		BYU	Other			
Payne	1972	278	Three Utah schools	S	Q	?
Peterson*	1971	795		R, studentbody	MQ	BYU students
Rich*	1970	188		S, 94 engaged couples	Exp, Q	?
Rytting & Christensen	1980	1,159 (1935 sample) 1,056 (1973 sample)[o]		S	Q	?
Sandall**	1979		156, three Utah schools; 194, four non-Utah schools[p]	S	Q	?
Smith	1976	8,584[q] 7 schools		S	Q	?
Stoddard*	1971		84, Snow College	S	Q	?
Swenson*	1973	1,007		S	Q	?
Tayson*	1972	1,056		S	Q	?
Westover*	1976	83[r]		S	Q	?
Williams*	1975	206		R	MQ	BYU students
Yorgason*	1973	104		S, (52 engaged couples)	Q	?

*Master's thesis

**Ph.D. dissertation

[a]S: students in selected classes (nonrandom, nonrepresentative); R: randomly or systematically selected, representatives of some well-defined collectivity such as an entire studentbody or all freshmen.

[b]Q: administered questionnaire; MQ: mail questionnaire; Obs: observation; Exp: experiment.

[c]?: unknown; indeterminate.

[d]The total sample of 616 students included students from a predominantly LDS college and high school in Utah, and from two high schools and two colleges in northern California.

[e]Respondents were 580 students at a western state university: only LDS students were included in this analysis.

[f]Data are presented on student samples from other universities, as well as 220 students at "Intermountain U."

[g]The 1935 sample was drawn from "required religion classes" and included about two-thirds of the entire BYU studentbody: it was much more representative than the 1973 sample, drawn from selected social science and English classes and a few physical science classes.

[h]An additional 282 respondents were drawn from the community.

[i]Subjects were thirty women students, including BYU and University of Utah LDS students.

[j]Subjects were "dating couples, volunteers" from Provo High School and BYU.

[k]Non-Mormons.

[l]Subjects were high school graduates of 1975, 90 percent of whom had attended the University of Utah by 1979.

[m]Sampling universe for 1975 not described.

[n]These cases are lost letters, not individual respondents; two hundred letters were lost at BYU, and two hundred each at Arizona State University and Cincinnati University.

[o]Respondents were male students returned from an LDS mission within the past two years.

[p]All respondents, in and outside Utah, were non-LDS.

[q]Although the analysis contrasts active and inactive LDS students, the number of LDS students in the seven-college sample is not given.

[r]Student respondents in class were given questionnaires to pass on; includes data on thirty-eight engaged couples.

it. Once again it appears that there is plenty of exploratory work and tentative hypothesizing but little hard evidence that findings apply to any population beyond the "accidental," and now dissolved, collectivity that was so conveniently available to the university researcher.

The Social Science of Contemporary Mormon Families

Our review of the contemporary research literature leads inescapably to the conclusion that the social science of Mormondom is far less developed than it ought to be. Indeed, it is far less mature than many of us thought it was. Let us buttress that conclusion, in traditional Mormon fashion, by reference to the testimonial.

Darwin Thomas recently wrote a chapter on "family in the Mormon experience" for a book on religion and the family. He tried to describe the position of the family unit in Mormon teachings and to marshall available scientific evidence on the characteristics of the Mormon family. His report on the state of knowledge about Mormon families begins this way (in this and subsequent quotations the emphases are ours, not his):

> The social scientist wishing to describe the Mormon family is . . . forced to acknowledge an acute lack of hard data and an *overabundance of soft opinion.* . . . The records of the Mormon Church are not open to everyone's use, do not have a lot of family-related information in them, and have an *unknown margin of error.* . . .
>
> Most of the information about Mormon families comes from a variety of relatively *small, nonrepresentative samples* and from census data for the state of Utah compared to national averages. The comparison of Utah with national data has to be treated with extreme caution, because no one is sure what percentage of the state of Utah is Mormon.

Thomas emphasizes in many different ways that his conclusions stand on very shaky struts. Observe the hedging forced on him by the "state of the art":

> On suggestions that Mormons marry young:
>> *If* Mormons are marrying young, it *could* portend difficulties for such marriages. Unfortunately, *good data are not currently available* to provide insight into how young marriages fare in the Mormon culture.
>
> On future fertility patterns of LDS families in non-LDS settings:
>> *It seems reasonable* to predict that they will opt for fewer children.
>
> On divorce among Mormons:
>> From the above *it seems logical* to conclude. . . .
>
> On gender roles:
>> Research is *virtually nonexistent.* . . . *It seems logical* to conclude. . . . *It seems reasonable to assume.* . . . The available evidence *probably warrants the hypothesis* that. . . .

On the socialization of Mormon children:

> *Not a great deal of research evidence exists* on parent–child relations in Mormon and non-Mormon comparisons.

On evidence suggesting that some LDS fathers may not express sufficient emotional support to their sons:

> *If* this decreased support . . . is replicated in additional research . . . it *could be seen as a possible forerunner* for. . . . [33]

Thomas's hedging is forced on him by the sorry state of the data on Mormon families. Yet our review of the literature led us to conclude that, disorganized and nonrepresentative though the sociology of the Mormon family may be, the assemblage of bits and pieces on Mormon families is a veritable treasure trove of knowledge in comparison to the evidence available on *any* characteristics of contemporary majority (that is, non-Utah) Mormons. With the exception of the epidemiology of cancer mortality and the documenting of fertility trends, even our knowledge of Utah Mormons is tentative and problematic.

Local Studies: Cities, Communities, and Neighborhoods

The early interest of rural sociologists and agricultural economists in the Mormon village has not been continued by today's social scientists. As a result, the contemporary Mormon community remains largely uncharted.

Many researchers have drawn samples from LDS ward or stake directories, and from city or telephone directories, but usually these scientists have not been interested in the Mormon community per se, but rather in drawing samples to test notions about such things as family relationships, voting patterns, or attitudes about interfaith marriage.[34] Similarly, questionnaires completed by LDS high school students have served to test relationships between religiosity and deviance, or religiosity and attitudes about ethnic groups, but community variables have not been explicitly considered in the reports of such work. In fact, usually the communities where the target high schools are located are not identified or described other than by approximate population size and state or region of location.[35]

Residents of Utah County have often served in experimental and control groups and as respondents in interview, questionnaire, and telephone surveys associated with student and faculty research at Brigham Young University. Even so, Utah County neighborhoods or the "community" itself—whether Provo, Orem, the metropolitan area that includes both cities, or local neighborhoods, stakes, or wards—has not been the focus of attention. Rather, Provo, Orem, and Utah County have simply served as convenient sites where the diffusion of good news, attitudes of police officers, Sunday shopping, children's

attitudes about death, voting behavior, the linkage between students' self-images and their emotions, and dozens of other topics relevant to modern social science might be investigated with little or no reference to real neighborhoods or the specific urban context where the behaviors in question are enacted.

The only valid exception to the generalization that modern Mormon communities have not been studied as communities is the study of social impacts associated with sudden population growth and energy development. Sometimes the social impact analyses have drawn primarily upon demographic and economic sources, but there have also been studies of satisfaction with medical services in some Utah towns (Duchesne, Roosevelt, and Vernal).[36] Data collected for their relevance to social impact analysis have been used to estimate migration flows into and out of Utah as well as attitudes about resource development. Publications drawing upon the social impact studies have usually combined data from several towns. For instance, the migration analysis draws upon data collected in Panguitch, Delta, Richfield, Salina, Moab, Duchesne, Roosevelt, and Vernal, and a summary article on attitudes about development combines data from Blanding, Kanab, Monticello, and Escalante.[37]

Research on Urban Mormons

Edward Geary, writing about "Mormon Country," repeats Charles Peterson's comment that Salt Lake City "may well have become the least Mormon of all Mormon places."[38] The statement underscores how little we know of contemporary "Mormon places" in contrast to the Mormon villages of a prior generation. What, precisely, is a "Mormon place" in the 1980s? More importantly, how do the Saints who live in manifestly un-Mormon places, the metropolitan areas of the world, differ from the Mormons still rooted in traditional Mormon country? The study of Mormonism as an urban religion, either within the U.S. or outside its borders, has barely begun.

