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John Tullidge: Utah's First Music Critic

WILLIAM WILKES*

A cultivated English gentleman, who only a few days before had trod the Mormon pioneer trail to the Zion of his recently espoused religion, wrote to the editor of the *Deseret News* the following:

> Sir: On entering the city on Saturday, October 31, I was much pleased in seeing, per advertisement, that a concert was to be given by the Deseret Musical Association on the Wednesday following; and not withstanding the debility occasioned by the long journey across the plains on "shank's pony," I would not miss the opportunity of hearing for myself of the progress made in vocal music by that Association, and at the request of several friends, I will endeavor to give my honest opinion of the performances of that concert.[1]

Thus in 1863 John E. Tullidge (1807-1873), "Professor of Harmony" from Liverpool, penned the first published music criticism in a Rocky Mountain frontier town only sixteen years old.

If it surprised Remy and Benchly and other early visitors to find music and the arts flourishing among the pioneer folk of the first Mormon communities in the West, it should be all the more surprising that in the second decade of the new colony music criticism began to appear in the periodical press. Although it was true that the Mormon movement had its roots in the East, its migrant focus of community was never in close contact with the large cultural centers of eastern United States. But even in eastern America serious music criticism had only recently found its beginnings in John Sullivan Dwight's *Music Journal* in 1858.

In their frontier city of Nauvoo, Illinois, Mormons had enjoyed a rich musical life. Transplanted to the Salt Lake Valley,

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their interest soon germinated a round of community bands, church choirs, singing and dramatic societies. Many homes had reed organs. Several had pianos, hauled by wagon all the way from St. Louis. This lively musical activity mingled the sacred and secular, side by side. And since the effort to produce music for worship, recreation, and pleasure seems to have satisfied the peoples' taste and aesthetic need, what place was there for criticism, which is the analytical grading of the musical experience, the evaluation of its success or failure?

The motive for criticism is not hard to find. For, as always, the imaginative capacity of the human spirit sooner or later outruns the practical means for satisfying its imagined ideals, leaving a gap between the actual experience and its wished-for perfection. Certain spirits among us sense this keenly enough to tell us when we should do better than we are doing. And they also praise us when we do satisfyingly well enough. These mandarins are a thorn in complacent societies, but a spur to the progressive. Although as humans they often err, mistaking the subjective for the objective, the specific for the universal, prejudice for taste, and pessimism for incorruptibility, still the effect of their critique in the long run is healthy, for they provoke hunger for more music and sharpen our ear for aesthetic pleasure. So early Utahns invited the new immigrant's critique.

We can only guess whether Tullidge's friends hoped for his praise, or suspected his adverse comment for their shortcomings. In either case they got both. To continue his debut article:

> The concert opened with one of Professor [Charles John] Thomas' pieces, which did him credit as a composer. The *introduction* by the Cornet was a chaste piece of rendering, and the band did well in giving the gentleman an opportunity of doing justice to that beautiful strain — in fact the gem of the piece — instead of destroying the effect by loud playing.[2]

Tullidge was no Pollyanna, and risked offense by describing the music as he heard it.

> The horns however were out of tune at the finale, but it may be here parenthetically observed that I have since then heard the same gentlemen play with fine expression.[3]

Later, faults are laid bare, then nursed with advice on how

to improve them:

> The duet "Hark 'tis music stealing," by Mrs. Trosper and Mrs. Horseley, would have been, for they both have good voices, a favorable performance, but for the non-conception of the piece, and the stiff execution of one of the passages. In the first place it was a "leetle" too slow, and in the second the triplets were unskillfully treated. The first fault can easily be remedied, and the second also. To avoid the second, the mouth should be kept moderately opened and the tongue still and horizontal. The passage would then be of easy execution, while the moving of the tongue causes a stiff and uncouth delivery of the notes.[4]

Turning from criticism of the performance to the music itself, Tullidge gives way to his penchant for technical analysis, mixed freely with authoritative musical jargon:

> The Association commenced with one of my old favorite Glees, "Awake Aeolian Lyre, Awake." The opening strain is not one of easy rendering, and without great attention to the largo movement with its first grand close on the *dominant,* that cautious awakening so necessary to the slumbering lyre is entirely last. In order to preserve the full effect of this movement, a *tremolo vibrato* should be employed to awake its drowsy strings from its forgetfulness with nature's simple ease.[5]

The Professor's pedantic descriptions of "executional unisonic passages" and "contrapuntic harmonical beauties" must have seemed arcanum to countryside musicians and newspaper readers in early Utah.

This brings to mind Bernard Shaw's scorn for Heathcote Statham's most learned analysis of the Mozart G Minor Symphony:

> How succulent is this; and how full of Mesopotamian words like the "dominant of D minor"! I will now, ladies and gentlemen, give you my celebrated "analysis" of Hamlet's soliloquy on suicide, in the same scientific style. "Shakespeare, dispensing with the customary exordium, announces his subject at once in the infinitive, in which, brief as it is, we recognize the alternative and negative forms on which so much of the significance of repetition depends. Here we reach a colon; and a pointed pository phrase, in which the accent falls decisively on the relative pronoun, brings us to the first full stop."[6]

Tullidge pontificates further:

> It appears by the author's working of the second period on the dominant "and give to rapture" that he had reserved for the *finale* of his first subject the thorough awakening of the instrument so descriptive of its joyous arousing. "From Helicon's Harmonious Springs," is a lively imitation of parts, which produces a fine tonic termination. "The laughing flowers around them blow, Drink life and fragrance as they flow" is too far fetched, and the author has not succeeded in a good interpretation of the poetry. The first line is truthful enough, but the second one "Drink life as they flow" is too gloomy with its termination on the submediant.[7]

As he goes on in this vein, it becomes apparent that his analysis of form and content, of texture and details, in fact his whole aesthetic inquiry is reduced to a question of harmony, the use of this chord or that—just as we might expect from this mid-Victorian of the English conservatory. The harmonic ingredient seems in fact so primary to Tullidge that he infers that without this understanding great music cannot be enjoyed. Comparing his present day England to a past generatiton, he says:

> Class teaching [then] was not known or most only in its infancy . . . . Theory of sounds belonged to the Germans and Italians only; and the varied mixtures of harmony was a perfect secret, . . . except to the above people. When the professors of music in England knew but little of harmony; it could not be expected that an English audience could understand classical works. But times are changed and in England the choruses of Handel and other great masters, are becoming familiar to the mass, and the grand Halleujah chorus of the immortal Handel is almost as popular as "I wish I was in Dixie." Take heart, therefore, good teacher, and never tire until the like glorious consummation is reached in the land of the saints.[8]

But Tullidge knew that greatness was not determined by crass popularity alone. Of another composition he says:

> "In Jewry God is known" is a great favorite in all cathedral cities in the old country, and it is a favorite through its excellence and not from any capricious popularity; for it has stood the test of much trial.[9]

Although he is generally pleased with the performance, Tullidge is disappointed in the audience, in which he perceives insensitivity denoting a lack of culture:

> The class . . . sang with marked expression and good enun-

ciation and precision. If fault there were, it was that the latter strain lacked energy; but upon the whole it was rendered with great credit. Indeed I expected from the manner in which it was sung that an encore would have followed; but such was not the case, and only a solitary echo of applause was heard throughout that gorgeous building.
This, at first would seem discouraging; but a maturer reflection would not expect, only from a highly cultivated musical audience, full appreciation of classical compositions.[10]

Was this judgmental attitude well taken by the public? Without all the information to reconstruct the picture, we can guess that Tullidge's criticism hurt the pride of some, but that it also was received in a climate of considerable receptiveness and bore several advantages that must have given it an attentive hearing. He was of course new in the community and arrived with reputation attached. Training and status in the "dear old England" of which so many immigrant saints could sing were the credentials of authority, difficult to challenge. It must be considered also that his criticism was not read by a frontier culture of the usual level in western America of the sixties, but in reality an island colony of eastern American and European life which was not unaccustomed to performance and discussion of the arts. Too, this was early in the development of Mormon society. The variety of thought and individualistic expression of Yankee independence characteristic of early Mormon creativity had not yet congealed into group conformity. Dissenting criticism could be tolerated and even valued in the secular fields of music and art.

Critical disapproval however was not always welcome. An anonymous writer later stated for the *Deseret News* what must have seemed to the editors a less volatile policy in writing up local music:

> We have no disposition to enter into criticism upon individual performances, neither would it be just to do so, as we regard the distinctly stated objects of the [Deseret Music Association] concerts as having been exceptionally attained. . . In justice to our own feelings, we can scarcely refrain from particularly and personally referring to the enrapturing performances of some of the ladies' association; but prudential considerations, commingled with a hearty appreciation of the whole musical performance by young and old, male and female, forbid.[11]

John Tullidge assumed his rightful position as a musical leader in the community in writing, teaching, and conducting concerts. Six years after initiating the Utah press to the tremors of independent music criticism, Tullidge co-founded with Harrison a cultural journal called *Utah Magazine,* which during its one year of publication carried his trenchant commentary on the musical scene. In an article running three issues he chided his fellow critics (one gets the impression that there were such) for vacillating in the cause of good music.

> The passing of Mozart's Overture to Figaro and Locke's celebrated Macbeth music, without special notice, would lead many to suppose that our critics were incompetent to the task of reviewing the inspirations of these two immortal composers, therefore, we cannot allow the present opportunity to go by without paying tribute to the merits of the above works.[12]

Then follows his poetic eulogy of the music interspersed with technical jargon pointing up worthy aspects of the performance.

Tullidge never seems to have altered his essential bias for rule-bound harmonic "correctness," a factor which is properly regarded as subservient to the composer's entire musical conception. Such a soulful melodist as Schubert, to whom harmony seems rarely to be crucial, is seen by Tullidge first as a harmonic craftsman. He cites Schubert as a model in defending an alteration he had made in the *Utah Magazine's* publication of one of Charles J. Thomas' compositions:

> We will beg [Professor Thomas] to bear in mind that to remove the errors of consecutive fifths—a very great fault—was the cause of the necessity of changing the two notes in his choral melody, in order to render the resolutions, as well as preparations in harmonic combinations, are required for correct progression; and we will also observe that in chorale renderings the harmonics are of more importance than the melody. In fact the song compositions of the great Schubert will prove that in his songs he has bestowed more pains and produced more effect by his varied and beautiful harmonics than he has by his melodies. We will observe that notwithstanding the Professor's objection to our altering his melody to remove errors, that the correct and pointed resolution of the passage more than compensates for the changing of the passing notes in his subject, and more especially as the linking character of the second period is not altered.

> We are always much pleased with the Professor's compositions and shall always be glad to receive any favor from him and we will also say that if he would send his pieces correct we would deem it sacrilege to alter them; but if they are grammatically incorrect, we must make a change. This observation will apply to all our contributors.[13]

Four short years after publication of these criticisms, accidental death silenced this first voice of music criticism in Utah. During this brief decade, John Tullidge's uncompromising critique raised music composition and performance to the level of evaluation for their strength and weakness. Although in the following generation concerts of local and later itinerant artists were regularly written up in the Utah press, reviews were almost never critical. The kindly epithet, the appreciative response, and even flattery became the fashion. The heterogeneous texture of the earlier society soon blended into a conformity oriented about a central core which set patterns and standards in nearly all aspects of the group life. By the 1880's and 90's local music style and repertoire were stereotyped in the taste of a few leaders. The resulting culture was inimical to criticism.

No successor to John Tullidge appeared in Utah journalism of the nineteenth century. His urge for refinement, his trust in his own aesthetics, and his lively forthrightness in publicly asserting his independent opinions despite their occasional dogma —these stand as a singular chapter in the story of music criticism in the mountain West.

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1 *Deseret News* (Salt Lake City, Utah), October 21, 1863.
2 *Ibid.*
3 *Ibid.*
4 *Ibid.*
5 *Ibid.*
6 George Bernard Shaw, *Music in London 1890-94* (London: Constable, 1949-50), Vol. 3, p. 321.
7 *Deseret News, loc. cit.*
8 *Ibid.*
9 *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*
11 *Deseret News,* December 17, 1863.
12 *Utah Magazine* (Salt Lake City, Utah), 1869, p. 347.
13 *Ibid.*

THE MARRIAGE OF TAMURA AND MIIKO

David Stires

Tamura sails his junk at night
Running a yellow paper light.

Miiko at her pond in evening sky
Toys with a leaf and a firefly.

The Contribution of Existentialism *

TRUMAN G. MADSEN**

Existentialism is in the air.[1] In America, at all levels of culture, its influence, especially during the past decade, has been pervasive. But for one whose outlook is shaped (as is my own) by resolute committal to science, the gains of recent formal and linguistic philosophy, and the general optimism of America, this movement is often treated with studied neglect and extreme distrust.

This distrust is reflected in the *ad hominems* that recur in discussion: that the origin of the movement is Continental catastrophe; that it is a giant psychic and cultural moan; that it is morbid, even pathological; that its writers are methodless, irrational, subjective, irresponsible, oracular; that its theses are a cloak for social and moral aberration; that its place, if it has one, is with tragic literature or perhaps with case books on human delusion under crisis. In short, the movement is identified with its least tolerable thinkers and dismissed.[2] For all this there is more than an atom of justification.

But today a decreasing number of thinkers in this country are indulging these genetic fallacies.[2] The serious question is being asked, "What, irrespective of sources, can be learned from this colossus of thought?" And answers based on actual appropriations can be made from the perspectives of literature, religion, art, psychology and psychotherapy, and all branches of philosophy.

The widest gap remaining, still a veritable chasm, is that between existentialism and recent Anglo-American philosophy, especially contemporary logical empiricism or analytic thought.[3] It is in this context, where appraisal awaits more extensive communication and understanding, that I wish to pose the question.

Taking broad unifying themes and ignoring areas of sub-

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* A condensed version of a paper delivered before the Utah Academy of Arts and Sciences, Spring, 1958.

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stantial internal difference, I propose to compare these two movements under four headings: method and language, ultimates of being and knowing, concrete findings for man, and decision. Exposition will give way to an illustration, the issue of human freedom, emphasizing contrasts and compatibilities. This development in turn will lead to a summary judgment of the significance, in terms of projected influences, of existentialism for present American thought.[4] I shall presuppose familiarity with the analytic literature and reference space will be devoted to fountainhead works of the existentialists. At the outset I shall strive to use the idiom of each camp with little interplay.

Method and Language

Analytic philosophy aims at concept-clarification and the analysis of consistency and validity in logical, scientific, and ordinary language. On its scientific side it is typically phenomenal and/or physicalistic in method, allied with strict criteria of meaning and sense-confirmation. Its data are properly operational, viz. "public," repeatable, sense-confirmable. Correlation and formulation of data are attempted in language that is precise and mathematical.

Existentialism is phenomenological.[5] It advocates the careful introspective scrutiny of the whole range of human consciousness. Reality (or "existence") is apprehended through the "participation" or "encounter" of the total self. The impact and meaning of such insight usually transcends sense-experience. Hence the data of existential analyses are often private, unique, vague. It follows that its language is indirect, symbolic, heavily connotative.[6] Metaphors, ciphers, aphorisms, paradox, and their variants occur constantly in existential literature and the content seems more associative than analytic, more recollective than representational.[7] Yet the expression of the depth-self, the "Ursprung" or center of personality in its awareness of reality is held to be not merely evincive of subjective states, but revelatory of being-itself.

Ultimates of Being and Knowing

Analytic philosophy is concerned with relations in the natural order for purposes of prediction and control, and with the

removal of linguistic stumbling-blocks. All genuine problems are scientific or linguistic. No "ultimate principles" of being or knowing are sought. Such an enterprise is accounted meaningless or futile. Epistemic or metaphysical presuppositions are acknowledged only as proposals or functions to be altered or rejected according to the (scientific) job-in-hand. Many issues are thus not solved but dissolved. "Values" are usually reduced to emotion or attitude or conventions.

