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Sino-Soviet Dispute

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Key Issues in the Development of the Sino-Soviet Dispute

RAY C. HILLAM*

The Soviet Union and Communist China are engaged in a bitter struggle for power. The impact of this struggle is having a dramatic effect on the unity of the Communist world and is presenting a new challenge to the West.

With the development of their differences, the Chinese have adopted the more aggressive stand while the Soviets have assumed a moderate role, trying to control the situation. Over the years, particularly since 1960, their differences have intensified and their charges and counter-charges have become more volatile. In order to understand their current differences, it is useful to give some historical perspective to the development of Sino-Soviet relations, which may be conveniently divided into three periods: the pre-1949 relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union; the first ten years of Sino-Soviet "cooperation" following their treaty of 1950; and the period from 1960 to the present.

The Pre-1949 Period

Since the Chinese Communists did not come to power until 1949, the relationship before them was largely one between parties rather than governments. During the twenties the creditability of Soviet leadership in China was short lived. With the bungling efforts of Stalin and the Comintern, Stalin's instruction to the Chinese Communists to join with the Nationalist Party of Chiang Kai-shek and to promote a proletarian revolution in the cities of China led to almost disastrous results for the Communist movement and did much to produce factional disputes within the party leadership. It was not until the early thirties that Mao Tse-tung, who had deviated from the Stalinist approach, was able to overcome the factionalism

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largely connected with the question of whether greater reliance should be placed on the urban workers or the peasant. Mao's struggle against the Li Li-san line within the party was in part a struggle against Stalin, who began referring to Mao as a revisionist.

Stalin had little confidence in Mao's agrarian approach, giving no assistance to his protracted rise to power until the eve of the Communist victory in 1949. As late as 1946 the Soviets continued to recognize and deal with Chiang's Nationalist government, which had permitted them to regain control of Port Arthur, Dairen, and interests in the Manchurian railways. By 1948 Stalin admitted that he had underestimated the chances of the Chinese Communists of seizing power.

The present Sino-Soviet dispute is also an outgrowth of certain pre-1949 factors not mentioned above. For instance, one such factor was the increase of xenophobic nationalism in Communist China. The "Middle Kingdom" view that the rest of the world is peripheral lends a kind of arrogance to the belligerency of the Communist Chinese. This feeling was strengthened by the humiliation China suffered at the hands of western imperialism and an awareness that Russia had played an important role in those humiliations. The fact that the Soviets took over in Russia only partly modified this resentment.

Some of the most resented and costly humiliations were the loss of territory. In the nineteenth century, Russia seized the land between the Amur, the Ussuri and the Pacific and did its best to seize Manchuria and Korea until she was stopped by the Japanese. Nevertheless, the Russians secured a foothold in Manchuria and were not forced out until long after the Soviets came to power in 1917. Eliminated from Manchuria by the thirties, the Soviets returned after World War II and did not surrender their special privileges in Manchuria until 1954, five years after the Chinese Communists came to power.

Perhaps a more important bone of contention has been the assumed protectorship of Outer Mongolia by the Tsar and later the Soviets. Although the Soviets repudiated this relationship in 1919, they invaded Outer Mongolia two years later and established a People's Republic under Soviet suzerainty rather than Chinese. Another territorial claim which has become part of the Sino-Soviet debate in recent years has to do with disputed territory in the western part of the Sinkiang Province.

A Decade of "Lasting Friendship"

The Communist victory in China and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance in early 1950 seemed to usher in a lasting friendship. The treaty, however, permitted the Soviets to remain in Manchuria until the mid-fifties and its loan provisions were meager compared with China's needs. In terms of China's vast requirements, the Soviet loan was little more than a token of good will and intentions. It was less, for example, than the Russian loan granted to Poland. New credits were periodically given but the overall amount of assistance to China was not impressive. Also, the Soviets were slow to replace the industrial equipment built in Manchuria by the Japanese which they stripped in 1945. And, while the relations between the Soviets and Chinese Communists during the Korean War are still obscure, there are reasons to believe the Chinese were peeved by the lack of air support and modern weapons from the Soviets.

After the Chinese Communists seized power in China, they assumed effective control of western Sinkiang and suppressed a Kazakh revolt in the area by 1953. Soviet influence, however, continued in the area with the existence of joint Sino-Soviet stock companies from 1950 to 1954. Sino-Soviet relations improved when these companies were liquidated as a result of the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Peking in 1954. Direct Soviet influence in Sinkiang seemed to cease.

While Sino-Soviet relations were generally on the up-swing, the Soviets continued to insist on the independence of Outer Mongolia, which Peking and Taipei both regard as part of China. In recent years, further assurance of the continued separation of Outer Mongolia from China has been achieved through its membership in the United Nations.

The earliest sign of Sino-Soviet competition for the non-aligned countries seemed to emerge during the mid-fifties with Chinese participation in the 1955 Bandung conference and the Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to India later in the year. Both Moscow and Peking made a bid for leadership in the developing societies, which extended to most Afro-Asian countries in later years.

Today the Chinese Communists claim their differences with the Soviet Union first became serious in the spring of 1956, immediately after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist

Party of the Soviet Union. De-Stalinization by Khrushchev led to new policies which were offensive to the Chinese. Khrushchev's emphasis on peaceful transition to socialism and on peaceful co-existence as the new line of the International Communist movement and his policy of *détente* with the United States and the effort to expand political and economic influence in India and Indonesia were developments which produced a sharp clash with Peking's interests. Khrushchev, after the death of Stalin, considered himself the senior living Marxist-Leninist. De-Stalinization led to Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe which encouraged the Chinese to exert pressure on Moscow against intervention in Poland and in favor of it in Hungary. With regard to the Polish question during the summer of 1956, the Soviets were not appreciative of Chinese meddling.

The Soviets' sputnik launchings in the early fall of 1957 and the promise to aid the Chinese in obtaining an atomic capability in mid-October did much to improve Sino-Soviet relations and to prepare a better atmosphere for the November Moscow meetings of world Communism. At this conference, the Chinese, who felt the Soviets should take greater risks in the struggle with the West because of their strategic breakthrough, were lectured on peaceful co-existence. The result of the conference was a serious confrontation of two opposite points of view.

In 1958 when the Chinese adopted a more "leftist" course, increased tensions became almost inevitable. Realizing that massive economic aid from Moscow was not forthcoming, the Chinese launched their "great leap" and the communes in a desperate attempt to achieve rapid self-directed industrialization and increased agricultural production. The claims of the newly introduced "People's Communes" as a shortcut to Communism was greeted in Russia with silence and later with contempt.

With the "great leap" and the communes came enforced sinicization of the Turkic peoples in western Sinkiang. This, in turn, led to border clashes along the Sinkiang-Soviet border. Border clashes were also reported in the Amur river areas as well.

An affront by Khrushchev during the summer of 1958 and just prior to his visit to Peking did little to improve his already tarnished image among the Chinese ruling elite. Weeks prior

to his visit Khrushchev proposed a summit conference concerning the crisis in the Middle East and had recommended that India, not China, be represented.

Following Khrushchev's visit to Peking the Chinese made an effort to "liberate" Taiwan. The only Soviet support forthcoming was a promise that Moscow would retaliate if the United States attacked the mainland. The shelling of the offshore islands for almost two months ended in a Chinese retreat. Since Taiwan was being supplied with missiles by the United States, the Chinese Communists had reasons to be disappointed with Moscow for not giving them similar weapons.

During 1958 and by mid-1959 the Chinese were clearly aware of Soviet efforts at a détente with the United States. During the first half of 1959 Khrushchev decided to force the Chinese to retreat from their belligerent course. In June he formally abrogated the 1957 Soviet commitment to give China aid in atomic weapons.

While Khrushchev was visiting the United States, the Chinese had their most serious border dispute with India, whereupon the Soviets declared their neutrality on the issue. This was followed by Khrushchev's last visit to Peking after which the Chinese accused him of trying to convince them to accept a "two China solution" as part of their peaceful co-existence policy.

Since 1960

In the Spring of 1960 the Sino-Soviet dispute was brought into the open with the Chinese promoting "the inevitability of war" and the Soviets continuing to promote peaceful co-existence. In June, 1960 the Chinese made an overt attempt to detach other Communist parties from Soviet control. This was followed by a verbal counterattack by Khrushchev, withdrawal of Soviet specialists from China, sharply reduced trade, and an effort to overthrow the pro-Peking leadership in Albania.

In the late fall of 1960 a major effort was made to overcome the dispute through a conference of 81 parties meeting in Moscow. But the conference solved nothing. Most of the parties, except for Albania and the Indonesian and Vietnamese parties, gave overwhelming support to the Soviets.

In 1961 during the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the conflict received more

publicity when Khrushchev publicly denounced and subsequently broke off diplomatic relations with Albania. The Congress formally approved the Soviet version of the transition to Communism for underdeveloped societies as opposed to the Chinese approach. This was followed by anti-Chinese attacks toward Albania with a vigorous reaction by the Albanians who were supported by the Chinese. Anti-Soviet polemics by the Chinese were directed at Belgrade.

During the polemic of 1962, both the Chinese and Soviets worked hard in their organizational and ideological moves to gain support, which efforts worsened Sino-Soviet relations. The Chinese continued to attack Yugoslavia, declaring that capitalism had been restored, and the Soviets continued to attack Albania. The Chinese invasion of India's frontier and the Cuban crisis in October moved the dispute toward an open public break where the polemics became explicit and direct, no longer restricted to attacks on one another's "allies," Yugoslavia and Albania. The Soviets deplored the Chinese aggression against India and promised the sale of fighter planes to India. The Chinese accused the Soviets of cowardice when they withdrew their missiles from Cuba.

The Chinese publicly raised the issue of Russian territorial annexations in Asia and charged the Russians with the 1960 withdrawal of specialists from China and cutting down economic aid and trade. They sought to pull Castro closer to Peking, using his disappointment over withdrawal of missiles and fear of Soviet-U.S. détente. They sought and gained considerable influence and support from Asian Communist parties and consolidated their influence in North Korea and stepped up their efforts in Africa and Latin America.

By early 1963, there was another effort at mending their differences by other Communist parties. The Chinese hoped for a large meeting to include all the parties, particularly those from underdeveloped societies. The Soviets had their way when a bilateral meeting was convened in July. Simultaneous negotiation of the test ban treaty in Moscow was a direct slap at Peking. The result of the meeting brought Sino-Soviet relations "to the verge of an open split" according to the Chinese. Peking followed with the accusation that the Soviets attempted to overthrow Chinese leadership, had reneged on their promises to give atomic weapons, had enticed the Chinese citizens to

revolt in Sinkiang, and had formed an open alliance with the U.S. to prevent China from obtaining nuclear weapons.

In November, 1963, the Soviets called a sudden halt to their polemics, presumably hoping the Chinese leaders would exercise similar restraint. Peking's rejection of the offer encouraged the Soviets to organize a world conference to condemn the Chinese. By the beginning of 1964, however, the Soviets backed off from such a conference, fearing a complete split. Both continued to press their public attacks on one another, Moscow releasing a bitterly worded anti-Chinese book and a series of *Pravda Observer* articles castigating the Chinese and the Peking leaders calling for the overthrow of Khrushchev and pro-Soviet leaders in other parties.

In the spring and summer, 1964, the Chinese accused the Soviets of subversive operations in Sinkiang and claimed Khrushchev was restoring capitalism to Russia. In the meantime the Soviets resumed their efforts for a conference, contending that the vast majority of the world's Communist parties desired such a conference in order to resolve the issues in the dispute. In September, Khrushchev, to a group of Japanese journalists, compared Mao to Hitler.

A significant lull in the polemics occurs with the removal of Khrushchev in October. Within a few weeks, however, it became obvious the Soviets were not about to reverse Khrushchev's position. While the December conference was postponed, the new leadership reaffirmed the policies of the Twentieth, Twenty-First, and Twenty-Second Congresses. In November, Brezhnev reiterated the standard themes anathema to Peking but also called for unity. Initially, Peking's polemics were directed at Khrushchev but eventually the new Soviet leaders were accused of carrying on the "sinister spirit of Khrushchev."

By the Spring of 1965, the polemics became heated over the escalation of the war in Vietnam. The Soviets were criticized by the Chinese for their lack of enthusiasm for the "war of national liberation" in Vietnam. The Chinese condemned Moscow's "ruthless suppression" of students engaged in a "legitimate" demonstration in Moscow against U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and sent a formal note demanding that Moscow admit error in putting down the student demonstrations and apologizing to the American ambassador.

The war in Vietnam, while many assumed it would bring Peking and Moscow closer together, has only exacerbated the Sino-Soviet relations. China's relations with other Communist countries, as well as the Soviets, is at an all time low.

The Twenty-Third Party Congress, scheduled in March, 1966, almost led to a total break between Peking and Moscow. While the purpose of the Communist Party Congress was to demonstrate support for North Vietnam, the Congress became the object of further polemics. In the preparatory memorandum which the Soviets were circulating, they accused the Chinese of "subversive activity" against the Soviet Union and of flooding the Communist countries with "anti-Soviet tracts." It listed a series of "provocative incidents" along the Sino-Soviet border and accused Peking of exploiting the Vietnamese war to serve her own ends. Of course, Peking had its own answers to these allegations and its objections to Moscow's effort to isolate China.

The Sino-Soviet dispute is fundamental and ranges over a wide front. Its issues are multiple and complex. Those issues which seem to stand out are: (1) the territorial claims of the Chinese; (2) the border conflicts and subversive activities against each other; (3) failure of the Soviets to grant assistance to China on a scale remotely approaching China's need; (4) the resentment of Soviet assistance to India, Indonesia and the "bourgeois nationalist regimes"; (5) personal conflict between Mao and the Soviet leaders, particularly Khrushchev; (6) ideological claims of China; (7) indications of Soviet collusion with the West; (8) open rivalry for support by the Communist parties of the world, particularly in the developing areas; and (9) disagreement over the strategy of revolution, particularly in Vietnam.

What is the nature of the issues involved? Are they primarily ideological or are they a conflict of interests? To what extent is the conflict cultural, economic, or political? Is it a conflict over strategy and objectives in the international Communist movement? These are some of the questions discussed in this issue of *Brigham Young University Studies*.

A Geographic View of the Sino-Soviet Dispute

ALAN H. GREY* AND RUSSELL N. HORIUCHI**

The socialist honeymoon of the Chinese People's Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was very short, and the separation proceedings seem to have been initiated by the Chinese. In 1954, Peking published a map of "China Unredeemed" showing areas in which her new rulers felt she had legitimate territorial aspirations.¹ China made a bold if understandable claim for much of Southeast Asia, considerable areas in India and Pakistan, and the mountain states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan. The most surprising item on the map was Communist China's obvious desire to readjust her border with the Soviet Union to that existing between the Russian and Chinese Empires in 1840. Deeply rooted Chinese resentment of Imperial Russia's territorial encroachments in the nineteenth century had prevailed over the bonds of ideology, perhaps because the Soviet Union, while inveighing against imperialism, was loath to renounce its inherited benefits. As Sino-Soviet relations have deteriorated, the broad hint of the map has since been reinforced by more blunt denunciations of the treaties settling the present boundary.²

The growing rift between the two countries has received effective scholarly attention from political, historical, and economic viewpoints, but little work has been done from a geographical viewpoint.³ A brief indication of the geographical nature of the disputed border areas is germane to a discussion

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¹For a redrawn copy of this map see *New York Times*, September 10, 1963. See also page 158.