Mauss's widely cited studies of Mormons in urban areas draw upon two subsets of nonrepresentative respondents: persons living in ten different wards in Salt Lake City and those living in two wards in California.[39] It is possible that his findings apply to the entire Church. It is also possible that they do not fit most urban Saints. The critical point is that there is no way to judge how Mauss's respondents differ from urban Mormons generally. We would question the generalizability of his findings to anywhere but Salt Lake City even if he had had a random sample of Mormons in that city. As it is, neither the reader nor Mauss himself can know how representative his respondents are. Hogenson's data from a random sample of married Mormon men in

Calgary, Alberta, is a better cross section of Mormons in a metropolitan area, but again, we are unable to generalize beyond a particular city.[40]

Research on Mormons outside the United States

For many years, historians have pointed to the growing internationalism of Mormondom as perhaps the most significant problem facing the Church.[41] It is therefore heartening to read in Mauss's recent bibliographic essay on Mormon subculture that there has been some research on non-American Mormons. In addition to studies of Mormons in Canada ("part of the Mormon heartland") Mauss lists studies of Mormons in Mexico, Latin America, Polynesia, Asia, Europe, and Africa.[42] Unfortunately, closer examination of these studies reveals them to be historical accounts—here again, the historians are ahead of other social scientists—or essays in which U.S. observers relate their impressions about the problems faced by the Church in trying to adapt its programs to various more or less incompatible cultures, and about what Church members might do to reduce the problems of "lack of fit." With two partial exceptions, *none* of the articles and books cited draws upon systematic, empirical data from contemporary international Mormons. Of the seventeen non-Canadian studies of Mormons in foreign lands listed in Mauss's essay, thirteen were published after 1969. Of these, two are bibliographies to a periodical literature that is largely historical and nonquantitative; two are content analyses of the image of Mormonism in French literature; and four are narrative histories reflecting official LDS sources and drawing upon an author's familiarity with the country in question, but not buttressed by data collection among representative, or even nonrepresentative, samples of any size. The histories are of Mormon pioneering in Mexico, of the first LDS mission in Japan (1901–24), of the expansion of Mormonism in the South Pacific, and of missionary work in Africa.[43]

Of the remaining five pieces, one gives a prognosis for missionary work in Maoist China; one reports impressions on how "international" Japanese Mormons are, based on responses from seven stake presidents' unsystematic observation and statistics from a 1978 yearbook on Christian churches in Japan;[44] one purports to be a survey of "Mormons in Britain"; and two are essays on Mormonism in Latin America. The British survey turns out to represent, at most, only two localities (Hereford City and Glasgow), does not report the number of Mormons interviewed, and yields the conclusion that "missionaries' influence" was the reason usually given for joining the Mormon church.[45] The Latin American essays emphasize that the economic and political realities in Latin America are not compatible with the U.S. nationalism and ethnocentrism manifested, often unconsciously, by many U.S.

Mormons. Lamond Tullis, in a 1973 article, urges Anglo-Americans to "jump out of the world of your own political rhetoric and into the real one that exists in Latin America,"[46] where the political and economic realities include a recognition that a person's acceptance of revolutionary rhetoric and anti-Americanism is often a realistic adaptation to economic exploitation by foreign capitalists. Seven years later, Tullis framed an essay on Mormonism in Latin America around two issues aimed at different audiences: "I have chided Anglo-Americans on the issue of nationalism, and I have chided the Latin Americans on traditional leadership culture."[47]

None of these articles provides quantitative data on the characteristics of LDS people in the countries where Mormondom has grown so rapidly. There is nothing here that conveys even an approximate depiction of what Church members outside North America are like. In a way, these thirteen pieces are articles of faith: faith that someone, sometime, will collect the data necessary to allow more certainty about how closely these authors' impressions fit the reality experienced by members, active and inactive, in these lands.

Dean May refers to the traditional Mormons, rooted in the LDS pioneer heritage of the Mountain West, as "Deseret Mormons" and says that they continue to dominate the Church culturally as well as numerically, even amid the changes forced by the rapid growth of the Church in foreign lands.[48] We would argue that even the numerical dominance of the Deseret Mormons is open to question, as is the extent of their cultural dominance and its rate of decline.

In Summary: The Quality and Scope of Existing Research

Earlier we described six kinds of standards or paradigms that might be applied to assess the social science of modern Mormondom. They are: (1) the list of major social processes and institutions essential to the survival of any society; (2) the standard of grounded theory; (3) Sorenson's ten emergent levels of human activity and organization; (4) geographic or ecological scale; (5) the issues of social structure, historical place, and human variety imbedded in Mills's "sociological imagination"; and (6) standards of method, especially generalizability and replicability. Now that we have considered the available research, let us summarize the status of the social science of Mormondom as measured against these six standards.

Social Institutions and Processes. Whether our standard is a list of social processes or of institutions, the result is the same: apart from the work by historians on the economic structure of early Mormon communities in Utah and adjacent states, and on how modernization

has changed the economic and political power of the Church, none of the essential institutions has received much systematic study.

There is probably more research literature on matters related to family life, ranging from fertility studies to analyses of parental support and control, than on any of the other essential institutions. There is no research literature to speak of on patterns of social differentiation and the division of labor in modern Mormon society, little on stratification processes (apart from comments by observers that Mormon males "get ahead" in the Church hierarchy by rigid conformity to the authoritarian control of the authorities over them), nothing but opinion and argument by illustrative instance with regard to social control, and nothing on patterns of inequality in contemporary Mormon communities. There is very little on the Church as a functioning bureaucracy concerned with secular needs such as welfare, human resource management, and communication; on the relationship between Mormon society and the military in the various national settings; on political organization and power; on the functioning of educational institutions (as distinguished from characteristics of selected students); on LDS kinship structure; on Mormon consumer behavior (including relationships to national and regional economies); on involvement in voluntary associations or organizations (recreational, artistic, philanthropic, educational); or on the issues of the interconnection of Mormondom with the major institutions in the wider society, as opposed to the maintenance of separate "parallel institutions."

Grounded Theory. Because the approach of grounded theory builds upon or organizes "what is there," the social science of Mormondom looks better from this perspective than any other. The points of emphasis that stand out when we simply distribute the research literature by topic are fertility, epidemiology, and research on young people, both high school and college students. Perhaps the next step would be to ask how these kinds of studies relate to some of the behaviors said to be critical by Mormon leaders, such as missionary work, temple work, mate selection, family solidarity, and community service. In any case, the grounded theory approach affirms the importance of large families, healthful living, and formal education in Mormondom.

Emergent Levels of Human Activity. The comparison of existing work to the ten types of activity identified by Sorenson is perhaps our simplest task. Only three of the levels—demography, population distribution, and social organization (levels 4, 5, and 6)—have received systematic attention sufficient to generate empirically-based propositions. The interaction of Mormons with the natural environment of the Great Basin in past times has been extensively covered by historians. However, our knowledge of the social organization of

today's Mormon people is minimal, and the higher emergent levels, such as language in the broadest sense, knowledge, values, and ideology, remain essentially virgin territory.

Geographic and Ecological Scale. We noted earlier that considering only two variables, location and member density, contemporary Mormons live in at least twenty-five geographic/density contexts. Although Church membership is not apportioned evenly among the twenty-five, the three or four ecological contexts where most studies of contemporary Mormons have been done no longer represent a majority of the Church membership. Our rough estimate (we have not systematically coded each of the studies by the location and member density of the research site) is that most research on contemporary Mormons has dealt either with sublocal samples such as local wards or stakes in regions where Mormons are a majority of the population, or with Utah considered as a whole, where Mormons are the predominant religion, or with relatively small communities—rarely metropolitan areas—where Mormons make up at least 10 percent of the population and typically are a majority. Those geographic/ecological sites where the most Church growth is taking place and where an ever-larger proportion of all Mormons reside, namely metropolitan areas where the LDS people are less than 1 percent of the population, are virtually ignored in contemporary research.

Applying the Sociological Imagination. Mills defines productive social research as an exploration of personal problems and social issues in the context of individual biography, history, and social structure. We believe he would approve of some of the recent histories of Mormondom. What is lacking is the other two components of the picture: an understanding of the human variety exhibited by today's Mormons and of their social structure. Because so little is known of the personal and demographic characteristics of today's Mormons, the fruitful juxtaposition of population composition, historical process, and social structure urged by Mills is usually impossible. Remember that when Mills refers to social structure he means more than the social structure as idealized; he means the varying social structures worked out in process, growing out of a give-and-take social evolution. He would want to know the diversity of social and political structures in the many settings where contemporary Mormons live out their lives. It seems to us that so little is known of the personal problems and pressures experienced by Mormon people in the 1970s and 1980s, and of how these relate to the issues and constraints of our times, that Mills's view of the promise of social research as it might apply to Mormondom remains an unreachable goal.