Existentialism is concerned with the ultimate grounds of being and knowing and valuing. With new urgency it presses the classical questions of existence, thus far emphasizing *human* existence or *dasein*. Why is there something and not nothing? What is being-itself? What, phenomenologically, is man? What is truth? What is the meaning of time, change, history? What are the foundations of commitment, of faith, of self-fulfillment? These genuine, indeed crucial, problems lie beyond science and language. There *are* limits to inquiry—the transcendent, the elusive, the mysterious—but these limits are discovered, imposed by reality not by stipulations of method.[8]

Concrete Findings for Man

For analytic philosophy man is the analyst not the analyzed. "Findings" are piecemeal, detached from the stream of practical awareness, and pertain to language and the natural order. Its mood, if this is calculable, is one of aloof security.

Existentialism aims at an authentic portrayal of man's modern predicament or situation, in strokes that are broad and deep. Some of its insights (in a different terminology) have been defended by American writers to whom it is unrelated.[9] But however numerous its precursors or unofficial allies,[10] its message and polemic are unique on the modern scene. Its mood is one of stark and dark involvement, of the agonized awareness of living at the foot of a volcano or at the edge of an abyss.

Compressed to a paragraph, here is the existentialist portrait of 20th Century man:

Man exists in a condition of alienation—from himself, from others, from the "transcendent." He lives under the inescapable threat of nothingness (Sartre) or non-being, of failure to

actualize himself, to become what he is (Kierkegaard). His contingency or finitude yields care (Sorge) and anxiety (Angst). Though in-the-world and with-others man is isolated and alone, cut off from genuine communication. He is "leveled" by the masses, by technology, by the standardizations of an organized age, until he is an anonymos "das man" (Kierkegaard, Marcel, Heidegger). He is subject to several awesome limits or boundaries (Jaspers) which bear in upon him and from which there is no exit (Sartre). These include passion and repetition (Kierkegaard); the body (Marcel); chance, suffering, conflict, crisis (Jaspers); guilt, temporality, death (Heidegger); mood, monotony meaninglessness (Sartre); agonic struggle (Unamuno); and ultimate concern (Tillich). The individual *exists* in these dimensions regardless of his proximate goals or theoretical denials. In his grasp of reality man moves through stages (Kierkegaard) or levels (Tillich) ranging from sensory immediacy to rational schematization. But these and all others are transcended by and permeated by the depth-level, the level of ultimate and abiding significance.[11]

This ontology of man is clearly the center of gravity in the movement to which all its remaining theses are intimately related if they are not actually derived.[12] Their distance from the means and ends of analytic thought is obvious.

Decision

Analytic philosophy is limited to inductive probability; its theoretical structure, hypotheses and results are tentative. At every level it is subject, by its own insistence, to revision or rejection. Evidence is a matter of degree or weight. In the absence or balance of evidence the only intelligent course, assumed or tacitly recommended, is suspension.

Existentialism underlines the inescapability of choice. With respect to life issues we face an either/or. Decisions are either made *by* us, by our whole selves, in which case they are authentic, or made *for* us in which case they are diluted by the ongoing pressures of life. Either way, by active choice or passive permission, infinite consequences accrue. "Suspension" is in fact impossible. It too is a choice, however hesitant or prudential, and everything is being gained or lost.[13]

II

Turning now to a classical issue, as a kind of paradigm, we may observe how these diverse approaches fare in application. The issue: Is man in any sense free?

Method

The analyst turns immediately to linguistic questions and answers, and to the behavioral sciences where criteria of confirmation are sensate. The existentialist turns to the inward depth-awareness of the self. He offers no criteria except the phenomenological "Look and see."

Ultimates

The analyst skirts the question, "Is man ultimately free?" and cognate ones as a pseudo-problem. Both "causality" and "freedom" require thorough therapeutic treatment before their functional meaning in science is vindicated, and causality has received far more attention than freedom. The tendency is to redefine freedom in the Hume-Schlick-Stevenson line as absence of external compulsion or fredom of action (not of decision) or as psychological ignorance of outcome.

The existentialist persists toward the ultimate. He wants to know about freedom not as a name for ignorance, or change, or a feeling, but as a *way of existing.* What would it mean, phenomenologically, to be free? What is the witness of the depth-self to the difference between *sein* and *dasein,* between subhuman and human existence?[41] Does man—can man—*exist* in a decisive, active, self-determining, even self-creating way?[15]

Concrete Results

The guidance and findings of the analyst are mainly linguistic. He negates the way the problem has been formulated in the past (including the one above). He sharpens the elements of the puzzle. He warns against the linguistic remnants of outmoded faculty psychology, against the uncritical assumption of a "ghost in the machine," against hypostatizing of "self" or "will" or "soul." He explicates category mistakes and quasi-referential "the phrases" and reminds of the multiple functions of language. In his less cautious moments he inclines, sometimes overtly, to a deterministic view that man is likely one more link in the causal sequences.

The existentialist uncovers, paradoxically, the necessity of freedom, viz. he points to data which show that freedom with its inward resultants is the prius of all human thought and action even for those who suspect it as illusory. He uncovers the uncompromising data of the depth-self (not merely, it is claimed, the "sick self" but the every self): its guilt, its anguished recognition of alternatives and possibilities, its projects and commitments.[16] He shows the interrelationships of freedom as an existential datum with dread and choice and responsibility. Phenomenologically, he concludes, man is not a billiard ball, not even a very complex one. Man decides, he acts, he projects. No one, not the determinist and not the supposedly non-committal analyst, *exists* as if he were determined. If his freedom is diminished it is only because he has freely yielded it up. For the existentialist it is the paradoxical human plight that we are wholly responsible for choices which are forced and which require a "leap" beyond any factual estimate of consequences. We are condemned to be free.[17]

Decision

The analyst having defined the problem away, decides only the preferential status of word-usage. Generally, the causal proposal (not a proposition) is defended as simple, adequate, fruitful in the scientific enterprise. No overt answer to the existentialist query is offered.

The existentialist commends and condones total commitment to freedom and all other "existentialia" of the depth-self. More, he derives an imperative: Choose in a total authentic way, not in a partial self-deceptive way! Indeed, aware of the risks involved, we *must* choose. Our decisions are not simply among specific courses of action, A or B or C, but among all-encompassing ways of life. We are confronted inescapably with Hamlet's question, "To be or not to be," and whatever the framework of choice are wholly responsible for our selves.[18] Suspension, so-called, may water down our control of our own lives, but it will not avoid the consequences. It is thus that the existentialist provides unconditional encouragement on *how* to choose, though little assurance on just *what* to choose.

In sum, the analyst redefines freedom, calls it a proposal, tentatively votes against freedom in the self-determining sense,

or claims to suspend judgment. The existentialist phenomenalogically recovers the notion of freedom as a way of existing and derives an imperative: Choose totally!

To complete the apparent deadlock, one may show that the explanations offered by each camp for the errors—on this and many other issues—of its opponents are very similar. Thus the analyst reiterates three closely-related criticisms of the existentialist. (i) He is duped by an approach to knowledge that is arbitrary and in no sense empirical, (ii) He fails to examine the actual data, (iii) He is unclear on the distinction between the factually given and utterly subjective interpretation thereof.

Just these charges are made in the existentialist rejoinder:

Thus he argues (*i*) *The analyst is arbitrary and unempirical.* He is victim of an assumption, not at all warranted by "evidence" as he himself defines it, that all cognitive problems are either scientific or linguistic or both. Other matters lose out either by denial or default by a circular meaning-criterion which excommunicates from discussion whole ranges of data and affirmation. The analyst, in Marcel's way of speaking, substitutes sensation and language for being.[19]

(*ii*) *The analyst fails to examine the actual data.* Whether he evades the issue by his "pseudo-problem" ploy or makes certain covert assumptions, his skirting of the problem of freedom, and many others, is due to what Heidegger calls "relief seeking," a kind of semantic escapism. In the face of our dreadful freedom it is comforting to believe that we are thing-objects subject to total manipulation. Hence, the analyst flouts the primal deliverances of the depth-self, talks as if freedom is simply a verbal puzzle, and spurns all appeals to the immediate experience of freedom as "emotive" and "non-cognitive." For the existentialist his claim to a rigid dependence on the data available is sheer delusion. It is his unassailable inward conviction of freedom with its burdensome implications, not his science, that drives him to reject it.

(*iii*) *The analyst is unclear on the distinction between the factually given and utterly subjective interpretations thereof.* Having decried the classical and existentialist notions of freedom, even the very question, as meaningless, he nevertheless

retains covertly the conviction in attitude and action that the question *is* meaningful and that the answer is likely "no." This self-refuting error (which he conveniently avoids defending by the claim that his apparent determinism is not a statement or proposition but simply a fruitful methodological function) is followed by another. Having restricted the "given" to scientifically formulable sensation he violates his own scruples by his tacit conviction that the findings of science justify a deterministic extrapolation. In both cases his outlook is a stretch beyond the actually and factually given. It is a subjective interpretation. [20] It is a subtle form of that modern disease, "the objectification of man" which Kierkegaard scored against Hegel and which, with its innumerable effects, has been traced by existential writers. It is self-contradictory logically; but also existentially in that it vitiates the self of its genuine meaning and authenticity.

Thus the analyst's case against the existentialist is turned against himself, together with the unexpected charge of inconsistency.[21]

III

With these contrasts before us we may now ask what the influence and contribution of existentialism may be for analytic thought, which is to say Anglo-American and scientific thought generally.

One prior question is whether partisan opposition of persons is an index to incompatibility of ideas. To what extent, it may be asked, are these widely divergent approaches reconcilable? Is a coherent inclusion or synthesis of both feasible? Is the disharmony peripheral rather than basic? The answer here, I believe, is in the negative. If the general contrasts we have drawn are not convincing on this point, the antitheses of our paradigm should remove all doubt. Yet from a detached standpoint, ignoring the illustration, it is not clear why this should be.

With respect to method and language there seems no *a priori* reason why the deliverances of sense should be at odds with the deliverances of the depth-self. There is, again, no *a priori* reason why language that is precise and mathematical

should be at odds with language that is expressively powerful, connotative. and subtle, or why either should be given superior cognitive status. But whatever may be said of possibilities, the actual cleavage persists. One cannot maintain with the analyst that whatever is not sensate and linguistically precise is non-cognitive, and at the same time agree with the existentialist that the profoundest cognitive awareness is utterly impenetrable to sense-experience and precise formulation. These theses are not only contradictory, but contrary.[22]

Again, as concerns scientific-linguistic conclusions vs. introspective-existential ones, there is no "in principle" opposition. The analyst is silent on the ontology of man as the existentialist is silent on the logic of word-usage. Their findings are about different things. Yet for each the silence harbors an implicit conviction that nothing significant is really being said by the other or, at least, that each is preoccupied with matters preliminary or unrelated to the real cognitive issues. This too then is a split which though conceivably avoidable, is actually unbridged.

The remaining two contrasts, i.e. proximate pragmatism vs. ultimates of being and knowing, and probability-suspension vs. total personal commitment, might be mediated by a two-aspect theory. Thus it could be argued that methodic restrictions and personal detachment are requisite to one sort of enterprise, while whole-life inclusion and personal involvement are appropriate to another. We follow one set of rules for science and another set for life. Attractive though this, and like-minded resolutions, may be, our freedom paradigm makes it clear that no such double-think is admissible. The competing perspectives and conclusions of these movements on the question of freedom are such that the adaptation of one to accomodate the other would be the equivalent of destruction. The conclusions are no less disparate than the starting-points and this is another reason the charges and counter-charges come to a stalemate. In practice, then, one cannot combine the stringent analytic refusal to ask and answer ultimate questions with the full-blown ontology of the existentialist. Nor can the detached use of the probability-calculus be squared with the plea for involved, participating commitment.

It must be admitted, then, that we have here two of the most distinctive outlooks in the history of thought, radically rival views each of which has a tremendous contemporary influence. In method, language, mood, motive, rationale, findings, and overall tone of thought they are poles apart. Though here and there apparently parallel or compatible, they are yet "in tension" at almost every point. And as with the problem of human freedom so with a host of other issues: they end opposed. Moreover, reflection on the controversies of our time will suggest that these two movements symbolize the crux-conflicts and the root divergencies of Western civilization.

Analytic philosophy and its scientific temper are profoundly enmeshed in the web of Anglo-American culture. They are far too well-entrenched, far to fruitful as a whole, to be in any literal sense replaced. Yet where two diverse movements clash in an epoch one can assume that if there is not revolution there may be supplementation, if not rejection of central theses, then the renewed scrutiny of them, if not influential examination from without, then from within.

It is probable that the contribution of existentialism to analytic thought will be of this less spectacular sort. Because of its radical character existentialism will serve as a reminder, even if from afar, of gaps, limitations, and provincialism in the means and ends of American thought. Not in revolutionary *dis*coveries, but in stimulation toward *re*covery will its influence lie. Existentialism will open, wedge, and widen the door to reexamination and reconstruction, challenging reductive and exclusive tendencies, and reincorporating for serious study those seemingly invincible and inevitable elements of human consciousness which, by present analytic orthodoxy, have been neglected or ignored. It will loom large in its continual insistence that, whatever we make of it, the depth dimension is there, a dimension that can no longer be disposed of by resort to autobiographical epithets nor by methodic stipulations.

In just this way, then, existential method and language, its quest for ultimates, its concrete inward insight into twentieth-century man, and its portrayal of the anatomy of decision, have already stimulated much reexamination within the analytic tradition. But in these and related themes, the impact and contri-

bution of existentialism to American thought is still ahead of us.[23]

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1 The term existentialism was coined by F. H. Heinemann and is meant to focus human existence and to affirm at base (somewhat misleadingly) that "existence precedes essence," which untechnically means that one exists before he thinks and that thought (essence) never fully encompass existence. Negatively it attacks the modern Cartesian and scientific-mathematical view that reality is subject to clear and distinct, quantitative analysis and formulation. Positively it holds that being or reality in its concreteness, viz. "existence," is living, inward, personal. This thesis, and related ones, have vast bearings for logic, ontology, theory or knowledge, ethics and esthetics.

2 First-hand knowledge of the movement is still limited in America. Except for the works of Kierkegaard, which, in translated versions, have enjoyed a tremendous vogue, important and disciplined writings (as distinct from novels, plays and lighter works) of Sartre, Jaspers, Marcel, Heidegger, Buber, Berdyaev, Unamuno, and Tillich have not even been translated into English.

3 This is the present-day somewhat diversified offspring of the Vienna Circle, devoted to the formalization of science, symbolic logic, semantics, and analysis of language.

4 This means a fragmental but I hope central selection of issues. It also means a perilous abstraction from the social and historical roots of the movement, perhaps excusable in that many recent accounts err the other way.

5 The term, bequeathed by Husserl and Hartmann, has come to signify the effort toward the full and disciplined examination of the way things appear in consciousness; to describe, without hidden assumptions of method or system, the given factors. The process is not intuitive, or, if so, requires extreme patience and care. (Cf. Husserl's *Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,* Logos, Vol. I, 1911).

6 Though its major philosophical works are heavy and technical, fiction, poetry, drama, and personal journals are a prominent vehicle of expression in the movement. In addition to such products of its philosophers, consider, for example, the works of Dostoevsky, Kafka, Rilke, de Beauvoir, Gide, Camus.

7 Paradox becomes a category of reality, almost, indeed, a test of truth. The analytic movement, by contrast, is devoted to uncovering and *removing* paradoxes, e.g. Russell's paradox, the antinomies of set-theory, and puzzles of ordinary language.