²*Ibid.* See also the issue of September 14, 1963.

³One of the most recent geographical works on the Sino-Soviet frontier sees it as a zone of tension that has been transmuted to one of cooperation through the cementing power of ideology. See: W. A. Douglas Jackson, *Russo-Chinese Borderlands* (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1962), p. 110.

of the Sino-Soviet rift, but this essay endeavors to shed more light on the rift primarily by examining the thesis that among the causal factors are Soviet and Chinese attitudes toward space or area.

These attitudes may best be described by reference to the now unfashionable ideas of a nineteenth century German geographer, Friedrich Ratzel. Strongly influenced by the new and intellectually fascinating biological theories of Darwin, Ratzel saw state-area relationships in organic terms. The congeries of organic states in the world, like other organisms, ought to develop according to laws of natural selection. Each state was seen as competing for space or living room, the most viable state being that most successful in the acquisition of territory. The condition of the frontier, the sensitive peripheral organ of the living state, was seen to reflect the health of the state. Developing this thesis, Ratzel formulated seven "laws" of state growth.⁴ Because these ideas developed in warped fashion into the *Geopolitik* of the Third Reich, considerable odium has been attached to them. But when one strips away the biological symbolism and when one remembers that Ratzel wrote during the most vigorous period of Western European (and Russian) imperial growth, it is clearly seen that Ratzel's seven "laws" of state growth are in reality empirical descriptions of the ways imperial states grow.

Even a brief study of the Soviet Union and Communist China in the light of Ratzel's observations shows a definite correspondence between the activities of these two powers and those of the former colonial powers. The impetus to state growth in recent times has come from Communism, an external stimulus; the new and growing culture associated with Communism has expanded in space; missionary and commercial activities abroad have been followed by political expansion into the territory of weaker states; and successful expansion has whetted appetites for still greater expansion. By criteria frankly stated in an age when imperialism was respectable, the two primary Communist powers may be classed as imperialist powers.

⁴A discussion of Ratzel, his ideas and seven "laws" of state growth may be found in most texts on political geography. For example see: Lewis M. Alexander, *World Political Patterns*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963), pp. 18 and 19.

Being imperialist powers, the Soviet Union and Communist China are especially sensitive to conditions on their frontiers. Both countries have publicized intentions of world domination, a course which would involve further territorial expansion. As these countries now face one another over a boundary which each has expressed or demonstrated a desire to expand, this border represents the juxtaposition of competing aims, a situation now contributing to the Sino-Soviet rift. The tension along the boundary zone is not lessened by an ostensibly common ideology, for neither state views the projected Communist world with a leader other than itself. Moreover, these border tensions, while they may be stimulated by the vigorous nationalism engendered by Communism, stem primarily from aims and resentments which have been part of the "iconography"⁵ of each state for more than a century. This sensitive border not only represents a confrontation of competing ambitions but also of greatly different cultures and historically conditioned responses emanating from the respective corelands. These border tensions may be more cause than effect in the diverging paths of Communism chosen by the two states.

But while territorial expansion represents power and prestige to both countries, very important matters for states that aspire to leadership of a Communist world, such expansion has more urgent geographical underpinnings in Chinese iconography. Whether or not Red China subscribes openly to the concepts of *Geopolitik* or its Japanese variants, the size of her population and her land-use patterns tend to resurrect the ghost of *Lebensraum*.

It is this land hunger which appears to be behind Chinese intransigence. Otherwise it seems odd that the Chinese would deliberately jeopardize their relationship with the Soviets, with whom they are ideologically identified against the West. Peking must have been cognizant that once a claim was openly made and fully publicized she could hardly back down and relinquish it. Whether or not concessions proved to be logical or prudent, yielding on such an issue would brand Peking as a proverbial "paper tiger." Why China would place herself in

⁵"Iconography" is a convenient piece of jargon introduced by the geographer Jean Gottman to cover the complex of ideas and traditions, such as the Flag, Constitution, or the Crown, which form part of a nation's self image, and which condition national action.

such a difficult position can perhaps be partly understood by reference to the land and population relationship within the country.

Despite the unreliability of statistics for large areas in China, the careful student can infer a good deal about her land use. A study of climatic, physiographic and soil maps indicates that little more than one fourth of the country has physical conditions suited to agricultural exploitation. That this land is potentially suited to agriculture does not mean that it is used. A Communist source gives the estimated cultivated area as 206,000,000 acres in 1932 and 255,000,000 acres in 1946. Recently it was reported that the Communist agricultural program had expanded the tilled area to approximately 300,000,000 acres.⁶ This figure taken alone is meaningless, but when considered with a population figure of approximately 750,000,000 people, this means that there is only 0.4 acre of tilled land per person. With double and even triple cropping in the most favored locations, the average Chinese can expect little but bare subsistence even in a good crop year. Adding to the woes of an incredibly high nutritional density is the fact that much of this productive land is subject to the natural disasters of drought, river flooding or devastating typhoon damage.

The pressure of subsistence production is shown further by demographic patterns. Some eighty percent of China's people live in farm villages and market towns, and about seventy-five percent of China's gainfully employed are directly or indirectly in agricultural pursuits.⁷ The dependence of so large a proportion of the population on the soil only reinforces Red China's spatial problems. Furthermore, China's population is not static, for every year an estimated 15,000,000 persons is being added to the already staggering total. Her food resources are severely taxed.

China's leaders are aware of her geographical insufficiencies, and much of her internal and external policy is conditioned by her leaders' interpretation of her geography. Red China wants more land. Thus, to her a boundary is not simply a line but a shifting zone of contact. It exists as a temporary phenomenon on the landscape and ought to move in response to the

⁶Norton S. Ginsburg, ed., *The Pattern of Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1958), p. 171.

⁷*Ibid.*

state's needs. The frontier area is a peripheral organ of the state and reflects the growth, strength, and changes of the same.

The influence of power, prestige and geographic pressure on China's attitude towards space is most clearly shown in Southeast Asia, and brief reference to the area offers a partial clue to the Sino-Soviet rift. The Chinese feel the area to be part of their sphere of influence, and any intervention or meddling by the Soviets is seen as a direct threat to Peking's position and interests. Moreover, more than 10,000,000 overseas Chinese are settled in Southeast Asia and are thoroughly diffused in the economic structure. They control money lending and most of the rice marketing. The ties that bind China to this area are strong, and any Soviet operations here are bound to elicit a strong reaction from Peking. Thus, the expansionist policies of Moscow and Peking cause friction in other places than their common boundary.

Very important to China is the fact that the countries of Southeast Asia have relatively rich agricultural and industrial resources, in the light of which these countries are underpopulated. The Irrawaddy-Sittang, Chao Phraya and Mekong drainage basins have long produced rice surpluses for their respective states. Nearly 25,000,000 tons of rice are produced here annually, a substantial proportion of it being available for export.⁸ In addition, one finds here maize, copra, pulses, and rubber, as well as minerals such as tin, bauxite, and iron ore. Although the present production of agricultural products is very desirable, the Chinese are aware of the much greater production possible if land which is now being cropped but once a year is used to produce two or in some cases three crops a year. Were this production available to China, she would have agricultural surpluses that would enable her to pay more attention to her much-cherished industrial sector.

However, even a brief examination of the geography of Soviet territory claimed by Peking shows that this territory is relatively remote and unprofitable. In the 1954 map, claims were made for some rather extensive territory along the Amur drainage, including the Soviet maritime area and the territory extending beyond Sinkiang to Lake Balkash. Including Outer

⁸*United Nations Statistical Yearbook*, 1964, pp. 132-136.

Mongolia, the area claimed along the Sino-Soviet border is about 500,000 square miles and has but 10,000,000 inhabitants.

Nevertheless the boundary claims against Moscow are serious, open clashes having taken place. This has been especially noted regarding fishing in the Amur where a tiny island, Hsia Heitzu, in the middle of a fork where two tributaries meet, has been the object of claims and counterclaims.⁹ Infiltration both ways across the border in the Sinkiang region has also been noted.

Why China would make these claims and spoil her relationship with her Communist partner is then not a matter of logic but of iconography. As an imperially-minded power and in common with the Soviet Union, Communist China feels a need to expand. These opposing desires over a common boundary were bound to create friction. The condition has been exacerbated, however, by Chinese views of territory, conditioned by her geography. For China, land in terms of living space and productivity is crucial. Without remedying this land-space deficiency, China, even with her manpower reserves, will remain vulnerable. Her critical margin of subsistence means that she may be unable to sustain power for a period long enough to attain her objectives. When viewed from this felt need for space, much of what seems dangerous and almost irrational at least becomes understandable. The *attitude* toward space which is part of China's iconography has been applied even though it does not completely suit the geographical circumstances of the Sino-Soviet border.

* * *

Note: See map on page 158 of this issue.

⁹Interview with Professor Koretada Sakamoto of Tokyo Foreign Language University, 11th November, 1965. Professor Sakamoto is Japan's leading expert on Inner Asia and particularly on Mongolia.

Cultural Implications of the Sino-Soviet Conflict

PAUL V. HYER*

When the Chinese Communists set up shop in Peking, it was predicted that they would soon dispense with Soviet leadership both in theory and practice. Those acquainted with the Chinese are aware of their great population, a venerable tradition and a keen sense of national pride—cultural elements incompatible with subservience to Moscow. Those who predicted a pending divorce between the two Communist giants, because of their knowledge of Chinese historical development and culture, at the same time assumed that the Chinese brand of Communism would also be more moderate, reasonable and humane. Although this is true in certain particulars, the Chinese, on the contrary, have shown themselves to be more fanatical, intolerant, and ruthless. Now that the Moscow-Peking axis has broken for most practical purposes, there are many ideas advanced to explain the break, which is very real in spite of the fact that some people with an overly simplistic view still feel that the whole thing is a hoax to deceive the free world. Among the explanations the most common point stressed is the matter of national interest including more particularly geography, Russian occupation of former Chinese territory, and the Chinese desire to revive ancient glory and the former empire. Others stress economic development in explaining the break and the fact that Russians are "fat Communists," a "have nation," whereas the Chinese are "lean Communists," a "have-not nation." It is also pointed out that the revolutions in Russia and China are at different stages thus causing a conflict. The Russian revolutionaries now in the second generation have "arrived," are bureaucrats with vested interests, creeping capitalism and a tendency to moderate. On the other hand, the Chinese still feel the ardor and agonies of a genuine revolutionary epoch. They want to maintain international tensions leading to

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world revolution, and they feel that now is no time to encourage their overworked and underfed people to bask in the sunlight of co-existence. The problem of personalities is also mentioned with such conflicts as those between Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev. The Communists themselves talk most loudly about ideological conflict, and everyone is aware of the problem of race, subtly injected into the fray.

Certainly these are important factors but a very basic element underlying and indeed conditioning all factors is that of culture, which involves attitudes and values, "national character," and the Chinese "world image" or "self image." Little more can be given here than a few elliptical comments regarding very complex matters which still require a great deal of study. Indeed it might be said that much of the Sino-Soviet conflict is in the mind of the Chinese. At another time with a different mental set or frame of reference it may not exist.

An idiosyncrasy gradually becoming known to Westerners is the fact that the Chinese civilization grew up largely in isolation surrounded by the ocean, the Gobi desert, Himalayan mountains or wastes of Central Asia. The only real contact with aliens was confined to nomadic tribes or others with a much lower level of culture or social organization. The eagerness of such peoples as the Koreans, Japanese, or Vietnamese to adopt Chinese institutions and pay tribute to the dragon throne only confirmed the Chinese in the notion that they were the fountain head of culture. Indeed this old view was valid until comparatively recent times.

Perhaps it should be pointed out that this sinocentric concept is not entirely unique if we observe that the old world wide empires set up by small European countries buttressed by far-flung territories have given way to the empire of the continental, self-contained mass society. The history of all three, the United States, Russia and China is one of isolation and powerful ethnocentricity. The Chinese are only unique in having a much longer history of conditioning in these attitudes and in being much slower in emerging to a mature internationalism.

Until recently the Chinese thought not in terms of *Kuo-chia* (nation state), but in terms of *Tien-hsia* (all under the heaven, the universe). The former term was invented only in modern times when the Chinese became more aware of international political realities. Intellectually this tradition made it easier for

the Chinese to go from a Confucian universalism to a Communist internationalism. The idea of a world order of nations is common to both Communists and non-Communists alike. However, a basic assumption of the Chinese world order is that it should be sinocentric. While our term, China, is derived from the ancient Ch'in dynasty (221-206 B.C.), which first unified China and created an empire, the Chinese still speak of their nation as *Chung-kuo* (the middle nation or central country), the point around which all other peoples revolve. While the concept of the Chinese world has changed, the form still persists in the Chinese self-image. It is emotionally untenable for the Chinese to subordinate themselves to anyone even within the Communist world and certainly not the Russians whom the Chinese consider to be crude and overbearing. It goes without saying that the Peking-Moscow split has been followed by splits and often chaos in virtually every Communist party around the world. There seem to have emerged pro-Peking parties following roughly the old Chinese pale of the former imperial tributary system.

In spite of their ethnocentrism and xenophobia, the Chinese are aware of one advantage over the Soviet Union in Asia in that they know a great deal about the culture and society of their neighbors while the Soviet Union is basically ignorant about the non-Western world and often ignores Asian Communist needs and sensitivities. Not only the Chinese, but other Asian Communist leaders see Russians such as Khrushchev as second-generation bureaucrats of peasant stock and thus very impetuous and vulgar. These they contrast with the suavity of Chou En-lai or the classical intellectualism of Mao Tse-tung. These personal, cultural, or "esthetic" considerations are very important to the contemporary Communist elite of all Asian nations. While the Chinese have gross distortions about the nature of the Western world, they have keen insight into the world of Asia. In the competition between themselves and the Russians in this area, involving the forces of nationalism, regionalism, and internationalism, one important deciding factor in the conflict is the degree of cultural rapport which China and Russia are able to establish in the countries concerned. In most areas the Chinese are significantly ahead. They are hampered only by their inability to subsidize development and to some extent by their recklessness.

No people, even though they experience a revolution, divorce themselves from the past or break entirely from their historical and cultural roots. It is not surprising, therefore, that what we really have is not Chinese Communists but Communist Chinese who still see themselves and the world largely through Chinese eyes. Thus some of the experts stress that the new regime and its foreign relations are still "in spirit" or real content traditional, regardless of what the surface forms of revolution may seem to be. While this point can be pressed too far, it is not coincidence that old Confucian China and present Communist China are both institutionally bureaucratic and despotic, intellectually dogmatic and canonical, psychologically restrictive and demanding, and internationally culturalcentric and condescending. These attitudes with strong cultural roots all find expression in the bitter exchanges directed by Peking against the Soviet Union. "Sinological determinism" is therefore still an important principle in analyzing the behavior of the Chinese.

The change in the role of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis China from ally to antagonist is prompted as much by ancient memories as it is by personal resentment. The Ch'in dynasty created the first Chinese empire (c.215) and built the great wall for defense. Eighty years later the Han dynasty sent China's first representatives abroad to subvert an offensive alliance of barbarians beyond the wall. Since that time every Chinese regime which could not prevent outer barbarians from uniting against it has been destroyed. To the Chinese mind, keenly aware of past indignities, there is little difference between the Mongols who conquered the Sung dynasty, the Manchu who conquered the Ming dynasty and the ambitious Soviet Union which still holds large areas of old China and draws close to the wall. Conversely, the Russians associate the Mongols and the Chinese together historically and have not forgotten that the Mongols were the only aliens to conquer Russia and occupy it for two hundred and fifty years. Now in our day China provokes nightmares of a new "yellow peril." This, incidentally, is reflected in divergent Chinese and Russian interpretations of the historical role of Chinggis Khan, great world conqueror of the Mongols. The Russians continue to condemn the Mongol conqueror while the Chinese only recently have reinterpreted him as a great leader who promoted cultural contact between the East

and the West through the famous Pax Mongolica. The Russians complain bitterly that the Chinese have "wiped the blood from the hands of imperialistic Chinggis Khan and have rehabilitated him as a Chinese hero."