Generalizability and Replicability. We discussed standards of generalizability at some length, buttressing our points with tabular

summaries of much of the best contemporary research. A quick review of tables 2–5 reaffirms the conclusion that most research on today's Mormons is not generalizable beyond the particular population studied. In many cases that population is not described well enough even to permit replication. Most of the social science of contemporary Mormonism is exploratory work using small or unrepresentative samples, and most of the findings are appropriately viewed as hypotheses for further testing rather than as probabilities or facts. Finally, the concentration on populations convenient to the researchers rather than on those most representative of the Church, or those most interesting from a theoretical standpoint, means that even the best studies have ever more limited applicability as the proportion of ''traditional'' or ''Deseret Mormons'' in the international Church declines.

We have reviewed the accumulated scientific knowledge about contemporary Mormondom, as we understand it, in the light of several models or sets of standards. There are some bright spots, but our conclusions are mostly disappointing. Measured against any of the standards, it is plain that social scientists are not well informed about contemporary Mormondom. This ''research gap'' is especially critical in view of Rodney Stark's admonition to sociologists of religion generally that ''the 'miracle' of Mormon success makes them the single most important case on the agenda of the social scientific study of religion.''[49]

Perhaps more serious than missing data—things we can agree we don't know about—is the problem of distinguishing among facts, probabilities, and possibilities in a literature where the typical data base is an undefined or unrepresentative population. There is no limit to the number of ''exploratory hypotheses''—possibilities stated as facts—that one can produce. That is why we must be very careful not to make such hypotheses without labeling them as hypotheses: so many more things *might* be true than *are* so. And the production and consumption of such froth consumes time and other resources better devoted to documenting what, in fact, *is*, rather than what conceivably may be.

To illustrate the kinds of things that are set forth as facts about Mormondom, rather than as assumptions or hypotheses to be tested, we present in table 6 a set of seventeen statements grouped into six categories. Many of the statements within categories are contradictory, and most raise many questions: Does this finding apply to *all* Mormons? How are the ''players'' defined? What is an ''intellectual'' or an ''urban'' Mormon? How is ''rigidity'' defined? And so on.

The appearance in table 6 of one or two statements from a single work does not mean we have exhausted the possibilities offered by an imaginative piece of writing. Readers may choose to take the statements, as written, on faith—apparently that is how many of the writers

TABLE 6. IMPRESSIONS, INTUITIONS, AND EXPLORATORY FINDINGS THAT LOOK LIKE FACTS: SOME PROBLEMATIC ASSERTIONS ABOUT CONTEMPORARY MORMONDOM

Wealth and Worthiness:	*The positive relationship between worldly success and goodness:* The association between spiritual and material progress operates at both the level of the individual and of mankind in general. A particular man's economic prosperity is often taken as a sign of spiritual "worth."[1]
	The lack of relationship between worldly success and church callings: Callings to church office are tendered on the basis of piety and diligence in church service rather than wealth or occupational status.[2]
Tolerance and Diversity:	*Intellectual tolerance exhibited in LDS meetings:* Participants are allowed a wide freedom of expression and interpretation. As M. P. Leone has noted, in Sunday School the Mormon appears to truly be his own exegete. Along with the reaffirmation of the unified collectivity (through blood) comes a pronounced tolerance for idiosyncracy and diversification.[3]
	Intolerance for intellectual or any other kind of diversity among Mormon lay leaders: Any bishop or stake president who wishes to retain his position or move to a higher one fully recognizes that he must conform to the expectations of those above him. Otherwise he will be replaced. Consequently, remarkably little difference obtains among Mormon officials. . . . The hierarchical structure, succession policy, and lay ministry . . . reinforce a general homogeneity across social and geographical boundaries.[4]
Individualism versus Central Control:	*Changes toward individualism over the past century:* The major change is not doctrinal, it is structural. Those who define belief have changed. The people do it now, the leaders did it then. And this change has occurred not in theory but in practice. The President is still Prophet, Seer, and Revelator. Interpretation, however, once in the hands of a few, those who also safeguarded the economy, is now in the hands of all.[5]
	The continuity of rigidity and authoritarianism over the past century: The modern church is no less authoritarian and hierarchical than in the past. In some respects, the Church exercises greater control over beliefs and morals today. . . . At no point in Mormon history have the sexual and dietary codes been more rigidly interpreted and apparently enjoyed greater consensus.[6]
	Freedom of thought among urban Mormons: Many urban Mormons have already been secularized by the process of urbanization and are seeking a more relevant approach to the Gospel. This new Mormon is . . . independent in applying these Gospel principles to contemporary situations. He no longer fits the old rural stereotypes . . . nor is he willing to be "instructed" politically or told how to think religiously. He does his own thinking.[7]
	The attitudes of educated Mormons: LDS liberals . . . are uncomfortable as leaders of the church express conservative social, political and economic positions in such a way that they become official. . . . Intellectuals in the church . . . are bothered by the drift toward rigid orthodoxy in the spheres of both behavior and belief.[8]
Socialization of Children:	*The bad manners of Mormon children:* Mormon children are doted upon, are present and accepted in adult society, and are not taught to know their place. They are assertive, bold, even brassy, and do not respect adults.[9]
	On the effectiveness of socialization: That these young men [missionaries] are willing and able to go suggests they have accepted the standards and values of their parents.[10]
	Methods of socialization: It appears that the prime value of Mormon parents is "proper" socialization in terms of end results rather than in terms of method. They do what they think will be effective in terms of making/the child a good Mormon.[11]
Absence or Presence of the Past:	*The weakness of ties to the past and historical perspective:* [Mormons represent] a rational population without a memory. . . . Most Mormons, especially older ones, can report virtually nothing about the past.[12]

TABLE 6 CONTINUED

	The strength of ties to the past and historical perspective: [There are] customary situations that can take modern Saints back to the mythic time when the Mormon world was fresh and new. . . . The return to the uniquely sacred time in the Utah Mormon experience happens often enough to a large enough number of Latter-day Saints to guarantee that today's Saints live out their lives in a corporate community that still stands squarely and securely in the presence of the past.[13]
Mormon Youth and Premarital Sex:	*A decline in innerdirectedness:* Mormons . . . are discovering that internalization of morals leading to expressions of self-control are increasingly difficult to achieve. Considerable evidence points to an emerging tendency of Mormons to return to traditional, externally sanctioned mechanisms of social control.[14]
	Moderate increases in premarital sexual experience: [Longitudinal studies show] some increase in the percentage of students in the Utah area approving of sexual intercourse before marriage. . . . As for actually having sex relations . . . the most dramatic change was that of the females [an increase of over 200 percent between 1958 and 1970]. . . . It appears that the Church's stand on sex relations may be supported more in belief than in practice but still exerts a powerful influence on the young members of the Church.[15]
	Increased emphasis on premarital chastity: Contemporary Mormons find premarital chastity to be the bulwark of civilization. [There is] an increasing preoccupation with chastity and denial of premarital experience among Mormon youth. . . . Perhaps . . . the most peculiar characteristic of the ''peculiar people'' today is the emergence of a conservative, ''straight'' life-style.[16]
	Negative impact of ''sexual revolution'' greatest among inactive Mormons: [Between 1950 and 1972 among college students] greater abstinence was reported for each succeeding decade by the active Mormons, while the inactive moved toward greater indulgence. . . . Mormons of both sexes who reported infrequent church attendance reported increasing heterosexual activity right along with the non-Mormons.[17]

[1] Janet L. Dolgin, ''Latter-day Sense and Substance,'' in *Religious Movements in Contemporary America*, ed. Irving I. Zaretsky and Mark P. Leone (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1974), 525.

[2] Dean L. May, ''Mormons,'' in *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, ed. Stephan Thernstrom (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980): 728.

[3] Dolgin, ''Latter-day Sense and Substance,'' 540.

[4] O. Kendall White, Jr., ''Mormonism in America and Canada: Accommodation to the Nation–State,'' *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 3 (February 1978): 176–77.

[5] Mark P. Leone, ''The Economic Basis for the Evolution of Mormon Religion,'' in *Religious Movements in Contemporary America*, ed. Irving I. Zaretsky and Mark P. Leone (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1974): 765.

