Chapter 3: The Historical Development of the Militia in America, 1607–1861, and in Antebellum Missouri

During the decade of the 1830s the Latter-day Saints generally sought peaceful means of negotiation to resolve potential conflicts with their Missouri neighbors. However, they were not afraid to respond to anti-Mormon agitation with their own militia force when arbitration proved futile. Critics may be prone to quickly condemn a militia response as not only being unauthorized but illegal. However, an understanding of military history, and more specifically the militia system as it developed over time, as well as a knowledge of the state and federal laws governing it, is necessary in order to correctly interpret the mustering of militia by both Mormon and Missouri authorities. Both sides called out their respective forces, and both sides felt it was their legal and civil right to do so.

The English and Colonial Militia Systems

Like many of her religious, political, social, and economic institutions, America’s military system is also of English, and more specifically, Anglo-Saxon origin. In England, a concept emerged which centered in an abstract ideal called “The Great Fyrd,” or the notion that in return for one’s liberty and protection, every male citizen capable of bearing arms was obligated to render service in defense of the country and the king. For centuries, universal military obligation was considered the most proper way of defending a society. The outgrowth of this concept and practice was the establishment of the militia, which was to be in principle and practice an all-nation citizen’s army. ^[38]

In the Elizabethan period of the late sixteenth century, the English military underwent some evolutionary changes. Rather than prepare every able-bodied man for military duty, it was decided to select a small number of men in each shire (one in ten), and drill them in military tactics. This group was called trainbands (literally “trained bands”). The remaining nine-tenths of the adult male population were considered “inactive general reserve” to be mobilized only in times of extreme emergency. Those selected for military duty generally came from the middle class rather than the peasantry, and were in reality a bourgeois militia. Trainbands received periodic instruction and training throughout the year, usually by experienced soldiers. Company members were expected to supply some of their own equipment, although they could borrow supplies and some arms from the public stocks. A general muster was called for once or twice a year. These musters not only helped to ensure military readiness, but also provided a social experience for militia members and their families as well as the community.¹

When Englishmen established the first permanent colony at Jamestown in 1607, the majority of men in the Virginia company had little or no military experience. But it was an accepted fact that upon coming to America, the Crown expected the company members to defend themselves. The harsh Chesapeake environment and the problems caused by Native Americans, forced the colonists to totally reject the concept of a select militia in favor of the entire male population being trained and armed for the defense of the community. Thus, each man was expected to have dual roles in the new world—laborer and soldier.

Captain John Smith, a veteran of Europe’s religious wars, was the first to teach military skills to Jamestown’s settlers. Upon taking command in 1608, he immediately recognized the ^[39] military deficiencies in the men and instilled military training which included formal discipline, drilling, marching, and building fortifications. After Smith’s departure in 1610, several men with fighting experience emigrated to the Tidewater area and intensified the training. They also introduced English titles and ranks such as captain general, marshal, colonel, captain, lieutenant, ensign, sergeant, corporal, and private. Perhaps more significantly, hereafter, social status in the community depended on a person’s military rank. Over the course of the next few decades other changes and developments occurred. Although each man was obligated to provide himself with arms, armor, and ammunition, in 1622, London officials sent a shipment of arms and weapons which were placed in a public arsenal to supplement the colony with necessary items and supplies for their protection. Beginning in 1634, the militia was organized along county lines with an officer appointed by the governor to command them. The commanding officer also had the authority to call out or raise the militia depending on the disturbances and circumstances. This arrangement meant that the governor had less control over the militia since it essentially came under the control of local authorities. Still later, in 1645, the assembly met and created two military districts or associations comprised of the three upper and three lower counties, making the county militias part of a larger military organization of the colony. And finally, beginning in 1661 county militia units included for the first time a band of dragoons, or mounted forces.²

The establishment of the militia in early colonial Massachusetts played a needed role in the New England region. Upon its creation the militia essentially became subject to the General Court ^[40] of Massachusetts. Later it operated under two additional authorities—the Inter-Colonial New England Confederation (made up of commissioners representing their colonial governments who could call up troops from the various provinces to serve temporarily in areas outside their respective colonies), and the Crown, who occasionally took control of military affairs and supplied English-trained professional advisors in order to guarantee victory. Like Virginia, when called up for emergency duty, the volunteers were expected to provide their own weapons, but they were also paid for their services from the colony’s coffers—sometimes per day, and other times per campaign.