8 It is incorrect to say that analytic philosophy is dedicated to the rejection of metaphysics, existentialism to its renewal. Both movements are anti-traditional, and both are convinced that much of past philosophy has been devoted to "pseudo-problems." The difference lies in which problems are reinstated for study and on the criteria for deciding what sort of answers are relevant.

9 For example, in its emphasis on the scope of human awareness, the distortions of "objectification," the irreducible uniqueness of the individual, the risks of choice, the inseparability of thought and action, existentialism is close to ideas of James Dewey and Whitehead.

10 Job and Ecclesiastes, Socrates, Paul, Augustine, Pascal, Shelling, Lessing, Nietzsche, Bergson, William James are most frequently mentioned in this connection.

11 The existentialist makes an all-important distinction—his entire case depends upon it—between emotions or feelings available to psychological ("essential") description, and existential awareness. A standard example is Kierkegaard's contrast of fear and existential dread. Fear is a feeling, has an object, and is psychologically definable. Dread is all-encompassing, has

no object, and manifests the finitude of man. This "depth below the depth" common to all existential writers is held to go beyond the categories of Freud or Alder or Jung. If the distinction fails, then existentialism becomes a form of introspective psychology, and the analyst's dissociation of intellect and feeling becomes the definitive rejection of is claims to ontological knowledge.

12 Hence existentialism is sometimes called a "philosophical anthropology."

13 Cf. Kierkegaard's *Either/or, Stages on Life's Way, Concluding Us-scientific Postscript.* Also Heidegger's *Sein and Seit* Sec. 62, where merely adjusting and actually choosing are distinguished.

14 The emphasis on the radical discontinuity between human and sub-human and the prominence of "transcendent" elements, set existentialism apart from "naturalism" or "idealism" in many traditional uses of these terms.

15 The phrase "self-creating" is pointed toward Sartre's near-absolute notion of freedom which ascribes complete spontaneity and non-limitation to the "pour soi" or self. This notion is, in several interpretations, self-contradictory and hardly distinguishable from chaos. It is rarely noted, that Berdyaev with mystical roots held a similar view, that freedom is prior to being. (Cf. *Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung,* Vol. V, 1, pp. 86 ff.) The present essay will avoid these extremities.

16 CF. the second section of Heidegger's *Sein und Seit.*

17 Cf. Sartre's *L'Etre et le Neant,* pp. 127-30, 639-642 f. The point is elaborated in Kierkegaard's *Concluding Unscientific Postscript.*

18 Cf. Jaspers, "So far as I choose, I am. If I am not I do not choose." *Philosophie,* Vol. 11, p. 182: Marcell, "I am what I have done." *Etre et Avoir,* p. 138; Sartre, "I am my liberty." *L'Etre et le Neant,* p. 127-30.

19 Cf. Marcel, "Today no attempt is made to use language as a means of contemplating being, language being substituted for being . . . . This concentrating upon words for their own sake is the outcome of a convulsive endeavor to discover form in cultural chaos." *Man in the Modern Age,* pp. 134-5. Cf. *Man Against Mass Society.*

20 But it is not subjective enough. At the depth-level "subjectivity is truth" (Cf Kierkegaard). But to be swayed by the fleeting and less intimate aspects "of the subjective" is to violate the depth-self and flee the actual.

21 Cf. Kierkegaard's protest, "How are the sciences to help? Simply not at all, in no way whatsoever. They reduce everything to calm and objective observation — with the result that freedom is an inexplicable something. Scientifically Spinoza is the only one who is consistent." *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (Lowrie trans.), p. 121.

22 It is ironical that existentialism, radical in its attack on Hegelian rationalism (which has often meant on reason itself) and Cartesian mathematical method and theoretical concepts, should be remarkably accomplished on both counts. Rarely have the resources of reason or human expression been more effectually used. Articulate, if sometimes vague, the movement thus uses with unsurpassed mastery the very tools it condemns; but not in the fashion of the mathematical logician.

23 Symptomatic of the trend is the volume *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (eds. Flew and MacIntyre, New York, Macmillan, 1955). Here British analysts take up with seriousness several existential issues, and such writers as Otto and Wittgenstein, Bultmann and John Wisdom are consulted and compared on the same page.

The Wages of Sin in Hawthorne

MARDEN J. CLARK*

"Each human soul is the first-created inhabitant of its own Eden," Hawthorne remarks in one of his sketches.[1] And much of his work is a serious attempt to find out what happens to that individual soul when it introduces sin into its Eden. In a sense Hawthorne recreates the scene in the Garden over and over again in order to investigate from every angle man's soul following the introduction of sin. It is this series of probings, already often explored, that I trace in this essay with the hope of shedding more light on the development of Hawthorne's art and his view of human experience. Since the theme of sin is almost everywhere in his work, I treat only those tales and novels that are concerned more or less directly with the question, What happens to the individual after he sins?

In preface to the consideration of Hawthorne's sinners we need to note that nearly all the sins in the tales and novels can be reduced to a form of intellectual pride or to a kind of violation of the sanctity of another's individuality—the two are closely related, one often following from the other—usually with a resultant isolation of the sinner from his fellow humans. Often, as we shall see, this takes the form of the scientist whose intellectual devotion to science leads him to violate the personality or soul of his victim in the interest of scientific experiment.

Although the villain of *Fanshawe* foreshadows many of Hawthorne's later sinners, the first tale to consider specifically the wages of sin is "The Hollow of the Three Hills." Each of the successive visions the old hag conjures up for the unnamed lady reveals people who have been hurt by her sins: her forlorn parents, her deserted and maddened husband, her dead child. And after the last vision she herself apparently dies. The wages of sin is suffering and death.

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In "Roger Malvin's Burial" the sin of Reuben Bourne is his failure to keep his promise to the dying man to return and bury him—Hawthorne is ambiguous about whether his leaving Roger to die was wrong—and in his lying to Dorcas about her father and about Reuben's own actions. The last half of the story is a somewhat mechanical working out of the idea that sin brings retribution, here retribution through Reuben's remorse and eventually through the horror of his killing his own son at the site of the old man's unburied bones. In this act and the suffering which follows it, Roger's guilt is expiated, an ending noteworthy because Hawthorne does not allow it many times.

In "Lady Eleanore's Mantle" Hawthorne treats the specific problem of the intellectual pride that isolates. Symbolized by her mantle, Lady Eleanore's evil pride isolates her from human sympathy and brings pestilence to the province and death to herself. Dying, she summarizes not only her own sin but much of what Hawthorne has been saying in the early tales:

> The curse of Heaven hath striken me, because I woult not call man my brother, nor woman sister. I wrapped myself in PRIDE as in a MANTLE, and scorned the sympathies of nature . . . (980)[2]

"The Birthmark" treats a kind of pride that leads to a specific sin. In Georgianna, Aylmer has a wife as nearly perfect as humans can be, except for the small birthmark. There is a horrible presumption in Aylmer's desire to remove the mark and thus have her perfect. The desire becomes an obsession which drives him to the fatal attempt to remove the mark, an act obviously considered by Hawthorne a violation of her soul as well as her body. The horror of his act is increased by the broad symbolic significance which the birthmark gradually acquires, the symbol of the necessary imperfection of all mortal men. Aylmer does succeed in removing the birthmark almost completely; but the same draught which removes the mark kills Georgianna.

Pride is again explored in "Egotism; or, The Bosom Serpent," though the sin is presented much more abstractly. The result of the sin is isolation, symbolized by the serpent that gnaws at Roderick's heart. But here, for the first time since "Roger Malvin's Burial," is presented a possible redemption

from the evil effects of sin. Roderick knows the cure. "Could I for one minute forget myself, the serpent might not abide within me. It is my diseased self-contemplation that has engendered and nourished him" (115). And the serpent does leave when he forgets himself in the idea of another, his wife whom he had deserted years before.

In "Rappaccini's Daughter" and "Ethan Brand" Hawthorne reaches the highest artistic statement in the tales of the sin-destruction theme. Rappaccini is almost the ultimate of Hawthorne's fiends. In his scientific detachment he commits what to Hawthorne is the worst of sins by infusing his own daughter with a poison deadly to any living thing which contacts her—a violation of the sanctity of her soul which could have no other than tragic results. It has cut her off from any normal intercourse with humanity, but not through any sin of her own. When Giovanni does come into her life, bringing companionship and love, to him also is gradually imparted the poison until he not only is able to touch Beatrice, but is himself poisonous to others. Beatrice dies trying to rid herself of the poison with an antidote which Giovanni has obtained. Her death, one feels, is the only possible end. But Rappaccini is not the only sinner. Giovanni's mad curse of Beatrice for knowingly, he thinks, imparting her poison to him in order to have someone to love is also sin, perhaps as bad a sin, contributing to her death and bringing misery to Giovanni, who is just beginning to hope that they could find some kind of life and happiness together in spite of the poison. For both Giovanni and Rappaccini, the wages of sin is disaster and death to the loved one and isolation for the sinner.

"Ethan Brand" repeats the theme. Ethan Brand develops his intellect by contemplation until he becomes an incarnate fiend: ". . . he was now a cold observer, looking on mankind as the subject of his experiment, and at length, converting man the woman to be his puppets, and pulling the wires that moved them to such degrees of crime as were demanded for his study" (1194). The worst of his violations of the individuality of his victims in his search for the Unpardonable Sin is that of "the Esther of our tale," whose soul he had "wasted, absorbed, and perhaps annihilated" in the process. His search, though, is suc-

cessful; he has found the Unpardonable Sin in his own breast:

> The sin of an intellect that triumphed over the sense of brotherhood with man and reverence for God, and sacrificed everything to its own mighty claims! The only sin that deserves a recompense of immortal agony! (189)

And having found the sin, he has nothing more to achieve. Ethan Brand throws himself into the infernal pit of the lime kiln, just as he had thrown his soul into the greater pit earlier.

From this survey of the tales, two or three significant observations can be made. The early tales were a more or less mechanical working out of the theme that sin brings retribution, that the wages of sin is death, that when the soul introduces sin into its Eden, the soul must necessarily be blighted. Only occasionally and almost incidentally does Hawthorne introduce the idea of a possible redemption from sin, as he does, rather mechanically, in Reuben Bourne's expiation at terrible cost or, more specifically, in Roderick's redemption through forgetting himself in love of another. But there is evident, even in the brief sketches given above, an increasing awareness of the complexity of his problem and an increasingly complex treatment of it. For one thing, Hawthorne is aware that it isn't merely the sinners who suffer. Beatrice and Georgianna, both depicted as at heart completely pure, are innocent victims. And Esther, though we are told nothing about her own innocence or guilt, must have suffered horribly under Ethan Brand's evil experimenting. Another idea, later to become very important, is introduced in Ethan Brand's final declaration, "Freely, were it to do again, would I incur the guilt. I accept the retribution." Hawthorne seems to be suggesting here that, at least for Ethan Brand, sin carries not only its own retribution but also its own reward. Still another idea can be noted in the fact that Rappaccini's sin is not confined to himself; it results in Giovanni's sinful curse of Beatrice. The theme that sin begets sin Hawthorne explores at greater length in *The Scarlet Letter,* and it becomes the primary theme of *The House of Seven Gables.* In a sense, then, Hawthorne's tales can be looked upon as an apprenticeship for his more extensive and involved probing of the human soul in its Eden, probing that could be handled only in the greater scope given him by the novel form.

The Scarlet Letter is the most complex of Hawthorne's explorations of the effects of sin and will require rather extensive analysis. In it all the themes we have noted in the tales are brought together in a kind of grand assault on the problem of evil. The sin as such is pushed into the background. The apple has been eaten a full year before, and it is Hawthorne's problem to see what happens to the souls of Hester Prynne and Dimmesdale, together with that of the wronged husband, Roger Chillingworth, at first more sinned against than sinning. Chillingworth is the simplest of the three, another of the line of cold-blooded scientist-demons that includes Rappaccini and Ethan Brand, perhaps even the most vicious of them, for Chillingworth is motivated by a cold and long-continued desire for revenge and by an even colder scientific experimentation. The means is a diabolical variation of the familiar violation of the sanctity of the human heart. As Dimmesdale's leech—the word here, of course, is double edged—he is able not only to find out Dimmesdale's true connection with Hester, but to keep the unknowing minister in a state of perpetual remorse, anxiety and pain the like of which no mortal man might endure and live. Contriving to keep Dimmesdale's body alive, Chillingworth keeps his mind and soul in torment. As Chillingworth describes himself, "A mortal man, with once a human heart, has become a fiend for his especial benefit" (186). In Hawthorne's thinking, and, I imagine, in any system of either human psychology or Divine retribution, such monstrous action could result only in absolute deterioration, a deterioration which is symbolized in the parallel physical deterioration and increasing ugliness of Chillingworth. And once Dimmesdale is placed beyond him by confession, Roger himself, his object of revenge gone, "positively withered up, shrivelled away, and almost vanished from mortal sight," dying within a year. It is the familiar sin-begets-destruction theme of the tales, but worked out more elaborately and in a more complex character. For Roger is carefully painted as "calm in temperament, kindly, though not of warm affections, but ever and in all his relations with the world, a pure and upright man," before his design for revenge shows him progressively becoming a devil by undertaking a devil's office.

Dimmesdale's sin is also a variation of a type familiar in the tales. His original sin, of course, is the adultery, but it is not this that results in his deterioration so much as it is his self-centered pride—reminiscent of that of Roderick in "Egotism"—and his resultant hypocrisy. That this is Hawthorne's view of Dimmesdale is seen by the repeated emphasis on this trait. Aware of the healing power of confession, Dimmesdale loves too much his position in the eyes of the world to give it up for the ignominy of confession. Suffering remorse enough from his original deed, he sees that remorse multiplied many times over by his own awareness of the falseness of his position. He even does confess his "vileness" before his congregation, but he does so equivocally so that his hearers think him but the more nearly divine:

> The minister well knew—subtle, but remorseful hypocrite that he was!—the light in which his vague confession would be viewed. He had striven to put a cheat upon himself by making the avowal of a guilty conscience, but had gained only one other sin, and a self-acknowledged shame, without the momentary relief of being self-deceived. He had spoken the very truth, and transformed it into the veriest falsehood. (169)

His remorse drives him to the mockery of his midnight stand on the scaffold, but it can bring him to public confession only after he has reached his ultimate public triumph, in the election sermon, and is dying anyway. It is indicative of the real Dimmesdale that when Hester reveals to him her relationship with Chillingworth he cries out,

> O Hester Prynne, thou little, little knowest all the horror of this thing! And the shame!—the indelicacy!—the horrible ugliness of this exposure of a sick and guilty heart to the very eye that would gloat over it! Woman, woman, thou art accountable for this! I cannot forgive thee! (199)

The Dimmesdale who has let Hester bear alone her public degradation at the scaffold thinks first of his own shame, and he cannot forgive the woman who has been only indirectly responsible because of her love for him.

But if Dimmesdale's sin, first of passion then of pride and hypocrisy, brings about his destruction, it does more. It is by his very sorrows that Dimmesdale is able to achieve his extraordinary success as a minister: "His intellectual gifts, his moral

perceptions, his power of experiencing and communicating emotion, were kept in a state of preternatural activity by the prick and anguish of his daily life" (167). The destruction comes, but first Dimmesdale receives positive benefits from his sin and suffering.

Through Hester Prynne, without doubt Hawthorne's most complex and noble character, Hawthorne explores this possible regenerative effect of sin, a theme only hinted at in his earlier work. Hester's sin with Dimmesdale brings her almost unbearable suffering and humiliation. But from the very moment of her appearance at the door of the jail there is almost no evidence that the sin itself brings her real remorse of conscience. By the strength of her own will she bears her humiliation and suffering, gathering in turn strength and development from them and from her unselfish service to suffering humanity. It is not at all certain from Hawthorne's handling of her that she really considers her action sin or that she felt it something to repent of. She wears her badge of shame with great dignity, almost with pride and at times defiance. In response to Dimmesdale's comparison of their sin with that of Chillingworth, her famous cry is, "What we did had a consecration of its own. We felt it so!" (200) Though one can make too much of this, it surely must be taken as indicative of Hester's attitude.