[6] O. Kendall White, Jr. and Daryl White, ''A Critique of Leone's and Dolgin's Application of Bellah's Evolutionary Model to Mormonism,'' *Review of Religious Research* 23 (September 1981): 47–49.

[7] James L. Clayton, ''The Challenge of Secularism,'' *Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought* 3 (Autumn 1968): 75.

[8] Jan Shipps, ''The Mormons: Looking Forward and Outward,'' in *Where the Spirit Leads: Seventeen American Denominations Today*, ed. Martin E. Marty (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1980): 39.

[9] Dean L. May, ''A Demographic Portrait of the Mormons, 1830–1980,'' in *After 150 Years: The Latter-day Saints in Sesquicentennial Perspective*, ed. Thomas G. Alexander and Jessie L. Embry (Provo: Charles Redd Center for Western Studies, Brigham Young University, 1983): 55.

[10] Bruce L. Campbell and Eugene E. Campbell, ''The Mormon Family,'' in *Ethnic Families in America, Pattern Variation*, ed. Charles H. Mindell and Robert W. Habenstein, 2d ed. (New York: Elsevier North Holland, 1981): 404.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Mark P. Leone, *Roots of Modern Mormonism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979): 147–209.

[13] Jan Shipps, ''In the Presence of the Past: Continuity and Change in Twentieth-Century Mormonism,'' in *After 150 Years: The Latter-day Saints in Sesquicentennial Perspective*, ed. Thomas G. Alexander and Jessie L. Embry (Provo: Charles Redd Center for Western Studies, Brigham Young University, 1983): 28.

[14] Klaus J. Hansen, ''Mormon Sexuality and American Culture,'' *Dialogue* 10 (Autumn 1976): 54.

[15] Campbell and Campbell, ''The Mormon Family,'' 404.

[16] White, ''Mormonism in America and Canada,'' 177.

[17] Wilford E. Smith, ''Mormon Sex Standards on College Campuses, or Deal Us Out of the Sexual Revolution!'' *Dialogue* 10 (Autumn 1976): 77–78.

intended them to be taken. If so, we merely note, with some anxiety, that the foundations for a body of knowledge can sustain relatively few articles of faith; include too many, and the foundation anchors something other than science.

We want to be very clear about the difference between writing that points to significant questions, laying out an agenda of productive research topics or priorities, and writing that disguises as fact statements that are hypothetical at best, or that generalizes, implicitly or directly, from unrepresentative samples to some wider, undefined, ambiguous population of Mormons. It is the latter that we suffer a surfeit of; there is rarely enough of the former in any discipline.

PROPOSALS FOR RESEARCH PRIORITIES AND PERSPECTIVES

Some Neglected Essentials

What is distinctive about Mormonism, apart from peculiar dietary habits, low cancer rates, and large families? First, there is the astonishing growth outside North America, growth such that Mormonism is now heralded as "a new world faith."[50] The source of that growth often is a direct result of the Church's far-flung missionary efforts. Then there is the affirmation by converts and lifelong members alike that they have a "testimony" or personal confirmation of the truthfulness of Mormonism, a confirmation often attributed to the Holy Spirit. Finally, there is the conformity to authority: among the things Mormons say when they bear their testimonies is that they have a conviction that the current President of the Church is a prophet, seer, and revelator, that in matters relating to the Church as a whole he is authorized to speak for God. Indeed, much of the often-remarked willingness of Mormon people to submit to ecclesiastical authority may stem from that conviction.

These topics can be grouped under four headings: the nature and consequences of the international growth of the Church; the processes of missionary work and conversion; the experiential component of personal religiosity; and the attribution and management of charisma. International growth, teaching and conversion, testimonies, and prophetic leadership: it may not be everyone's list, but it covers much that makes Mormondom unique.

What is remarkable as we list these essential characteristics of Mormondom is that *none* of them has received much attention in the research literature. There are demographic projections of Church growth but no available analyses of how converts in the Third-World countries differ from those who do not join; or of the consequences of their conversion for themselves and their social networks, as well as for the local LDS branches and wards. There is virtually no published research

on the life-styles, characteristics, and personal experiences that lead some people to become Mormons and others to turn the missionaries away.

The experiential component of religiosity and the nature, maintenance, and transmission of religious charisma are much neglected in the sociology of religion generally. Even so, the personal testimony and the perceived "mantle" of the Prophet (or of the bishop, stake president, patriarch, or mission president) seem so central to Mormon society and to the motivation that "drives" individual Mormons that they deserve far more attention than they have received.

Perhaps our social scientists are timid or our members suspicious of those who would try to measure intrinsically immeasureable things such as testimonies and prophetic callings. Yet the social scientist merely seeks to understand the nature of charisma and testimony as manifest in daily life, in what people say they think and feel, and what these thoughts and feelings have to do with the way Mormons live, work, play, and worship.

The poet E. E. Cummings warned us, decades ago, of the perils to the humanistic appreciation of nature posed by the meanspirited who would reduce the "sweet spontaneous earth" to charts and figures. Addressing the earth, he lamented:

> how often have
> the
> doting
>
> fingers of
> prurient philosophers pinched
> and
> poked
>
> thee
> , has the naughty thumb
> of science prodded
> thy
>
> beauty . how
> often have religions taken
> thee upon their scraggy knees
> squeezing and
>
> buffeting thee[51]

Yet the sweet earth, Cummings assures us, in blissful forgiveness answers with spring.

Nowadays the doting fingers and naughty thumbs are attached to meteorologists, agronomists, plant geneticists, and geologists, yet the miracle of spring continues. Spring springs back, as it were. Similarly, the fingers and thumbs that would plumb the spiritual pulses of Mormon converts and chart the nebulous clouds of the experiential and charismatic dimensions of Mormon religiosity need be neither

sacrilegious nor profane, but merely honest attempts to understand the most important features of Mormonism. And if the problem is not an aversion to inquire about the sacred, how can we explain a social science that has neglected most of the "big" questions? Is it lack of imagination?

Mormondom as an Underdeveloped Nation

Some of the problems of rapid growth facing Mormondom are similar to problems facing underdeveloped nations in the process of modernization. We believe some valuable insights and useful research questions are brought into focus when we consider Mormondom as an underdeveloped nation. With its population of over five million, Mormondom commands the allegiance of more citizens than Israel (1980 population 3.92 million) and is approximately equal in population to Haiti or Denmark (1981 populations respectively 5.10 and 5.12 million). Despite the size and, in many ways, the cosmopolitan nature of Mormondom, essential facts and figures on its people are far less accessible than they are for impoverished Haiti, let alone for more developed nations of comparable size. In fact, the existing social science data base for this growing "nation" is a series of studies that describe nonrepresentative portions of the national heartland, where are found the oldest, most traditional, and most powerful communities.

The spectacular growth of this "country"—its birth rates are higher than those of Mexico and Brazil, and its total growth rates include substantial immigration—occurs near the national boundaries, in regions where local culture is far different from that of the traditional core. Building on the "underdeveloped nation" model, we might hypothesize that the burgeoning "national" growth—the rapid influx of people whose ethnicity and culture are vastly different from the historical, western-European influence that has dominated Mormondom for 150 years—is largely ignored by most "traditional" Mormons. Moreover, the values and attitudes of Mormondom's old-timers, who live in the powerful central cities, seem to reflect an acceptance of the status quo and a belief that the present way of doing things—including great inequality in the distribution of power and resources and a traditional life-style that by Third-World standards is profligate—will continue. Whether this observation is accurate is one of the empirical questions that cries for an answer.

The gap between the richest and the poorest citizens of Mormondom does not seem to be diminishing (no available scientific data would let us be certain of this), and if present growth rates continue the impoverished new Mormon "villages" will soon contain more citizens than do the cities in the traditional heartland. As the numerical power

of the impoverished newcomers increases, so will their aspirations: that is one of the truisms of modernization. Pressures to alter the balance of resources and of social power to reflect the new economic and demographic realities may become nearly irresistible. Perhaps the well-to-do, traditional old-timers—the Deseret Mormons—should be preparing for the wrenching shift in institutional priorities likely to follow their own decline into minority status within the body of the Church. Are they doing so? To what extent are they even aware of the pending ''revolution''?

There are few social indicators on the growing non-U.S. LDS population. Sociologically and statistically, most of the newcomers represent the unknown. And the lack of good demographic data hampers program administration and virtually guarantees that many of the newcomers' needs will not be met by Church programs designed by the well-to-do old-timers.