Moscow frustrated the Chinese ambitions to the north and deliberately interferes with Peking's advance into Southeast Asia, which has been culturally tributary to China for centuries, by contesting Peking's monopoly of the Communist parties in the region. To China insult is added to injury by Russia's publicly taking India's side against China in the recent conflict. The Communists were able to prostitute Chinese nationalism and exploit it in their rise to power. Currently in place of nationalism, but using much the same strategy, the Chinese are making a thinly veiled exploitation of racism and striving to develop a bond between themselves and the non-Caucasian peoples of Asia, Africa and even Latin America. They thus grasp the banner and leadership of world revolution to the exclusion of the Russians. Peking has been adept at turning nationalism against the West in general and the United States in particular. However, the cultural expression or phenomenon of nationalism can also be turned against them. To the degree that the Chinese moves beyond the pale of traditional Chinese cultural hegemony, the more they will be frustrated by difficulties of cultural, linguistic and racial differences.

In a sense the phenomenon we are witnessing with regard to China is one case of many in history. In the nineteenth century Western merchants and missionaries supported by their governments and using militant measures, projected their way of life into China and disrupted the stability of Confucian culture. The abrupt end of old Chinese society doomed Western hopes of seeing the emergence of a Christian, democratic China. Instead a hostile, totalitarian regime emerged from the political, economic and social chaos. Now in a similar way Chinese Communist strategy is a systematic and self-conscious expression of the general tendency of most people to project their values, attitudes and way of life abroad, to judge foreign peoples by their own standards and to interpret alien affairs in terms of their own self image. The irrevocable result is friction with those who only partly share Chinese standards or values.

One of the dominant themes of modern Chinese intellectual history is the conflict between "historical tradition" and the

"value of existence." While modern-minded Chinese have been intellectually alienated from their tradition, they are at the same time emotionally attached to it. A corollary of this theme has been the attempt to seek an equivalence between the Chinese world and the world of the barbarians. In accepting Western science and technology the Chinese were constrained to reject Western Christianity. In accepting Marxism, Leninism and the Russian model of development the Chinese feel compelled to reject Russian leadership and strategy. The frustrating factor is that in seeking independence from the West in order to remain Chinese, the Chinese have been forced to be dependent on the West, various nations at different times, in order to protect themselves from a real or a felt threat. Old style imperialism was a real threat. Now the Americans are felt to be a threat. Understandably the Chinese judge themselves by their ideals and the United States or Russia by their actions.

Paradoxically but truly the Chinese reaction against Western physical domination has gone far to complete the conquest of China by Western culture, more recently of the Soviet brand. As the Chinese came to worship science, and to seek a panacea for her social, economic and political problems, their iconoclastic tendencies drew them to Communism. The only alternative would have been to cling to tradition or to come hat in hand to sit at the feet of the West. This being emotionally untenable, many anomic Chinese intellectuals accepted Communism and its claim to a scientific solution to social problems. And in so doing the Chinese feel they have bypassed the West and arrived at the head of the line of history to look down from the vantage point of Communism, to which all societies, in their view are evolving, and disparage the West with its social and economic inequities. Chinese attachment to their own culture and the emergence of a hyper-nationalism has brought China to a new stage, to a dispensing with the leadership of their Russian comrades and a swinging of the pendulum once more to independence, isolation and the establishment of the Chinese model as a rallying point for other Asians and now Africans also. Certain factors nourish Chinese parochialism or provincialism, and thus encourage a grossly distorted view of American conditions, Russian policy and the world situation. This brings China into conflict with Russia over strategy and how to exploit revolutionary conditions. The particular factor is the ignorance

of the Chinese in general and of Mao Tse-tung and most of the other leaders in particular regarding the outside world. Most of these men with their roots in the countryside spent most of their adult lives in guerrilla warfare among the peasants. Now Chairman Mao, once constantly among the people, has reverted in a way to the practice of the imperial court, rarely appearing in public and refusing to travel outside China. The myopia of Mao is in a sense an archetype of the Chinese population in general.

One important pattern of traditional Chinese international relations as seen in the old tributary system was the strategy of "using barbarians to fight barbarians." Since the United States is the object of opposition focus, the leader of the free world, and the single most important factor frustrating the Chinese in gaining what they consider to be their rightful place in the world, and since the Chinese lack the industrial base and the strength to attack the United States directly, Peking's approach is to pressure the Russians into using their resources to confront the Americans. The Russians, however, who have met the Americans face to face in Berlin and Cuba, are inclined to be more responsible than the Chinese and to take fewer risks, particularly in areas in which they feel the Chinese would be inclined to gain more than themselves. Vietnam is a case in point.

China in its extreme iconoclastic purge of traditional culture on the basis of class criteria must still feel the emotional security of self-worth. This the Chinese gain in part by presenting themselves as the only true defenders of the faith. In condemning Soviet revisionism and launching their famous commune movement they claim to be the first nation to move into an advanced stage of evolution closer to true Communist institutions, something the Soviets have never claimed.

In the religious field the Chinese have relegated Confucianism to the philosophy department of the university, have rooted out the decadent cult of Taoism unmercifully and have severely restricted Christian churches, setting up autonomous units cut off from the West and accountable only to Peking. Buddhism has been used, however, as one more international arm of the government, to influence other Buddhist states of Asia such as Cambodia or Laos. Refurbished temples are used as places to impress Buddhist dignitaries from abroad and a

tame clergy maneuvers in the ecclesiastical politics of Buddhist neighbors.

It is easy to condemn the Chinese Communists, and although it is much more difficult to understand their behavior and attitudes, this is exactly what Americans must spend more effort at. Errors begin in the mind, both our own and the Chinese; wrong assumptions lead to wrong decisions. Accordingly we need to examine our own assumptions and at the same time do much more homework to become acquainted with Chinese society and culture thus gaining our longitude and latitude and being better able to understand, predict and possibly influence the actions of the Chinese.



The Fifth Princess

The Emperor, incapable of owning imperfection,
Regarded the fifth princess as a temporary humiliation sent by
the Devil.

Untroubled by her plain face and little twisted foot,
She passed her days in the garden near the stables;
She had a merry heart and a river imp's delight
In the absurdity of things in general.
One day the second gardener put his heart
Into his laughing, handsome eyes for her to take.
Accepting it, she was immediately banished
And went joyously with her husband to the south end of no-
where.

The Emperor industriously blotted her out of the records,
Grumbling the while at the chill dreary wind from the garden.

—Jeannette Morrell

The Strategy of Conflict: *Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung*

DIANE MONSON*

The complexities of various crises around the world have intensified public confusion concerning the causes of particular conflicts and the feasible alternatives of positive action in order to achieve a meaningful solution. The Sino-Soviet dispute has not soothed already troubled brows for, when confessions are finally made, no one really confidently knows all the whats, whys and wherefores of the chain of events in this dispute. Lack of information and beleaguered political stereotypes discourage understanding of the elements, let alone the complexities, of the problem. Yet with all the available analyses of the historical background and issues of the Sino-Soviet problem, the essential frustration of an incomplete definition of the problem is compounded by intellectual gaming in trying to discern the most appropriate term to be applied: tension, dispute, split, break, rift, cleavage, conflict, etc. Such splitting of hairs tends, however, to overlook some of the common ground which the Soviet and Chinese camps actually share both in their political theory, and military strategy and tactics. This insensitivity to the shared elements and nuances of difference tends to make the onlooker oblivious to the essential commitment which both sides have to an ongoing strategy of conflict. This paper will thus attempt not to delineate the causes or issues of the Sino-Soviet conflict in particular, but will rather focus on the broader aspects of Communist theory on conflict. In this way, it is believed that the reader will be able to view the specific dispute in greater perspective.

Since the exploitation of Communist theory occurred first in Russia, and since Stalin is a pivotal figure in the adaptation of Communist theory to both strategy and tactics, this discussion begins with him, moving then to Mao Tse-tung as the foremost Chinese theorist.

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Communists are totally absorbed in their theory.¹ The significance of this supreme dedication is evidenced not only in an almost mechanical acceptance of the theory *per se*, but mainly in a seemingly dehumanized fanaticism in provoking the realization of theory in practice. Communist theory provides this working dynamic in its comprehensive explanation for the sequence of events in time. Once the inevitable outcome of history is established and the factors that will cause the outcome determined, the human participator is effectively channeled in his task of "making the outcome an end and using the causes as means."²

This integration of Communist theory and practice is a result of the view that strategy and tactics are derivatives from theory by strictly logical deduction. "Without a revolutionary theory, there cannot be a revolutionary movement."³ "Only a party guided by an advanced theory can act as a vanguard in the fight."⁴ Whereas strategy is the application of theory to a broad context, tactics involves the direct, practical application of theoretical and strategic principles to the particular daily situation.⁵

Whereas strategy is concerned with such wide purposes as the winning of the war against tsarism or the bourgeoisie . . . tactic is concerned, not with the war as a whole, but with the fighting of this or that campaign.⁶

Although such categorization of action does not dictate a specific decision for a particular situation, it does orient the Communist to an awareness of his responsibility and contribution to a total historical commitment. The resultant zealousness is further sparked by a strategy of conflict whose characteristic of continued discord breeds a peculiar dynamism—which can be illuminated by an exposition, comparison and evaluation of the strategy of conflict as propounded by Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung.

The Western search for substantive guideposts to Communist ideology for present and future strategy has been some-

¹Committee on Foreign Affairs, *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism*, p. 5.

²*Ibid.*, p. 24.

³*Ibid.*, p. 5.

⁴*Loc. cit.*

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶*Loc. cit.*

what obscured by an inattention to Communism as a method "of conflict in space over a sustained period of time, i.e., of protracted conflict."⁷ This method of conflict both serves the goal of the establishment of a Communist society and, due to the self-accelerating excesses of the method, appears, if not becomes, in reality, an end in itself. The Communist conception of the struggle for power in the detailed and comprehensive context of "its terms, its theater, its methods and its goals,"⁸ was first formulated by Marx and Engels as a limitless contest of socio-economic forces in a world area.⁹ Lenin also recognized conflict as integral to Communist development:

To discuss conflict outside of its historical and concrete setting is to misunderstand elementary dialectic materialism. At various junctures of the economic evolution, and depending upon changing political, national, cultural, social and other conditions, differing types of struggle may become important and even predominant.¹⁰

Indeed, all Communist theory is concerned with a strategy for annihilating the opponent over a period of time by diverse, although co-ordinated, tactics. The utilization of conflict as a means to keep the opponent off balance and to wear down his resistance is geared to the objective of total conquest. This extremely close attunement of procedure and objective not only highlights the method of conflict but almost makes the means and end appear identical.

Stalin adds to Lenin's analysis by implying that inevitable conflict is the result of internal and external contradictions within society as represented respectively between the proletariat and the peasantry, and between socialism and capitalism.¹¹ A certain inadequateness of a single nation is implied in the need for the efforts of the proletariat of several countries to resolve the external conflict; moreover, this technique promotes an implied internal involvement in external conflict even with the elimination of any contradiction between the proletariat and the peasantry. Apparently oblivious to these theoretical inconsistencies, Stalin dauntlessly envisions the establishment

⁷Robert Strausz-Hupé, *Protracted Conflict*, p. 7.

⁸Strausz-Hupé, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

⁹*Loc. cit.*

¹⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

¹¹Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, p. 63.

of the dictatorship of the proletariat as not only achieved by "class struggle"¹² but maintained as a

persistent struggle, sanguinary and bloodless, violent and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative—against the forces and traditions of the old society.¹³

In a continued contradictory vein, Stalin assures that the dictatorship of the proletariat will preclude "not merely," indeed "not even mainly,"¹⁴ the use of violence, and that such dictatorship is justified as a "higher type of social organization of labor compared with capitalism."¹⁵ Such reasoning for the inevitable complete victory of Communism is indeed presumptuous, primarily due to the ambiguity on the nature of violence and of the features of the proletarian organization. The logical outcomes of this vagueness would appear to be procedural and organizational chaos or the irrelevance of theory for reality. This latter possibility would admit a practical "freedom" which could intensify the danger from an unconstrained commitment to conflict.

Stalin's preoccupation with the extension of Socialism presents an interesting case study of inherent theoretical conflict. Not only does the term Socialism appear to be a facade for the realization of Communism but the theoretical indecision for this development provokes discordant interpretation. In Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism* (1924), he advocates "Socialism in one country" as a result of capitalist Imperialism which would make any country vulnerable to Socialism regardless of the degree to which it had become industrialized. Yet he also admits it is impossible to "organize socialist production" and so achieve "the final victory of Socialism" without revolutions "in several advanced countries." Realizing the extremity of the latter formulation, Stalin substituted in his *October Revolution and Tactics of Russian Communists* (December 1924) the proposition that "the proletariat can and must build up a socialist society," but that this does not mean that it can achieve "the complete and final victory of Socialism"¹⁶ in the sense that it would be guaranteed against the danger of counter-revolution. In his

¹²Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁵*Loc. cit.*

¹⁶R. N. Carew Hunt, *The Theory and Practice of Communism*, p. 197.

Problems of Leninism, Stalin explained the rationale for the previous rejection of extended revolution; he felt that the important distinction should be kept intact between "the possibility of building up Socialism by the efforts of one country" and the impossibility of any country considering itself "fully guaranteed against counter-revolution without a victorious revolution in a number of other countries."¹⁷ Not only did Stalin later emphatically affirm that the building of Socialism in one country had actually been achieved, but he also indicated that the victory of Socialism was not complete even in that particular country—so long as Russia was encircled by hostile capitalistic states.¹⁸ Thus, the hazy and seemingly contradictory reformulations of Stalin's position indicate in a measure the lack of a clear, positive program. Such a lack would seem to be compensated only by the mask of conflict: the ambivalences in Stalin's theorizing could thus be camouflaged through the implementation of his aggressive and uncompromising policies.

Despite the lack of any reasoned analysis of the sources of contradictions and the causes of conflict, Stalin staunchly advocates the inevitability of war. This prediction not only illustrates the "weasel" use of words but also the assigned absolutism from any outside insinuation of the Communist role in instigating conflict. On the eve of the Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU in October 1952, Stalin attributed the inevitability of war to the capitalist states but affirmed the "peaceful" policy of the Soviet Union which would be immune from active engagement. Stalin also emphasized that war between the capitalist camp and the "camp of peace" was unlikely since the capitalists would seek to avoid a war where the "very existence of capitalism" would be reviewed. Moreover, capitalist states were aware that Russia's "peaceful policy" precluded an attack on them by the Soviet Union.¹⁹ Yet the Soviet involvement with conflict does find theoretical exposition in Stalin's writings.

A conflict is inevitable. This is the greatest difficulty of the Russian Revolution, its greatest historical problem: the necessity to solve international problems, the necessity to call forth the world revolution.²⁰

¹⁷Carew Hunt, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 200.