But the significant thing about Hester is what happens to her as a result of the sin and the wearing of the scarlet letter. Though she early dedicates herself as a "self-ordained Sister of Mercy," Hawthorne interprets this as an act of volition rather than one of true feeling or human sympathy, for "her life had turned, in great measure, from passion and feeling, to thought." What she is experiencing is an intellectual development which leads her into deep speculation in the realms of morality:

> Standing alone in the world . . . , She cast away the fragments of a broken chain. The world's law was no law for her mind. It was an age in which the human intellect, newly emancipated, had taken a more active and a wider range than for many centuries before . . . Men . . . had overthrown and rearranged . . . the whole system of ancient prejudice, wherewith was linked much of the ancient principle. Hester Prynne imbibed this spirit. She assumed a freedom of speculation . . . which

> our forefathers, had they known it, would have held to be a deadlier crime than that stigmatized by the scarlet letter. (181)

Hawthorne is grudging about it. He represents Hester as having wandered "without rule or guidance, in a moral wilderness," though gaining freedom through her speculations:

> The scarlet letter was her passport into regions where other women dared not tread. Shame, Despair, Solitude! These had been her teachers,—stern and wild ones,—and they had made her strong, but taught her much amiss. (202-3)

But there can be little doubt that Hawthorne considered Hester's freedom, her strength and her intellectual development as tending toward a higher morality. His obvious respect for her, the appealing personality with which he endows her, plus his comments about her, make any other interpretation very difficult. Hawthorne could not approve of her plan to run away with Dimmesdale, but he could not hide his respect for the woman with strength and courage to conceive and carry it out. Neither the fact that Chillingworth's diablery made his plan fail nor the fact that nowhere else does she actually put into practice any of the daring ideas to which her speculations have given rise can be interpreted as nullifying those ideas or the conception of them as a higher morality. For this intellectual development is followed by a return of her capacity for feeling, called forth apparently by her interview in the forest with Dimmesdale, but for Hawthorne probably resulting from and increased by her intellectual development. Hawthorne undoubtedly intended us to view her later life of unselfish service as, if not the result of her higher morality, at least the highest form of Christian morality.

The real contribution of *The Scarlet Letter* to Hawthorne's treatment of sin, then, is in the study of Dimmesdale's partial development and Hester's dual development as a result of their sin. Other themes, too, are there, notably the idea that sin begets sin and the more familiar one that cold-blooded, long-continued sin can result only in destruction.

The sin-begets-sin theme receives its fullest statement in *The House of Seven Gables,* but Hawthorne develops it as a rather mechanical working out of the curse of old Matthew Maule rather than as a dynamic study in human behavior fol-

lowing sin. Hawthorne is aware of the weakness and tries in several places to suggest that each new occupant of the house was aware of the original wrong and by failing to rectify it committed anew the crime and incurred its responsibilities. Old Judge Pyncheon is a villain such as appears nowhere else, as I recall, in Hawthorne. Lacking the motivation and subtlety of the demons like Chillingworth, he yet has an infinite capacity for evil. His major crime is undoubtedly his contriving to send the innocent Clifford to prison. His own destruction as a result of his evil seems much closer to the mechanics of the early tales than to the deep psychological study of *The Scarlet Letter*. But a significant note, an elaboration of the later tales, is the emphasis on the terrible suffering of the innocent as a result of Judge Pyncheon's villainy. Indeed, to me the strongest point about *The House of Seven Gables* is the way in which Hawthorne somehow manages to endow poor old Hepzibah and Clifford with a kind of tragic dignity in their suffering.

In *The Blythedale Romance* Hawthorne turns his attention to a type that had interested him earlier, the reformer whose passion for reform leads him to evil. Hollingworth, though a type character, makes an interesting study in sin. To his plan for prison reform, evolved apparently with the highest motivation, he dedicates his life. But the plan requires money and support, and in his attempts to carry it out the dedication becomes passion, then obsession. Under its influence Hollingsworth subordinates all human sympathies, conceiving a plan to wreck the Blythedale project in order to use both its land and what it has accomplished, throwing over Miles Coverdale when he refuses to be part of the scheme, casting aside Zenobia when she can no longer be of use to him, and finally planning even to sacrifice Priscilla to it—at least so Zenobia interprets him. But the most interesting aspect of all this is that he has done it in apparent self-deception. Right up to the time that Zenobia finally makes her impassioned charges, he has felt that everything he has planned and done has been just and righteous. Blinded by his own obsession, he cannot see, as Zenobia finally is able to see, that he is all self:

> Self, self, self! You have embodied yourself in a project. You are a better masquerader than the witches and gypsies

> yonder; for your disguise is a self-deception. See whither it has brought you. (568)

And Zenobia is speaking for not only herself but Miles Coverdale and Hawthorne when she tells him, "The utmost that can be said in your behalf . . . is, that a great and rich heart has been ruined in your breast." The results of Hollingworth's sin follow the now familiar pattern: misery and death to those about him and for himself a complete loss of the power that had been so compelling to Zenobia, Priscilla, and even Coverdale. In the ruin of his heart was also the ruin of his mind and soul.

Hollingsworth is the center of the novel, but it is with difficulty that Hawthorne keeps him there. Zenobia is the most interesting, complex and attractive character in the novel, and in her Hawthorne studies most subtly the complexities of the soul which introduces sin into its Eden. Zenobia's sin is the familiar, though here perhaps indirect, violation of the individual soul. Having apparently the power to prevent it, she either allows Priscilla to fall into the hands of Westervelt or deliberately places her there. Motivated by her love for Hollingsworth and seeing in Priscilla an obstacle to obtaining him, she removes the obstacle, coldly and heartlessly. Hers is the sin of pride, but it is not of scientific detachment. Rather than lacking in humanity, she is most human, most womanly. As she describes herself and her sin,

> At least, I am a woman, with every fault, it may be, that a woman ever had,—weak, vain, unprincipled . . . , passionate, too, and pursuing my foolish and unattainable ends by indirect and cunning, though absurdly chosen means, as an hereditary bondslave must; false, moreover to the whole circle of good, in my reckless truth to the little good I saw before me,—but still a woman! A creature whom only a little change of earthly fortune, a little kinder smile of Him who sent me hither, and one true heart to encourage and direct me, might have made all that a woman can be! (567)

Zenobia's sin must be interpreted as resulting in her death. But this is no mechanical working out of the sin-retribution formula. Nothing about Zenobia is mechanical. It is rather a study of a woman. Zenobia drowns herself, not a repentant sinner, but a woman scorned, a proud, beautiful, "magnificent" woman. Indeed, if sin causes her death, it is not her sin toward Pris-

cilla—though that might have helped cause her rejection by Hollingsworth—but the sin of pride, the pride of a woman who has given her heart away only to find the recipient neither desirous nor worthy of it.

Of the other characters little need be said. The mysterious and demoniac Westervelt, another incarnation of evil, always lurks in the background, but his is only a mechanical part in the novel. And Miles Coverdale can hardly be considered blameless. Both he and Zenobia recognize in him the coldly detached observer of life, a type with which Hawthorne has dealt severely before. His unrequited love for Priscilla might be considered just deserts.

The Marble Faun is a specific handling of the "soul in its Eden" theme, carried out on a higher level of abstraction and generalization than in any of the other novels. Donatello is presented, both symbolically through the faun resemblance and actually, as a man in the state of natural innocence, as Adam in the garden before sin has entered. Living in this state Donatello is naively happy, loving Miriam but without real depth in his love, having no real sense of moral relationships, hence unable to make decisions involving right and wrong on any basis other than his own naive emotions. It is his very innocence that is largely responsible for his sin. His passion for Miriam leads him to kill her persecutor, simply as a response to the look in her eyes. Had the Hawthorne of the tales been writing here, this murder would have been the beginning of an inevitable process of deterioration, leading eventually to destruction for Donatello. And at first it seems to be just that. After the first avowal with Miriam of kinship in crime, Donatello isolates himself not only from her, but from the rest of the world. Alone in the tower of his castle, he morbidly contemplates himself and his crime, his remorse dominating all other feeling or thought. But something unusual is happening to Donatello during his suffering. Kenyon first notices it when he is finally accepted into the tower of Donatello:

> From some mysterious source, as the sculptor felt assured, a soul had been inspired into the young Count's simplicity, since their intercourse in Rome. He now showed a far deeper sense, and an intelligence that began to deal with high subjects, though in a feeble and childish way. He evinced,

> too, a more definite and nobler individuality, but developed out of grief and pain, and fearfully conscious of the pangs that had given it birth. (741)

What is happening is more definitely stated a little later when Donatello responds to Kenyon's suggestion that he find relief from his burden by living for the welfare of his fellow creatures: "In the black depths, the Faun had found a soul and was struggling with it toward the light of heaven" (744). The process goes on throughout the wanderings of Donatello and Kenyon until Donatello is able finally to reunite himself with Miriam, a crucial step because she is so much a part of his sin. But the process cannot end there. Together, as Kenyon tells them, they must continue the climb that will bring their souls out of the morass of sin into the light of Heaven, each one of them dependent on the other. Beyond that Hawthorne will not go. He has Kenyon quickly caution them that their bond is of black threads, that it is for one another's good, "for effort, for sacrifice, but not for earthly happiness" (776).

The significance of Donatello's development as a result of sin is expressed in the musing of both Miriam and Kenyon. Miriam, who has much of Hester Prynne's ability for moral and intellectual investigation, notes the change in Donatello and then asks,

> Was the crime—in which he and I were wedded—was it a blessing, in that strange disguise? Was it a means of education, bringing a simple and imperfect nature to a point of feeling and intelligence which it could have reached under no other discipline? . . .
> . . . The story of the fall of man! Is it not repeated in our romance of Monte Beni? And may we follow the analogy yet further? Was that very sin,—into which Adam precipitated himself and all his race,—was it the destined means by which, over a long pathway of toil and sorrow, we are to attain a higher, brighter, and profounder happiness, than our lost birthright gave? Will not this idea account for the permitted existence of sin, as no other theory can?

And in response to Kenyon's hesitance in following her in her speculations, she adds:

> Ask Hilda what she thinks of it . . . At least she might conclude that sin—which man chose instead of good—has been so beneficently handled by omniscience and omnipotence, that, whereas our dark enemy sought to destroy us by it, it

> has really become an instrument most effective in the education of the intellect and soul. (840)

To Hilda's horror, Kenyon takes up Miriam's musings, ending with the question, "Did Adam fall, that we might ultimately rise to a far loftier paradise than his?" (854) And though he immediately disclaims his belief of the idea, the idea itself remains.

Before we leave *The Marble Faun,* a brief look at Hilda will shed more light on Hawthorne's treatment of the problem. Hilda is presented as competely pure and angelic, the human soul as near Christian perfection as is possible on earth. But one soon feels that something is lacking in her, something that shows up when she is suddenly confronted with sin. Having lived completely beyond evil herself, she knows not how to cope with even exposure to it. She flings off Miriam at the moment of Miriam's greatest need and goes through a horror of remorse worse even than that of the sinners, a remorse which culminates in her confession before the Catholic priest. When Kenyon later suggests to her that the verdict on them might better be "Worthy of Death, but not unworthy of Love," she recoils in horror, neither knowing nor wanting to know how "Right and Wrong can work together in a deed." To which Kenyon can only respond:

> I always felt you, my dear friend, a terribly severe judge, and have been perplexed to conceive how such tender sympathy could coexist with the remorselessness of a steel blade. You need no mercy, and therefore know not how to show any. (811)

Kenyon's suggestion bears fruit; Hilda finally realizes her own heartlessness: "Miriam loved me well, . . . and I failed her at her sorest need." The final result of Hilda's contact with evil is that she becomes able to participate in normal human sympathies and relationships. Before, she had dedicated her life to copying the great masters; now, she is able to respond to Kenyon's love with a self-forgetful love of her own—with the fertility and creativity implicit in such love—and without losing her essential spiritual quality. Not only in Donatello but in Hilda herself Hawthorne dramatizes the positive results of sin that Miriam and Kenyon have only speculated about.

During the writing of his tales and novels, then, Hawthorne has moved—hesitatingly, to be sure, and with several retreats—from a position in which retribution was the only and inevitable result of sin, through one which recognizes and studies the complexities of sinners and the results of sin, to a final one which affirms the possibilities of positive good resulting from sin. The significance of this movement seems to me twofold: first, that Hawthorne became aware of the greater dramatic and artistic potentialities of a more complex handling of the problem; second, and more important, that through his probings into the nature of sin and the human soul, Hawthorne was evolving for himself, just as Hester Prynne had done in her speculations, a higher concept of morality.

The first of these probably needs no proof other than the obvious development toward both a more complex concept of the problems involved in sin and a more complex handling of both characters and problems. Compare, for example, the simple and rather mechanical plots of the early tales with the complex "Rappaccini's Daughter" or, even more obvious, with the complexity of *The Scarlet Letter.* The awareness of the fact that sin cannot be reduced to the formula of the early tales apparently developed hand in hand with the awareness of the greater artistic possibilities involved in the new concept.

But if the first is obvious, the idea that Hawthorne was evolving his own higher morality needs some qualification and explanation, for it is probable that not everyone will agree that it is a higher morality. That it is a changing and broadening concept of morality has, I think, been demonstrated by this review of his work. Hawthorne's own experience, both with art and with life, must have convinced him that it simply is not true that sin is always punished, that the good always prosper and the wicked perish. What Hawthorne was doing—and this is important for me—was recognizing the complexity of human relationships. The good-evil duality was being brought into question, with the inevitable result that Hawthorne began to recognize and to study in his work infinite gradations of good and evil. *The Marble Faun* does not stop with asking what happens when evil is introduced into the soul; the musings of Kenyon and Miriam go on to ask, Why does sin exist?

That the position which recognizes the complexities of human interaction and of moral problems is a higher morality can, I think, be demonstrated, though I do not care to press it here. That it was for Hawthorne in his own mind, I feel, cannot be denied from the evidence of his work. The final question of *The Marble Faun,* "Did Adam fall, that we might ultimately rise to a far loftier paradise than his?" is fraught with so many problems of interpretation and of philosophical import that there can be no hope of agreement of whether it is really a higher morality. But it is significant to note that it is also a theme of other and even greater writers, notably Milton[3] and Dostoevsky.[4] The fact that Hawthorne has Kenyon immediately respond to his own question, "I never did believe it!" suggests that Hawthorne had not solved the problem for himself. He also denies Hester complete triumph in her higher morality, just as he sees only the possibility, not the probability, of real happiness and perhaps eventual salvation for Miriam and Donatello.

It need not surprise us that Hawthorne could not resolve his problem completely, could see only partial salvation for even the best of his sinners. One feels that for him even the principle of love, which he suggests rather often as the nearest thing to an ultimate saving principle, cannot be completely trusted—it is, after all, Hester's completely selfless love for Dimmesdale that forces her to leave him to the mercy of Chillingworth. Hawthorne was unable to find a final solution to his problem simply because he was working with the complexities of human consciousness; and the soul of man cannot be reduced to a formula. Given the intensity of his probings and the seriousness of his nature, it was perhaps inevitable that he arrive at a tragic view of life, just as most other great artists who have probed intensely have done. And it is Hawthorne's triumph, not that he gives us a system by which we might guide our lives, but that he gives us experience and understanding which might help us to better meet the complexities and problems of a world which itself cannot be reduced to a formula.

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1 "Buds and Birds Voices," *Mosses From an Old Manse* (Vol. I, Salem ed.; New York, 1893), p. 165.