There is an enormous scientific literature on modernization and national development. Here are some of the characteristics of ''developing man'' according to one authority on Third-World modernization:

> He uniformly blames his shortcomings, his failings, and his condition on society rather than on himself as in former times. . . .
> . . . Freedom and liberty have increasingly come to mean security for the person. When such security is not forthcoming, the situation becomes ripe for social rebellion.
> [There is] . . . discontent with low-grade economic status, which is expressed in a variety of ways—shifts from house to house and from job to job, concern with the education of children, willingness to postpone immediate gratifications. . . .
> . . . Secularization of personal values, as expressed in ''free'' love patterns, a lessening of the bonds of religious fervor, *or even sometimes conversions to other faiths*, and a general acculturation to the impersonal, anomic life of the large industrial city [emphasis added].
> . . . Above all, [there is] an unwillingness to return to the agricultural communities from which they have immigrated. . . .
> Developing man . . . believes the world is imperfect as it is; and further, he believes he can better himself or better the world as such.[52]

Which of these characteristics fit the citizens of underdeveloped nations who opt for citizenship in Mormondom? Are the Mormons of 1986 in the Third World rejecting traditional values and embracing Mormonism as a ''modern'' religion? Does the experience in the Church of recent Third-World converts help them educate themselves and improve their economic position? What proportion of Third-World converts become quickly disenchanted with the Church because it fails to provide the social network or the services that it promised? Given the liberation of women from traditional life-styles that is also

characteristic of modernization, what is the impact of Mormon gender-prescriptions and "traditional" family values? Does joining the Church represent an attempt to hold onto some traditional values or a step toward greater emancipation? What are the hopes and dreams of these new citizens of Mormondom? Alas, the social scientists cannot tell us. We cannot describe the marital status or educational attainment of Third-World Saints, let alone their aspirations for the future.

Thomas O'Dea asked similar questions almost fifteen years ago, and his admission that no one had the answers then still applies:

> Are the Mormon converts converted because they find in the Mormon Church a deeper understanding of the divine-human encounter and consequently a more authentic religious life that enables them to live reasonably and ethically with the upsetting crisis of our day? Or are they converted because they find in the Mormon Church a reinforcement of older values and attitudes that had been undermined and threatened by the conditions of our times?[53]

Critical in the governance of a Third-World country is the provision of opportunity for the young people. Yet issues of occupational aspiration, educational aspiration, and occupational mobility either within or between generations have been almost entirely overlooked by students of contemporary Mormonism. There is no sociology of work among the studies of the LDS people, no sociology of modernization, and only a rudimentary sociology of secularization.

Mormondom in Boomtown Metaphor

Another perspective that might profitably be applied to international Mormondom is the "boomtown" metaphor. Boomtowns face serious economic and social problems because of rapid growth. Most U.S. boomtowns of the past two decades have been towns located near energy resources or projected power-generating installations. They grew rapidly as construction workers and people in mineral extraction industries moved in and strained existing community support services. In the stereotypical boomtown, housing becomes hard to find and is very expensive, schools are overcrowded, medical facilities are inadequate, welfare and mental health services are strained, and rates of suicide, divorce, crime, and alcoholism increase. Part of the trouble in boomtowns is culture conflict between the "old-timers," who lived there before the rapid growth, and "newcomers" who may differ from the old-timers in ethnic origin, values, and life-styles. The newcomers are often seen as lacking long-term commitment to the community; they "don't care," have little investment in the community, and threaten traditional ways of life.

Communities that have coped successfully with rapid growth generally have done so by carefully monitoring rates of population increase and the characteristics of the newcomers arriving or anticipated. Impact-mitigation programs have been designed which take into account the attributes of newcomers, such as their marital status, the size of their families, their educational background, their customary recreational and social activities, and even their religious practices. In some instances, local political action and planning have prevented development until the firms or government entities fostering the development have helped to provide "front-end" resources that allow the community to expand essential facilities and services along with, or even in advance of, projected growth.

An annual growth rate of 5 percent or more is one of the distinguishing characteristics of a boomtown. In many locales in contemporary Mormondom, growth rates are much higher than that. Does a local LDS community beset by a flood of new converts experience many of the problems that boomtowns encounter? Several historians have pinpointed rapid growth as a mixed blessing to Mormondom. Jan Shipps cautions that "the church will have to exercise enough control over its growth to allow time for each new LDS cohort to complete the acculturation process," and Michael Quinn interprets the heavy emphasis on personal obedience to Church directives as a bureaucratic response to "an inherent fear of the centrifugal tendencies of enormous Church growth."[54]

The "old-timers" of Mormondom are the Saints in Utah and the Mountain West. Their culture includes aspects of the gospel as well as characteristics of the pioneer and the American heritage. Students of contemporary Mormondom have worked almost exclusively upon these Mormon "old-timers." As a result, almost everything we know about Mormons, in the sense of generalizations having some basis in research, reflects traditional Mormondom.

If international Mormondom experiences some of the problems of boomtowns—newcomers who are not entirely accepted by old-timers, converts whose loyalties to the community have not been tested, new families who bring their economic problems and unmet expectations along with them, and thereby strain existing welfare, counseling, and leadership resources—perhaps the Church can profit from some of the experience of boomtowns in impact analysis and amelioration programs.

However, to be able to apply lessons learned in boomtown research, continuous monitoring of converts' characteristics, abilities, attitudes, and experiences is necessary, and so is constant review of projected growth in the various subpopulations which, taken together, comprise the local or regional LDS community. There is little evidence in the public/scientific domain to suggest that enough is known about the

converts' characteristics—age, education, occupational experience, marital situations, expectations, and abilities—to permit efficient management and mitigation of the impacts of rapid growth in the Church. The long-range costs of ignorance—of unmet expectations, inadequate support facilities, insufficient preparation among old-timers for the differing values and attitudes of newcomers—are likely to be very high. LaMond Tullis states the problem in these terms:

> From the telescope we view the grand sweep of events that transforms nations and peoples, knowing in advance that the outcome—the triumph of the kingdom—is never in doubt. But if we turn to a microscope and view in magnification smaller parts of the Mormon reality, thereby holding them up for closer inspection . . . events of this hour, this day, set the scenarios for magnification—the happiness, the heartache, the dilemma. Only a moment's time at the microscope impresses us that each person's crucial role in the chain of events that links individual lives and feelings with the destiny of the gospel obliges Church members to bring all our faculties of mind and spirit to bear on what is happening to us in these latter days. Sometimes families are won and lost in the Kingdom for odd reasons. Yet from the micro view where a close focus may be had on the sentiments and values of individuals and groups—differences of opinion exist about the meaning of what is seen, or even about *what* is seen.[55]

Some of the lessons of social impact analysis—the experience of communities that managed to absorb large numbers of very different types of people and still maintained community solidarity and an acceptable level of community services, and the experience of communities that failed—are relevant to the problems of international Mormondom. How useful they may be is another empirical question. Surely "to bring all our faculties of mind and spirit to bear on what is happening to us" includes careful, continual study of the demographic, social, ethnic, and political composition of the vast population of newcomers who have adopted the Mormon community as their own. And surely the community of Mormon scholars must include some who are willing to undertake the kind of trend monitoring done by planners in successful boomtowns.

Some Prescriptions

Our concern that much of what passes for a social science of contemporary Mormonism is noncumulative ritualism—scientific activity that does not contribute much to the body of probabilities and facts about international Mormondom—leads to some suggestions aimed at reducing what seems to us an unacceptably high dross rate in a scientific specialty whose workers are already overwhelmed by the abundance of the potential harvest. We recognize that Mormondom is not, in fact, a developing nation—although its members may see themselves as citizens of an international kingdom—and that the

information necessary to manage this international body (or bodies), as defined by those to whom its management is entrusted, may not be the same kind of information social scientists desire. (Ecclesiastical managers are not necessarily concerned about the same questions or indicators of development that interest social scientists.) Even if Church administrators are interested in the kinds of variables that also interest professional Mormon-watchers, there is no organizational imperative or ethic that compels, or even suggests, that the ecclesiastical administrators should share their data with professionals who on the face of things have much less stake in the success of the Mormon enterprise than do the administrators.