The number of training days, or musters, also varied from time to time. In 1637 eight days of drill were required each year; by 1660 the number was reduced to six, and ultimately to four. The threat of war however, tended to create a sudden spurt of interest in the drill. For example, during King Philips War in 1675–78, the Massachusetts militia held musters twice a week. Drills in the Boston area generally took place in or near the center of town—often on the Common. The day began with a prayer, followed by the actual drill which included marching, forming lines, skirmishing, and retiring or retreating, with many of these activities being performed to the sound of a drum. A musket exhibition or demonstration (somewhat similar to today’s formal drill and ceremony exercises) was also practiced and included a fifty-six-count maneuvering of arms based on Elton’s The Complete Body of Art Military. Interestingly, it was not until count number forty-three that the soldier would finally fire his weapon breast high. Noting this procedure one historian has written, “Though the magnificent variety of motions found in [Elton’s] manual may have served as an exhaustive means of discipline for soldiers at drill, it is difficult to understand how the militiaman managed to avoid the scalping knife of some reasonably competent Indian while he struggled to reach number forty-three.” A prayer service ^[41] ended the exercises around three p.m. in the afternoon. Dinner was frequently served to the men and was oftentimes followed by the consumption of rum.³

In numerous ways the Virginia and Massachusetts colonies established patterns and precedents of militia laws, policies, and organization that would later be adopted and incorporated, not only by other colonies, but in the federal and state systems as well. By 1640, Connecticut and Maryland had organized their colonial militias, and by 1671 the other six colonies in existence had done so as well. By the end of the seventeenth century, every colony except Pennsylvania had formed and organized a militia system.⁴

The colonial militia system was rather complex and in many ways varied from colony to colony. This was principally due to sectional and regional diversity which caused the militias within each of the respective colonies to have different roles from each other. For example, by 1700 the Indian population in Virginia was so weak that professional rangers were employed to do the job of patrolling the frontier. This situation meant there was very little need for a militia and it virtually ceased to exist for about half a century. However, this was not the case in Massachusetts. Here the militia retained much of its vitality since it continued to conduct raids on marauding Indian bands who threatened and harassed settlers. In South Carolina, a colony with a more sparsely settled population, it was difficult to muster up the needed volunteers because they were so spread out. Fear of slave insurrection and revolt also made it out of the question to arm Blacks. Furthermore, as time went on, the militia became a means of controlling slaves rather than ^[42] a means of defense. Southern colonies generally organized militias along county lines, while in the more populated areas in the North, cities and towns had their own organized units.⁵

At the heart of the colonial militia system was the principle of universal military obligation for men generally between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. (Sometimes the upper age was sixty, and occasionally the lower age limit was raised to twenty-one). Men summoned into general service were part of the “common” militia and organized into companies normally created along county lines. As the population increased, regiments were established comprised of several companies. Historically, the majority of civilians displayed little or no fondness for military parade or service but were nonetheless compelled to be called into duty when emergencies arose.

Interest and participation in the regular militia experienced a marked decline during the colonial period. Deterioration occurred for several reasons. Notably, as the population increased, the frontier advanced, making Indian threats less likely. Militia service was frequently seen as being inconvenient and an intrusion on one’s time spent in employment. Muster days also became more of a social event rather than an organized drill, and an ever-increasing exemption list meant that fewer and fewer men were obligated to participate. In some instances, the more wealthy could hire able-bodied substitutes to fill their obligation. The net result was that the common militia began to wane. However, it was the decline in the irregulars which led to the emergence of a new type of militia known as “volunteers.” These units were made up of men who had a fancy for soldiering and were willing and anxious to be a part of it. Volunteer, or independent companies were organized separately from the regular militia. They had distinctive uniforms, a formal ^[43] and well-structured organization, were well armed, trained frequently, and manifested esprit de corps. Unlike the men who were part of the common militia who had very little military training or expertise, these men were essentially amateur soldiers.⁶

The American militia played a significant role during the Colonial Wars, and more specifically the Seven Years War. From the onset of the French and Indian conflict, Great Britain adhered to the policy that it would be a joint operation—the mother country would provide its share of British regulars, while the colonists would be required to provide their allotment of men and equipment. During the war, there were essentially three types of American forces who participated: a relatively small number of rangers or frontiersmen who were selected as scouts and hunters; the common militia, composed of ordinary citizens called up by the colonial legislatures who had little or no military training; and volunteer provincials who were uniformed, outfitted, and as well-equipped as the British troops. In spite of the fact that all three groups scored some successes, British officials were generally not impressed with the military skills or conduct of the colonials, particularly those comprising the regulars. There were several reasons for such a perception. The Americans did not view themselves as being employed by the king, so much as they were employed by the colonial province. Upon enlistment, since they believed they were under a contract with the province, if the contract was violated, this automatically nullified or voided the soldiers responsibilities and he felt free to return home. For example, if the province failed to send the promised supplies such as food or rum, the militiamen would refuse to work or simply walk off. Furthermore, they resented being subject to the same military codes of justice and penalties as British regulars. They resented authority, particularly that of the Crown, and ^[44] wanted to serve under the command of their own officers. Following the war, both the British and American forces fostered negative perceptions about the other. The colonists harbored a disliking and disdain for the British standing army, while the British believed the colonials made poor soldiers.⁷