2 Page numbers in parantheses refer to *The Complete Novels and Selected*

Tales of Nathaniel Hawthorne, Modern Library Giant Edition (New York, 1937).

3 See F. O. Matthiessen, *American Renaissance* (New York, 1941), pp. 305-312.

4 See Valdimir Astrov, "Hawthorne and Dostoevsky as Explorers of the Muman Conscience," *New England Quarterly,* XV (June, 1942), 296-319.

An Economic Interpretation of the "Word of Wisdom"

LEONARD J. ARRINGTON*

How did it happen that the Latter-day Saints, once distinguished primarily by their group economic, political, and social activity, and by certain "peculiar" beliefs and practices, came to be noted, in this century, primarily for the non-use of liquor, tobacco, tea, and coffee? Certain evidence suggests that an important contributing factor was economic in nature. Economic interpretations are almost always inadequate and one-sided, but they frequently offer helpful insights into historical processes and their causation. This essay is presented, not as a "final" interpretation, but only as a contribution toward the understanding of a sensitive phase of Utah history that has seldom been studied.

The "Word of Wisdom" of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is a part of its revealed scripture, having been announced by Joseph Smith, first Prophet of the Mormons, at Kirtland, Ohio, on February 27, 1833. The name of the revelation, "Word of Wisdom," is found in the first verse of the revelation which begins: "A Word of Wisdom, for the benefit of the council of high priests, assembled in Kirtland, (Ohio) and the church, and also the saints in Zion (i. e., Missouri) . . . " The admonitions given in the revelation are as follows:[1]

1. It is not good to drink wine or strong drink, except during the Lord's Supper, when it should be "pure wine . . . of your own make."
2. Tobacco is not good for man.
3. Hot drinks (interpreted contemporaneously and at present to mean tea and coffee) are not good for man.
4. God has made available for man's use wholesome herbs and fruits. These are to be used in their seasons "with

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> prudence and thanksgiving." Grain is set apart for man's use, as the "staff of life."
> 5. The flesh of beasts and fowls also is ordained for man's use, but must be used sparingly. It should not be used except in the winter, during cold weather, and in times of famine.

Those who obey these admonitions are given promises that they shall receive health and strength, find wisdom and great treasures of knowledge, run and not be weary, and walk and not faint, and escape the destroying angel, who will "pass by them and not slay them." The revelation states that it was given as a "greeting" rather than as a "commandment" or by way of "constraint," but it purported to show forth "the order and will of God in the temporal salvation of all saints in the last days." It was given as a "principle with promise," and was adapted to the capacity of "the weak and the weakest of all saints . . . ."

There are two theories as to the origin of the "Word of Wisdom." One is that it grew out of specific problems in the early history of the Mormon Church. Thus, the provision with respect to wine states that it was given in consequence of the "evils and designs which do and will exist in the hearts of conspiring men . . . ." Among these were the apparent attempts of hostile elements to dispose of church leaders by putting poison in wine. Similarly, the provision on tobacco is said to have grown out of the complaints of Emma Smith, wife of Joseph, about the condition of her floors after meetings of early church leaders in her home. Brigham related the circumstances as follows:

> I think I am as well acquainted with the circumstances which led to the giving of the Word of Wisdom as any man in the Church, although I was not present at the time to witness them. The first school of the prophets was held in a small room situated over the Prophet Joseph's kitchen . . . . Over this kitchen was situated the room in which the Prophet received revelations and in which he instructed his brethren. The brethren came to that place for hundreds of miles to attend school in a little room probably no larger than eleven by fourteen. When they assembled together in this room after breakfast, the first (thing) they did was to light their pipes, and while smoking, talk about the great things of the kingdom, and spit all over the room, and as soon as the pipe was out of their mouths a large chew of tobacco would then be

taken. Often when the Prophet entered the room to give the school instructions he would find himself in a cloud of tobacco smoke. This, and the complaints of his wife at having to clean so filthy a floor, made the Prophet think upon the matter, and he inquired of the Lord relating to the conduct of the Elders in using tobacco, and the revelation known as the Word of Wisdom was the result of his inquiry.[2]

In recent years a number of scholars have contended that the revelation is an outgrowth of the temperance movement of the early nineteenth century. According to Dean D. McBrien, who first expressed this theory, the Word of Wisdom was a remarkable distillation of the prevailing thought of frontier America in the early 1830's. Each provision in the revelation, he claimed, pertained to an item which had formed the basis of widespread popular agitation in the early 1830's:

> A survey of the situation existing at Kirtland when the revelation came forth is a sufficient explanation for it. The temperance wave had for some time been engulfing the West. Just a few years before, Robert Owen had abolished the use of ardent spirits in his community at New Harmony. In 1826 Marcus Morton had founded the American Temperance Society, called at first the Cold Water Society by way of contempt. In June, 1830, the *Millenial Harbinger* quoted in full, and with the hearty personal endorsement of Alexander Campbell, an article from the Philadelphia "Journal of Health," which in turn was quoting a widely circulated book, "The Simplicity of Health," which article most strongly condemned the use of alcohol, tobacco, the eating intemperately of meats. Thereafter, Campbell and his paper gave wide publicity to the temperance cause. Temperance Societies were organized in great numbers during the early thirties, six thousand being formed in one year. On the Western Reserve many temperance lectures were delivered, many temperance pamphlets circulated, and many temperance meetings held from 1826 on. The arguments used everywhere were based as much on physical as on moral grounds. On October 6, 1830, the Kirtland Temperance Society was organized with two hundred thirty nine members. Among its members were listed a George Smith, several Morleys, a Wells, a Coe, and a Lyman. These are names all associated with the history of Mormonism, and it is not improbable, though not known as certain, that these temperance workers had relatives among the Saints, even if they themselves were not Mormons.
> This society at Kirtland was a most active one . . . . it revolutionized the social customs of the neighborhood.[3]

McBrien then goes ahead to point out that the Temperance Society succeeded in eliminating a distillery in Kirtland on Februray 1, 1833, just twenty-seven days before the Latter-day Saint revelation counseling abstinence was announced, and that the distillery at Mentor, near Kirtland, was also closed at the same time.

How did Mormon leaders and members interpret their obligations under the new revelation? The evidence points two ways. Some apparently regarded the revelation as prohibitory and binding and wanted to make the obedience of its principles a matter of fellowship. The church council in Kirtland, in February, 1834, for example, adopted the following resolution: "No official member in this Church is worthy to hold an office, after having the Word of Wisdom properly taught him, and he, the official member, neglecting to comply with it or obey it . . .[4] In December, 1836, the church congregation voted a pledge of total abstinence from intoxicants after which water was used in the Lord's Supper.[5] At a general meeting conducted by church authorities in Far West, Missouri, in 1837, the membership agreed that "we will not fellowship any ordained member who will not, or does not, observe the Word of Wisdom according to its literal reading."[6] Several months later, at the annual conference of the church, Joseph Smith spoke on the Word of Wisdom and stated that it should be observed.[7] Moreover, when a council at Far West tried a high church official (David Whitmer) for his fellowship, the first of the five charges against him was that he did not observe the Word of Wisdom.[8]

Taking the 1830's and 1840's as a whole, however, there is considerable evidence that many Mormon leaders and members believed that the Word of Wisdom meant only a piece of good advice and nothing more. One large group of Mormon families, for example, was advised in 1838 that they should not be "too particular in regard to the Word of Wisdom . . . ."[9] The same attitude continued during the years 1839-1845 when the Mormons were in Nauvoo, Illinois.[10]

Joseph Smith's published journal, moreover, indicates a somewhat casual treatment of the injunctions contained in the revelation. After a double wedding in January, 1836, he wrote: "We then partook of some refreshments, and our hearts were

made glad with the fruit of the vine. This is according to the pattern set by our Savior Himself, and we feel disposed to patronize all the institutions of heaven."[11] A fortnight later at the marriage of the apostle, John Boynton, the Prophet was presented by Orson Hyde, Luke Johnson, and Warren Parrish with "three servers of glasses filled with wine, to bless." "And it fell to my lot to attend to this duty," he wrote, "which I cheerfully discharged. It was then passed round in order, then the cake in the same order; and suffice it to say, our hearts were made glad while partaking of the bounty of earth which was presented, until we had taken our fill; and joy filled every bosom, and the countenances of old and young seemed to bloom alike with cheerfulness and smiles of youth . . . ." The feast, he wrote, "was conducted after the order of heaven, which has a time for all things . . . ."[12] A few months later in the same year Joseph records that he took his mother and Aunt Clarissa in a carriage to Painsville, Ohio, where they "produced a bottle of wine, broke bread, ate and drank, and parted after the ancient order, with the blessings of God."[13]

A tolerant rather than vigilant attitude also characterized the application of the Word of Wisdom in pioneer Utah. Brigham Young, although a fairly strict adherent to the Word of Wisdom, particularly after 1861, did not make the obedience of it a matter of fellowship; nor did he identify the Word of Wisdom with moral principle. As Nels Anderson wrote, "For him the test of a man's faith was his integrity to an assignment given by the church. Could a man take a company of Saints to a desert and hold them to the task of building a community; then it didn't matter much to Brother Brigham if he was a user of whiskey and tobacco. Those 'Word of Wisdom' virtues were precious to him but secondary."[14]

President Young's remarks in the "Old Tabernacle" in Salt Lake in 1861 were surely not typical and yet they indicate a kindly—though disapproving—eye toward tobacco users:

> Many of the brethern chew tobacco, and I have advised them to be modest about it. Do not take out a whole plug of tobacco in meeting before the eyes of the congregation, and cut off a long slice and put it in your mouth, to the annoyance of everybody around. Do not glory in this disgraceful practice. If you must use tobacco, put a small portion

> in your mouth when no person sees you, and be careful that no one sees you chew it. I do not charge you with sin. You have the "Word of Wisdom." Read it. Some say, "Oh, as I do in private, so do I in public, and I am not ashamed of it." It is, at least, disgraceful . . . to expose your absurdities. Some men will go into a clean and beautifully-furnished parlour with tobacco in their mouths, and feel, "I ask no odds." I would advise such men to be more modest, and not spit upon the carpets and furniture, but step to the door, and be careful not to let any person see you spit; or, what is better, omit chewing until you have an opportunity to do so without offending.[15]

Likewise at the fortieth annual conference of the Saints in Salt Lake City in 1870, President Young similarly took time to chastise the members:

> On Sunday, after meeting, going through the gallery [of the new tabernacle] which had been occupied by those claiming, no doubt, to be gentlemen, and perhaps, brethren, you might have supposed that cattle had been standing around there and dropping their nuisances. Here and there were great quids of tobacco, and places a foot or two feet square smeared with tobacco juice. I wish the door-keepers, when, in the future, they observe any persons besmearing the seats and floor in this way to request them to leave the house; and, if they refuse and will not stop spitting about and besmearing their neighbors, just take them and lead them out carefully and kindly. It is an imposition for those claiming to be gentlemen to spit tobacco juice for ladies to draw their clothes through and besmear them, or to leave their dirt in the house. We request all addicted to this practice, to omit it while in this house. Elders of Israel, if you must chew tobacco, omit it while in meeting, and when you leave, you can take a double portion, if you wish to.[16]

Obviously, such backsliders were in the minority. Nearly every reliable writer who traveled through Mormon Country in the nineteenth century made special comment of the fact that the Latter-day Saints were frugal, industrious, sober, and temperate. To quote just one example from among the many, Jules Remy and Julius Brenchley, after a relatively lengthy tour through the Mormon commonwealth in 1855, wrote the following about its citizens:

> The style of living among the Mormons is simple and frugal. They are very temperate, which enables them the better to bear the privations to which they are exposed by their frequent

changes of place, and during the periods of scarcity too often caused by great droughts and the ravages of locusts. Bread, maize, potatoes, pompions, dairy produce, bacon, beef, are their principal and almost their only food. They make use of tea, and coffee less frequently. The majority abstain from fermented or spiritous liquors, either voluntarily and from motives of temperance, or on account of their poverty. They chew tobacco more than they smoke it; this vile habit, however, is less usual among them than in other parts of the Union.[17]

In short, the Word of Wisdom was largely observed, but there can be little doubt that it had not become a group taboo in the 1850's and early '60's.

The strong and increased emphasis on the Word of Wisdom which characterized the official Mormon attitude throughout the remainder of the century appears to have begun in 1867. In that year were organized, in each Mormon community, a Women's Relief Society and a men's School of the Prophets. Both organizations adopted rules requiring observance of the spirit and meaning of the Word of Wisdom.[18]

The explanation for these rules and the widespread resolves to obey the Word of Wisdom seems to lie in the conditions of the Mormon economy. Separated as they were from the United States by over 1,500 miles of treeless plains, hounded as they had been by hating "mobocrats," it was necessary for the Latter-day Saints to develop and maintain a self-sufficient economy in their Rocky Mountain retreat. Economic independence was a necessary goal of the group and every program of the church tended toward that end. Economic independence meant developing all the agricultural, mineral, and industrial resources of the region, but it also means husbanding the cash resources of the community under proper (i.e., church) leadership for the purchase of machinery and equipment needed in building a prosperous commonwealth. There must be no waste of liquid assets on imported consumers' goods. Utah had no Marshall Plan on which to rely for the solution of her chronic shortage of dollars; she could not maintain consumption as usual and still build up her productive power in the way that was necessary to provide jobs for the never-ending streams of converts coming to Zion to dwell. And as for "the gathering"

of the converts—also a basic Gospel principle—that also required large sums of cash.

For the purchase of needed supplies and equipment the Saints had few cash resources. They had little cash when they reached Utah; and there was no product they could export from Utah to get more cash in the normal commercial way. Saints who used their cash to purchase imported Bull Durham, Battle-Axe plugs, tea, coffee, and similar "wasteful" (because not productive) products were taking an action which was opposed to the economic interests of the territory. In view of this situation, President Young came to be unalterably opposed to the expenditure of money by the Saints on imported tea, coffee, and tobacco. It was consistent with the economics of the time that he should have had no great objection to tobacco chewing if the tobabcco was grown locally. It was also consistent that he should have successfully developed a locally-produced "Mormon" tea to take the place of the imported article. Something more permanent and productive than tea, coffee, and tobacco was wanted for the building of the Kingdom, in view of the limited funds at the disposal of the Saints.