It follows that most social scientists interested in the sociology of modern Mormondom will have to support their work with personal or limited institutional resources. Because the number of scientific person-years available for the study of international Mormondom is limited, and the rate of development is so awesome, those of us committed to the social science of Mormondom must do all we can to assure that our limited resources are not wasted in unproductive or marginal work. In the interest of improving the efficiency of our research effort—of moving the social science of Mormondom ahead more rapidly and less painfully—we make the following recommendations:

(1) Let there be a moratorium on studying Mormon college students just because they are captive or readily available. As is apparent in our discussion of table 5, it is usually impossible to identify a larger population to which results of research on students in particular courses may be generalized. We cannot afford to waste resources in nongeneralizable work. This is not to say that researchers should not use Mormon subjects in experiments where the objective is to understand something about human behavior generally. But if the goal is to understand Mormonism and Mormons, then usually there is little utility in collecting and analyzing data from nonrepresentative samples. At the very least, researchers who wish to study LDS college students should make certain that their student samples are demonstrably representative of the university population or some clearly defined portion of it.

Even better would be imaginative studies using Mormon students from nations outside the U.S. as respondents in exploratory research or as associates in well-designed, probably small-scale studies of their home communities. In such collaboration, old-timers and newcomers in the social science of Mormondom might work together to identify trends, problems, and opportunities. As the essential, critical problems are international in nature, it seems sensible procedure to work with people from nations where Mormondom is growing rapidly. Certainly the feasibility of doing research in Third-World settings will be enhanced

if international students and their social networks at home are involved in *joint* research with professional social scientists, rather than simply serving as respondents.

(2) In light of the availability of Polk city directories and telephone directories as sampling frames in many U.S. cities where Mormons are a substantial minority, there should be more mail surveys and telephone surveys of Mormon people—gleaned from samples that include non-Mormons as well—that would yield findings generalizable at least communitywide. Small samples representing known and definable populations are usually better for our purposes than large samples representing ambiguous or undefined populations. A sample of one hundred Mormon households, carefully drawn to insure representativeness, would produce results far more useful in the evolution of our science than findings from ''available'' populations of students or neighbors many times larger.

(3) The unknown territory we wish to chart is the world of international Mormondom, or at least that of *majority* Mormondom, or non-Utah Mormondom. Therefore, where possible, researchers should study Mormons outside Utah, especially urban Mormon populations, even though Utah Mormons are far more accessible.

(4) Two available resources for studying the characteristics of non-Utah Mormons are greatly underutilized: (a) the national censuses of nations such as Canada and Britain that include a census item on religion; and (b) the myriad national and regional studies stored in various data archives in the U.S. and elsewhere. In assessing the census data, researchers are limited to the items that happened to be included in a given census, but the advantage of being able to generalize to all Mormons in a region or nation justifies much gleaning of census tapes and vital statistics records.

As for the secondary analysis of data sets available in private and public archives, the essential first step is to determine if a given sample was large enough to include a fair number of Mormons, and the second is to determine whether they can be identified in items on religious preference or affiliation. Sometimes it will be necessary to pool the handful of Mormons in each of several similar surveys to produce a composite sample large enough to justify analysis. And sometimes a consequence of that pooling will be that analysis is severely limited because only a few items—educational attainment, employment status, occupation, and marital status, for instance—are common to all of the data sets.

Even so, the benefits from analyzing data sets based on samples generalizable to nations, regions, or metropolitan areas—data collected by investigators who had no connection with LDS officialdom and obtained from persons who identified themselves as being Mormons

independent of any Church record or roster—should far outweigh the outlay of scientific detective work necessary to construct the composite samples. Mormons who are totally inactive, for example, who are "lost" as far as the official Church records are concerned, might still report their religious preference to a non-LDS researcher as "Mormon." Thus, by gleaning the handful of LDS respondents from several surveys and combining them, we may obtain a clearer picture of the differences between "active" and "inactive" Mormons than is possible in studies sponsored by or associated with Mormon institutions. The creative use by Heaton and Calkins of the Mormon subsamples in several national fertility surveys is a good example of such methods.[56]

Our review has been illustrative rather than definitive, and the prescriptions are neither original nor exhaustive. Scholars in anthropology, psychology, political science, and history will have other models and perspectives that may serve them better than our pictures of Mormondom as underdeveloped nation or boomtown. What is abundantly clear, we think, is that the social science of Mormondom will mature only through the personal commitment and coordinated, creative efforts of the interested individual scientists. It does not seem likely that federal or private foundation funding will support much research on Mormons, nor that the large-scale studies of contemporary Mormons conducted by Church administrators in the course of their official stewardships will be made available to scientists generally— that is, to the public—in the near future.

The social scientists of Mormondom are relatively few, and the field for study is vast and growing. Nevertheless, we must make do. It appears that the present cohort of scientists interested in matters Mormon—those of us working in the next two decades—will be the trained social observers present while Mormonism blossoms into a major world faith, the first such development since the Protestant Reformation. It would be grand if history showed that we cooperated and conducted the crucial studies as best we could, making up in careful resource use, strategic research design, and bristling scientific integrity for what we lacked in numbers and external funding.

NOTES

[1]We have tried to distinguish between "Mormondom" and "Mormonism." Following the lead of some historians, we apply the term *Mormondom* to the political, social, and temporal domain of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and its members in the last quarter of the twentieth century. This contemporary "kingdom" includes Mormon organizations spanning local or regional political jurisdictions and concerned with members' secular and spiritual welfare. The term *Mormonism* is reserved for the belief system of the Church, its principles, doctrines, and theology (in LDS parlance, the restored gospel). Mormonism is a body of teachings and religious practices; Mormondom is a highly visible worldwide organization devoted to its own expansion and to providing for the spiritual and temporal welfare of people in general and Mormons in particular. Mormondom is wider than the Church; it embraces Latter-day Saint political, economic, educational, and familial organization as well as the cultural attributes of the Mormon people.

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[3]Bruce A. Chadwick, Howard M. Bahr, and Stan L. Albrecht, *Social Science Research Methods* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1984), 7, emphasis added.

[4]Robert S. Michaelsen, "Enigmas in Interpreting Mormonism," *Sociological Analysis* 38 (Summer 1977): 155. Our own rough count of references in recent years of the *Social Science Citation Index* confirmed O'Dea's continuing first rank as most-cited sociologist of Mormonism.

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[6]Michaelsen, *Sociological Analysis*, 151.

[7]Daryl White, "Review of Mormonism and the American Experience," *Sociological Analysis* 42 (Fall 1981): 297.

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[9]Dean L. May, "Review of *Roots of Modern Mormonism*," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 12 (Winter 1982): 551.

[10]Joseph G. Jorgensen, "Review of *Roots of Modern Mormonism*," *American Ethnologist* 7 (1980): 787.

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[15]Ibid., 26.

[16]Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, 15.

[17]Ibid., 14.

[18]Ibid., 6-7.

[19]Ibid., 126-27.

[20]See note 12, above.

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[47]F. LaMond Tullis, "The Church Moves outside the United States: Some Observations from Latin America," *Dialogue* 13 (Spring 1980): 63–73.

[48]Dean L. May, "Demographic Portrait of the Mormons, 1830–1980," in *After 150 Years: The Latter-day Saints in Sesquicentennial Perspective*, 64–66.

[49]Stark, "The Rise of a New World Faith," 26.

[50]Ibid., 18.

[51]E. E. Cummings, "O Sweet Spontaneous Earth," in *A Concise Treasury of Great Poems, English and American*, ed. Louis Untermyer (New York: Pocket Books, 1958), 503.

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[53]Thomas F. O'Dea, *The Mormons* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), 154–55.

[54]Jan Shipps, "The Mormons: Looking Forward and Outward," 40; D. Michael Quinn, "From Sacred Grove to Sacral Power Structure," *Dialogue* 17 (Summer 1984): 29.

[55]Tullis, "The Church Moves outside the United States," 156–57.

[56]Heaton and Calkins, "Family Size and Contraceptive Use among Mormons," 102–13.

Alberta Wheat Pool

Grain elevators rise
Against vast prairie sky
Like Royal Grenadiers on watch.
Yet peeling paint, some aging sentinels
Seem rustbound as a dustbowl plow,
Stand single aside weed-filled railways as if forgotten.

In sprouting towns near grainfields thick as porridge
The few new melt pastels into landscape—
Pale green, brilliant orange,
As if a circus or a midway sideshow.

I have spent half a lifetime
Reading their messages,
Measuring journeys by their passing towers,
Longing for their landmarks in the dying dusk.