¹⁹Legislative Reference Service, *Khrushchev on the Shifting Balance of World Forces*, p. 2.

²⁰Stalin, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

This aggressive clarion call is, nevertheless, balanced by Stalin's intimation of the defensive Soviet position: "We are surrounded by people, classes and governments, which openly express their intense hatred for us."²¹ It is interesting to note how Stalin attaches connotative value to words so that the reader could be impressed by allegations of badness and by declarations which claim the occurrence of a certain process as *ipso facto*. Such theoretical aggressiveness without the necessary foundations would seem to be effective only with an uneducated public or a society controlled by powerful instruments of curtailment and enforcement.

Although Stalin's technique of affirming that mere declaration makes truth has questionable validity, there is a significant section in his *Foundations of Leninism* which illuminates the present reality of Soviet tactics. Stalin's theory in this section has been zealously inculcated into the fibre of Soviet foreign policy. Stalin accused capitalist countries as having three main frictions:

- 1) capital versus labor; i.e., "increase [in] the indignation of the working class against the foundations of capitalism."²²
- 2) capital versus colonies; i.e., the capitalist extension of "spheres of influence" versus the colonial powers' desire to liberate themselves.
- 3) capital versus capital; i.e., "the uneven development of the different capitalist countries, which leads to a bitter struggle between the countries."²³

This analysis furthers the Communist tactic of aggravating these frictions to the extent that almost every Soviet move today is motivated by the exploitation of at least one of these frictions. The apparent rationale is that the best way to weaken the outside world is to play upon frictions, which is easier to do than to quiet frictions. Thus, the lack of theoretical implementations of practical specifics is compensated by the truism that a destructive policy is easier than a constructive one.

This utilization of the contradictions, conflicts and wars between non-proletarian classes or states for the advantage of weakening the adversary or strengthening the Communist re-

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 66.

²²Joseph Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism*, p. 31.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

serves is carefully considered from the view of relating all human actions to both ideological impact and earthly gains:

Tactics must not be guided by the transitory interests of the movement, they must not be guided by motives of immediate political effect, still less must they leave firm soil and build castles on the air. Tactics must be adapted to the aims and possibilities of strategy.²⁴

The utilization of resources for maximum strategic advance consists principally of:

- 1) the concentration of the main forces of the revolution at the decisive moment, at the most vulnerable point of the enemy.²⁵
- 2) the selection of the moment for striking the decisive blow. . . . as to coincide with the moment when the crisis has attained the highest pitch.²⁶
- 3) [the recognition that] a course having been mapped out, it must be pursued no matter what difficulties and complications may be encountered on the road.²⁷
- 4) maneuvering with the reserves calculated to effect a correct retreat when the enemy is strong, when retreat is inevitable.²⁸

Of similar thematic implications is the tactical advice:

to locate at any given moment that single link in the chain of events which if seized upon will enable us to control the whole chain and prepare the ground for the achievement of strategic success.²⁹

Thus, the exploitation of weakness and of timing is of paramount and steadfast importance. The Communist method of conflict thrives only on the opponent's disabilities and is lessened only by the existence of a strong enemy.

Although Mao Tse-tung deplores the ambiguity of the terms "war" and "peace" used in Stalin's writings to explain complex social realities,³⁰ Mao himself draws upon the internal

²⁴*Strategy and Tactics of the Proletarian Revolution*, p. 28.

²⁵Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism*, p. 92.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 93.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 94.

²⁸*Loc. cit.*

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 98.

³⁰Strausz-Hupé, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

contradictions in society to explain the necessity for conflict—almost paradoxically in a greater development of theoretical abstraction than Stalin's analysis.

Social changes are chiefly due to the internal contradictions in society, namely, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production, the contradiction between the classes, and the contradiction between the old and the new.³¹

Mao, like Stalin, sees the inevitable juxtaposition of contradictions resulting in an apparently positive re-alignment, although there is no questioning of the means involved or the ends sought.

It is the development of the contradictions that impels society forward and starts the process of the superseding of the old society by the new one.³²

Moreover, like Stalin, Mao Tse-tung also stresses the importance of strength in international relationships, but adds the implication that the quantity of power itself is a source of conflict. "The enemy is strong and we are weak, so we are facing the danger of subjugation."³³ However, this analysis is fortified by a strong measure of theoretical relativity which allows for the dynamism of practical strategy:

The strength or superiority on either side is not absolute in nature. . . . Conditions are continually changing. In the course of the war, as long as we employ correct military and political strategy . . . a decisive change will take place in the relative strength as well as in the relative position of superiority and inferiority, a change that will bring about the enemy's defeat and our victory.³⁴

Mao conceives the strategy of protracted conflict in effecting this change in the relative strength of the revolutionary and the *status quo* as multi-dimensional. Not only is war regarded as "one of the highest forms of struggle for the settlement of contradictions,"³⁵ and as a necessity when politics cannot proceed by the usual means,³⁶ but political, economic, and psycho-

³¹Mao Tse-tung, *On Contradiction*, p. 13.

³²*Loc. cit.*

³³Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, II, 181.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 182.

³⁵H. Arthur Steiner, ed., *Maoism: a Sourcebook*, p. 13.

³⁶Mao, *Selected Works*, p. 202.

logical forces³⁷ are nourished in the arsenal of conflict. However, in Mao's theorization, there looms the fundamental contradiction of how war can solve contradiction, when war actually thrives on contradiction and especially when war is viewed as protracted. The logical impasse is that, for the Communists, conflict is the solution and victory is the only settlement. Thus, Mao's theoretical frame of reference is on a wholly different level than the traditional Western approach. For Mao, a just war is synonymous with progress, although he sets no criteria for the determination of "justness" or "progress." "We Communists are opposed to all unjust wars that impede progress, but we are not opposed to progressive, just wars."³⁸ The length of the war entirely depends on the amount of change in the "relative strength"³⁹ of the Communists and their opponents. Thus, the term "war" acquired the qualitative haziness which Mao himself criticizes, but one could easily assume that conflict in whatever form continues until victory. Even then, the dilemma might arise as to how to deal theoretically and practically with the alleged internal dynamics of society. Mao only poses this problem but does not attempt a solution: "The struggle within the contradiction is ceaseless."⁴⁰

Antagonism and contradiction are utterly different. Under socialism, antagonism disappears, but contradiction exists.⁴¹

Utilizing various fronts, Mao views the winning of the war as the paramount objective—regardless of methods or consequences. Military success is prepared by theoretical assumptions whereby

each of the two aspects of every contradiction finds the pre-supposition of its existence in its opposite aspect. . . . Each of the two contradictory aspects, according to given conditions, tends to transform itself into its opposite aspect.⁴²

In other words, these statements could be interpreted to mean that Communism is not only fortified by opposition but also, even though it might have only secondary power and influence

³⁷Strausz-Hupé, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

³⁸Mao, *Selected Works*, p. 199.

³⁹*Ibid.*, p. 193.

⁴⁰Mao, *On Contradiction*, p. 53.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁴²*Ibid.*, p. 42.

in the world at a given moment, it will inevitably succeed. Moreover, military victory is readied by strategic crystallization:

Enemy advances, we retreat;
 enemy halts, we harass;
 enemy tires, we attack;
 enemy retreats, we pursue.⁴³

Finally, for Mao, the winning of the war is ascertained by the highly organized implementations by the "strong mass base"⁴⁴ of the peasants, a strong party, a strong Red Army, and by strategically located territorial bases.⁴⁵ Although Mao is concerned with organization mainly if not only in terms of its membership—the peasants,⁴⁶ he has explosively blended the ingredients of theory and strategy to maximize the fervor for revolutionary ferment.

Both Mao and Stalin ruthlessly gear their theoretical discourse to the utilization of conflict for eventual Communist victory. "Conflict to the bitter end is the stuff from which Communism draws its very sustenance."⁴⁷ Although there is a vagueness in both expositions on the deep-rooted, definitive causes of conflict, their zealous consciousness of the historical process and timing is inexorably illuminated. In their unquestioning justification of the *raison d'être* of conflict, they assume that conflict serves their advantage. The very explicitness of their stages of political and military advance is, nevertheless, counterbalanced by a certain indefiniteness of the present, their blindness to the possible "boomerang" repercussions of their own distrust and their imperviousness to potential tactical immobility or to political setbacks. Any theoretical shortcomings have however been compensated by a fearful and dynamic aggressiveness, by a people theoretically wooed mainly as a result of illiteracy or a party-disciplined education, and by awesomely powerful political mechanisms for doctrinal adherence.

⁴³Mao, *Selected Works*, p. 164.

⁴⁴Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, p. 189.

⁴⁵Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

⁴⁶"Chinese Communism in its Maoist development demonstrates in fact that a communist party organized along Leninist lines and imbued with a sincere faith in certain basic Marxist-Leninist tenets can exist quite apart from any organic connection with the proletariat." *Ibid.*, p. 191. Indeed, a basic concern of the Chinese Communist party is to minimize if not conceal this severance of the Chinese party from its proletarian base. *Ibid.*, p. 192. This development indicates the conflict within Communism in contrast to the international conflict it tries to promote.

⁴⁷Strausz-Hupé, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

Communism's theoretical pretensions of a mastery of and stimulation by conflict are largely supported by a devastating technique of co-ordinating all phases of political warfare and graduated violence, and all possible relationships between states and groups—political, economic and cultural.⁴⁸

Any effective strategy for waging the ubiquitous protracted conflict must be, by necessity, a revolutionary strategy; to wit, a strategy that puts the revolutionary forces-on-the-loose in politics, economics, culture, science and technology to its own use.⁴⁹

The co-ordinated and comprehensive qualities of this Communist strategy are abetted by an enlarged vision of conflict whereby military action is only one of the many forms of warfare. This view has enormous impact for the Western strategist who traditionally views quick, decisive military victory as conclusive and who considers political objectives to be the responsibility of politicians or diplomats. In contrast, the Communists view policy and war as being the two sides of the coin of strategy.⁵⁰

The strategy of conflict expounded by Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung presents a challenge of survival to democratic, peace-loving nations. The dire crucialness of this contest is real and immediate, not imaginary or merely future-oriented. The conflict is not the hypothesis of a theoretical ivory tower. The approach to counteraction is complex in its strategic, policy and structural details and implementations, but the crux of our positive response will be the result of a deep awareness of the strategy of conflict for all it intends, of a sustained clarity of decision-making despite the pressures to deceive, of continued improvement and emphasis of the best features of our system and beliefs as well as correction of our weaknesses, and a greater leadership and insight in the means of strengthening our influence abroad. The formulations of Stalin and Mao Tse-tung are presented in the forms of theory and strategy whose effectiveness is determined in the testing grounds of reality. In similar fashion, democratic theory is determined by the reality of details, specifics and particulars. Not only will the realities

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

determine the winner, but the strength and identity of both conflict and peace are at stake.

* * *

Note: See map on page 158 of this issue.

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ISSUES ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS¹

Some of the points at issue and the respective positions regarding the question of strategy and tactics are as follows:

1. Moscow believes there is a real possibility that world war can be avoided. Peiping believes that "imperialism" is an inevitable source of wars and although the avoidance of a nuclear world war is theoretically possible it is unlikely.

2. Moscow maintains local wars such as the Korean conflict are not needed to advance socialist causes. Local wars can get out of control, risk world war, and hence must be avoided. Peiping maintains that until "imperialists" are destroyed local wars are inevitable. Further, Peiping argues that local wars will not of themselves lead to world war, that they can be contained by resolute struggle.

3. What effect would world war have? Moscow claims world war would be ruinous. It would destroy the centers of civilization,

(Continued on page 168)

¹House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on the Far East and the Pacific. *Sino-Soviet Conflict* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 4R-5R.

The Rift Widens: Sino-Soviet Competition in the Underdeveloped Areas

LEE W. FARNSWORTH*

In the years 1965-1966 we are seeing the breach between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic widen to the point where it seems irreparable. The Chinese have reached the point of claiming that the Soviet Union is secretly co-operating with the United States on such international problems as Vietnam, the India-Pakistan dispute, and Japan, with the Soviet Union completely conforming "with the requirements of U.S. imperialism, and especially with the latter's policy of encircling China." This is a complete circle from the Chinese position up to 1955 which was that China belonged to the side of "the anti-imperial front headed by the Soviet Union. . . ." Much of the competition between the two Communist giants is taking place in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

At the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1956 a decision was arrived at to seek to win over the newly emerging nations by means of economic aid and through encouragement of the development of united fronts formed from Communist and other anti-imperialist groups. This was an attempt to counteract the claim of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made in 1949 that the successful revolution in China was to be the example for all colonial and semi-colonial nations. Mao Tse-tung proclaimed that the pattern of the Soviet Union applied only to revolutions in the technologically advanced nations of Europe and North America. In 1954 Chou En-lai proclaimed the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence with India and Burma, and in 1955 with the Afro-Asian nations meeting at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia.¹ From this point on the competition

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¹The Five Principles are: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) mutual nonaggression; (3) mutual noninterference.

began in earnest and has become increasingly intense to the present time.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF COMMUNIST CHINA

In order to understand the conflict we must understand why each of the participants has become so involved—at times in areas geographically far removed, such as Africa and Latin America.

Professor George T. Yu has put forth the thesis that China has four basic foreign policy goals.² These are (1) to gain international recognition as the sole legitimate government of China; (2) to view the underdeveloped area as an important "battlefield" where indirect assaults can be made against the United States, the main enemy of China; (3) to break out of isolation and form new allies for support in the battles both against the United States and for control of the international Communist movement; and (4) to build and maintain leadership against colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism in the African-Asian-Latin American world.

The Afro-Asian neutrals such as India, Indonesia, and Ghana apparently accepted the Five Principles partly to ward off the enmity of Red China and charges of being colonialist puppets of the West. In so doing, however, they opened up their countries to the "popular diplomacy" of China. This brand of diplomacy has three basic themes: self-determination, self-reliance, and Asian-African unity.³

Self-determination not only means independence for a particular nation, but independence of all territories still under colonial rule. This has particular appeal in Africa, even though only a handful of areas remain under European control and more than forty African states have gained independence in the recent past. The second theme, self-reliance, encourages breaking of all social, political, and economic ties with the West and

in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence.

It is interesting that China condemns the Soviet Union proclamations of peaceful coexistence as being anti-revolutionary on the basis that they are with the imperialist powers and can never be on the basis of respect, equality, and mutual benefit, given the aggressive nature of capitalism.

²George T. Yu, "Sino-African Relations: A Survey," *Asian Survey* V (July 1965), 321-332.

³*Ibid.*, p. 322. See also R. G. Boyd, *Communist China's Foreign Policy* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 110-11.

becoming one's own master. The Chinese point to themselves as the prime successful example of such a policy. The third theme, unity among the former colonial and semi-colonial states, finds its basis in mutual experience in subjugation to and exploitation by the European and American "imperialists." The claim is that the underdeveloped peoples are still subjected to threats and interference from the imperialists and must, therefore, unite and cooperate to oppose external interference and safeguard their national independence. Although Dr. Yu's thesis relates primarily to African-Asian relations, the Chinese definitely include Latin America in their schemes, as indicated by the following Chinese declaration:

Many Latin American countries are independent countries but U.S. monopoly capital controls their economics and reduces them virtually to the status of semi-colonies. The U.S. monopoly organizations, like the United Fruit Company (called the "Green Devil" by the Latin American peoples) and its like, form a sort of "state within a state" in quite a few Latin American countries.⁴

On the basis of the Five Principles, Communist China has signed a whole series of treaties of friendship and mutual non-aggression with her Asian neighbors and a number of trade agreements outside Asia. This is in sharp contrast to her call for a continuation of the thesis that wars within and between the imperialist states and between them and the socialist states are inevitable. The Chinese further attack the Soviet Union for failing to stress that no socialist state can arise without revolution from within. The Chinese justify this seemingly contradictory stand on the basis of "just" and "unjust" wars. "'Just' wars are those which are the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat and working people of all countries," the "liberation struggles of the oppressed nations," and the "struggles of all peace-loving people and countries." Wars which have been on this basis, they argue, have not led to world war, and when they have been victorious, they have weakened "the forces of imperialism," and actually defended "world peace."⁵ All other wars are unjust.