The Militia and the Revolution

The Revolution essentially created the need for a dual army—the professional Continental Army in addition to the citizen army or militia. Washington clearly perceived the militia would not stand up long against British regulars. What was needed to successfully defeat the British was a professionally trained army and he petitioned the Continental Congress to make it possible. The fact that the militia system had been in place for over a century and a half however, created some problems throughout the war. Perhaps foremost, the militia limited the numbers who joined the ranks of the regular army, since given a choice between serving periodically in the local militia, or for an extended period of time in the Continental army, most men chose the former. Fortunately, the spirit of independence led just enough men to enlist with General Washington throughout the war. While the commander-in-chief depended most heavily on the Continental Army in order to achieve success on the battlefield, during the Revolution volunteer companies steadied the regular army’s lines and fought alongside the regulars. These militia units had a mixed battlefield record, whose effectiveness often depended on the commanding officer.

General Washington’s opinions of the local militia units was not very high. He never ceased complaining about their performance which he labeled as undependable, undisciplined, and cowardly under fire. Writing to the president of the Congress he penned, “To place any ^[45] dependence upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff.” Furthermore, “If I was called upon to declare upon Oath whether the Militia have been most serviceable or hurtful upon the whole; I should subscribe to the latter.”⁸ There were exceptions to this, such as the famous efforts of the Massachusetts minutemen, although they were only partially organized, and after the clashes at Lexington and Concord disappeared within a few weeks. In the end however, the common militia may very well have given the British the most problems. While seldom achieving any degree of military proficiency, these part-time soldiers made the British pay a price by their constant probing, foraging, and marauding. In real emergencies, these early reserve units provided reinforcements, and an inexhaustible pool of draftees to the Continental Army’s regular forces. The local militias also became a means of political surveillance. Citizens who refused to join their local unit, or who were simply apathetic, were immediately labeled as either disloyal or actual Tories. They were then given the choice to take up arms or be thrown in jail.⁹

The Militia and the Constitution

The Revolutionary War essentially established the foundation for America’s defense policy concerning military service—that being a mixed force of professional and citizen soldiers. In spite of the fact that Americans had a genuine dislike and distrust for a standing army, it was evident from the war with Great Britain that a professional army was vital in preserving the country’s national security. Yet at the same time the colonial experience demonstrated the militia system had proven at times to be effective and frequently necessary as well. In 1783 Congress appointed a ^[46] committee to consider what type of military system would best suit the states and the nation as a whole. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, two members of the committee, wrote to Washington asking for his views and recommendations. In his “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment,” the General proposed that a national militia be established, one designed to keep a select group of citizens constantly prepared for military service and emergencies. Every citizen from eighteen to fifty years of age was to be enrolled on the militia rosters and suggested they muster a minimum of once or twice a year. Furthermore, he proposed that from among the numbers of young men ages eighteen to twenty-five, a select corps be chosen in every state which would receive superior training. This body would be called the Continental Militia and would be organized along the same lines of the Continental Army. They would be required to drill twelve to twenty-five days each year, uniforms and equipment would be standardized, and every state would have its own arsenal. Other views were also considered, particularly that of Henry Knox, Secretary of War under the Confederation. Knox proposed three units of militia be created—an “advanced corp” consisting of men aged eighteen to twenty who would be given six weeks of regimental training each year and who would make up the main force; a “main” corp consisting of men aged twenty-one to forty-five; and a “reserved” corp comprised of men aged forty-six to fifty-nine. Unfortunately, because of what appeared to be more pressing matters to the Congress, nothing became of these recommendations.¹⁰

Drawing upon the lessons of the past, the founding fathers made provisions in the Constitution for the creation and establishment of both a regular army and a militia force with a few significant changes, particularly in regards to the latter. The document gave Congress the ^[47] power “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions;” and “To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.”¹¹ Furthermore, the executive “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into actual Service of the United States.”¹² Known as the militia clause, there were essentially three factors governing it. First, it provided that the citizen army be made available for federal service “to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections, and repel invasions.” Second, if the militia was called out by the president, he was its commander-in-chief, and it was to be organized, armed, and disciplined by Congress. Finally, to ensure that the states would have authority and control over some part of the military system, the Anti-federalists recommended what became the Second Amendment—“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” These three statements constituted the core elements of the federal statutes governing the militia, but it was expected that further details and stipulations would be worked out by the Congress after ratification.^{13 [48]}