Such meditations bring to mind
A child's pride in four elevators
Beside our railroad tracks
And endless games of run-sheep-run
Among the boxcars' shadows.

This afternoon, touched by warm Hawaiian rain,
I span the Pacific in an eye blink
To walk once more those rutted roads
And feel the gusting prairie wind
Blow warm mellow of memory
Through my head of half-grey hair.

—Jim Walker

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A Response to Bahr and Forste

Jon P. Alston

The article by Howard M. Bahr and Renata Tonks Forste calls for higher standards of research on Mormondom than has been the case. Scientific findings, they rightly claim, should be objective, generalizable, replicable, and public. Few social scientists would object to these criteria, though many social science studies of Mormons and non-Mormons alike violate one or more of these standards. Such criticisms are especially valid in the study of religion, which tends to be underfunded and understaffed. The authors also level specific criticisms toward undue and uncritical acceptance of enshrined classics, exploratory works, and conclusions based on ill-defined and nonrandomly selected samples of Mormon subjects, notably Brigham Young University students and "accidental" adults living in Mormondom's heartland.

In response to these criticisms—which place doubt on the utility of most social studies of Mormonism—Bahr and Forste present a number of research models and topics for future, scientifically reliable projects. They call for research projects which place Mormons and Mormonism in larger, more comparative contexts. The authors then present two metaphors—Mormondom as an "underdeveloped nation" and as a "boomtown"—that challenge the traditional, often superficial and unsophisticated ways former research questions have been selected and answered. These analytic guides suggest a surprising number of research questions couched within well-developed research and theoretical frameworks. They offer ambitious research challenges to social scientists.

However potentially useful, the danger of the above research metaphors is that they are too restrictive. There are other models of scholarship, if any must be used, which also offer promises of yielding insightful and objective findings. I offer one additional metaphor for future researchers investigating Mormondom: Mormonism as a religious phenomenon.

MORMONISM AS A RELIGIOUS PHENOMENON

Much of the research interest in Mormonism and in its unique characteristics derives from the fact that Mormons form a religious group. It follows that a religious metaphor can be fruitfully used. We can do

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no better than to look at Mormonism's religious past as a guide to future research. In addition, Mormonism is one religion among many and should be studied in comparison to other religious groups.

In spite of the very impressive membership growth of the LDS church in recent decades, the history of Mormonism indicates a tendency toward apostasy and schism. Steven L. Shields, in his study of Restoration-derived schisms, finds more than one hundred sects and divisions, many of which exist today.[1] Similarly, J. Gordon Melton describes almost twenty *currently* existing major groups listing Joseph Smith, Jr., as a source of revelation.[2] While the growth of LDS membership in recent decades suggests that Mormonism may emerge as a "new world faith," according to Rodney Stark,[3] the schismatic tendency is also a fact that should not be ignored. In addition, the high rates of conversions into the LDS church are also accompanied by a dropout rate of lifelong members and former converts. Nor are conversion rates, as measured by missionary years or population, evenly distributed from one country to another or from region to region within a society. I encourage social scientists, including historians and geographers in addition to sociologists, to select research topics that deal with schism, membership growth, conversion, apostasy, leadership styles, and organization, ideally on a comparative basis.

Much of what is known about membership and conversion rates comes to us from official sources. These figures may not be completely reliable or meaningful for social scientists. Many officially designated LDS members are no doubt inactive in one degree or another, and an officially defined "member" may not define himself as such. Studies of Mormons should clearly define, apart from official sources, what is meant by membership. I do not mean to imply that Church officials inflate membership figures, though that is a possibility to be tested. Rather, membership figures can be used for different purposes which are not always compatible. A Church official may define some persons as members or not; the persons involved can disagree. Church rolls can also become dated and distorted through officially recognized disaffiliation and inactivity. Membership statistics for Roman Catholics, as well as other religous groups, are notoriously inaccurate. Social scientists should maintain a skeptical attitude when dealing with official statistics of any type.

Statistics, no matter how reliable and "true," are often meaningless when viewed in a vacuum. It is true that Mormon membership has increased by over 50 percent in the last three decades, but so have the Jehovah's Witnesses and other religious groups. The research based on Mormons sometimes borders on monomania in its exclusivity. While no one criticizes research specialization, a more comparative orientation should balance the penchant to restrict one's focus to Mormonism per se.

As an aside, the spate of bibliographies on Mormon studies published in recent years suggests to me a great preoccupation with past findings. Even if this preoccupation criticizes past works, scholars should look outward more. As a non-Mormon fascinated by Mormonism, I detect a too-great concern by scholars to deal exclusively with Mormonism. This isolates those researchers from a wider community of scholars. Professional ''anti-Mormons'' make me nervous, but so do, though to a lesser degree, exclusively ''Mormon specialists.'' Why these exist would make a study in itself.

Thus, again, I call for more comparative research. Even if this research is based on nonrepresentative samples, the comparative approach offers a great promise of utility. Why not, for example, draw samples of students at BYU and at Seventh-Day Adventist, Roman Catholic, Baptist, and Methodist sponsored universities? One could add student samples from Bob Jones University and Oral Roberts University. How these students differ from each other and over time would be of incalculable value to the understanding of these religious groups.

At the very least, I urge future researchers to compare missionary tactics and converts among a plurality of growth-oriented, evangelical religious groups. Rodney Stark has projected a ''conservative'' estimate of over sixty-three million Mormons in the year 2080.[4] But there could be, assuming similar projection techniques, almost as many Baha'is, Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and even Nichiren Soka Gakkai members of various types.

ON ''SENSITIZING'' WORKS

The study of Mormonism is both blessed and cursed by the availability of well-respected exploratory and ''sensitizing'' studies. Their positive characteristics are based on the fact that such works as Thomas O'Dea's *The Mormons* alert scholars to issues which otherwise might be ignored. Unfortunately, such hallowed ''classics'' do not always indicate that the source of a statement is intuition rather than testable fact. Readers can fall into the trap of accepting as scientific truth what is in fact a flight of fancy and overstatement, however brilliant and intellectually appealing. Then, too, these affirmations, if accepted on trust, probably support the biases of the readers and authors, or else there would be an immediate hue and cry of disagreement and rebuttal.

One solution to this problem is to encourage graduate students to test one or another statement in these standard classics in their theses and dissertations. There is no better training for a student than to challenge a master's hunches and suggestions. To do so, the students

must become thoroughly familiar with these classics, something that most readers fail to do. Classics are more often skimmed than critically read. In addition, graduate students being what they are, they will use the latest techniques and methodologies to test statements made in these classics. This practice provides ongoing tests for "factual" claims made during previous stages in scientific and theoretical analyses.

However—and here I disagree strongly with Bahr and Forste— I call for *more* "intuitive," imaginative, exploratory studies of Mormonism. Each generation of scholars must reinterpret its subject matter, and each generation needs its "classic." I'll gladly exchange studies of BYU students for one or more subjective interpretation of contemporary Mormonism. Let such a work contain flights of fancy, personal impressions (even if biased), and glib generalizations. These will be tested with more rigorous techniques and hypotheses, and their utility will be debated and determined. But we still need these pioneers, if only to test ourselves against their wisdom.

Bahr and Forste call for "no more surveying: it's time for the shovels." However, intuitive "surveying" can locate diamonds as well as or perhaps even better than empirical "shoveling." The findings of much scientifically rigorous shoveling at times more closely resemble intellectual manure than paydirt. The study of Mormonism deserves better than mediocre, though empirical, research.

NOTES

¹Steven L. Shields, *Divergent Paths of the Restoration*, 3d ed. (Bountiful, Utah: Restoration Research, 1982).
²J. Gordon Melton, "The Latter Day Saints Family," in *The Encyclopedia of American Religions*, vol. 2 (Wilmington, N.C.: McGrath Publishing Co., 1978), 1–21.
³Rodney Stark, "The Rise of a New World Faith," *Review of Religious Research* 26 (September 1984): 18–27.
⁴Ibid., 22.

Reply to Alston

Howard M. Bahr and Renata Tonks Forste

We agree with much of Jon Alston's critique of "Toward a Social Science of Contemporary Mormondom." Certainly the potentially fruitful paradigms he recommends to supplement our metaphors of boomtown and underdeveloped nation are appropriate. Alston's most useful observation, we think, is that social scientists of Mormondom have been distressingly ethnocentric in their research; only rarely have they contrasted Mormons with members of other faiths. Alston suggests that this narrow focus be supplanted by comparisons across space and time—between modern Mormons and the Mormondom of yesteryear, between Mormondom and splinter groups of Mormon origin, and between Mormons and non-Mormons.