A particularly crucial problem faced the church as the transcontinental railroad approached Utah after the Civil War. It was evident to Mormon officials that a stepped-up program of economic development was essential if the local economy was to escape absorption into the wider free-trading economy of the nation. At least three things had to be done: (1) The territory must utilize every means of earning "outside" income with which to purchase machinery and equipment and other needed imports. This was done by taking a contract to construct the transcontinental line in Utah. (2) The territory must establish cooperative stores and industries to insure that the profits of trade would be available for investment in the local economy. Thus was initiated what is known as the "cooperative movement" in Mormon history. (3) The territory must pare consumer imports to the bone in order to finance agricultural and industrial (i.e., productive) imports. The School of the Prophets and the Women's Relief Societies figured prominently in executing this third phase of Mormon policy. Accented emphasis on Word of Wisdom observance after 1867 was unquestionably

an essential part of the development program stimulated by the approach of the railroad.[19]

Brigham Young's sermons in the 1860's and '70's give clear indication that Mormon leaders were worried over the economic waste resulting from importation of the products prohibited in the Word of Wisdom. In a letter of instructions to all the settlements south of Great Salt Lake City, President Young wrote:

> This community has not yet concluded to entirely dispense with the use of tobacco, and great quantities have been imported into our Territory. The silver and gold which we have paid out for this article alone, since we first came into Utah, would have built several extensive cotton and woolen factories, and filled them with machinery. I know of no better climate and soil than are here for the successful culture of tobacco. Instead of buying it in a foreign market and importing it over a thousand miles, why not raise it in our own country or do without it? True principles of domestic and political economy would suggest the production at home of every article of home consumption, for herein lies the basis of wealth and independence for any people . . . .
>
> Tea is in great demand in Utah, and anything under that name sells readily at an extravagant price. This article opens a wide drain for the escape of much of our circulating medium . . . . Tea can be produced in this Territory in sufficient quantities for home consumption, and if we raise it ourselves we know that we have the pure article. If we do not raise it, I would suggest that we do without it.[20]

An added indication of the thinking of Latter-day Saint leadership is gleaned from the remarks of Brigham Young at one of the sessions of the general conference of the church, held in Salt Lake City in 1867, at which he strongly urged the women of the church to refrain from the use of tea and coffee. By this abstinence, and by teaching their families to do likewise, he stated, means could be saved and devoted to emigration, the construction of temples, and the support of Gospel and economic missionaries.[21] On the tobacco question, he gave explicit expression of the economic loss to the Saints of importing that article:

> You know that we all profess to believe the "Word of Wisdom." There has been a great deal said about it, more in former than in latter years. We, as Latter-day Saints, care but little about tobacco; but, as "Mormons," we use vast quantity

> of it . . . How much do you suppose goes annually from this Territory, and has for ten or twelve years past, in gold and silver, to supply the people with tobacco? I will say $60,000. Brother William H. Hooper, our Delegate in Congress, came here in 1849, and during about eight years he was selling goods his sales for tobacco alone amounted to over $28,000 a year. At the same time there were other stores that sold their share and drew their share of the money expended yearly, besides what has been brought in by the keg and by the half keg. The traders and passing emigration have sold tons of tobacco, besides what is sold here regularly. I say that $60,000 anually is the smallest figure I can estimate the sales at. Tobacco can be raised here as well as it can be raised in any other place. It wants attention and care. If we use it, let us raise it here. I recommend for some man to go to raising tobacco. One man, who came here last fall, is going to do so; and if he is diligent, he will raise quite a quantity. I want to see some man go to and make a business of raising tobacco and stop sending money out of the Territory for that article.
>
> Some of the brethern are very strenuous upon the "Word of Wisdom," and would like to have me preach upon it, and urge it upon the brethren, and make it a test of fellowship. I do not think that I shall do so. I have never done so.[22]

The attempts of the latter-day Saints in southern Utah and elsewhere to make wine are also illustrative of the dominating philosophy of economic self-sufficiency. One function of these enterprises, of course, was to provide wine for the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. Brigham Young stated in 1864: "I anticipate the day when we can have the privilege of using, at our sacraments pure wine, produced within our borders. I do not know that it would injure us to drink wine of our own make, although we would be better without it than to drink it to excess."[23] Wine was used in the sacrament of the church as late as 1897.[24] A more important function of wine-making, however, was to provide much-needed income for the poverty-stricken pioneers in Utah's Dixie. The intention was to sell most of the wine in mining communities in southern Utah and Nevada. Brigham Young instructed as follows: "First, by lightly pressing, make a white wine. Then give a heavier pressing and make a colored wine. Then barrel up this wine, and if my counsel is taken, this wine will not be drunk here, but will be exported, and thus increase the fund."[25] More of the Dixie wine was con-

sumed in the Mormon settlements than church officials had hoped, however, and the enterprise was discontinued before 1900.

There can be no doubt that a major goal of church policy in pioneer Utah was economic independence. Achieving self-sufficiency required a policy of urging upon the Saints the necessity of saving their dollars for items which were more important to the welfare of the group than tea, coffee, and tobacco. Thus, it came about that those who "wasted" their cash on such "unnecessary, self-gratifying" imports were "talked about," criticized, and accused of being unwilling to sacrifice for the common good. The majority realized that abstinence would help to build local industry and agriculture and help to finance immigration and missionary work; therefore, strong sanctions were applied against those who refused to cooperate in this program of building up Zion. Persons who refused to go along with the policy of non-use were not "good Mormons."

Those interested in promulgating the Word of Wisdom worked particularly with the young people, who soon learned that to abstain from tea, coffee, tobacco, and wine—all imports—was a test of one's loyalty to the church, its program, and its leadership. By the time of the 1880's the Word of Wisdom campaign had gone so far as to lead to widespread pledges of total abstinence. The "infamous" antipolygamy raid, the growing influence of nearby mining camps, and the lack of employment for the younger men, all combined in the 1880's to create a worrisome problem of drunkenness and juvenile delinquency. At the general and local conferences of the 1880's much time was devoted to sermons on the "liquor habit," the "tobacco habit," and similar vices.[26] There is evidence that the church's governing "Council of Twelve Apostles" took the pledge to obey the "Word of Wisdom" at this time. This program was so effective that in the late 1890's it was possible for President Lorenzo Snow to state that he believed the Word of Wisdom was "violated as much or more in the improper use of meat as in other things, and (he) thought the time was near at hand when the Latter-day Saints should be taught to refrain from meat eating and the shedding of animal blood."[27] A matter of

economic necessity had been converted into a principle of religious faith.

The vast changes in the Mormon economy in this century, of course, no longer require the monolithic program of sacrifice and development which spurred Utah's pioneers. Nevertheless, there has been, if anything, a heightened emphasis on the Word of Wisdom since 1900. Much of this is the normal institutionalization of social ideals and processes. But there is far stronger reason for the continued weight of the Word of Wisdom in Mormon practice: the findings of medical research. Several Utah-born scientists who had been trained in the East, particularly Dr. John A. Widtsoe and his wife Leah, began to demonstrate the medical truths of the Word of Wisdom in a widely-read series of articles in Mormon magazines and papers.[28] Science could now demonstrate to the reasoning mind the ultimate wisdom of the Lord and His Prophet in announcing the revelation to His people. For reasons of faith, loyalty, and good health, therefore, the faithful Latter-day Saint still observes the Word of Wisdom.

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1 The *Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints* (Salt Lake City, 1935), section 89.

2 Sermon of February 8, 1868, *Journal of Discourses* (Liverpool, 1854-1886), XII, 158.

3 Dean D. McBrien, "The Influence of the Frontier on Joseph Smith" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University, 1929), pp. 147-149.

4 Joseph Smith, *History of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints*: *Period I* (2nd ed., Salt Lake City, 1948), II, 35.

5 Matthias Cowley, *Wilford Woodruff . . .* (Salt Lake City, 1909), p. 65.

6 *History of the Church,* II, 482.

7 *Far West Record,* p. 11, quoted in John A. Widstoe and Leah D. Widstoe, *The Word of Wisdom*: *A Modern Interpretation* (2nd ed., Salt Lake City, 1938), p. 263.

8 *History of the Church,* III, 18-19.

9 *Ibid*., III, 95.

10 See *History of the Church,* V, 380; "History of Joseph Smith," June 27, 1843, in the *Millennial Star,* XXI (1859), 283; Diary of Oliver Huntington, Vol. III, p. 166, typescript, Utah State Historical Society, Salt Lake City.

11 *History of the Church,* II, 369. It is quite possible, of course, that the "fruit of the vine" could have been unfermented grape juice.

12 *Ibid*., II, 378.

13 *Ibid*., II, 447.

14 Nels Anderson, *Desert Saints*: *The Mormon Frontier in Utah* (Chicago, 1942), p. 439.

15 Sermon of March 10, 1861, *Journal of Discourses,* VIII, 361-362.

16 Sermon of May 5, 1870, *Deseret News,* Weekly, May 11, 1870.

17 Jules Remy and Julius Brenchley, *A Journey to Great-Salt-Lake City* (London, 1861), II, 271-272.

18 The rules of the School of the Prophets are given in the Journal History of the Church, September 19, 1868, MS., Church Historians Library, Salt Lake City. See also Emmeline B. Wells, "History of the Relief Society," *Woman's Exponent* (Salt Lake City), XXXII (1903); and sermons in *Journal of Discourses* for 1867-1870.

19 A fuller discussion of this program is found in Leonard J. Arrington, "The Transcontinental Railroad and Mormon Economic Policy," *Pacific Historical Review,* XX (May, 1951), 143-158.

20 *Deseret News,* July 15, 1863.

21 Sermons of April 6, 1867, *Journal of Discourses,* XI, 349, 350-353.

22 Sermon of April 7, 1861, *Ibid.,* IX, 35.

23 Sermon of June 4, 1864, *Deseret News,* June 22, 1864.

24 Journal History, October 29, 1897.

25 Journal History of St. George Stake, March 26, 1874.

26 See, for example, Journal History, July, August, and September, 1884.

27 Journal History, March 11, 1897.

28 Their great synthesis, of course, is *The Word of Wisdom: A Modern Interpretation,* already cited.

CHILD BEFORE FIRE

A. WILBER STEVENS

Slow my child
Into comfort drawn
The sky is bright
The morn is hell
And God is night
And none are well.

Slow my child
Into comfort drawn
The wood is black
And drink is cold
Yet feel no lack
For God is old.

What Is Humanistic About Modern Art?

CONAN MATHEWS*

Every epoch or culture has had difficulty understanding and evaluating its creative art. Twentieth century art in the Western World has had more than its share of doubters. This fact is explainable in that not since Giotto painted "The Life of Christ" in 1300 were such radical departures ever made with tradition.

Part of our problem stems from the term *art* itself. Few words mean more things to more people than the word *art*. To most it means in a kind of general way pictures, books, poems, music, dancing, and acting; it is for the purpose of teaching, explaining, moralizing, directing; and it is representation, decoration, entertainment, play and busy-work for children, and recreation for adults who have nothing better to do in their leisure time.

Though the activity or travail of painting or writing may require talent and skill, or the product (picture or poem) may exhibit ingenuity or virtuosity, and though the seeing or hearing by an observer or participant may involve edification, enjoyment, or even inspiration, it is still quite possible that nothing genuinely artistic or aesthetic has happened. Not that these things are bad—it is just that they should not be mistaken for *art*.[1]

Then what is art? Art is a peculiar intellecto-emotional experience called an aesthetic experience. And what is an aesthetic experience? It is that sense of spiritual lift that brings integration; a dynamic inner peace, accompanied by relatively little or no reference to things, places, people, or information. This statement means that in the presence of a work of art

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which moves one to some degree of joy, the experience is comparatively immediate and terminal rather than mediate or associational. Through traditional Romanticism and Naturalism, we had erroneously come to believe that humanistic values were embodied only in the acquisition of knowledge that would further our well being. We had lost the capacity to see or appreciate color, form, or symbol for their own sake; that is, the immediate experience of beauty.

This *experience* is the basic criterion of great art, art with a capital A. The artist realizes it in expression; the observer, auditor, or reader relives it as an understanding or sensitive participant.

What evokes this aesthetic emotion? It is imagined form, or order, embodying complete, functional, and organic interrelationships—interrelationships of visible or audible colors, tones, lines, spaces, patterns, motives in space or time. These are manifested universally and particularly in natural phenomena, ideas and ideals, in the mystic, the divine, in movement and energy.

Have you ever felt yourself carried away to something beyond *I, me,* and *mine* while standing before monumental architecture, or listening to a symphony? What did it? It was the *order,* the *form,* the significance of structural organismic relationships of pattern, color, tone, linear theme, meter measure, or proportion, rhythm, and movement.

This is the real humanism of contemporary art. This is why artists have sought to emphasize the formal aspects of expression and creation even to the exclusion of "subject matter" and, to a degree, "content." Subject matter and content carry the associational values; form carries the power to evoke the immediate experience of joy and exaltation.

If one cannot accept the idea that the composition, or form, is effective in moving individuals or groups to a higher morale or esprit de corps, how can we explain the effect the Parthenon or a Bach fugue has had upon millions of people? The principle of the "golden mean" or the "divine proportion" in the Parthenon is the secret of its power. It has been referred to as "frozen music." These perfectly assembled measures are the principles the painter is trying to incorporate. Art is an ex-

pression of man in "*significant patterns* which tend to induce feelings for the *Beautiful,* the *Energetic,* and the *Sublime.*"[2] John Dewey has said about the same thing this way: "It is an attitude of spirit or state of mind that demands for its own satisfaction and fulfilling the shaping of matter into new and more *significant form.*" Both of these definitions clearly state that the basis of art, the thing that distinguishes it, the factor in it that is the real spirit or life, the thing that inspires or evokes the aesthetic response, is form, order, pattern, or design.

"Art does affect the lives of men; it moves to ecstacy thus giving color and movement to what might be an otherwise rather grey and trivial affair."[3]

Color, just as proportion and rhythm, has its effect upon man. Psychologists at Johns Hopkins University reported after two years of research on the effects of color that they were "pleasantly surprised to see such amazing clear results come from this research."

Complete scholastic and attitude reports were kept on all the children during one year in three schools needing new paint. The one school was repainted according to the principles of "color dynamics," the second in the usual light buff wall and white ceilings, and the third went untouched.

The second-year performances of the students were next compared with the first. "A study of the work, play and language performance of kindergarten children shows a 33.9 per cent improvement between the first and second year in the school painted with dynamics; 7.3 per cent in the second painted with conventional color; and only 3 per cent in the unpainted school," the psychologists found.[4]

Ordered color and space relations do the same for workers in factories or offices. The attitudes, the morale, the health, the productive capacity, and harmonious relationships can be improved in the citizens of a community, patients in a hospital, or members of a church or a family by the intelligent use of artists and aesthetic principles.

It relieves social tension and conduces to peace and good will. Various forms of strife and anxiety are abated in times of aesthetic enjoyment, and life is lifted to a higher plane.

In times like these man needs art that is more of a magic

carpet than that which is a mirror. He doesn't need to see reflections of more confusion and conflict. He needs to be lifted above them. This is not necessarily escape which implies running away from reality to the fanciful. Many have held that art comes nearer being ultimate reality than anything we experience otherwise. The creation and appreciation of Art, like Religion, is a means to man's exaltation and at-one-ment.

John Galsworthy says that

> It is Art when, for however brief a moment, interest in myself is replaced by interest in itself. And this Art is the one form of human energy in the whole world which really works for union and destroys the barriers between man and man. It is the real cement of human life; the everlasting refreshment and renewal. What is grievous about our lives is that we are shut up within ourselves. To be stolen away from ourselves by Art is a momentary relaxation, a minute's profound and, as it were, secret enfranchisement.
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> There has crept into our minds once more the feeling that the Universe is all of a piece, Equipoise supreme. We have begun, in fact, to have a glimmering of the artist's creed, that nothing may we despise of neglect—that everything is worth the doing well, the making fair—that our God, Perfection, is implicit everywhere, and the revelation of Him, the business of our Art. Art must indeed be the priest of this new faith in Perfection whose motto is Harmony, Proportion, and Balance.[5]

One of the obstacles in achieving the environment conducive to the above benefits is the attitude of many who claim: I don't know anything about art, but I know what I like. People in positions of leadership have a responsibility, but what of the artist? Is he responsible and what is that responsibility?

Each age tends to declare its artists, poets, and musicians irresponsible. "Picasso is a Charlatan," "Beethoven was a barbarian," "Michelangelo was sacrilegious," "Shakespeare was vulgar," "Blake was insane." Historically, what works by what men are truly humanitarian? Who are the great architects of humanistic morale? Your list is likely to include all of the above but Picasso, but what of the list one hundred years from now? It is evident that in historical perspective artists have been stubbornly conscientious and sincere about their responsibility as they saw it.

An artist's moral responsibility is to express himself artis-

tically in his own unique way, creatively in the language or media suitable to his temperament, talent, or communicative purpose.

He, in the aesthetic realm, is a seer. Through special powers and sensitivities he is capable of seeing beyond the surface of things confused and in conflict. "To send light into the darkness of men's hearts—such is the obligation of the artist," says Shuman.[6]

"Whether anybody hears him or sees his work or not makes no difference to the fact that he has expressed his emotions and has therefore completed the work in virtue of which he is an artist."[7]

In some way or other, or to some extent, every human being is artistic. If he is made in the image of the Creator, he is creative. As such, he is moved to shape his environment into new and more significant form; otherwise his world is without form and void.