Congressional Legislation

During Washington’s first term as president, Henry Knox was retained as Secretary of War, and a common objective of the two leaders was to get through Congress legislation that would strengthen the role of the citizen army. In 1790, Knox made some recommendations based upon his earlier proposal to the Congress under the Confederation, but his proposals were essentially ignored. Two additional bills were introduced in 1791, and two more the following year. The two which eventually emerged in 1792 and received approval from Washington’s administration were known as the Calling Forth Act, and the Uniform Militia Act. (See Appendices B and C.) The Calling Forth Act embodied several provisions. Most importantly, in cases of invasion, Congress gave the President power to call out any number of state militia deemed necessary. In cases involving insurrection within a state, he had power to call out the militia if requested by the state legislature or governor.¹⁴ Six days after passage of the Calling Forth Act, the Uniform Militia Act received approval. This legislation was based on the traditional concept of universal military service for able-bodied males between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, with each man being required to furnish himself with an adequate weapon and sufficient supplies for his firearm. The size of each division, brigade, regiment, battalion, and company was also established, with their respective officers listed. (See Appendix D.) Furthermore, the state adjutant-general’s office was required to submit an annual report to the federal government (i.e. ^[49] the Secretary of War), detailing enrollment figures, activities of the militia during the year, and the situation concerning the number of arms, accouterments, and ammunitions available.¹⁵ As granted by the Constitution, the states retained the power to maintain, control and govern their own units (generally junior officers were elected by the men in their own respective units while senior or commissioned officers received their command by appointment from the governor), and also maintained the legality allowing for the organization of independent volunteer companies. These volunteer units were also incorporated (at least on paper) as part of the state militia.

The Uniform Militia Act has been the subject of much criticism over the years. One military historian has stated that it soon became apparent to most political leaders the legislation was in fact too weak. Its greatest flaw was that it was essentially unselective. “It imposed a duty on everyone, with the result that this duty was discharged by no one. Its provisions were unworkable when they were adopted; they were soon obsolete; [and] as measures of nation defense, they were worthless.”¹⁶

Perhaps what is so remarkable about the 1792 Uniform Militia Act is that it essentially governed the role of the militia into the twentieth century. The turning point came in 1903 with passage of a bill sponsored by Representative Charles H. Dick from Ohio. It essentially created an “organized” militia, or National Guard, which thereafter brought the Guard under stronger ^[50] federal and state control. Legislation also organized the Guard along the lines of the regular army. In addition, provisions were made for Guard members to participate in summer camps and maneuvers with the professional full-time soldiers and officers. The President was also given the authority to call up the Guard for nine months rather than three, but service could only be performed on the continent.¹⁷ This provision was changed in 1908 to include service for an indefinite time as well as overseas duty. However, in 1912, compulsory overseas duty was ruled unconstitutional.¹⁸

The Militia, 1800–1861

With the new federal government exercising only limited control over the militia, national officials turned their attention and interest to the army and navy, leaving the states the major responsibility of maintaining and supporting a viable militia organization. This they did not do. Thus, participation and interest in the state-sponsored local companies experienced a steady decline from the onset. Recognizing some of the deficiencies in the system, several presidents sought for needed changes. Jefferson believed wholeheartedly in the militia system as the only competent means of defending the country from foreign invasion and hoped Congress would strengthen its role; however, few reforms were made.¹⁹ The most significant change occurred in 1808 when Congress appropriated an annual expenditure of two hundred thousand dollars for weapons with distribution to the states being based proportionally upon enrollments given in the annual reports ^[51] submitted by adjutant-generals of each state to the federal government.²⁰ This inclusion however, did little to actually strengthen the function and position of the citizen army in American society.

The first real test as to how the militia would perform came during the administration of James Madison and the War of 1812. Expectations ran high that the common militia and volunteer companies would provide a formidable force along with the regular army. However with a few exceptions, the militia responded and performed rather miserably, thus doing little to enhance its image.²¹ Presidents Monroe and Adams gave little attention to the militia, while Jackson recognized changes were needed but his recommendations were never acted upon. During the Van Buren administration, Secretary of War Joel R. Poinsett proposed an active militia of 100,000, with a reserve force of the same number, but opponents viewed the proposal as coming dangerously close to having a large standing army and his plan was repudiated. During the Mexican War, because military action was to be fought beyond the boundaries of the United States, common militia were not called out by President Polk. However, members of volunteer regiments combined to make up the bulk of Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor’s forces and they performed admirably. Therefore, it was the volunteer element, not the common militiaman, that was extolled. To Polk, the volunteer enlistee typified the American soldier, while the irregular militiaman was essentially useless.²² Following the war with Mexico, militia returns indicated the organization experienced a short-lived revival until about 1852, after which the decline resumed once again. ^[52] On the eve of the Civil War there was a slight resurgent interest, but the general feeling was that the traditional common militia had fallen into disrepute.²³