Alston suggests that there is no harm—perhaps even benefit—in continuing to encourage impressionistic, intuitive, and pseudoscientific writing about Mormons. He is far more optimistic than we about the likelihood that sometime, somewhere there will arise devoted empiricists to assess the accumulated results of studies of unrepresentative samples and tell us which findings are valid and which are errors stemming from faulty procedures, improper research design, or uncontrolled overgeneralization.

Indeed, our careful review of the published research of the past fifteen years, along with a less exhaustive assessment of research done in the 1950s and 1960s, suggests the opposite conclusion: as long as scientists are rewarded for studies of "convenient" or "accidental" samples, most of us will not be motivated to do the more difficult and often more costly work necessary to secure defensible probability samples or to study Mormons who live beyond the environs of the universities where we and our students are located. Thus the present status of the social science of Mormondom clearly illustrates the "principle of least effort": if our convenient samples generate findings that are treated as legitimate contributions to the field, there is less motivation to design and administer data collection programs that meet more rigorous standards.

There may also be a kind of Gresham's Law operating: bad research spawns more bad research, and in the process the few studies based on representative samples are overbalanced by the sheer volume of

"evidence" from inadequate samples or unsystematic small-scale observation.

Many times in the literature review we encountered a "fact" about Mormons duly certified by a handful of citations: on the face of it, the generalization was well-supported. However, careful checking of the alleged support—an examination of each study cited—generally revealed that the "scientific support" reflected such flawed research design that the evidence offered provided shaky support at best and, at worst, was positively misleading.

Perhaps the most telling argument against Alston's optimistic hope that someone will come along and separate all that misleading research chaff from the valuable kernals of fact is the absence of any such winnowing process in the research literature in the past twenty-five years. As we noted in the paper, there are some hopeful signs. For a few topics there has been some highly credible, generalizable work. But the accumulation of "soft" and pseudoscientific literature continues to outpace the production of defensible empirical work. Excepting the discipline of history, most of the social science literature on Mormondom is an untrustworthy guide to the characteristics of Mormon people and the social processes that affect them.

Alston concludes that our suggestion for curtailing "exploratory" work—that we "stop surveying and start shoveling"—is as likely to leave us shoveling offal as rich ore. That may be so. If it is, it reflects the quality of three decades of often uncontrolled and sometimes irresponsible surveying. We are certain that some of the surveyors are better than others at pointing us toward pay dirt. Unfortunately, the available empirical work—the appropriate, well-directed shoveling necessary to assess a surveyor's credentials and his "success rate"—is insufficient to allow us to decide which surveyors to dismiss and which to put on long-term contract.

Therefore, the conclusion that it is time to do some serious "digging," and thereby learn enough that we may dismiss the least efficient surveyors, remains in our view a most important task facing the social scientists of Mormondom. We suspect that the rate of progress would be much improved if, rather than continuing to encourage impressionistic journalism and the study of idiosyncratic Mormon populations, there were indeed a swing toward "rank empiricism." Then, when a brilliant theorist or social critic does come along, he or she will have a body of solidly grounded research to build on. We believe that the chances for genuine progress in our disciplines are much enhanced if our best thinkers can work from good data bases.

There are swings and cycles in the evolution of science. For several decades the social science of Mormondom has been heavily skewed to the impressionistic–intuitive, exploratory side of things. A period of

overemphasis on empiricism—on social bookkeeping and low-level theorizing along with high-level attention to methodological rigor—is long overdue.

We therefore reaffirm our call for a partial moratorium on the study of Mormon college students—to be relaxed only when defensible, as in the case of studies of college samples that can be generalized to some wider population. And we repeat our call for a period of "overemphasis" on careful enumeration and careful description of the various segments of contemporary Mormondom and of the major processes that seem to determine their characteristics. It would be well for us to have a firm fix on what, in fact, is so before we proceed to the "why" questions or to recommending changes. In any case, we need to do enough shoveling to know which surveyors are most likely to guide us to pay dirt. Multiplying exploratory studies without an appropriate testing of the accuracy and legitimacy of the surveyor/explorer seems a misguided policy at this stage.

Waiting for a Soldier, 1917

The dull daguerreotype holds her image
As if on weave of linen. Light grazes
Her surface, whose immediate glow amazes
Our memory. She was young before the rage
Of contravening hate in the fiery cage
Of war, when restitution began in phases
On the kaiser's front among mounds and mazes
Of Verdun, the continuity. Hail, gut of sage
And soldier in a wiry violin, excrescent
And warbling gas in its venue, chlorine
Nestling in a lung that sogs in a tureen
Of skull, whose strewn mind, recent
In its occupancy, is green in the rush
Of death like proud flesh, the intaglio.

—Clinton F. Larson

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Book Review

R. LANIER BRITSCH and TERRANCE D. OLSON. *Counseling: A Guide to Helping Others.* Vol. 1. Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Co., 1983. xi + 238 pp. $8.95

Reviewed by Jodine J. Wood, executive director, Broderick and Wood, Marriage and Family Counseling, Inc., Cypress, California.

This book contains twenty-one chapters, each written by separate authors. Its purpose, as stated in the preface, is "to explain in layman's language some of the shared wisdom of the specialists regarding a number of life's most serious and vexing problems" (x). The various authors "have attempted to show lay counselors a number of gospel-oriented solutions to human problems" (xi). These are ambitious goals!

The first defines the role of the lay counselor. It indicates the necessity for preparation of the counselor and makes a clear statement as to when appropriate professional referrals are necessary. This is essential for those who take on the role of counselor, as they share the burden of helping and nurturing those who have problems.

Gospel-oriented solutions abound in every chapter. The "how to" lists are helpful and profuse. The discussion of crisis intervention is particularly helpful on understanding the crisis and using appropriate resources. The chapter on counseling couples makes the excellent point that the responsibility for the healing of a marriage should be placed on the couple's shoulders. The chapter on depression has an adequate discussion of the emotional, cognitional, motivational, and physical facets, and includes a wonderful quote from Abraham Lincoln describing how depression feels. The chapter on children and discipline is outstanding. It makes the excellent point that we should use spiritual power instead of secular power in the process of discipline, not to control but to teach through acts of love.

There are many strengths in the book, but in my opinion there are also some serious omissions. With all the research that has been done on the biochemical component of depression, it was disappointing to have this facet neglected. In the chapter entitled "Depression," David G. Weight indicates that grieving for the loss of a loved one will produce short-term depression. In my experience this just has not been true. Working through a major loss often takes up to a year to

resolve. I also disagree with the claim that those who lose a marriage partner through death experience emotions similar to those who lose a partner through divorce. My experience indicates that the emotional upheaval is much worse in divorce because of the rejection and failure components involved.

In counseling couples, a major component is joining the couple (letting them know you care and that you understand each of them). According to Carlfred Broderick, achieving this triangular rapport among each member of the couple and the counselor is the most crucial task when beginning counseling with a couple. Yet this is not addressed at all in the volume. If it is not possible to have the couple attend counseling sessions together, it is still possible to work on the marriage relationship. Contrary to statements in the chapter, ''Counseling Couples,'' James Framo rightly teaches that you work with whoever you can get.

The book's instruction on assessing the suicide potential is inadequate. The most critical factors in determining the probability of a suicide attempt are:

(1) Has the person attempted suicide before?
(2) Does he/she have a plan?
(3) Does he/she have the means to carry out the plan?

The more lethal the method the person has in mind, the greater the likelihood the suicide will succeed if attempted. But the lethality of the method does not necessarily have a bearing on the likelihood that suicide will be attempted.

The responsibilities of the counselor, as outlined in this book, seem heavy, even to a professional. According to R. Lanier Britsch, ''counselors are responsible to advise behavior changes to solve problems'' (13). This premise of one theoretical school is not shared by all professionals and seems, to this reviewer, to be ill-advised and overburdening for the lay counselor. Later on in the same chapter, the lay counselor is instructed that the best help for those who sorrow and grieve because of the iniquities of other men is to remind them of the positive side of life. I have never gotten to first base with someone in sorrow by reminding him of the positive side of life.

There is a great need for a book of this kind: explaining in layman's language the wisdom of the specialists. Perhaps the next volume will cover fewer subjects in greater depth and with more specialists' wisdom.