⁴Kuo Chi-chou, "Hail the Great Victories of the National Liberation Movement," *Peking Review*, V (Jan. 5, 1962), 11-13, 16.

⁵John Wilson Lewis, *Major Doctrines of Communist China* (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1964), 258-59.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION

The policy of the Soviet Union toward the underdeveloped world begins at the same point as that of the Communist Chinese—the idea of peaceful coexistence. In Khrushchev's speech to the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, even the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence of Communist China were praised as having been successfully used throughout the world. The divergency was shown in that Khrushchev preached the new doctrine that war and revolution were no longer necessary because the historical situation had changed radically since Lenin's original analysis of the "objective conditions." Khrushchev said: "The forces of socialism and democracy have grown immeasurably throughout the world, and capitalism has become much weaker."⁶ Therefore, he concludes, a peaceful changeover to communism is possible.

The Moscow Declaration of 1957, signed by both the USSR and Communist China, was very careful to include in the camp of peace, along with the "socialist" countries, "the peace-loving countries of Asia and Africa," "the liberation movement of the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies," "the peoples of the European countries who proclaimed neutrality," and "the peoples of Latin America"—all as the powerful forces for the cause of peace against the militaristic imperialists rallying around the reactionary United States.⁷

The policy of economic aid and cultural relations with the developing countries was to be on the basis of equality, mutual benefit, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. This policy of assistance, however, was intended to achieve the international ends of the Soviet Union. Replying to oblique Chinese attacks that the USSR was actually cooperating with the West to protect colonialism and to suppress national liberation wars,⁸ the Soviet spokesman said:

But we have a broader understanding of the international duty of our socialist country—we understand it as rendering assistance to those liberated peoples, too, who are not included in the world system of socialism all-round, disin-

⁶The entire speech can be found in G. F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal, and Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), 42-46.

⁷Full text in *ibid.*, 46-56.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 88.

terested assistance in strengthening their political and economic independence is the foundation of our relations with the newly-created states. Of course, we do not impose assistance on anyone, but we help when we are asked to do so.

The road to the consolidation of the independence of the liberated countries is the road of developing their national economy, promoting the advance of their culture, and improving the living standards of the people. . . . Understanding this, the Soviet Union is accordingly developing its economic cooperation with them.

A basic drawback in Soviet policy, however, is that the bloc always comes first. She seeks self-sufficiency in the brotherhood of Socialist nations—all centered on the Soviet economy. Thus the developing nations are expected to add to the Soviet economy, even if it means slower industrialization.⁹

We can see, then, that both the Soviet Union and Communist China have as a basic aim of their foreign policy to attempt to influence the neutralist underdeveloped countries. They have each attacked the other for the way the policies are being carried out, and, as we shall see, have competed vigorously in some countries for dominant influence. For the purpose of analysis a brief survey of the competition on each of the three continents of Latin America, Africa, and Asia will be presented.

LATIN AMERICA

Communist China has practiced a two-headed policy in Latin America. The first is that of seeking to expand trade and cultural relations with the established nations. The vehicle for pushing this program is the Chinese Council for the Promotion of Foreign Trade, which sets up exhibits of Chinese Communist goods. For example, from December 1963 to January 1964, a Chinese Commercial Exhibition was presented in Mexico City. During the exhibition China announced the purchase of \$28 million worth of Mexican cotton. A short time later Mexico agreed to sell 450,000 tons of wheat to China, worth \$30 million. Similar exhibitions and sales have been announced in other Latin American countries. Argentina has announced

⁹Stanley J. Zyzniewski, "Soviet Foreign Economic Policy," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXIII (June 1958), 206-33. This policy has had repercussion in the Eastern European bloc as Rumania and Poland have increasingly made efforts to build their own economy rather than provide food and raw materials to the other members of the bloc who are expanding their industrial base.

sale of wheat worth \$50 million and expects also to sell meat. Chile is selling nitrates and has even talked of having China build nitrate factories in Chile toward fulfilling a proposed sale of one million tons.¹⁰

These trade agreements all favor Latin America because they are cash or trade deals with the balance of trade in their favor. China's advantage is to obtain new markets.

The second policy of China in Latin America relates to political goals. China encourages anti-Americanism and the establishment of national liberation fronts, with the local Communist party as the vanguard directing the revolution. Although Cuba serves as the recent prototype, China cites her own experiences as the ultimate pattern. To carry out this policy China tries to build fraternal ties with the indigenous Communist parties, but she has had only limited success. The Brazilian Communist Party has had close affiliation with China, and some pro-Peking factions are quite active in Colombia, Argentina, and Peru. One means of influencing the local communists has been to take them to China for training and then "seeding" them back into the movement.

The Chinese try to reach the masses through ten hours of Spanish broadcasts daily and a few hours in Portuguese. The *Peking Review* and *China Reconstructs* are both printed in Spanish and distributed in Latin America. The articles in *Peking Review* are not only anti-United States but are also anti-Soviet.

Soviet policy in Latin America has been along the lines of peaceful coexistence. The official prognosis in 1956 was that due to U.S. neo-colonialism the revolutionary potential in Latin America was nil. The Monroe Doctrine made the area only a tertiary target of Soviet foreign policy. They even abandoned hope of penetrating labor unions and of establishing inter-Latin American labor union popular fronts. The most that was hoped for was that the weak Communist parties would seek to establish broad popular fronts and participate in elections.¹¹ This was the same advice given the Chinese Communists in 1923 relative to the Nationalist coalition led by Sun Yat-sen. The

¹⁰Daniel Tretiak, "Latin America: the Chinese Drive," *Contemporary Review*, CCV (Nov. 1964), 571-76.

¹¹David T. Cattrell, "Soviet Policies in Latin America," *Current History*, XLVII (Nov. 1964), 286-87.

alliance most successful in Latin America has been the Popular Front in Chile, which the Socialists dominate.

The Soviet Union has decided since Castro, and with the increased Chinese activity, that Latin-American nations are in the midst of radical changes, and she seeks to influence them as much as possible. She is seeking expanded trade relations, on the basis that economic progress must precede socialism. On the problem of revolution, Russia agreed at the Latin-American, African, Asian Conference held in Havana in January 1966 to give "all-round assistance" to the national liberation fronts in the Western hemisphere.¹² It remains to be seen whether this was to undermine China's influence among the delegates or actually will be carried out. The Soviets also increased their Spanish broadcasts to 45.5 hours weekly plus 17.5 hours of Portuguese to counteract the Chinese propaganda.

Cuba, as the only Communist nation in Latin America, deserves special mention. Castro has not been an enigma only to the United States; both the Soviet Union and Communist China have found him an uneasy ally. China has consistently used Cuba as the ultimate example for all other Latin-American countries. Castro himself seemed to be parroting Chinese policy by training leaders for and encouraging uprisings throughout the continent. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Castro's leading theoretician (until his recent disappearance) was an advocate of the Chinese line. When the Soviet Union began criticizing China for deviation, Cuba steadfastly refused to break either government or party relations. This was to change, however.

Apparently Castro realized that despite his ideological affinity to China, Cuba's economic survival would ultimately depend on the Soviet Union. He knew that the Soviet Union would have to acknowledge his revolution as being successful and that his fiery image had great influence among all leftists in Latin America. Thus the Soviet Union which had criticized Chinese "adventurism" in the hemisphere had to tacitly acknowledge the validity of Castro's similar tactics. The Soviet Union weighed the demands of Castro that Cuba be recognized

¹²*New York Times*, Feb. 6, 1966. The Communist Chinese were quite upset at the Soviet presence in this conference because they wanted to dominate it. The Soviet Union is trying to be invited to the African-Asian Conference as well (if Algeria ever settles down sufficiently to call it), which China also vigorously opposes.

as taking its own path to socialism¹³ and that Cuba be given predominant influence in training revolutionaries for Latin America (with Soviet material support). The advantage to the Russians would be a check of sorts on the United States (which failed to materialize with their defeat in the missile crisis). The disadvantage might be the inability to control the ebullient Castro and the need to change her official policy away from peaceful coexistence. As late as February 1962, in the Second Havana Declaration, Castro still called for the maximum use of force.

The Soviet Union had sent Anastas Mikoyan to Cuba in February 1960 to begin economic and political cooperation, but it was not until the spring of 1962, in conjunction with the decision to place missiles in Cuba, that Cuba was accepted into Communist brotherhood. In March 1963 orders came from Moscow to Castro via Luis Carlos Prestes, a Brazilian Communist, that armed struggle in Brazil would not constitute the best support for Cuba because it would alienate the masses. Furthermore, he said, "it is possible [to achieve a change of classes in power] in certain countries of Latin America, in present conditions, without civil strife and without armed insurrection."¹⁴

Castro was summoned to Moscow on April 27, 1963, and remained until June. Although he still resisted attacks on China, in his marathon speech in Havana on his return he extolled the virtues of Khrushchev and the military and economic might of Russia. After his visit to Moscow again in January 1964 Castro agreed to cooperate in the Socialist economy, i.e., Cuba would continue in its one-crop economy in return for Soviet bloc material goods.

By January, 1966, Russia was buying Cuban sugar at six cents a pound (world market at two cents) and in return Castro has been anti-Chinese and Guevara has vanished.¹⁵

¹³Under Leninist theory there must be two stages in a revolution—from semi-feudalism to bourgeois nationalism and thence to socialism. Maoist theory (because it happened this way) was that the two stages could be combined into one continuing stage led by the Communists. Castro preferred the latter because the Batista regime had generally been considered semi-feudal and a second stage revolution would necessarily oust Castro.

¹⁴Theodore Draper, "Castro, Khrushchev, and Mao," *The Reporter*, XXIX (August 15, 1963), 28. The Chinese continued to support armed struggle. See *Peking Review*, No. 2, January 10, 1964, p. 18.

¹⁵It is interesting to recall that the United States was "imperialist" for the identical policy towards Cuba.

China reacted to the deal by announcing on January 2, 1966, that it was cutting its trade with Cuba by \$80 million—leaving Cuba with sugar surpluses and great shortages of rice, the Cuban staple. Castro retaliated by accusing China of being “imperialist” and having “contempt for and underestimation of smaller peoples.”¹⁶

AFRICA

The Communist Chinese record in Africa is quite extensive, beginning as early as 1949, with their moral support of the Arabs in North Africa against Israel. This paid off in early diplomatic recognition by the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. Of these, only Algeria has maintained a semblance of sympathy toward China.

They have supported the causes of revolution throughout Africa since this first effort. An example is the support of Piere Mulele in the Kwilu region of the Congo, a Peking-trained revolutionary who follows Maoist principles in complete detail.¹⁷

The two-headedness of China's policy again is shown by the great attention paid to advancing trade and cultural relations in Africa. With the independence of so many African states, this was to be expected. The normal treatment is that accorded Ghana. Diplomats were exchanged on March 26, 1961. Kwame Nkrumah then visited Peking in August, receiving a tremendous public welcome. This was followed with the conclusion of a variety of agreements, including a ten year friendship treaty based on the “five principles of Bandung,” a 20-year economic and technical cooperation agreement, which included a five-year \$19.6 million credit and dispatch of Chinese industrial and technical experts, training of Ghanians in China, and Chinese construction of textile mills in Ghana, plus a five year trade and payments agreement. The Chinese technicians who went to Ghana lived and worked with the peasants, teaching them simple cultivation and labor intensive techniques. This was capped off with a visit by Premier Chou En-lai as part of his

¹⁶See *New York Times*, January 3, 1966, January 10, 1966, and February 6, 1966.

¹⁷Robert A. Scalapino, “Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa,” *Foreign Affairs*, XLII (July, 1964), 641-54.

African tour in January 1964.¹⁸ The same treatment was accorded Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Kenya, Algeria, and others as they achieved independence. As in Latin America, the China News Agency then entered the scene, along with radio broadcasts and film distribution.

Surprisingly, China still continues trade relations with South Africa. She has publicly declared a cessation of trade three times, but each time national interest requirements made it unwise to follow through. China simultaneously supports the South African underground movement, especially in the training and "seeding" of revolutionary leaders.

The Soviet Union has had a traditional policy of support of the national fronts. She has had various programs for expanding her influence such as "seeding" of trained leaders, subsidization of sympathetic journalists, scholarship programs, and large scale economic aid.

The African nations are more prone to accept the Soviet Union because of greater proximity, greater prestige, and greater capacity to aid. Soviet aid is more than twice Chinese aid, as the following figures show. Russian aid and credits to Algeria were \$100 million compared with China's \$50 million. Other figures were: Somalia, \$44 million versus \$20 million; Ghana, \$81 million versus \$20 million; Mali, \$55 million versus \$19.6 million; and Guinea, \$80 million versus \$24 million. When one adds Eastern European contributions, the gap in favor of the Soviet Union widens. In numbers of students being trained, there are 600-1000 each from the various African nations in Soviet bloc countries compared to only 5-10 in China. In neither area has the program proven satisfactory, with few good students going and few returning happy with the experience.¹⁹

The Sino-Soviet competition in Africa is extremely strong, with the Russians sometimes being quite defensive of their program. When Chou En-lai arrived in Mali in 1964, he found Soviet leaflets entitled "Friends and Comrades in Africa" being distributed among the crowd. It accused the Chinese of disruption of "proletarian internationalism" and of using Africa for selfish ends. It naturally played up the great amounts of Russian aid, which has included myriads of projects from the Aswan

¹⁸Jan S. Prybyla, "Communist China's Economic Relations with Africa 1960-1964," *Asian Survey*, IV (November, 1964), 1135-43.

¹⁹Scalapino, *op. cit.*

Dam down. One problem of Soviet assistance is that it is so massive an entire economy depends on it, and any failure of the economy can be blamed on Russia. This could never be the case with the relatively miniscule Chinese aid. The recipient nations, too, can find themselves in a Russian strait-jacket by becoming overly dependent. This is true even though the U.N. Representative, Nikolai Federenko, declared non-interference in internal affairs.

We consider, on our part, that no one—not one country—has the right to interfere in the affairs of other countries and that every people has the fullest right to determine by itself its own policies and future.²⁰

In Africa, as in Latin America, the Soviet Union is coming out on top in the dispute. Whereas China demands the development of African-Asian groups, exclusive of the USSR, the African states themselves favor the Yugoslav-India brand of non-alignment. China seeks turmoil, while the Africans seek stability and economic progress. China inevitably loses because it is the master teacher in warfare but lacks the funds to support development, particularly long-range development.