There were several reasons for the disintegration of the irregular forces. For most men, attendance and participation in the musters were often seen as a nuisance, taking them away from work and family responsibilities. Furthermore, while a few states were able to assemble a respectable store of arms, each man still had an obligation to arm himself. A large number of men in American society had no need to own the type of weapon prescribed for military exercises, so this obligation frequently proved to them to be an irritation. There were also fines for nonattendance at the muster. And while fines varied from state to state, the affluent man could generally afford to pay the charge while the poorer man could not. In addition, the conception behind the militia was that it was to be universal and obligatory. However, the 1792 Act excluded individuals employed in certain professions from militia duty, and states were permitted to add other professions to the list—some of which were long and lengthy. Generally it was the men of wealth who qualified for exemptions which meant the poorer classes had to bear the burden of responsibility.²⁴

While participation in the common militia was in decline, the independent or uniformed companies experienced a marked increase in enrollment and activity, particularly in the urban centers. In fact, in some cities the regular militia disappeared altogether, making the volunteer ^[53] company the only organized unit in the community. Volunteer units tended to be made up of men who enjoyed soldiering and were willing to sacrifice time and money to be a part of the group, which usually numbered between fifty and one hundred members. In organizing a company, the men in the community would get together, form a military club, elect officers, select a name, and agree upon a uniform. Names varied from the more common designations of Rifles, Cadets, Guards, to more exotic titles such as Invincibles, Avengers, and Snake Hunters. Generally, units were named after the community or locale and the color of the uniform—blue and grey being the most common. The uniform and dress was also the distinguishing feature that separated the volunteer unit from companies made up of common militia. When a unit had a sufficient number of men, the company would apply for a charter from the state which was issued through the governor as were the commissions.

Drills, maneuvers, and target practice were conducted on a regular basis. Volunteer companies were social as well as military organizations. Social prestige also played a role. Uniforms, equipment, parades, dinners, and clubrooms all cost money, thereby restricting membership to those in the upper or higher middle classes. Companies often times even displayed an elitist attitude and when called out for state or local service, volunteer regiments resisted being included or merged into the larger force comprised of regular militia. The pomp and circumstance of military parades, mock battles, and artillery contests became a significant social pastime in many communities. Strong drink was always included as an important part of the festivities. Although they were usually better trained than local compulsory militia during the nineteenth century, the social pageantry which accompanied the activities of the volunteer units made them so they were in many ways not fit for any type of war duty or to render much aid in time of national crisis.^{25 [54]}

The Missouri Militia

Following the Peace of Amiens and the settlement giving the United States the territory acquired by the Louisiana Purchase from France, the region became the District of Louisiana on 1 October 1804. Six months later, on 3 March 1805, Congress passed the act establishing a separate territorial government for the province. Since the area that became the state of Missouri in 1820 was part of this land acquisition, for sixteen years the region came under the district and later the territorial statutes of the province, and included in the first laws governing the region were statutes regarding both common and volunteer militia. For example, every able-bodied male from age sixteen to sixty was obligated to militia service unless exempted. (In 1807 the age qualification was changed to eighteen and sixty).²⁶ Exemptions were made for certain professions. For example, in 1804 only federal officers, superior court judges, the attorney general, jail keepers, and ministers of the gospel were not subject to militia duty. However, the list expanded over the years so that by 1835 exemptions included essentially every elected official, as well as any person employed in federal, state, or local offices. Individuals in the banking industry (bank presidents, commissioners, cashiers, and clerks), ferrymen, owners of iron works (and their hands), those employed aboard any vessel transporting the produce of Missouri, millers, postmasters, mail carriers, most firemen, paper mill workers, or those employed in cotton or wool manufacturing were also exempt. Furthermore, if a man was a member of the uniformed or volunteer company and fully equipped himself and rendered faithful service to his unit, he too was exempt, although not from regular duty if called out. It simply meant he did not have to drill with or be a member ^[55] of the common militia forces.²⁷ Officers were expected to be uniformed in the appropriate grade of the United States Army, but if the cost of the uniform was considered too burdensome alterations could be made.²⁸ In practice however, the officers and the regular troops were generally attired in nothing but their everyday working clothes. The number of musters also varied over the years. In 1804, territorial law required attendance at six per year, in 1810 it the number was reduced to four, and in 1831, ten years after statehood was achieved, it was reduced to one. However, during Missouri’s Black Hawk War in 1832, the militia demonstrated its unpreparedness, resulting in the return of the four annual musters.²⁹