The artist's first responsibility is to himself, but because of the humanistic power of art he cannot escape a responsibility to others. He cannot escape the consideration of the communicative aspect as he creates.

Regarding this responsibility Louis Mumford has said,

> There are two processes at work in our civilization; one upbuilding, life-bestowing, the other life-denying, leading to ultimate extermination and annihilation. There is a cult of violence that threatens our rationality, indeed, our very humanity. He believes that the artist's greatest danger is in surrendering to the accidental and the irrational and the denial of the possibility of coherence and intelligibility.[8]

It is a cult of the meaningless, the negative, the humorless. No work of art is created in a vacuum. The artist draws upon his experiences. The impact of the social context and visual world upon the artist may be through the philosophical or psychological temper (ethos) or even through "a pair of old boots" (Van Gogh) or a rubbish heap (Pathos).[9]

If we are spiritually and aesthetically sterile or corrupt, is it the artist's duty to hold up the mirror to us? Yes, if he does so responsibly . . . if he does not "betray his art as well as his humanity." He, too, says Mumford, "has a responsibility to be sane, the duty to be whole and balanced, the obligation to

overcome or transform the demonic and to release the more human and divine elements in his own soul. In short, the artist has the task of nourishing and developing every intuition of love and of finding images through which they become visible. If all he can say in his pictures it, 'This is the end'—let it be the end and let him say no more about it; let him be silent until he has recovered the capacity to conjure up once more a world of fine perceptions and rich feelings, of values that sustain life and colerent forms that reinforce the sense of human mastery."

Few cultural epochs in the history of the Western World have sought conscientiously through form or aesthetic experience to "reinforce the sense of human mastery" in the visual arts.

It was a major concern with the Greeks prior to the Helenistic and Roman period (329 B.C.). To the Greeks the composition of a true work of Art was necessarily "organic." Nicomachean Ethics stated that in a good work of art "it is not possible either to take away anything or to add anything"; it must be of single action, one that is complete, whole in itself, so ordered that it produces its pleasure with all the organic unity of a living creature. This is reminiscent of MacLeish's statement, that a poem "must not mean, but be."

To some extent this spirit and vitality existed in Byzantine Mosaics; it is also found in most genuine primitive art and in unsophisticated child art. Some of the Renaissance painters were aware of it, but their pre-occupation with content and visual authenticity (Romanticism and Naturalism) soon overcame their concern for form, and it was never to be resurrected except in a few individual cases until the advent of so-called modern art.

Paul Cezanne, the father of modern art, in his struggle to "realize," was searching for significant form. The major effort in modern art is not unlike that in classicism so far as form is concerned—the difference being that the Greeks sought for it through logic and objectivity. Today's epoch is a long way from ideal. It is ugly, cruel, and materialistic, and it is producing much poor art. Frank Lloyd Wright said recently, "Five per cent of modern Art is junk." Historically, however, if

twenty-five per cent is good Art we can still feel encouraged. There have been worse periods. In general, art of today is a revolt against materialism. It is a search for spiritual, inner, and transcendental meanings. We assume a small percent of it to be great art. Not all who say this way or that way have the answer, but my personal acquaintance with a few persuades me that most are deeply and humbly sincere.

Collectively, contemporary artists feel obligated to open the doors to pure aesthetic experience, the sense of complete integrity with the soul of man at the center. This is the humanistic contribution contemporary art would make. Our age has been defined as sensate—that our quest is for the sensory and sensational and that we are preoccupied with the pathological and negative. Nevertheless, modern artists take issue with almost all the basic characteristics of this materialistic age. The revolt is both fundamental and relatively successful. Modernism is destined to enjoy a fairly long lease on life.

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1 R. C. Callingwood, *The Principles of Art* (Oxford, 1958), p. 275.
2 Raymond Stiles, *The Arts and Man* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1940), p. 12.
3 Clive Bell, *Art* (New York: F. A. Stokes, 1913), p. 75.
4 Arthur H. Rice, *The Nation's Schools,* November, 1953.
5 See *Candelabra* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), pp. 17-37.
6 Kandinsky, *Concerning the Spiritual in Art* (New York: Witetenborn Schultz, 1947), p. 73.
7 Callingwood, *op. cit.,* p. 301.
8 Lewis Mumford, *The New Republic,* March, 1954.
9 T. I. Semall, *A History of Western Art* (New York: Henry Holt, 1953), p. 65.

INTERIM

Cameron Johns

Grieving because the work of words is ended,
In gloom the poet lies lazy in the sun
Where the poem was torn from his side. Warm and trembling,
He shed the slow years of light from the bright wound.

Day fades and the mysterious symbol of death fills the room.
Now the margin of midnight darkens the solitary hour.
In the iciclic cold, his fears lengthen across the silence
Stifling the captured happiness of the song.

What does the poem recall? On the wall is a picture
By an artist who forgot the sun and birds and trees,
Except one hewn into a cross and two limitations,
Holding in nailed sequence the outstretched arms of men.

The poem walks in quiet over the invisible, private world
Of his wilderness, carrying the music of memory
Until the light again appears with staring eyes
To a poet lonely as a god who must love all men.

Carl Becker and the Historian as Priest and Prophet

R. KENT FIELDING*

One of America's most gifted philosopher—historians, in describing the rationalist movement of the eighteenth century in Europe, observed that the intellectuals of that age had merely transferred the ideals and values of the thirteenth century Christian cosmology from a religious to a secular basis and had retained them virtually unchanged in a cosmology of their own. In the removal of the heavenly city from a spiritual to a secular foundation, the historian had replaced the priest as the conservator of value and had become the interpreter of orthodoxy to rationalistic communicants.[1]

One is tempted to extend Carl Becker's delightful imagery of the historian as priest to the full extent of its parallel, for not only was the historian the high priest of the new order, but the purposes and methods of his office bore a strong resemblance to those of the religious structures of the preceding ages. The method of the historian was a new scholasticism with the documentary records of the past serving in the place of holy writ and the outstanding historians assuming the mantle of the saints, fathers, prophets and philosophers. Like the scholastics, the historians sought in the authority of their written documents for uniformities in human experience that would give them the authority which a Bible-derived theology had bestowed upon their predecessors. On the basis of their researches a structure of generalizations began to arise which the eighteenth century historian regarded as elucidating the laws of nature as they applied to human society. On the basis of such generalizations, a new orthodoxy arose and while the priests administered its truths to the rising generation, the more bold extended the curve of its findings into the future

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and, with the confidence of an Old Testament prophet, announced that they had discovered a key to continual progress and prophesied that there would one day be a secular millenium in which reason would have triumphed over ignorance and error and where men might dwell in peace and felicity.

It was not in the eighteenth century, however, that the historian-priest with his new orthodoxy established the tenets of his faith in the cloisters of the new order, the state universities. Esthetes may argue whether the founder of what amounted to a new monastic order was Humboldt, Niebuhr, or Ranke, but to the last, historians for a century paid homage and to his seminars as to a shrine made dutiful pilgrimage. Ranke's own benedictine dedication to his work set a strenous example to others of his order. His "criticism, precision and penetration," became a *modus operandi* equivalent to the monk's pledge to poverty, chastity, and obedience. In his concept of history as a recapitulation of past actuality, Ranke felt that he had established the catholic history, accurate and complete. His disciples, like converts to a new revelation, spread the gospel of Ranke with missionary zeal in all the western world.

In the fullness of their faith, the historians of catholicity believed that they had discovered the rules and procedures by which society should be conducted toward full idealistic realization. "Shall we ever discover the immutable laws of History?" asked Henry Adams. He entertained the idea and even offered his version of the law, but finally abandoned the search. Some of his contemporaries were less doubtful. John Fiske saw the laws of history inscribed in the works of Adam Smith and Charles Darwin and became a ready convert to Spencer's insistence that these and other so-called natural laws were the way of truth. The whole tribe of "ologies" born in this age constituted new orders of the priesthood anxious to preach the gospel of the science of society. Even the "new history" defined by Robinson, though less sure of its entire accuracy, was sufficiently confident to lend its efforts wholly to good causes as defined by the terms of nineteenth century liberalism.

It was one of the purposes of Carl Becker to protest against historical catholicity. In one light, Becker may appear as a protesting prophet bearing witness against the false priestcraft of

his day. As such he was an iconoclast destroying the partial images of the past that had assumed the proportions of idols erected by the priests of the cults of historical idealism, Prussian statism, economic determinism, social Darwinism, the Rule of Phase, or any other presumably scientific system. The spirit of Becker's protest was that of the liberal protestant who refuses to submit to rules for which he can find no justification in holy writ.

Becker had an idealist's concept of history. To him it was past actuality. He noted, however, that the historian did not deal with this actuality but with generalizations about it which drew inferences from a thousand and one separate facts. Such a simple historical "fact" as Caesar's crossing the Rubicon could never be restored "as it actually was," for it was a singular event which once acted out could never be recreated. The event consisted not alone in Caesar crossing the Rubicon, but in all of the associated occurrences within Caesar's army, between Caesar and the Senate, to say nothing of the exact condition of the setting in which the entire event occurred. That the past was a totality and that it was largely irrecoverable, no one could deny. As a matter of fact, no one did deny it. Even Ranke, whose school of scientific history Becker was obviously attacking, did not insist upon total recovery. Scientific history required only that the significant events be discovered and placed in a proper relationship to each other. If this were effectively done, then the only changes that could be made would be in the embellishment of detail. Perhaps not all historians would agree what details were significant, but obviously certain ones could be eliminated as unimportant. It is of little historical importance, for example, to know how many women wearing blue hats and matching parasols attended Ford's Theater on the night of Lincoln's assassination. As to the accuracy of the details which are selected as of historical significance, even Becker admitted that these could be restored with great accuracy.[2]

A greater problem to the relativist historian lay in the meaning of the facts. Because the historian operates on the level of generalization, how could one be sure that his generalizations were accurate? "With a little intelligent prompting," Becker

asserted, the facts "will speak, within reason, whatever they are commanded to speak."[3] Thus each age interprets the past to suit itself and history can never be restored as it was. This is the real meaning of Becker's relativism. With such a concept, Becker, like Luther, proclaimed a priesthood of all believers. But Luther, after denying the old authority and when confronted with the radicalism of the anabaptists and the anarchism of the peasants, defined a new orthodoxy. Becker was not a crusading prophet of a new order. He refused to enlist his craft as a tool for any group who would rush humanity cross-lots to some imagined paradise. He chided for sin which he could see, but he did not know the way to salvation. Becker was an antinomian who knew no orthodoxy except that of the individual historian. Like liberal protestantism, historical relativism threatened to fragment at the touch and to become all things to all people. Every man his own historian came to mean that one man's history was as good as that of another or perhaps that all were equally defective and misleading.

That there is some validity in the charge of relativism in history is too patently obvious to deny, for much that passes as history is no more than scholarly propaganda. From this observation, however, there are clearly two lines of reasoning. One leads from relativism to revisionism and thus back to the old orthodoxy of universal history. The other leads from relativism to nihilism which can only end in anti-intellectualism or an historical equivalent of existentialism. Becker followed the latter alternative.

Perhaps the clearest light in which Becker can be seen is that of an Ecclesiastes, weary of the world and lamenting its vanity. His mind is that of the Epicurean who finds his world disordered and tumultuous, himself without hope, and the people in such a state that nothing can be done to change their lot. Becker is his own best example of the truth which he affirms that each generation writes its history in terms of its own needs and values. Historians have called his time the age of the "Lost Generation," and lost they were as to purposes and goals. Nineteenth century liberal ideals had obviously failed of realization. The events from the rise of Bismarck to the First World War were powerful arguments against the

liberal ideal. The terribly tragedy of that war was a final disillusionment to those who had dared to hope. The crusading spirit of earlier times fell prey to disaster. There is in the writing of Becker the sharp irony, the thinly veiled cynicism and the open ridicule of one who has seen the folly of a vision which he may have longed to hold himself, and who now turns the full wrath of his scorn upon those who do not as yet know the illusion has been shattered. Here is the portrait of a man who would have led a crusade had he not known the folly of aspiration. Knowing beforehand the antidotes for the poison of passionate belief, he was certain that before he had well begun someone would hand him the draught.

In Becker the parallel is complete, not only between priest and historian, but between the fate of history and of liberal protestantism as objects of popular faith. In his rejection of historical catholicity, the historian became a protestant, but unable to define an acceptable orthodoxy he became an antinomian, a modernist, and finally an atheist, denying the faith. The study of history is futile, Becker asserted. In one hundred years of historical research before 1914, libraries were filled with facts and an incredible amount of expert knowledge of human experience was brought to light, but what influence had all this profundity exercised upon the life of the time? It could not be demonstrated that it had done anything to restrain the foolishness of politicians or to enhance the wisdom of statesmen. Neither had it enlightened the masses or made them more wise or reasonable. World War One had come despite their reasonings and stood as the most futile exhibition of unreason ever made by civilized society. Stupidity was undiminished; fanaticism was unabated and the human capacity for deceiving themselves and others was unimpaired.[4]

As the relativist lost faith in history he also lost his capacity to attract a following and his congregation, in search of the security that had once been offered them, left him in search of new faiths, new priests and prophets. These were found in the collective person of the scientist, especially the mathematician and the physicist, followers of the specious metaphysical deductions drawn from the affirmations of Copernicus and Newton. Long practiced in a belief of absolutes, they were un-

shaken when researches into the microcosm of the atom and the macrocosm of the universe revealed disparities in their orthodoxy. They confronted the new phenomena with at least undiminished hope that a correlated meaning for it all could be found and concealed their doubts from the congregations. Their spectacular successes in performing miracles transformed the flagging hope of the congregation into a ravishing faith that threatened to recreate human civilization in its own materialistic image. The rise of the physical scientist as priest and prophet commenced with the rise of industrialism, and in proportion as faith in the humanities and social sciences died, the new dogma arose. There is at present no sign of a weakening in its leadership.

Few historians could accept the dictum of the relativist and follow him into intellectual anarchy. Some minds doubtless found satisfaction in nihilism and likely the critical facility which it fosters is still a necessary adjunct for the historian. Objectivity, if it is possible at all, may come only when one is convinced that his own values are simply personal and institutional rather than universal and immutable. But all minds are not content to remain trembling on the brink of eternity and to dwell in contemplation of nothingness; for after one is disabused of a belief in the God of the Hebrews he may yet feel the necessity of a belief in some God, in immortality and in at least human values. The main line of historiography has followed the alternative leading from relativism to revisionism and back again to the orthodoxy of universality.

Universality is once more the goal of modern historiography, but the historian is much more humble in his affirmations than formerly. Like the modern liberal, who is virtually a stoic, the modern historian sees the accomplishment of his purposes as a far distant goal not to be attained without many reverses and after the passage of much time, but he is assured of success through his faith in the indomitability of the enlightened human spirit. The study of history is only one of the many ways in which man seeks to understand himself. It is an effort to distinguish order from the chaos with which human life is surrounded; to reduce it to a system and to discover its true meaning. History is one aspect of the infinite and its study is as

deep and penetrating, as meaningful and significant as the mind that delves into it seeking to know.