In January 1966 Egypt took China to task for opposition to the India-Pakistan accord at Tashkent, for opposing Soviet participation in conferences, for giving money to eleven Communists on trial in Egypt, for attempting to establish the "People's Republic of Egypt," and for failing to live up to promises of economic and scientific assistance—including a Chinese refusal to share technical information with Egyptian atomic scientists, while simultaneously demanding the right for Chinese experts to visit the UAR's only atomic reactor, one built by the Soviet Union.²¹

ASIA

China holds the upper hand only in Asia. The Vietnamese war is the result of China's encouragement of wars of liberation. The Communist party forms the core of the National Liberation Front there. The Chinese Committee for African-Asian Solidarity has the function of training revolutionaries and sending

²⁰Nikolai Federenko, "The Soviet Union and African Countries," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, CCCLIV (July, 1964), 1-8.

²¹*New York Times*, January 31, 1966.

them back to rebel against "imperialism." The apparent targets include the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand.²² In a warning to North Vietnam, the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee in its ideological journal said that the struggle with the United States could not be won unless cooperation with the Soviet Union ceased. Moscow's aid, they said, only helped the Johnson administration to "realize its peace plots." "Only by drawing a clear-cut line of demarcation between oneself and the Khrushchev revisionists and by carrying the struggle against Khrushchev revisionism through to the end can one wage a successful struggle against U.S. imperialism."²³

In the areas of peaceful coexistence, China has fair relations with Burma, Nepal, Cambodia, and Ceylon, two of which are royalist governments. She carries on trade and has various friendship treaties with these nations.²⁴

The Soviet Union is fighting to maintain some influence in North Vietnam and North Korea and gives massive aid to India, the enemy of China. Aid to Burma resulted in bad feelings as the bartered goods were so inferior they were unusable in some instances.

The interesting case in Asia is Indonesia where China has given massive support to the Indonesian Communist party, which Sukarno has used to balance the military. The military, however, was rearmed largely with Russian aid. Liu Shao-Chi, the Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, was a great success when he visited Indonesia and has kept the Communist party there on the Chinese side. The army recently overthrew the Communists in government and outlawed the party. Sukarno was subdued for awhile and then fired General Nasution from the new cabinet, leaving the entire issue aflame. Whatever happens, the use of Russian guns against Chinese supporters, as in India, can only exacerbate the Sino-Soviet dispute.

We can see through these cases the reasons for the conflict: first, the struggle for leadership of world Communism, and second, the confrontation of the Soviet policies of "solidarity of socialist states" and peaceful coexistence in the form of united fronts with the Chinese policies of encouragement of economies

²²*Ibid.*, January 14, 1966.

²³*Ibid.*, February 11, 1966.

²⁴C. P. Fitzgerald, "The Sino-Soviet Balance Sheet in the Underdeveloped Areas," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, CCCLI (January, 1964), 40-49.

independent of the Soviet Union and establishment of national liberation fronts in guerrilla warfare. The Chinese desire to lead a colored versus white coalition and the Russians seek to lead a monolithic socialist bloc while influencing the developing countries.

Both of the contestants are experiencing some successes and some difficulties. Both have advantages in the areas of nearest proximity. It is clear, though, that the dispute is too deep-seated to allow for any immediate resolution. It should also be clear that skillful Western diplomacy and maneuvering could leave both of them floundering if the Latin American, African, and Asian nations could see that genuine interest and assistance were forthcoming without the stigma of being imperialistic designs, as each of the Communist giants has so conveniently tagged the other's policies in this area of their conflict.



COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND POSITIONS IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD*

Country or Area	Communist Party Membership	Sino-Soviet Dispute
Albania	53,000	Pro-Chinese
Bulgaria	528,674	Pro-Soviet
China (Communist)	18,000,000	
Czechoslovakia	1,676,509	Pro-Soviet
Germany, East	1,610,679	Pro-Soviet
Hungary	520,000	Pro-Soviet
Korea (North)	1,300,000	Pro-Chinese
Mongolia, Outer	46,000	Pro-Soviet
Poland	1,614,237	Pro-Soviet
Rumania	1,240,000	Neutral
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	12,000,000	
Vietnam, North	570,000	Pro-Chinese
Yugoslavia	1,030,041	Pro-Soviet

*SOURCE: House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on the Far East and the Pacific. *Sino-Soviet Conflict*, Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Implications (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 17R-19R.

COMMUNIST PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND POSITIONS
IN SELECTED COUNTRIES OF THE
NONCOMMUNIST WORLD*

Country or Area	Communist Party Membership	Sino-Soviet Dispute
Algeria	5,500	Pro-Soviet
Argentina	65,000	Pro-Soviet
Australia	5,000	Open split
Austria	35,000	Internal faction
Belgium	11,000	Open split
Bolivia	4,500	Pro-Soviet
Brazil	31,000	Open split
Burma	5,000	Open split
Canada	3,500	Pro-Soviet
Ceylon	1,900	Open split
Chile	27,500	Pro-Soviet
Colombia	13,000	Open split
Cuba	35,000	Neutral
Cyprus	10,000	Pro-Soviet
Finland	40,000	Pro-Soviet
France	260,000	Pro-Soviet
Greece	20,000	Pro-Soviet
Guatemala	1,300	Pro-Soviet
India	135,000	Open split
Indonesia	2,000,000	Pro-Chinese
Israel	2,000	Pro-Soviet
Italy	1,350,000	Pro-Soviet
Japan	120,000	Internal factions
Jordan	500	Pro-Soviet
Malaysia	2,000	Pro-Chinese
Mexico	50,000	Open split
Netherlands	12,000	Pro-Soviet
Pakistan	3,000	No stand taken
Paraguay	5,000	Open split
Philippines	1,200	No stand taken
South Vietnam	Estimated 31,000 hard core	Pro-Chinese
Sweden	20,000	Pro-Soviet
Spain	5,000	Internal factions
Switzerland	Less than 6,000	Open split
Syria	4,000	Pro-Soviet
Uruguay	10,000	Pro-Soviet
United Arab Republic	1,000	No stand taken
United Kingdom	34,372	Pro-Soviet
Venezuela	30,000	No stand taken

*SOURCE: House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sub-Committee on the Far East and the Pacific. *Sino-Soviet Conflict*, Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict and Its Implications (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 17R-19R.

Image and Generation: A Social-Psychological Analysis of the Sino-Soviet Dispute

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When the Chinese Communists accuse their Russian comrades of the heinous sin of collaboration with the West, obviously more is involved than political polemics. There are, in fact, social-psychological factors involved which, when subjected to brief analysis provide some interesting insights. Utilizing the two concepts of images and of political generations, it is possible to demonstrate that one of the serious, if not controlling, factors contributing to the deteriorating state of Sino-Soviet relations is the different image of the external world, particularly the manner of working within the inter-state system, held by the decision-makers of both countries. What we attempt to demonstrate, in particular, is that, as a result of singular experiences with the inter-state system (that is, between China and the external world and between the Soviet Union and the external world) during the formative years of the present leadership of these nations, certain attitudes and habits of behavior relevant to the external world were determined. Further, that these "images," particularly of accommodation-non accommodation and collaboration-non collaboration have tended to become one of the primary sources of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

In general, we are saying that in order to understand any crucial problem in international relations, it is necessary to know "not only *what* exists but also to understand what men *perceive* to exist and the resulting attitudes they hold."¹ In other words, fruitful study and understanding of any aspect of the international system must include some concern for not only the

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¹Ole R. Holsti, "The Value of International Tension Measurement," *Journal of Arms Control*, I (1963), 702.

actual behavior of the individuals within the system but their *perception* and *images* of the system. Our concern here is to examine why the Chinese and the Soviet leaders perceive relations with the inter-state system differently and how this difference in perception has contributed to the Sino-Soviet dispute.

The Role of Images. The theory of images, as applied to international relations, suggests that a nation's foreign policy is to some degree a function of the image held about the situation or object toward which the policy is directed. The goals which nations set and the inter-state system in which these goals must be achieved are the result of a nation's perception of the ends and means available to it. These perceptions are a product of the nation's image or belief system. To say that a nation has an image is not to impute anthropomorphic qualities to a state, since it is obviously true that only individuals can possess an image. It merely recognizes that within any given decision-making body, there may exist enough shared aspects of a common image to speak of a modal image. It is not only possible, but also useful, to speak, by way of metaphor and analogy, of organizations, states, or societies as possessors of images.² This sort of metaphor recognizes that any state (when speaking of that state's action in international relations) is merely the "sum total of those major decision-makers who are empowered to make policies which are binding on the government."³ Thus, when we speak of the Chinese leaders' image of the external world, for example, we are referring to the most frequent or characteristic aspects of the individual images held by the sum total of decision-makers who can make binding decisions for China.

Once this image is developed it governs the manner in which the external world is perceived. All perceptual data and cues must pass through the image before they are cognized. The image is thus the "total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behavior unit, or its internal view of itself and

²Kenneth Boulding, *The Image: Knowledge in Life and Society* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956), p. 54.

³Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and Howard E. Koch, Jr., "Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of War," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 472.

the universe."⁴ There is a dual relationship between perception and the image which occurs in four stages: First, early perception in the life experience along with physiological factors determine the creation of the image. Second, the image prepares an individual (or a group of individuals acting as a decision-making unit) to "see" in a particular fashion.⁵ Third, the actual input of information from the environment is filtered or metered through the image. That is, the image becomes the window through which all perceptual data must pass. On entering, this data must pay the price demanded by the image. And fourth, the information is evaluated and verified according to the image.⁶

Thus, the concept of images assumes that the key to the explanation of why a state behaves the way it does is to be found in the decision-makers' image of the situation.⁷ In international relations (as in interpersonal relations) reality is internal to the observer. "A change in frames of mind among those dealing with great affairs, even though a matter of imagination, rates as a change of reality, for attitudes are part of reality in foreign affairs."⁸

Political Generations. The concept of generations as a tool for political analysis is relatively new and somewhat unused. It has been widely used by historians, novelists, artists, and sociologists but only rarely by political scientists.⁹ A generation

⁴Kenneth Boulding, "National Images and International Stereotypes," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, III (1959), 120-21. See also George E. Miller, Eugene Galanter, and Karl H. Pribram, *Plans and the Structure of Behavior* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1960).

⁵Jerome S. Bruner, "Personality Dynamics and the Process of Perceiving," in R. R. Blake and G. V. Ramsay, *Perception: An Approach to Personality* (New York: The Ronald Press, 1951), pp. 124-25.

⁶O. J. Harvey, David E. Hunt, and Harold M. Schroder, *Conceptual Systems and Personality Organization* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1961), p. 50.

⁷Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton: Foreign Policy Analysis Project Series, Organizational Behavior Section, Princeton University Press, 1954), p. 37.

⁸Charles Burton Marshall, "Détente: Effects on the Alliance," in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), *Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West* (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 45.

⁹The late Sigmund Neumann first developed this tool of analysis. See his *Permanent Revolution: The Total State in a World at War* (New York: Harper, 1942), pp. 230-256 and his "The Conflict of Generations in Contemporary Europe," *Vital Speeches of the Day*, V (1939), 623-28. See also Marvin Rintala, "The Problems of Generations in Finnish Communism," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, XVII (1958).

in politics is defined as those who have undergone essentially similar historical experiences during their period of "social adolescence" or formative years. The great events and influences of this period must be analyzed in order to better understand that generation's reaction to present problems.

This stage of social adolescence is critical to the political scientist for in the years from fifteen to twenty-five virtually all of the individual's social and intellectual concepts are formed. An individual's basic views and modes of thinking are shaped and colored by all which influences him during this ten year period and this influence remains part of his image for the rest of his life. This is particularly true in regard to images and modes of thinking about international relations since a relationship between international events and domestic affairs is usually not sensed until the age of social adolescence.

The concepts of images and political generations are admirably suited to the study of international relations since, when used jointly, they can assist in ordering data and in explaining the behavior of any particular behavior unit. While the concept of political generations has been used to explain the development of revolutionary movements *within* a state, this paper uses this concept, along with the concept of images, to explain partially why the Soviet Union and China violently disagree on the extent to which even tactical accommodation with the "enemy" is acceptable. All of this, in some respects, merely points to the indisputable and unexceptional fact that the difference in historical and cultural experience and the concomitant geopolitical position of Russia and China have yielded different leadership bodies with distinctive perspective and modes of reaction. Yet, as in so much analysis, concentration upon the "obvious" can often be more fruitful than a search for the esoteric.

The following quotations from an editorial in the Chinese ideological journal, *Hung Chi*, amply demonstrate that one of the foremost aggravants in the Sino-Soviet dispute is the manner in which China perceives Russia as collaborating with the West.

The leaders of the CPSU have completely reversed enemies and comrades. They have directed the edge of struggle, which should be against United States imperialism and its lackeys, against the Marxist-Leninist fraternal parties and countries.

The leaders of the CPSU are bent on seeking Soviet-United States cooperation for the domination of the world. They regard United States imperialism, the most ferocious enemy of the people of the world, as their most reliable friend, and they treat the fraternal partners and countries adhering to Marxism-Leninism as their enemy.

If the leaders of the CPSU genuinely want unity and are not just pretending, they should draw a sharp line of demarcation between enemies and comrades . . . in order to oppose U.S. imperialism.

It is absolutely impermissible for them to treat enemies as friends and friends as enemies and to ally themselves with the U.S. imperialists . . . in the vain pursuit of world domination through U.S.-Soviet collaboration.¹⁰

Such widely divergent perspectives regarding accommodation or non-accommodation with the West are more than just "revisionism" and "dogmatism." They owe their existence, in fact, to deep-seated images of the inter-state system which in part developed in the thinking of the current leaders during their period of social adolescence.

The Chinese Experience. In assessing the impact of events on the lives of the present Chinese leadership it is necessary to answer two questions. First, was this leadership born within a particular period? and second, was the social adolescence period of these leaders marked by certain events and situations which would tend to foster the development of a singular image of the external world?

In any generational analysis of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership, it is striking to observe that the great majority was born between 1895 and 1905. In fact, of the relatively small number of Chinese leaders who have interlocking responsibility in the State, the Party, or the Military, all but two were born between 1895 and 1905.¹¹ By going beyond this "interlocking directorate" and by resorting to less than satisfactory statistical devices (i.e., "average year of birth") it becomes clear that not only the upper level of leadership falls within this generation but that the lower levels do

¹⁰From the Chinese Communist Party's newspaper *Jenmin Jih Pao*, February 4, 1964, as reprinted in the *New York Times*, February 7, 1964.

¹¹See *Directory of Chinese Communist Leadership* issued by the Biographical and Information Section of the Press and Publications Unit, American Consulate General, Hong Kong, November, 1960.

also. Analysis of the membership of the Central Committee of the CCP provides the following data:

<i>Group</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Average Year of Birth</i>
I Full members elected in 1945.	36	1895
II Alternate members as elected in 1945 but most made full members at 8th Party Congress in 1956.	29	1905
III Made full members in 1956.	29	1905
IV Elected alternate members in 1956.	58	1907
V Elected alternate members in 1956 at the 2nd Session.	23	1909

Adapted from Donald W. Klein, "The 'Next Generation' of Chinese Communist Leaders," *The China Quarterly*, No. 12 (October-December, 1962), pp. 58-59.

The average age of the 18 full members of the "Political Bureau" of the CCP in 1963 was 64 and that of the six alternate was 60. This would place the average year of birth at 1899 and 1903 respectively.¹²

A remarkable aspect of Chinese Communist leadership is that not only the current leaders stem from the 1895-1905 generation, but that an analysis of the Politburo, or the ruling clique within the Politburo, from 1921 to 1945 reveals that at no Congress did the average year of birth range beyond a period bounded by 1892 (the 1st Congress in 1921) and 1903.¹³ Several conclusions can be drawn from the above data, but those relevant to this paper are that the leadership of Communist China has been relatively unchanged since 1921 (the two obvious exceptions were the condemnation of Kao Kang in 1955 and the dismissal of Marshall P'eng Te-huai in 1959) and that the great majority of these leaders were born between 1895 and 1905.