While there was a general spirit of indifference portrayed by a majority of Americans toward the common militia, particularly after the War of 1812, there were some exceptions—Missouri being one. During the decade the Mormons resided in the state, historical evidence suggests there was considerable interest and zeal among the general male population for militia service. The Indian situation appears to have been the leading factor. Being a frontier state in the 1830s, the Native American tribes posed a real threat to the Missouri region. Rumors of uprisings were frequent and revolts occurred from time to time, necessitating the citizens, and more particularly the militia, be ready at all times. During the decade of the 30s, there were three major ^[56] call-outs of state militia to handle Indian problems. The first occurred in 1831–32, when the Sacs, Foxes, and Winnebago Indians situated in Iowa returned to their former lands on the Illinois side of the Mississippi and began to engaged in skirmishes with the settlers in the area. About the same time a marauding band from these hostile tribes (whose chief was Keokuk but who was led by Black Hawk) attacked a peaceful band of Menomonie Indians, killing twenty-five. In March 1832, these tribes crossed back over the Mississippi and established themselves near the Iowa-Missouri border. In May, the proximity of these hostilities to Missouri’s settlements caused Governor John Miller to call out one thousand Missouri militia from ten counties in the state to assist a contingent of U.S. troops stationed in St. Louis to head off any further confrontations. During the summer, these units patrolled the state’s northern border and established strategic outposts in the northeastern region in order to present a formidable opposition. However, by September, since the tribes still had not actually penetrated into Missouri, and with the hostilities appearing to have subsided, the troops were mustered out of service.³⁰

A second incident associated with the Indians occurred in 1836–37 in the upper Grand River region and was called the Heatherly War. An unruly clan known as the Heatherlys established a horse-stealing operation and began plundering from the Iowa Indian tribe and local settlers in the area. In June 1836, the Iowas tracked down the Heatherly gang and a skirmish ensued, but the desperadoes were able to escape, although one of their number was killed. Conflict within the band itself soon arose. The Heatherlys, fearing one of their own members, a man by the name of James Dunbar, would turn against them, had him killed. Thereafter they ^[57] roamed the countryside spreading reports the Iowa Indians were the ones causing all the problems. A militia force consisting of several companies was called out to patrol the area. One of the companies, the Liberty Blues from Clay County, was commanded by David R. Atchison. The depredations in the Grand River area were eventually traced to the Heatherly clan who were arrested in July. When they finally came to trial in 1837, the Heatherlys turned state evidence against Alfred Hawkins, one of their cohorts. They were dismissed while Hawkins was charged with the murder of Dunbar.³¹

The third Indian incident involving a call-out of the Missouri militia was actually fought outside the confines of the state. In his role as commander in chief of the army, navy, and militia, during the fall of 1837, President Martin Van Buren called upon the state of Missouri to provide six hundred volunteers to subdue the hostile warring Seminoles in Florida. These recruits were raised from Boone, Howard, Chariton, Ray, Jackson, and Marion counties and placed under the command of Colonel Richard Gentry from Columbia. After arriving in Florida in December, the Missouri militia encountered a sizable Seminole force led by Mycanopee, Alligator, Tiger Tail, and Sam Jones near the Kissimmee River. Without the support of U.S. regulars, the Missourians suffered heavy casualties, 138 total including Gentry their commander. The remaining troops returned to Missouri early in 1838.³²

Besides the call-out of state militia during the Mormon War of 1838, there was at least one additional mustering of state troops in the 1830s. During the summer of 1839, a land dispute between Missouri and Iowa arose. Governor Lilburn W. Boggs believed a small triangle of land situated between the Des Moines and Mississippi Rivers belonged to Missouri, while Governor ^[58] Robert Lucas claimed it for Iowa, and both men called out their respective militia to settle the matter. The disputed area abounded in trees containing beehives so settlers sarcastically called the conflict the Honey War.³³

The actual problem, however, was slavery. If the disputed region was actually in Missouri, slavery would be permitted. If in Iowa, it would be prohibited. Some 2,200 Missouri militia were called out. However in December, before any actual fighting broke out, negotiations were successful with Iowa retaining its land claims, and conflict was narrowly averted. The engagement was not popular, highly controversial, and perceived as essentially a dispute between the two governors. Upon learning of the peace settlement, Missouri militia members cut a haunch of venison in two, labeled one after Governor Lucas and the other after Governor Boggs, hung them up in the air, and then fired into them with rifles. The call-out of the Marion troops was also the third time in three successive years that they had been mustered into service, so before disbanding they issued several complaints to Boggs. The first grievance was that they had to supply themselves with their own tents and blankets. The second was a request that the governor furnish them with some guns by the next fall. The third was, “That we think it high time we had our pay for the Mormon campaign, last year.”³⁴ Thus, Missouri’s Indian wars (Black Hawk, Florida, and Heatherly), the Mormon and Honey wars, local call-outs of county militia (such as the Jackson militia being mustered against the Mormons in November 1833), and the general ^[59] frontier environment of the state kept the militia and its military spirit alive and well in Missouri during the 1830s.