It is ironic that the modern historian takes pride in the very multiplicity once singled out for attack by the relativist: that human interests and insights are such that the uses of the past and his understandings of it are seemingly infinite even where greatest regard is shown for factual accuracy. It is one of the strengths of the study of history that events which have been observed and recorded, even by partisan witnesses, can be examined at leisure through the eyes of as many participants as have preserved their accounts and, whereas the individual perception of reality as it occurs is limited to personal acuity, the historian, by the use of his sources, is able to obtain a degree of omniscience impossible to any living witness at the time the event occurred. The relation of the historian to the separate facts of the past is similar to that of the judge as compared to the witness as to the facts of contemporary life. The modern historian does not, however, make the mistake of assuming that every new judgment is equally valid or that its acceptance wholly invalidates previous assumptions. Each new historical insight should properly be regarded as an hypothesis, offered in modification or extension of a previously held point of view. It may be that the needs of a new age, fresh and penetrating analysis, new facts, or even prejudice may prompt the new interpretation. It may be intended merely to supplement the older view, as the economic interpretations of the Beards' proposed to do, or it may offer a new point of departure as was suggested by Turner's essay on the frontier or Andrews' and Beers' view of American history from the vantage point of emerging British imperialism. These hypotheses propose an enlargement of understanding rather than a hopelessness of ever discovering the facts of the matter, and the results of this approach have been startlingly successful. Every school boy is familiar with the reports of the causes of the first World War as they are related by the official historians of each of the major participating countries. Only the most biased nationalist could assert, in view of the differences of fact and interpretation of fact that existed, that his national version was accurate and complete. It required many years of dedicated effort for historians

in the name of objectivity to reconstruct the story of that extremely complicated event, but their labors established firmly the idea of revisionism rather than relativism as the proper approach of the historian and in recent years no event in history has been free from such scrutiny. Yet it is a matter of common knowledge that not all revisionist versions find acceptance. Before a new idea is admitted to the cannon of orthodoxy, it must pass the scrutiny of all the experts in its area of specialization. The whole priesthood of historians sits in judgment upon the uses made of the past. If they are properly jealous of their authority as guardians of the facts they may distinguish between a desirable new reforming insight and an heretical departure from the faith.

Becker asserted that facts are slippery things, and it appears that he is right, but it is the purpose of the historian to make them as solid, cold and hard as information and critical judgment may allow. It is too soon to make categorical judgments upon the value of the study of history as a source of reliable guides for the future, but Saluemini and a growing group of others unhesitatingly regard history as a scientific study capable of producing scientific results.[5] Preserved Smith notes that already the study of the past has uncovered numerous uniformities in the ordinary acts of man that are laws in the sense of generalizations that allow highly accurate predictions of future conduct.[6] The laws thus derived are at least as applicable to the individual in society as generalizations about matter and energy are in their application to the individual molecule or atom. Beale, after a penetrating analysis of what historians have said about the causes of the Civil War asserted that despite their many contradictory opinions and incompatible generalizations, the net result of their researches had brought us much nearer to an understanding of that event than ever before. He felt that the fault with American historians lay not so much with the results of their work as with the grandeur of their expectations.[7]

As one views the future of historical study it seems safe to assume that history may yet add to the wisdom of statesmen, help the politician to avoid error and perhaps add something to the perception of the masses. It is possible, too, that before this golden day can be attained the new faith in the omniscience of

science and scientists may have achieved earth's holocaust, but this is one of the stirring, if frightening challenges of our time. So far as historians are concerned, they must continue to be thorough in their researches and judicious in their judgments, willing always to project the curve of their insights into the future; less assertive than the prophets, perhaps, but less ambiguous than the Delphic Oracles. Always in their collective capacity they will be both prophets of doom and of salvation calling not for the allegiance of the congregation but for their consideration and understanding. History is by nature a liberal study. In the enthusiasm of a new insight it may become dogmatic as liberalism itself can become. This is an error to be guarded against, but unless history has insights and pursues them in a climate of free inquiry and free expression it becomes a meaningless study and its adherents can scarcely avoid the futility of a modern Epicureanism.

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1 Carl Becker, *The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth Century Philosophers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1932).

2 Charlotte Watkins Smith, *Carl Becker on History and the Climate of Opinion* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 97. Quotes from a Becker book review published in *Philosophical Review,* XCIX (May, 1940), 363.

3 Carl L. Becker, *Everyman His Own Historian* (New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1935), p. 169.

4 Carl L. Becker, "What Are Historical Facts?" *The Western Political Quarterly,* XIII, No. 3 (Sept., 1955), p. 339.

5 Gaetano Salvemini, *Historian and Scientist* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1939).

6 Preserved Smith, "The Place of History Among the Sciences," *Essays in Intellectual History,* David Muzzey (ed.) (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1929), p. 209.

7 Howard K. Beale, "What Historians Have Said About Causes of the Civil War," *Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography,* Social Science Research Council Bulletin 54 (New York, 1946), pp. 90-92.

Book Reviews

The Dead Sea Scrolls and Original Christianity. By O. Preston Robinson. Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Company, 1958. 123 pp., $2.00.

The historical connection between the Dead Sea community and original Christianity has been the subject of controversy for more than a decade. In spite of this present book, the problem of the relationship of the early Christian Church to the Qumran order still remains. However, this volume is important in that it represents one of the first attempts by a Mormon writer to inform L.D.S. Church members concerning the Scrolls and the sect which preserved them.

In the first four chapters of his book, Dr. Robinson reviews the historical data related to the actual discovery of the Scrolls in 1947, and he sketches the intriguing story of their recognition as one of the monumental archaeological discoveries of the century. The author describes the major manuscripts. In addition, he discusses briefly their significance and the problems of date. The above material is interestingly and effectively presented. It is written in a scholarly fashion, yet avoids the difficulties of technical terminology and controversial detail. An asset to the book is the excellent photographs of the Dead Sea area, of the caves from which scrolls and fragments were taken, and of jars in which the Scrolls had been preserved.

The chief weakness of this volume stems from the author's intention to establish the Dead Sea Scrolls as "another witness to the antiquity of the gospel." For example, Robinson finds L.D.S. Church organization, doctrine, and practice almost everywhere in the *Manual of Discipline.* The twelve laymen and three priests who governed the sect are, without qualification, referred to as "General Authorities," and from Robinson's point of view, the emphasis on priesthood in the Qumran order justifies his claim that here we have a "regular system of bishops, priests, teachers and deacons." The author draws further parallels between the communal-type meal of the Covenanters and the

Christian sacrament, between the stress placed on the term *knowledge* by the teachers of the sect and the L.D.S. concern for intelligence and wisdom, and between the order of precedence among members of the order and present-day ecclesiastical proprieties in matters of seating at meetings, taking the sacrament, etc. Moreover, Robinson maintains that the Covenanters "had a clear idea of the concept of grace and works" and, he continues, "no misunderstanding about the purpose of baptism." It may be admitted that there are some interesting parallels between the early Christian Church and the Qumran sect, but in most of the cases cited above the evidence is clearly forced. The terms "sacrament," "general authorities," etc., are implicates which seem to be based upon the author's desire to *prove* his theology rather than upon any substantial evidence derived from the manuscripts themselves.

In the opinion of this reviewer, the author's preoccupation with theology detracts from his book. Had he been content to follow through with his report on the Scrolls as a journalist rather than as an apologist for modern theology, his book might have been far more effective and informative.

Lewis M. Rogers

The Mormons. By Thomas F. O'Dea. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957. 289 pp., $5.00.

This book is a refreshing and provocative variation from most books on Mormonism because it neither attempts to prove the ultimate truth or falsity of the religion nor is it devoted to the sensational aspects of it. It is not a monumental work devoted to a meticulous study of Mormon history, organization, or theology *per se,* but to an analysis of these areas as a means of understanding Mormonism as a social and religious movement. It is a naturalistic, rather than a religious, attempt to explore the conditions and events that gave rise to Mormonism, the factors which have influenced its growth, and the dilemmas with which it is faced at the present time.

The book would seem to have something of interest for al-

most any reader. For the average non-Mormon, the book presents what is probably the most objective and best general statement on the Mormons; for the average Mormon, it presents a challenging and provocative opportunity for self-examination; and for the scholar it presents a whole series of hypotheses which need further examination. It is on this latter point that, to this reviewer, the book has the greatest contribution to make. For example, the following are but a few of the questions raised by O'Dea which need further examination and which are of vital concern to Mormonism: Are basic Mormon beliefs being diluted by universal secular trends? What will be the ultimate effect on a religion which seeks to retain conservative beliefs (as compared to other religions and current secular thought) and which at the same time encourages education and makes axiomatic the statement that "The Glory of God is Intelligence"? Despite the fact that Mormons have their own educational system, is not the Mormon emphasis on higher education putting Mormon youth into contact with the very elements in modern thought which are likely to act as a solvent to some basic beliefs? Is the Mormon tendency to compartmentalize life—that is, to encourage such socialistic practices as the Welfare plan and other cooperative ventures within the Church while condemning the same in secular life—a source of weakness or strength? Is the amazing vitality of Mormon organization being sapped of its strength by a tendency to make organization an end in itself? What social and psychological forces are involved in the ability of the Mormon organization to remain vital and strong in the face of such philosophical and organizational inconsistencies as absolutistic theocracy vs. free agency, the concept of eternal progression vs. the concept of a Satan and absolutistic God, centralized control vs. democratic congregationalism or the emphasis on activity, and "this-worldliness" vs. the apparent need in modern life for contemplation and spirituality?

While the historian, theologian, or sociologist might take exception to certain of these questions or to many of the conclusions drawn by Professor O'Dea, his efforts have helped to open up an area of scholarship which Mormon scholars, with their insights both from within and without the Church, might

have opened up more completely a long time ago. But because they found themselves suspect both from within and without the Church, they failed to do so. Perhaps with the impetus provided by this and similar works, the field might be more completely covered.

In discussing the strains and problems faced by modern Mormonism, Prof, O'Dea suggests the need for an empirical and rational approach to their solution. But by taking this naturalistic approach, he underestimates one of the most important and powerful forces in Mormon life today: the tendency to dichotomize ways of knowing into two types—religious and secular—and to believe that, while investigation and rationality are valid approaches in some aspects of Mormon life, anything so important as the problems raised above is best solved by religious methods—faith, authoritarianism, inspiration, and revelation. Consequently, it remains to be seen whether the Church as a whole even feels the need for the intellectual approach which he suggests. But whatever the outcome, he feels that Mormon flexibility and viability under adverse conditions argue well for the future of the Mormon Church.

LaMar T. Empey

Joseph Smith and World Government. By Hyrum L. Andrus. Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Company, 1958. 127 pp., $1.75.

As part of the latter-day "restitution of all things," a constitution for a political Kingdom of God was revealed to Joseph Smith. The political kingdom with its "Government of God," as the facts have been reconstructed by Dr. Andrus, was supposed to grow "out of the Church" and be subject to the ultimate rule of the priesthood. All officers of the government were to be nominated by priesthood authority, and citizens of the kingdom would "recognize the will and dictation of the Almighty" as revealed to Church leaders. Nevertheless, the political and spiritual kingdoms were to be distinct entities, with "a constitutional separation of powers between Zion and the political government." Being republican, representative and democratic,

the government would also hold individual rights and freedoms inviolate. The role of political parties in selecting candidates would "naturally" (and with good riddance) be eliminated. As the government expanded to encompass the earth, it was to assume a federal form, with respect for local customs, religion, and cultural patterns. Excluding the church and state relationship, the government would bear a striking similarity to the United States constitutional system as conceived by the Founding Fathers.

Because the revealed constitution is now nowhere to be found, and Joseph Smith was never able to inaugurate the "Government of God" in more than rudimentary form, the author's task of reconstructing Joseph Smith's concept of "world government" is exceedingly difficult. Recognizing the limitations of the source material, Dr. Andrus deals with the subject only in his first chapter. The remaining two-thirds of this slender volume relates to the organization and activities of the General Council, or Council of Fifty, which may have been a first step toward the political kingdom but certainly was not world government.

As an historical account of the Council of Fifty, the work successfully if somewhat tediously defends the proposition that the Council had an important role in directing the exodus from Nauvoo and the early civil government of Utah. In the exegesis of world government, however, hard facts seem more desperately difficult to come by. The reader lays down the volume with only a hazy notion of what Joseph Smith had in mind, and with an abiding wish that the missing revelation would appear to dispel the fog. Moreover, Dr. Andrus fails to offer really critical evaluation of the available fragments of evidence. To speak, for instance, of a "separation of powers" between Church and state when both are directed by the priesthood is nonsensical.

More distressing still is the author's uncritical endorsement of what he terms Joseph Smith's "brilliant analysis of man's inability to govern himself." This strikes at the very foundations of liberal democratic government, which must stand or fall on the postulate of the individual's capacity for self-government. Theoretically, democratic government may be inferior to gov-

ernment by the few who are wise and virtuous. All the more should we agree with Joseph Smith that a government of God would be superior to a government of man. In this world of fallible men, however, the postulates underlying rule by the virtuous few have generally proved incongruous with reality. To Dr. Andrus' credit, certainly, is his recognition that the political Government of God appears workable only when men approach perfection or when Christ comes to reign personally upon the earth.

Robert E. Riggs

Among the Mormons. William Mulder and A. Russell Mortensen. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958. 482 pp., $6.75

Virginia Woolf once observed that "few people ask from books what books can give us. Most commonly we come to books with blurred and divided minds, asking of fiction that it shall be true, of poetry that it shall be false, of biography that it shall be flattering, of history that it shall enforce our own prejudices."[1] If Miss Woolf is right, many Latter-day Saint readers who are used to hagiography and polemic instead of biography and history will not enjoy William Mulder and A. Russell Mortensen's documentary *Among the Mormons.* Those readers, both within and without the Mormon Church, who believe that the discovery of truth is the aim of scholarship should be delighted.

The use of a collection of "historic accounts by contemporary observers" as a way to report the history of a group and a period is very effective, as long as the people and the period are restricted enough in size so that the few selections a volume can conveniently hold are able to represent them honestly and adequately. Happily, the Mormons, appearing only a hundred and twenty-eight years ago, and living compactly in one rather restricted area of the world, can be fairly pictured in this fashion.

Even so, there are dangers. The anthological approach to history perhaps allows the past to speak for itself with less of

the personality of the historian intruding, but we sometimes miss the guiding hand of a narrator to help us interpret. Readers of this volume not rather familiar with Mormon Church history may be puzzled or may misinterpret. For example, the Word of Wisdom, perhaps the most compelling shibboleth of modern Mormonism, is only obliquely referred to in the book; the development of the temple cultus among the Saints is not referred to at all; and most serious of all, no reference is made to that most important corollary to the doctrine of gathering to Zion, colonization outward from Great Salt Lake City to southern Utah, Idaho, Nevada, and Arizona. The brave battle against the elements by Mormons "called" to settle away from the comparatively fertile Wasatch front is a saga that rivals the trek across the plains for sheer heroism, and is extremely important to the understanding of Mormonism historically.

Despite these few drawbacks, and a couple of editorial lapses (some readers would like to know who wrote what selections without turning back to the table of contents), the book is a landmark in Mormon scholarship. Non-Mormon readers will get a more sympathetic and more accurate picture of what the Mormons are like. Mormon readers should be relieved to be reminded again that they and their forebears are after all "human beings by birth and saints only by adoption."

One of the major reasons that the book is valuable is that it is effectively and attractively presented. The use of Biblical analogues for divisions of the material (Genesis, Exodus, Chronicles and Judges, Lamentations, and Psalms) helps to give a unity to the work which anthologies often lack. Many of the selections are not readily available in other places. Particularly noteworthy are the several long-forgotten newspaper accounts and letters by the young converts Martha Haven and Sarah Scott, as well as the letters and memoirs of such Gentile observers as Charlotte Haven, Eliza Cummings, the Thomas L. Kanes, and most of all, the hitherto unpublished letters of a lascivious lieutenant, Sylvester Mowry, who spent some time in Salt Lake in 1854-1855 with Col. Steptoe's troops and was remarkably candid about his success as a lover among the young women of the city.

The commentary on the selections provided by the editors is accurate, concise, unobtrusive and stylistically excellent.

Lyman Smart

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1 *The Common Reader,* First and Second Series; New York: Brace and Company, Inc., 1948, p. 282.