This 1895-1905 generation experienced their period of social adolescence between 1915 and 1925. This general period

¹²John W. Lewis, *Chinese Communist Party Leadership and the Succession to Mao Tse-tung: An Appraisal of Tensions* (Policy Research Study, External Research Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, January, 1964), p. iii.

¹³Robert C. North, *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elite* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute Elite Studies, Stanford University Press, 1952), pp. 116-18.

in Chinese history and foreign relations is a singular and unique period which could not help producing extremely distinctive modes of thinking and images of the external world. From a Chinese point of view, this general period can be characterized as one of complete betrayal by all foreign powers and one of complete disillusionment with the inter-state system. The revolutionarily changed educational system of China into which this generation was born signaled the end of traditional Chinese society.¹⁴ Contrasted with the earlier generation of the founders of Chinese Communism, this generation received little of the classical Chinese education and was much more at home in the potentially nationalistic modes of thought of the West.¹⁵

Within the early lifetime of most of this generation (although not necessarily within their period of social adolescence) nearly every major world power made inroads onto Chinese sovereignty. Following the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, for example, and through the various devices of loans from foreign powers, the granting of exclusive economic and mineral rights, the creation of "spheres of interest" protected by nonalienation agreements, and through out and out leases of territory, the Chinese melon was sliced. By the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) Manchuria was divided between Russia in the North and Japan in the South and Japan had acquired control over Korea, a control which was officially recognized by the U.S. through the Taft-Katsura notes. Great Britain, through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, realized that a recognition of Japanese interests in China would be the best defense against Russia.

Within the actual period of social adolescence of the Chinese Communist leaders, the foreign intervention did not lessen and this was complicated by deteriorating domestic conditions. The successful overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911 did not lead to a stable reformist government but rather to 13 years of civil war. During this time Western encroachment through loans and the acquisition of railroad rights increased. From the Root-Takahira Agreements of 1908

¹⁴See Franz H. Michael and George E. Taylor, *The Far East in the Modern World* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1956), p. 206.

¹⁵See Benjamin I. Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), p. 18.

(which gave implicit recognition of Japanese interest in Manchuria), through the Lansing-Ishii notes of 1917 (by which the U.S. recognized Japan's special relations in China on the basis of territorial propinquity), and including an entire series of treaties in 1917 and 1918 (by which Britain, Italy, France, and Russia agreed to support Japan's claims in China at a future conference in return for Japanese destroyers as protection against German submarines in the Mediterranean), China was "betrayed" by nearly every major foreign power. The central theme of U.S. foreign policy in Asia throughout this period was to maintain an "open door" in China, which the Chinese perceived as singularly detrimental to their national interests.

In the eyes of the 1895-1905 generation, the events of the twenties were as disastrous as the unequal treaties of the earlier decade. The May 4th Movement (1919-1920) was a critical period in the development of future Chinese Communist leaders and undoubtedly contributed significantly to their image of the external world. The Movement itself was partially sparked by the betrayal of Wilsonian idealism at Versailles and by pressure from the Japanese.¹⁶

This kind of imperialism was not a sole monopoly of the Western powers. In the developing relations between Communist Russia and the struggling Chinese Communist Party, a pattern of betrayal developed which was characterized by the selfish use of the revolutionary movement in China to further the interests of the Soviet Union. Although the successful revolution in Russia was probably one of the important formative events on the lives of the Chinese Communists, later Soviet policy in China seemed to be dictated solely by the need of extending the "breathing space" and of maintaining Soviet national security.

Even an overview of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1920's reveals several policies and actions which were undoubtedly formative experiences on the 1895-1905 generation of Chinese Communists. Three observations about this period are illustrative: One is that at no time were any policies of the Soviet Government or of the Comintern, no matter how detrimental they may have been to the interests of Chinese Communism, "thrown away merely in the interest of the Chinese revolu-

¹⁶See *ibid.*

tion."¹⁷ Another observation is that Soviet policy toward China not only ignored the interests of the Chinese Communists, but was dictated solely by the demands of Soviet security. Stalin's aim "was to concentrate as large forces as possible against the European Powers and Japan, the enemies of the Soviet Union," regardless of the effect of these policies on the Chinese Communists.¹⁸

A final observation about Sino-Soviet relations in the twenties is that Mao Tse-Tung was not the Soviet choice as leader and that Mao himself was quite dubious of Soviet advice and assistance from at least 1921 on. In fact, the whole emphasis of Mao's thinking and of his activities not only was unsanctioned by Moscow but was carried on *without* the knowledge of Moscow.¹⁹

Thus, following the concepts of generations and of images, the period from 1910 to 1930 was a formative period for the current Chinese leaders, who for the most part, were born within the 1895-1905 generation. As a result of singular experiences during the social adolescence of these leaders, a unique image of world politics developed which views any type of accommodation or collaboration with the "enemy" as not only deviation from the ideology, but as a betrayal and as portentous of actions which may be threatening to China.

The Soviet Experience. In examining the context within which the Soviet leadership developed, three factors stand out. First, while within the last century and a half, imperial exploitation and the anti-colonial revolt have been two of the most basic facts of Chinese life, Russia, both Tsarist and Soviet, has clearly *been* a colonial power. However traumatic the allied intervention of 1918-1920 may have been to the Soviet regime, it was not part of a pattern of imperialist exploitation. Russia as an imperial power was never as infected by the extreme xenophobia with its overtones of racism felt by the former Asian and African objects of colonial activity.

Secondly, Lenin and the Bolshevik intelligentsia conceived the Russian Revolution as part of a European revolution. Par-

¹⁷Hugh Seton-Watson, *From Lenin to Khrushchev* (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 141.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 147.

¹⁹See Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, p. 102 and Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Random House, 1938), pp. 167-69.

ticularly throughout the period from April to October 1917 it was assumed that a Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the ending of the war with a "democratic" peace, and a proletariat revolution in Europe were all part of a single process. Indeed, until 1922 there was the optimistic hope that the revolutionary spark would ignite throughout Europe, particularly Germany—a hope which to a much lesser extent survived throughout the twenties. In his pre-revolutionary writings Lenin seemed to envisage a world rigidly polarized into two ideological camps—a polarization which would terminate in the victory of socialism and an abrupt end of the essentially amoral balance-of-power politics. In any case, Lenin at this time believed a socialist revolution "unthinkable in a single country" and that it required "the most active cooperation of at least a few progressive countries in which we cannot include Russia."²⁰ Emotionally and intellectually Lenin was linked with the West.

Lastly, when the hopes for a European revolution diminished in 1921, it became increasingly difficult to unify into a single and consistent policy the two facets of Soviet foreign policy—the encouragement of world revolution and the maintenance of national security. Moreover, as early as 1918, Lenin became increasingly aware that the capitalist world did not represent a solid hostile phalanx. The realization that the capitalist world was divisible even in the face of a Soviet Russia and that the security of Russia was not to be found in external revolution led the Soviet regime to accommodate its ideological pretensions to the amoral system of world politics. Following the concept of political generations, the period from 1920 to 1940 represents the formative period of the majority of the present Soviet leadership who, for the most part, were born between 1905 and 1915. An imperial past and an uncertain intellectual attachment to the West formed the historical and cultural background of this period of political accommodation. It seems evident that the combination of these factors would put the ideological polarization of Bolshevik doctrine within a different perspective than another or radically different life experience.

George Kennan noted that by the end of the thirties, the Western democracies were forced to ally or accommodate

²⁰Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics: The Dilemma of Power* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 196.

themselves to at least one of the totalitarian powers in order to defeat the others. In somewhat similar fashion, it can be said that from 1922 through 1945 the Soviet Union was impelled for security reasons to accommodate itself to one or more of the Western regimes. In so doing it demonstrated an ability of maneuver, despite certain ideological inhibitions, which indicated a rapid adoption of traditional power techniques and the extent to which the revolutionary fervor had died down.

The developing Soviet image of the nature of world politics can be perceived in its successive attempts to gain recognition and guarantee its security. Despite the continued, though lessened, emphasis on the creative uses of violence and the inevitability of war in the class struggle, the Soviet Union showed surprising ease in accommodating itself to equilibrist politics, with all its "amoral" and non-ideological overtones. It is true that the hostile intents of dogmatic ideology often determined the mode of their competition and at times distorted the Soviet leadership's view of the internal and external configurations of power in the West, particularly in the case of ascendent Nazism. But, through it all, commitment to ideological bipolarity was definitely in a low key and any tendency toward virulent xenophobia kept in check—with the possible exception of the first Five Year Plan and then the reasons involved to a large extent the inward orientation and rising pressures of forced industrialization.

In Europe the regime displayed an increasing willingness to sacrifice the various national parties and the prospects of a revolutionary sweep through Europe to a solution of the more immediate security dilemma. The one serious revolutionary prospect after the collapse of the post-war uprisings was the disturbances and turmoil in Germany during 1923 after the French occupied the Ruhr. The Politburo membership wavered as to their appraisal of the revolutionary potentialities of the situation; but, in the end, the rewards of maintaining the Rapallo arrangement with Germany as a counterweight to the power of England and France seemed greater than any possible benefits to be gained by too actively assisting the German party.

In the Middle East, the conflict between Russia's revolutionary interests and its balance-of-power interests was less pronounced, given the possibility of dovetailing both these

considerations with the local nationalist attempts to remove the influence of the Western Powers, particularly England. Even here, however, when the two policies diverged, as they did in Kemal's suppression of Russian communist influence within his country, the Russians strove to maintain friendly relations with Turkey and bolster that country's position vis-à-vis Great Britain.

In China also the interests of revolution and equilibrist politics momentarily coincided. Soon, however, as in the Middle East, these interests diverged. Although Stalin attempted to maintain the coalition with Chiang, he was finally forced toward an open revolutionary break which resulted in an utter debacle.

The fact is that during this period every revolutionary attempt ended in failure and at times forced the Soviet government into extremely uncomfortable postures. When these debacles are contrasted with the relative success of traditional techniques of balance-of-power politics, the Soviet prolongation of this period of "tactical" accommodation with the capitalist sphere is easily understandable. But, as is so often the case in Soviet history, the sacrifice of the ultimate to the immediate often results in giving the immediate an independent validity of its own. The whole Soviet position on disarmament and collective security is illustrative of this point.

Before the establishment of the Soviet state, Lenin opposed disarmament on the grounds that it would hinder the course of world revolution. By 1922, however, Lenin had dropped his blatant opposition to disarmament, while maintaining in theory the two basic objections to disarmament—that war in a capitalist world is inevitable and that force was a prime instrument in the overthrow of bourgeois government. These two themes were played in a minor key after the collapse of the central European revolutions and the Polish war, only to be revived in the period of the first Five Year Plan when internal stresses were combined with external (vocal, at least) belligerency. Even during this latter period, however, disarmament was a major theme of Soviet diplomacy right up until 1934. The maintenance of this theme even during this period of stress cannot be seen simply as a technique to demonstrate Russia's peaceful intentions and to stigmatize the West—though it was undoubtedly that. But beyond this, the disarmament campaign was part of the Soviet

drive for recognition and normal relations. Most particularly, the whole campaign can be viewed as part of the Soviet search for security.

On the level of theory, disarmament was still presented as a tactical device and at no time during the period did the Soviet Union abandon the basic belief in the inevitability of war and the use of force in social transformation. At the same time, however, disarmament was beginning to be presented as having value in itself quite aside from any tactical consideration. And even when the theme of disarmament was dropped, the Soviet Union chose not to lessen its accommodation with the non-socialist world and adopt a revolutionary stance—but in fact attempted to increase those ties in pacts of mutual security. The advantages of such an approach over a revolutionary posture were even clearer to the Soviet leadership than during the twenties. By 1934 it had entered into normal diplomatic relations and was a member of the League of Nations. Given the growing menace of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union dropped the disarmament theme and attempted to turn the international organization into an effective instrument of collective security. Further, where the earlier period was noted by the conclusion of simple non-aggression pacts with most of its neighbors, the Soviet government now entered into pacts of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia. When this failed in 1938, the Soviet Union turned increasingly to the possibility of a pact with Germany which might offer them positive territorial advantage through an intermediate zone between Germany and the USSR. Disarmament, collective security, and territorial expansion were all phases of Soviet Russia's search for security. The abortive uprising in Germany in 1934 and the debacle in China made it even clearer that world revolution and non-cooperation were not serious possibilities. Moreover, it cannot be said that, in general, accommodation and a degree of collaboration with the West had been unfruitful.

Leninist doctrine and Stalin's reiterations emphasized the tactical nature of these successive policies. War as the engine of revolution and the goal of a Pax Communa in which the system of power politics would come to an end were still enunciated. However, as necessary means often become ends, so tactics pursued over a prolonged period acquire an independent validity. Interestingly, *The Fundamentals of Marxism-Lenin-*

ism published in 1959 made this point quite explicit. The distinction between strategy and tactics was blurred and thus gave Soviet policy at any particular time the illusion of greater orthodox purity:

The word tactics is often used to denote the political line pursued for a relatively brief space of time, and determined by certain definite conditions, while the word strategy denotes the line for an entire phase of development. But such distinctions were not always made. In the early stages of the working class movement (before the October Revolution), the word tactics presupposed the entire policy of the party, irrespective of any particular period. It was in this sense that Lenin used it . . . he did not consider it necessary to distinguish strategy from tactics.²¹


Now, although throughout the entire period the Soviet mode of thinking was essentially "revolutionary" and often determined the limits and possibilities of any concrete situation, nonetheless, the Leninist intellectual predisposition toward the West, the fact that Russia was not the object of prolonged imperial exploitation but was in fact itself an imperialist power, the security dilemma, and the immediate rewards of limited collaboration with the West as contrasted with the dangers and possible losses of revolutionary "adventurism"—all of these successively contributed to an image of the structure of the international politics which was neither a logical derivative of Marxist-Leninist ideological pretensions nor of more traditional geopolitical factors. But, in any case, the "mix" was of Russian vintage and the present leadership, who were reaching maturity during this eventful period, were bound in some significant degree to share its political image.

Borrowing for a moment from communist jargon, in an examination even of this limited facet of the origins of the Sino-Soviet dispute, it appears that the rift is "objective" and not dependent upon the "subjective" difference in personalities—be they Khrushchev, Brezhnev or Kosygin. The life conditions of the Soviet leadership have impelled them to approach the structure of world politics with different images and perspectives than the leader of a nation, albeit communist, whose conditions have been so radically different. In itself this fact

²¹Donald Z. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict—1956-1961* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 227.

hardly explains the concrete issues rending the communist world but it does give insight into the patterns of reaction of the two leaderships in the face of those issues.

Summary. Given the singular image of world politics developed during the periods of social adolescence of the leaders of the Soviet Union and Communist China, it is quite clear why Soviet "tactical" accommodation with the West is perceived as treason by the Chinese. While the period of social adolescence of the Soviet leaders was characterized by frequent, albeit "tactical," relations with the Western nations, the same period in the lives of the Chinese leadership was characterized by repeated disillusionment with the inter-state system. The extremely xenophobic Chinese image of the world is a natural byproduct of the experiences of the Chinese leaders during the 1920's and the 1930's. It is equally clear why the hostility and xenophobia of the Chinese is viewed by Soviet leaders as unnecessary dogmatism and as a threat to the unity of international Communism. The social-psychological tools of images and of political generations add some insight and understanding to this continuing dispute.