The fact that Missourians tended to manifest a considerable interest in the militia does not mean the men or companies were necessarily well-trained, outfitted, or armed. In fact, muster day frequently took on more of the appearance of a social event than that of a training period as the following narrative describing a muster in Boone County illustrates:

The militia musters . . . were occasions of great interest, and were anticipated and prepared for by people of all conditions, classes, and colors. They were bro ught together four times during each summer and fall the entire male population, to meet each other in social converse, to witness the splendid pageantry of peaceful war; to note the evolutions of gaily caparisoned horses and their plumed and uniformed riders; to gaze with patriotic pride upon the long and straggling lines of citizen soldiery attired in home-spun and armed with walking canes, umbrellas and corn-stalks; to pass judgment upon the merits of braying jack-asses and the stump oratory of political candidates who were often on exhibition in close proximity to each other; to eat ginger cakes and drink sweet cider, and destroy watermelons by the score; and late in the afternoon to form part of a wide and excited ring, which circled, halloed, cheering and swearing, around neighborhood bullies who, on all such occasions, settled their personal differences with “fist and skull.”³⁵

The musters in Livingston County (situated adjacent to Caldwell County) presented a similar scene. A great number of men did not possess the required weapon, so they “went through the manual of arms with sticks, cornstalks and other implements.” Even some of the officers were ill equipped. Not having field swords, daggers of lath and sabers and rapiers of pine “were waved and flourished in directing the movements of the troops.” The drill did not always produce the desired results. “The drill masters were not very efficient to begin with,” one local historian wrote, “and their tactics differed very widely.” The men were often “undisciplined, and resented ^[60] all attempts to force them to become ‘machines,’” noting also that the “drillings and meetings [were not] enough to render the militiamen trained soldiers, and there were too many for comfort.” The social nature of the muster days in Livingston also tended to overshadow the importance of the drill. “Great crowds attended these musters. Old darkies [Blacks] were there with spruce beer and ginger cakes; refreshment stands abounded; horse races were made and run; foot races wrestling matches, and other athletic sports were indulged in, and many a fisticuff was fought. . . . At all these things, . . . the crowd stared and admired.”³⁶

One young German recruit from Franklin County by the name of Gert Goebel recorded his impressions after attending his first muster in 1835 at the age of eighteen. His history indicates that his company lacked considerable decorum. He noted that previous to the muster he received a summons which instructed him to come “armed and equipped as the law directs.” This directive caused some concern since he did not even know what the law prescribed. Nonetheless, Goebel appeared on the appointed day and hour along with some fifty or sixty other men who constituted his company. Being non-uniformed, the participants came in a variety of apparel. “Some had coats on, others were in their shirt sleeves, while still others wore their hunting shirts,” he wrote. When the time for the drill began the captain and lieutenants wanted the company members to fall into a straight lines, which they eventually did after considerable difficulty. “One man, who was endowed with unusual corpulence could not be made to fit in the front rank at all, so he was placed in the rear rank, because there he had unlimited space for expansion to the rear,” he wrote. The company next proceeded to march in an orderly fashion to the site where the actual drill would be conducted. A drummer and a man playing the fife provided the sounds to which the men were to march. Goebel noted the two musicians had little, if any, musical talent which made marching to ^[61] the beat difficult. “The fearful noise which these instruments produced could not possibly be called music,” he recalled, indicating “It was nothing but ear-splitting discords.” The off-key music and irregular beat of the drum necessitated that the captain yell himself hoarse in order to keep the men in step. “Keep time, boys, keep time,” he would cry, “but this was asking too much of a body of men, most of whom stood in rank and file for the first time in their lives,” noting with “such a diabolical noise [as this] even a regiment of veterans would have gotten out of step.” At a later muster, two German immigrants were recruited to replace the less skilled fifer and drummer. Their music and beat so excelled the first two that the entire company “was completely electrified and drilled as they never had drilled before or after.” The militia members were so appreciative of the two foreigners that a collection was taken up and fifteen dollars raised and presented to them as a gift.

Two incidents demonstrate the lack of military protocol exhibited by Goebel’s company. While on the march, the detachment passed a spring. The refreshment a cold spring provided was too much for the drummer who suddenly stopped, put his drum on the ground, and yelled to his comrades, “Hold on boys, I am dry,” much to the consternation of the commanding officer. This caused the entire company to “fall out” in order to get a drink for themselves. The second incident occurred near the end of the day when a headcount was being taken. Upon numbering the men, it was observed that there was a considerable number of gaps in the line. But the missing persons were soon accounted for. They had fallen out and were crouched among the hazel bushes picking wild strawberries. The officer himself was rather amused about the whole incident and instructed his junior officer, “Adjutant, go and drive up these strawberry hunters.”^{37 [62]}

During the first few decades of the nineteenth century, independent volunteer companies sprang up around the country, but Missouri was an exception. During the 1830s most militia activities in the state actually revolved around the common or regular militia. Since volunteer units tended to originate in urban areas, and because Missouri’s only sizable city during this period was St. Louis, it is not surprising that there were only a few uniformed regiments. At the outbreak of the Black Hawk War in 1832 it was reported there were only two uniformed companies in the river city. However, the Indian conflict stimulated the creation of three more companies, the most notable being the St. Louis Grays, a volunteer company which maintained an organization until the Civil War.³⁸ Laws governing the regular militia (age classifications, number of musters per year, company organization, distribution of federally allotted arms) also applied to the uniformed volunteers with a few additional stipulations. For example, once one was a member of a uniformed company, he was expected to serve for a fixed term of at least seven years. If discharged, the individual would then be expected to return to his regular militia outfit. Surprisingly, an 1835 law required the governor give preference to the uniformed militia by ordering them into active service before calling out the common militia.³⁹ This was probably not the general practice, however. There appears to have been only one known independent company in western Missouri during this period. Known as the Liberty Blues, this Clay County unit existed at least as early as 1834 and was commanded by David R. Atchison.^{40 [63]}

The county militia that came against the Mormons in Jackson County in 1833, and the units called out by Boggs in the 1838 conflict, were comprised almost exclusively of local and county irregulars, not volunteers. Likewise, the Latter-day Saint forces from Caldwell (later to also include Mormon irregulars from Daviess County) were also a body of common militia. It was not until the 1840s and ’50s that independent companies came into vogue in the Missouri. Their creation and formation seems to have been stimulated by the independence of Texas, the war with Mexico, the increased social unrest, and the growing sectional differences of the 1840s and ’50s. In 1861, at the beginning of the Civil War, the adjutant general of Missouri reported a total of thirty uniformed companies in the state, eighteen of them in St. Louis.⁴¹

The Militia and Public Order

In theory, the militia in America was designed to function in essentially two capacities; first, as a military body in cases of foreign or hostile invasion; and second, to be a means of maintaining regional and local social control. However, as one historian has observed, “The militia’s continued association with the preservation of order and authority at the local level made ^[64] its utilization for external defense improbable, and in some cases . . . undesirable.”⁴² The two wars with Britain persuaded Americans to rely more on special fighting forces comprised of draftees and volunteers, than from the run-of-the-mill militia made up of the typical citizen-soldier. Thus, in practice the primary role and operation of the militia gradually changed from that of an external combat unit, to one of an internal police force. This shift occurred mainly during the first half of the nineteenth century where militia units were called out most frequently to assist state and local officials in maintaining law and order, suppressing insurrections, and acting as a means of civil control.⁴³

During the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the United States was relatively free of internal group violence. However, during the Jacksonian era, social violence saw a marked increase in occurrence. One historian has noted that between 1828–1833, there were some twenty incidents of riot, in 1834 there were sixteen, and in 1835, the number increased to thirty-seven.⁴⁴ Significantly, the rise of violence in American society corresponded with the founding and beginnings of the Latter-day Saint movement. Thus Mormonism originated during a period when societal members considered extralegal violence, riot, and protest as alternative methods of maintaining the status quo of the society. Nowhere was this more true than in frontier Missouri and the Mormon situation. As historian David Brion Davis has shown, Mormon beliefs, combined ^[65] with the ideals of collectivism, certain elements of separatism, a strong ecclesiastical hierarchy, and a merging together of church and state, were viewed as being incompatible with American republicanism.⁴⁵ Believing the Latter-day Saint movement to be subversive to their own social, political, economic, and religious institutions and culture, Missouri’s citizens felt justified in taking the law into their own hands, by using mob law or rule.⁴⁶ With such strong public support against the Mormons, governor’s Dunklin and Boggs were forced to deal with the situation, but recognized they would have to do so in a legally warranted fashion. In the case of the Mormon situation in 1833–34, Dunklin essentially chose to do nothing. However, in 1838 Boggs sided with public sentiment and then used the state militia to carry out his designs in subduing the Mormon element and then forcing them from the state.^{47 [66]}

During the colonial experience, Christian minorities were occasionally objects of persecution and suppression by an intolerant majority. During the formative years of the American nation and through the course of the nineteenth century, even with the freedoms granted under the Constitution, religious and semi-religious societies besides the Mormons—Catholics, Masons, and John Noyes’ Oneida communitarian order—were targets of opposition and oppression. However, while Mormons had a commonality with other religious groups in being the subjects of mob or vigilante violence, in one area they stood alone. In the course of American history, militia forces were called out to suppress disturbances associated with native Americans, abolitionists, rebellious slaves, disgruntled farmers, displaced tenants, strikers, social activists, and political action groups. But, the Mormons were the only religious organization to have been confronted or opposed by legally sanctioned state militia force. This, in part, is the significance of the story of the Mormon War of 1838. ^[67]