Book Reviews

JAMES R. CLARK (comp.), *Messages of the First Presidency*, Vol. 2. Salt Lake City: Bookcraft, Inc., 1965. Pp. 407. \$4.50.

Messages of the First Presidency, Volume 2, compiled by James R. Clark, will make an excellent contribution to the literature of the Church. These messages cover the period from 1849 to 1884, which includes the entire term of the presidency of Brigham Young and much of that of President John Taylor.

As one reads through these messages, he readily sees that of prime importance was the spiritual guidance given to the Latter-day Saints everywhere by the First Presidency, and at times, by the First Presidency and the Twelve.

Throughout the book the authorities spoke with decisiveness on moral issues, and always in agreement. The language of the messages is straightforward and clear, dealing in a definite way with each situation. The reader readily detects wisdom, inspiration, and revelation in these messages. As he reads the book through, he is amazed at the ability of the leaders to anticipate the needs of the people and the difficulties that would arise. Also, later history has verified that their suggestions to solutions to the problems were always correct. The agreement and unity of thought that prevails throughout the book is impressive. As the reader completes studying the book, he is thoroughly convinced that the authorities who wrote the messages were men who operated under divine inspiration, seen by the Saints to be prophets of God.

The reader receives a running narrative of the history of the Latter-day Saints in the Great Basin and throughout the world under two prophet-leaders—Brigham Young and John Taylor. He can follow the details of missionary work as it expanded into a world-wide system. He observes the methods used in an intelligent system of regulated emigration. He observes the expansion of colonization of the Great West under the superb leadership of President Brigham Young as he sent colonists in every direction from Salt Lake City and built an expansive empire. Also, the people's civic, social, educational and religious lives were thoroughly pictured in the messages.

The Saints throughout the world were kept abreast of the development of the Church in every phase of its activities through these messages.

The political and economic struggles between the Latter-day Saints and non-Church members are clearly depicted. During the Brigham Young period, the attempts at living the United Order in some of the communities are discussed, especially the development of economic cooperation and the purposes back of that cooperation.

President John Taylor's period is marked by the persecution of the Saints, which came about through the federal laws passed against the Mormons' practice of plural marriage. The instructions of the First Presidency, expressed as a result of the passage of the laws, instruct those who had entered into plural marriage regarding the course of action that they should follow during what has become known as the bitter "days of the underground." Also, appearing toward the latter part of the book are several revelations received by President John Taylor.

Although there are a number of printer's typographical errors in the book, the compiler has done quite a thorough job in collecting the available messages of the First Presidency of this period. However, the period of the "Utah War" contains the least messages of any comparable period. There are no messages between December 1856 and September 1860.

Milton R. Hunter

MILTON V. BACKMAN. *American Religions and the Rise of Mormonism*. Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Company, 1965. Pp. xvi, 466. \$4.95.

The apostasy-restoration cycle is one of the active organizing principles of Mormon thought. Our children learn its rudiments early in the Sunday School training. Investigators hear it in the first lesson of the Church missionary plan. Some of our most notable scholars, Roberts, Talmage, Barker, and Nibley, have given us highly erudite versions. Now Professor Milton Backman of the Department of Religion at Brigham Young University has taken up the theme, concentrating on the preparation for the restoration, a segment of the cycle previously slighted.

The apostasy-restoration concept compelled Professor Backman to start his account of American religions with the founding of the primitive church. More than a quarter of the book is devoted to the early church, to its metamorphosis into Catholicism, and to the Protestant reforms of the sixteenth century. Without recalling these events, the reader could not understand the direction of American religious development, that is, toward Joseph Smith's restoration of pure, first-century Christianity. To begin with the first settlements in America would rob the story of its meaning.

Though Professor Backman has compiled a good deal of useful information, his general treatment of the early period is familiar. The Protestants did not improve much on Roman Catholic doctrine, he points out, but they did re-establish the Bible as the standard of religious judgment, and post-Reformation diversity led to toleration, necessary preparation for the Restoration.

In a more original section, he describes trends in America which continued this preparation: 1) the evolution from uniformity to religious liberty; 2) the replacement of Calvinist doctrines with liberal views of divine and human nature more in accord with Mormon beliefs; 3) the prevalent quest for the true church in the midst of religious confusion—Joseph's question in the grove was typical, not exceptional. Some Mormons may be surprised to find liberal faiths like Deism and Unitarianism, usually classed as enemies of Christian orthodoxy, breaking ground for the Restoration.

Within this framework, the Restoration itself could be treated as the climax of Providential forces readying men for Joseph's revelations. Similarities between his teachings and earlier ones would simply evidence God's work in preparing the world. Even belief in the Israelitish origins of the Indians or the existence of manuscripts paralleling the *Book of Mormon* would fit. Though aware of this alternative, Professor Backman chose instead to discuss the unique features of Joseph's thought, not to prove divine inspiration, but to show that he made a contribution and was not simply eclectic. The book summarizes the unique aspects of the Mormon concept of God, of the Fall, of salvation for the dead, and so on.

Comparing this approach with the ordinary non-Mormon treatment of our origins suggests the futility of using history to prove or disprove the actuality of Joseph's revelations. Mormons can easily absorb any of the product-of-his-times arguments into the notion of Providential preparation for the Restoration. Moreover, one would expect similarities in a movement that purported only to restore what was taught anciently, especially when the guidebook to this tradition, the Bible, was the most widely read volume in America. On the other hand, little of Joseph's thought can be shown to be entirely unique. With the exception of the *Book of Mormon*, in its totality an anomaly in western America, Joseph's teachings examined piece by piece are only slight variants of beliefs held by one group or another. Even the materiality of God, which Professor Backman lists as unique, resembles ideas current in the Jeffersonian circle at the turn of the century. Mormons would err to build their faith on the assertion that Joseph taught a certain number of unique doctrines. It seems almost inevitable that research will turn up similar tenets in one corner or another.

Mormons and non-Mormons alike will best appreciate Joseph's contribution when they recognize that it lay not in the individual items he taught but in a total configuration of belief. The tone, the balance, the import were all exceptional, and, as Professor McMurrin's book has recently attested, the whole scheme answered some of the most troublesome problems of Christian theology. Historians will always differ on how to account for this remarkable flowering of doctrine in the American west, but all must take it seriously as theology.

Perhaps Professor Backman's work will awaken non-Mormons to the complexity of Mormon doctrine and turn them from the naive treatment of the Church as a strictly social phenomenon.

The usefulness of the apostasy-restoration theme is not exhausted with the establishment of the Church. Professor Backman describes the Seventh-day Adventists, Christian Science, and Jehovah's Witnesses as denominations whose founders rightfully sensed the failings of Christianity but who overshot the mark when they by-passed Mormonism and created their own theologies. A final chapter handles trends since the Civil War, the most important being the liberalization of Protestantism under the impact of scientific skepticism. Though Professor Backman might have pictured Protestantism dying on the vine after serving its historic purpose to seed the ground for the Restoration, he tells about the loss of faith without interpretation.

While the apostasy-restoration cycle thus enlarged frames the book, readers will find much more inside. Summaries of denominational histories and creeds fill most of the pages. Passing over the abstruse questions of philosophical theology, Professor Backman's description of religious tenets will make absorbing reading for Latter-day Saints interested in comparisons with their own beliefs. Indeed the book can be considered an extension of Rulon S. Howells' *His Many Mansions* into the historical dimension, and can stand as a convenient and trustworthy handbook of traditional Protestant and Catholic creedal doctrines.

Professor Backman's work shows how well the apostasy-restoration cycle serves as an interpretive tool, and we should be grateful to those who have written in this tradition. An immense amount of the religious history of western civilization fits into its rubrics. Of course, Latter-day Saint scholars cannot claim all the credit for developing this view. Protestants also wanted to demonstrate an apostasy, and a large part of Roberts' and Talmage's work was borrowed wholesale. The whig interpretation of history, which focuses on the growth of liberty, helped Professor Backman. Still and all, these men have made the most of the resources to create an intelligible past for Latter-day Saints.

Now perhaps we are ready to broaden the apostasy theme to achieve a more comprehensive interpretation of history. Standard procedure thus far has been to list the doctrines of primitive Christianity and to note departures as they occurred. So long as there was a consciousness of a lost truth to be recovered, or a conflict between the true belief and secular philosophy, this interpretation illuminates events. But as Dr. Backman's materials show, after a time theologians began to debate issues only remotely connected with primitive Christianity. Their frame of reference was quite different from ours and to explain them in our terms is to impose on them motives and tensions they never felt.

Perhaps we need to think of the apostasy as related to the fall, man's temporary spiritual death. Human strivings then become efforts to recover union with the divine. When revelation has been given, men conduct their quest in Gospel terms. Priesthood, the temple, and the true doctrines are the subjects at issue, and people continue to think in these categories as they apostatize. At other times men wander so far from the truth that they seek God in ways almost incomprehensible to us, though familiar elements—sacrifice, priesthood, and ritual—are still discernible. They resort also to ostensibly secular means, political power, wealth, science, and social eminence. Only by close attention can we see the similarity between these and the religious strivings we experience.

As we expand our vision, we will likely see that work by scholars like Dr. Backman is only a portion of the total picture. But that realization will in no way diminish our obligation to them for their pioneering efforts.

Richard L. Bushman

Book Notes

CHARLES Y. GLOCK AND RODNEY STARK. *Religion and Society in Tension*. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965. Pp. 316. \$6.00.

The vitality of religion in a changing world is the central subject of a series of statistical studies and essays by the Survey Research Center at the University of California, Berkeley. More questions are raised than answered. The authors view religion as the product of social conditioning and even challenge the compatibility of social science and religion as systems of truth on the ground that religion makes man ultimately accountable for acts that sociology shows are determined by environment. The conflict is overstated to the degree that the book overstates sociology as a "science." Generalization is also a problem: The inverse ratio of academic achievement and religious conviction is not necessarily true for every religion, since Mormon belief evidently stimulates rather than impedes scientific careers (cf. p. 287). Nevertheless, the book tends to show that traditional religion is not dominant as the source of values and social control in modern society. This may be evidence that a real reformation of popular religion is taking place, quite apart from ecclesiastical and theological conferences.

The most original part of this work is the chapter on "The New Denominationalism," which rests on a random sample of 3,000 Northern Californians and makes possible an up-to-date discussion of the anatomy of belief. The secularization of society discussed in other chapters is evident, as are also wide differences of belief within denominations that make the authors sociologically pessimistic of any widespread Protestant ecumenical action. Of interest to Latter-day Saints are the following trends: An obviously necessary high rate of belief in God and Christ by American Christians continues. However, inconsistency is evident in the application of certain doctrines, and most of all among liberalizing churches: Congregationalists, Methodists, and Episcopalians. Only about a third of the members of these groups accept Biblical miracles or have

basic confidence in the Second Advent. Yet the more theologically centered denominations—Presbyterians, Lutherans, and Baptists—are precisely those who are less likely to see love for or good to one's fellowmen as essential to salvation. So American Protestantism poses the dilemma of choosing between the first and second commandments, an election between theology and ethics that Latter-day Saint belief has always opposed. In fact, about 40% of American Protestants and Catholics see no relationship between salvation and love for or good to others, and when questioned as to their degree of certainty in finding "the answers to the meaning and purpose of life," approximately the same number of both groups are uncertain. This data, plus the normal human inaction in applying stated beliefs, raises doubts about the effectiveness of traditional religions to apply Christ's commands to assist those in need. As far as the economics of good will, about 10% of American Christians think that tithing is necessary to salvation. Despite a lack of theological sophistication in framing these questions, this survey undoubtedly illustrates current trends in applied religion.

ALMA P. BURTON (ed.), *Discourses of the Prophet Joseph Smith*, Third edition. Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Company, 1965. Pp. 280. \$3.95.

Although private interpretations of what an "edition" is plagues Mormon publishers, this third edition of Burton's compilation is significantly revised. It thereby assumes more importance as the best topical collection of Joseph Smith's discourses now available. The book is expanded by something like ten percent in the average chapter, with certain new chapters and topical breakdowns included, the most interesting of which is a collection of eye-witness descriptions and evaluations by contemporaries who met the Prophet. Certainly the core of Joseph Smith's teachings is here, classified and easily accessible. The importance of this approach cannot be overstressed. It is doubtful, for instance, whether the student of L.D.S. Church History will grasp the motivation of the Prophet until he turns to the collected statements on love, which Joseph Smith defined in terms of "long-suffering, forbearance and patience" toward everyone, with the result of "greater liberality" of thought and conduct of its possessor, who uses every opportunity "to bless the whole human race."

There are two weaknesses in the Burton compilation. The first is inherent in any compilation that aspires to less than comprehensiveness. That is, isolated comments often reported at random are not the measure of Joseph Smith's thought. As a single illustration, under the heading of truths made known by the Prophet, there is one statement of opinion on the hundred and forty-four thousand of the Book of Revelation. Although this gives the reader the impression of knowing what Joseph Smith thought on the subject, there are actually a half-dozen important statements that need to be correlated in reconstructing the Prophet's opinion. The second weakness is that the topical approach has not been applied adequately. For example, while those descriptions of the pre-mortal council that the book includes are classified generally under the chapter on "The Plan of Salvation," a key quote labelled "The Contention in Heaven" is put in an entirely different chapter on "Salvation and Exaltation." There are many more examples, perhaps illustrative of the need of a cross-referencing system in future editions. Likewise, it seems that catch-all chapters

as "Interesting Truths Made Known" and the "Maxims" and "Sayings of the Prophet" should be subjected to the same classification that is the strength of the book.



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setting mankind back hundreds of years. Peiping contends, although a nuclear war would be destructive, "imperialism" would perish and socialism could re-create with extreme rapidity a "beautiful new civilization."

4. With respect to national liberation movements, Peiping charges the Soviets with failing to support national liberation struggles because of its view toward the risk of local wars precipitating larger conflicts. The Soviet position is that liberation struggles must continue and will be supported; however, a sharp distinction must be drawn between internal wars and wars between states. Wars of national liberation must not be promoted from the outside. National liberation wars are conflicts between people of an area against their rulers. Moscow, unlike the Chinese, does not believe Korea is an example of an acceptable type of war of liberation.

5. Moscow has taken the line that disarmament is feasible and desirable. Peiping maintains disarmament prior to the final destruction of "imperialism" is inconceivable, unattainable, and undesirable. Negotiations and talk about disarmament, according to the Chinese, impedes the liberation struggle by reducing revolutionary drive.

6. Peaceful coexistence has become a principal plank of Moscow's foreign policy. Moscow believes that time is on its side. Given some years of peace, enabling the Communists to develop without the disruption caused by war, they believe the superiority of their systems will be demonstrated and victory assured. Therefore, peaceful coexistence should become the cornerstone of foreign policy of socialist states. On the other hand, Peiping's view is that liberation movements are strengthened only by struggle—not peaceful coexistence.

7. According to Moscow, the role of international Communist front organizations, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, World Peace Council, World's Federation of Democratic Youth, and women and student groups, should be to serve as a means for mobilizing non-Communists as well as Communists. Their effectiveness should not be impaired by requiring their involvement too deeply in militant revolutionary activities. To Peiping, front organizations must be used in the struggle against "imperialism" and their value is directly proportionate to their responsiveness to Communist control and manipulation.